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PLAINTIFF’S ACTION WAS NOT TIME-BARRED BECAUSE THE SIX-MONTH LIMITATION PERIOD IN THE SUBCONTRACT EXPIRED BEFORE SUIT COULD BE BROUGHT; THE TERMS OF THE ONE-YEAR LIMITATION PERIOD IN THE LABOR AND MATERIAL BOND CONFLICTED WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE STATE FINANCE LAW; THE STATE FINANCE LAW CONTROLS (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff-subcontractor’s breach of contract action against the general contractor and the insurance company (Liberty Mutual) which issued the labor and material payment bond for the construction work should not have been dismissed, and plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment on its action against the general contractor. The Third Department held that the six-month statute of limitations in the subcontract and the one-year statute of limitations in the bond did not render the actions time-barred:

“A ‘limitation period’ that expires before suit can be brought is not really a limitation period at all, but simply a nullification of the claim” … . The conflict in the subcontractor agreement between the limitation period and the payment provisions had the effect of nullifying plaintiff’s breach of contract claim; thus, the six-month limitation period is unreasonable and unenforceable, and Supreme Court should not have dismissed plaintiff’s complaint as time-barred … . * * *

State Finance Law § 137 (4) (b) sets forth a later accrual date than the payment bond, providing that “no action on a payment bond furnished pursuant to [State Finance Law § 137] shall be commenced after the expiration of one year from the date on which the public improvement has been completed and accepted by the public owner” (emphasis added). The provisions of State Finance Law § 137 govern bonds furnished pursuant to that statute, and, although parties may agree to expand the statute’s protections, they may not limit them … . As the accrual date set forth in the first part of the contractual limitation provision conflicts with State Finance Law § 137 (4) (b), the second part of the provision must be given effect, and the bond agreement must be deemed to be amended to provide for the accrual date set forth in the statute … . The record does not reveal the date on which the project was accepted … for this purpose. Accordingly, there are issues of fact as to when plaintiff’s cause of action against Liberty Mutual accrued and whether it is time-barred, and summary judgment dismissing the complaint against Liberty should not have been granted … . Digesare Mech., Inc. v U.W. Marx, Inc., 2019 NY Slip Op 07668, Third Dept 10-24-19

 

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DEFENDANT HAD A RIGHT TO BE PRESENT WHEN THE PROSECUTOR SUCCESSFULLY ARGUED... PLAINTIFF DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO CONTEST THE TOWN’S NEGATIVE DECLARATION...