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FORMER SAME SEX PARTNER WHO AGREED TO THE CONCEPTION OF A CHILD CARRIED BY HER FORMER PARTNER DEMONSTRATED SHE HAD STANDING AS A PARENT TO SEEK PARENTING TIME WITH THE CHILD (THIRD DEPT). ​

The Third Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Garry, determined that petitioner, who participated in the conception of the child (by artificial insemination) carried by her then same-sex partner, was a “parent” entitled to visitation (parenting time) with the child pursuant to Matter of Brooke S.B. v Elizabeth A.C.C. (28 NY3d 1 [2016]):

… [T]he parties agreed to conceive a child using artificial insemination. Both parties attended appointments with a fertility doctor. In testimony that Family Court found to be credible, petitioner stated that she and respondent agreed to select a sperm donor who would reflect petitioner’s ethnic background. There were two inseminations; petitioner was present and injected the sperm on at least one of these occasions. Petitioner’s credit card was used to pay the related expenses. …  Petitioner attended at least one baby shower where friends and family members of both parties were present. Petitioner attended respondent’s prenatal appointments, was present when the child was born, and cut the child’s umbilical cord. The child was given two last names, reflecting the parties’ two surnames. … Petitioner testified that the child was named, in part, after petitioner’s mother. Petitioner assisted in buying items for the child and shared day-care costs with respondent. The two parties are listed as the child’s two mothers in some of her medical and immunization records. Respondent testified that she told petitioner that the child would be part of petitioner’s life if they continued to reside together and also if they separated, so long as petitioner did not engage in illegal activities, but that if petitioner did so engage, she would not have a role in the child’s life.

Upon this record, we find that Family Court correctly determined that petitioner falls within the statutory definition of a parent and, thus, has standing in this proceeding. Contrary to respondent’s argument, Family Court did not err in applying the conception test to determine petitioner’s standing rather than a “functional” test that would have examined the relationship between petitioner and the child after the child’s birth … . The evidence fully establishes that the parties planned jointly for the child’s conception, participated jointly in the process of conceiving the child, planned jointly for her birth, and planned to raise her together. Accordingly, petitioner satisfied her burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that she and respondent entered into an agreement to conceive the child and raise her as co-parents. Thus, she established her standing to seek custody and parenting time under the conception test without regard to her subsequent relationship with the child … . Matter of Heather NN. v Vinnette OO., 2019 NY Slip Op 09325, Third Dept 12-26-19

 

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DEFENDANT’S PRESENCE WHERE METHAMPHETAMINE WAS BEING PRODUCED AND APPARENT POSSESSION (IN A BACKPACK) OF CHEMICAL REAGENTS (BATTERIES AND SALT) USED IN METH PRODUCTION, WERE INSUFFICIENT TO DEMONSTRATE CONSTRUCTIVE POSSESSION OF METH LAB EQUIPMENT, CONVICTIONS REVERSED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing defendant’s convictions relating to his presence in an apartment where methamphetamine was being produced, determined the evidence did not support the defendant’s constructive possession of the relevant contraband in the apartment:

… [W]e find that the evidence fell short of establishing that defendant constructively possessed the requisite items with the necessary intent. The uncontroverted evidence established that defendant did not live in or have keys to the apartment or store any of his personal belongings there … . Rather, the evidence demonstrated that the apartment was leased to Stevens and Short, that Schunk had recently been staying in the apartment and that defendant and Gardner had arrived at the apartment, as guests, not long before the police. Stevens, Short and Gardner … adamantly testified that, although he likely knew what was occurring in the apartment, defendant did not participate in the process of preparing, producing or manufacturing the methamphetamine…. . Stevens and Short each testified that defendant did not use methamphetamine that day, that they had never observed defendant use methamphetamine and that defendant was only in the apartment to try to convince Schunk that she needed to enter a rehabilitation program. Stevens also testified that defendant did not know how to make methamphetamine. Further, the responding officers stated that, unlike their observations of Stevens, they did not observe any black soot, which is indicative of methamphetamine production, on defendant’s clothing or hands. …

Stevens testified that defendant arrived with a backpack and that batteries (a reagent [used in meth production]) from that backpack went into the bathroom with him and Gardner. Stevens vaguely testified that the backpack contained “lab equipment,” but stated that he did not see defendant use anything out of the backpack. The evidence revealed that a backpack was ultimately recovered from the living room and that the backpack contained sea salt, a reagent in the production of methamphetamine, but no “lab equipment.”

