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DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO DISMISSAL OF THE MURDER INDICTMENT ON CONSTITUTIONAL SPEEDY TRIAL GROUNDS, SIX-YEARS BETWEEN ARREST AND GUILTY PLEA, SPEEDY TRIAL IS NOT A MIXED QUESTION OF LAW AND FACT (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Fahey, over a three-judge dissent, reversing the appellate division, determined that defendant was entitled to dismissal of the second degree murder indictment (to which he pled guilty) on constitutional speedy trial grounds. The opinion is fact-based, covers several significant legal issues (i.e. CPL 30.30 is not applicable, speedy trial is not a mixed question of law and fact, pre versus post-indictment delay, inter alia), and cannot be fairly summarized here. ” … [T]he People pursued a cooperation agreement with [codefendant] Armstead for approximately 2½ years. After that effort proved unsuccessful, they spent the next three years attempting to convict Armstead, trying him separately from defendant. After three mistrials, Armstead had been convicted of only criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, he had been acquitted on the top count of second-degree murder, and the People were no closer to securing his testimony against defendant. The time between defendant’s arrest on May 28, 2008 and defendant’s plea on September 23, 2014 spanned six years, three months, and 25 days, from when defendant was 16 years old until he was 22. Defendant spent the entirety of that period incarcerated.” The opinion goes through each of the Taranovich factors:

We analyze constitutional speedy trial claims using the five factors set forth in People v Taranovich (37 NY2d 442 [1975]): “(1) the extent of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the nature of the underlying charge; (4) whether or not there has been an extended period of pretrial incarceration; and (5) whether or not there is any indication that the defense has been impaired by reason of the delay” (id. at 445). These factors are similar, but not identical, to the factors used in evaluating speedy trial claims under the federal constitution, which include the “[l]ength of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant” … . “[N]o one factor or combination of the factors . . . is necessarily decisive or determinative of the speedy trial claim, but rather the particular case must be considered in light of all the factors as they apply to it” … . People v Wiggins, 2018 NY Slip Op 01111, CtApp 2-15-18

CRIMINAL LAW (SPEEDY TRIAL, APPEALS, DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO DISMISSAL OF THE MURDER INDICTMENT ON CONSTITUTIONAL SPEEDY TRIAL GROUNDS, SIX-YEARS BETWEEN ARREST AND GUILTY PLEA, SPEEDY TRIAL IS NOT A MIXED QUESTION OF LAW AND FACT (CT APP))/SPEEDY TRIAL (DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO DISMISSAL OF THE MURDER INDICTMENT ON CONSTITUTIONAL SPEEDY TRIAL GROUNDS, SIX-YEARS BETWEEN ARREST AND GUILTY PLEA, SPEEDY TRIAL IS NOT A MIXED QUESTION OF LAW AND FACT (CT APP))/APPEALS (CRIMINAL LAW, SPEEDY TRIAL, EFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO DISMISSAL OF THE MURDER INDICTMENT ON CONSTITUTIONAL SPEEDY TRIAL GROUNDS, SIX-YEARS BETWEEN ARREST AND GUILTY PLEA, SPEEDY TRIAL IS NOT A MIXED QUESTION OF LAW AND FACT (CT APP))/MIXED QUESTION OF LAW AND FACT (CRIMINAL LAW, APPEALS, SPEEDY TRIAL, DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO DISMISSAL OF THE MURDER INDICTMENT ON CONSTITUTIONAL SPEEDY TRIAL GROUNDS, SIX-YEARS BETWEEN ARREST AND GUILTY PLEA, SPEEDY TRIAL IS NOT A MIXED QUESTION OF LAW AND FACT (CT APP))

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