Viewed in the light most favorable to the People … , the evidence could reasonably support the conclusion that defendant had dominion or control over two reagents — batteries and salt. However, considering the witness testimony and the photographs demonstrating the extremely cluttered state of the living room and apartment overall, the evidence was legally insufficient to establish that defendant “had the ability and intent to exercise dominion or control over” any of the items of lab equipment seized from the apartment … . People v Gillette, 2019 NY Slip Op 09323, Third Dept 12-26-19

 

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AN APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS IS NOT A VEHICLE FOR ISSUES WHICH COULD HAVE BEEN RAISED IN A DIRECT APPEAL OR A MOTION TO VACATE THE JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION PURSUANT TO CPL 44O (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined petitioner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus was properly denied because the issues could have been raised in a direct appeal or in a CPL 440 motion to vacate the conviction:

With regard to petitioner’s claim that, pursuant to Penal Law § 70.35, his one-year jail sentences merged with and should have been ordered to run concurrently with his indeterminate sentence, “[h]abeas corpus is not the appropriate remedy for raising claims that could have been raised on direct appeal or in the context of a CPL article 440 motion, even if they are jurisdictional in nature” … . Petitioner’s contentions regarding his sentences, including their legality and whether they merged under Penal Law § 70.35, could have been raised on direct appeal or in a motion pursuant to CPL 440.20 … . As we perceive no basis to depart from traditional orderly procedure, we conclude that Supreme Court properly denied petitioner’s application. People ex rel. McCray v Favro, 2019 NY Slip Op 09065, Third Dept 12-19-19

 

INSPECTORS HIRED TO ASSESS DAMAGE TO PROPERTY CAUSED BY HURRICANE SANDY WERE EMPLOYEES ENTITLED TO UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE BENEFITS (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined inspectors hired by Partnership for Response and Recovery (PaRR) to inspect damage to property caused by Hurricane Sandy were employees entitled to Unemployment Insurance benefits:

Before the inspectors were deployed to a particular disaster area, PaRR set up a field operation near the site where it distributed FEMA-issued computers and cameras to the inspectors. In addition, for the inspectors’ convenience, it provided them with invoice forms containing the information required by FEMA to be used to receive payment. PaRR also supplied them with an identification badge bearing its logo and offered them training on how to utilize the FEMA computer system and comply with FEMA’s requirements. PaRR set the rate of pay at $62.50 per inspection, paid inspectors even if it had not yet received payment from FEMA, reimbursed them for travel to the site of the assignment and provided compensation for prepositioning to the site. Moreover, it conducted a quality review of 3% of the inspection reports and encouraged inspectors to complete their reports within three days as requested by FEMA. PaRR also provided field support to the inspectors to assist them with completing their inspection reports and using the FEMA computer system.

Although claimant and the other inspectors worked independently and without any supervision from PaRR in conducting the actual inspections, the evidence demonstrates that PaRR retained overall control over many important aspects of their work. Although some of this control emanated from the regulatory requirements imposed by FEMA, this was not to such an extent as to negate the existence of an employment relationship … . Matter of Jensen (Partnership for Response & Recovery, LLP–Commissioner of Labor), 2019 NY Slip Op 09073, Third Dept 12-19-19

 

 

CLAIMANT, WHO DISTRIBUTED NEWSPAPERS, WAS AN EMPLOYEE ENTITLED TO UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE BENEFITS (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined claimant, who distributed newspaper and other publications, was an employee of Gannett Satellite Information Network and was therefore entitled to unemployment insurance benefits:

Claimant was assigned delivery routes within a defined area, was required to deliver the newspapers by a certain time and was paid at a specified per-paper rate … . Additionally, claimant was required to provide proof of a valid driver’s license and insurance, was offered (and declined) additional accident coverage provided by a carrier utilized by Gannett and was precluded from placing any inserts or additional materials in the newspapers that he was delivering … . Finally, one of the two agreements signed by claimant reflects that he elected to purchase a tablet from Gannett — with the purchase price paid via weekly deductions from the moneys owed to claimant for his delivery services. Matter of Clifford (Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc.–Commissioner of Labor), 2019 NY Slip Op 08898, Second Dept 12-12-19

 

REGULATION LIMITING BRIEFS TO EIGHT PAGES IS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS AND THE LONGER BRIEF WAS NOT AN ADEQUATE GROUND FOR REJECTING THE EMPLOYER’S APPLICATION AND APPEAL (THIRD DEPT). ​

The Third Department determined the regulation limiting the length of briefs to eight pages was arbitrary and capricious. The employer’s application had been rejected solely because the brief was longer than eight pages:

The difficulty here is that there is no defined standard as to what explanation the Board would consider adequate. Worse yet, the regulation, by its express terms, does not authorize the Board to dismiss an application for Board review where a brief longer than eight pages is submitted without an adequate explanation. In such an instance, the regulation simply specifies that the brief “will not be considered” (12 NYCRR 300.13 [b] [1] [i]). Although the regulation also provides that an application may be denied “when the applicant . . . does not comply with prescribed formatting. . . requirements” (12 NYCRR 300.13 [b] [4] [i]), the filing of a brief is discretionary, not mandatory. As such, we find that the Board acted arbitrarily in dismissing the employer’s application for Board review. We further conclude that it would not be reasonable in the first instance for the Board to reject an oversized brief outright for to do so would undermine the role of counsel. We find this aspect of the regulation flawed for there is simply no safety valve that would allow an applicant to seek permission to file a lengthier brief without jeopardizing the ability to submit a legal analysis supportive of the application for Board review … . As such, we find that the regulation is unreasonable with respect to the oversized brief exception and must be rejected as arbitrary and capricious. The matter must be remitted to the Board for further proceedings. Matter of Daniels v City of Rochester, 2019 NY Slip Op 08902, Second Dept 12-12-19

 

THE INCLUSION OF EXTRANEOUS INFORMATION ON THE VERDICT SHEET WHICH DID NOT PROVIDE ANY SUBSTANTIVE INFORMATION ABOUT THE CASE WAS HARMLESS ERROR (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined, although it was error to include extraneous information on the verdict sheet, i.e., that the defendant had authorized the verdict sheet, the error was harmless:

The Court of Appeals has “held that it is reversible error, not subject to harmless error analysis, to provide a jury in a criminal case with a verdict sheet that contains annotations not authorized by CPL 310.20 (2)” … . Moreover, “[t]he basic principle is that nothing of substance can be included that the statute does not authorize” … . * * *

The extraneous statement was not part of the questions posed to the jury; rather, it was at the end of the verdict sheet. It did not change any of the questions to the jury. … [W]e find that the submission to the jury of the … verdict sheet with the statement asserting that defendant authorized it, without his signature, was not reversible error, because the extraneous statement gave no substantive information to the jury about the case and merely indicated that defendant saw the verdict sheet, was aware of his charges and was represented by an attorney … . People v Stover, 2019 NY Slip Op 08734, Third Dept 12-5-19

 

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ALTHOUGH COUNTY COURT ISSUED, ENTERED AND FILED A DECISION ADJUDICATING DEFENDANT A LEVEL THREE SEX OFFENDER, THERE WAS NO LANGUAGE INDICATING THE DECISION WAS A JUDGMENT OR AN ORDER; IN ADDITION, THE RISK ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENT DID NOT INCLUDE “SO ORDERED” LANGUAGE; THEREFORE THERE WAS NO APPEALABLE ORDER BEFORE THE COURT AND THE APPEAL WAS DISMISSED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department dismissed the appeal of County Court’s SORA risk assessment because County Court did not issue an appealable order:

Following a hearing, County Court rejected defendant’s challenge to certain assessed points, adjudicated him as a risk level three sex offender and designated him as a sexually violent offender. Defendant appeals.

An appealable order must be in writing (see CPLR 2219 [a] …), and must contain language that identifies the document as “either a judgment or order of the court”… . Consistent with these mandates, the Sex Offender Registration Act … requires that County Court must “render an order setting forth its determinations and the findings of fact and conclusions of law on which the determinations are based”… . That written order must then be “entered and filed in the office of the clerk of the court where the action is triable” (CPLR 2220 [a] …).

Here, County Court issued a written decision which was subsequently entered and filed. However, the decision contains no language indicating that it is an order or judgment, and it does not appear that a written order was entered and filed … . Moreover, the risk assessment instrument does not contain “so ordered” language so that it may constitute an appealable order … . Accordingly, this appeal is not properly before this Court and must be dismissed … . People v Porter, 2019 NY Slip Op 08743, Third Dept 12-5-19

 

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PROOF OF OCCASIONAL DRUG USE IN THE REMOTE PAST AND REFERRALS FOR ALLEGED DRUG USE IN PRISON SEVERAL YEARS AGO WAS INSUFFICIENT TO WARRANT THE ASSESSMENT OF 15 POINTS FOR A HISTORY OF DRUG AND ALCOHOL ABUSE (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant should not have been assessed 15 points for his history of drug and alcohol abuse. The evidence of drug use was remote in time and drug use was not an aspect of the offense:

Defendant reported that, prior to moving to this area in 1987, he had used cocaine once during his incarceration in Alabama and speed while working in the south, but denied any recent drug use. The information regarding defendant’s use of drugs is in the distant past and excessively remote … and, in any event, does not establish a pattern of drug abuse as contemplated by the Sex Offender Registration Act risk assessment guidelines … . In addition, the case summary reflects that, upon being screened by the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision, drug use was not an issue of concern with regard to defendant and he was not, at that time, referred to any alcohol or drug treatment program.

The remaining evidence with regard to defendant’s history of drug or alcohol abuse is the general reference to defendant twice being referred to alcohol and drug abuse treatment programs during his 26 years of incarceration for the instant offense “presumptively” due to defendant receiving five tier III disciplinary sanctions for drug use. The most recent referral was several years ago, in 2012. We find that this is insufficient, by itself, to establish a pattern of drug or alcohol abuse by defendant … . People v Brown, 2019 NY Slip Op 08746, Third Dept 12-5-19

 

ABSENT A FINDING OF PERMANENT PARTIAL DISABILITY, CLAIMANT NEED NOT SHOW ATTACHMENT TO THE LABOR MARKET AND IS ENTITLED TO RELY ON HER CHIROPRACTOR’S OPINION SHE IS TEMPORARILY TOTALLY DISABLED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing the Workers’ Compensation Board, determined claimant was not required to show attachment to the labor market because there had not been a finding of permanent partial disability:

Claimant sought review by the Workers’ Compensation Board, contending that she was not required to demonstrate attachment to the labor market because, absent a finding that she had sustained a permanent partial disability, she was entitled to rely upon her chiropractor’s opinion that she was temporarily totally disabled. …

Claimant’s obligation to demonstrate attachment to the labor market is predicated — in the first instance — upon a finding of a permanent partial disability … . Matter of Bowers v New York City Tr. Auth., 2019 NY Slip Op 08748, Second Dept 12-5-19

 

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