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DISMISSAL OF A CLAIM BASED UPON THE PRECLUSION OF AN INDEPENDENT MEDICAL EXAMINATION (IME) REPORT DID NOT CONSTITUTE LITIGATION OF THE CLAIM; CLAIMANT WAS ENTITLED TO CONSIDERATION OF THE CLAIM BASED UPON A NEW IME REPORT (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing the Workers’ Compensation Board, determined that the dismissal of the claim based upon the preclusion of the 2015 Independent Medical Examination (IME) report was not a litigation on the merits and claimant was not precluded from further consideration of the claim based upon a new 2017 IME report:

Claimant contends that the Board erred in denying his request for further action without considering … 2017 IME report on the ground that the claim had already been litigated and disallowed. We agree. By disallowing the claim in its prior decision based upon the record as it existed after the preclusion of … 2015 IME report, and declaring that no further direction was planned at the time, the Board did not deny the claim outright … . As such, the Board’s prior decision did not preclude claimant from submitting further medical evidence of causally-related consequential injuries (see Workers’ Compensation Law § 123 … ). Accordingly, the Board’s decision that the claim for causally-related consequential injuries was already litigated and that claimant could not submit further medical evidence in support thereof was in error, as was its decision denying reconsideration, and they must be reversed. Matter of Galatro v Slomins, Inc., 2019 NY Slip Op 53955, Third Dept 11-27-19

 

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THE STAY-AWAY ORDER OF PROTECTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN VACATED BASED SOLELY ON A PSYCHOLOGIST’S REPORTS IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY TESTIMONY (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Family Court, determined that the stay-away order of protection should not have been vacated without further fact-finding. Apparently the order was vacated based upon a psychologist’s reports without any testimony:

On … the first day of a combined fact-finding hearing on both petitions, both of the psychologist’s reports were received into evidence on consent. Without any testimony being taken, respondent, joined by the attorney for the child, then moved to vacate the stay-away order of protection. Both petitioner and the mother objected, and, after taking a brief recess, Family Court issued a ruling from the bench vacating the stay-away order of protection, without explanation. …

The record shows that the stay-away order of protection was based on allegations of sexual abuse first reported by the child’s therapist and subsequently pursued by petitioner after its caseworkers interviewed the child. The petition speaks to specific acts of sexual abuse, as well as the emotional stress on the child resulting from respondent’s threatening behavior towards the mother. The decision to vacate the stay-away order of protection was made on the first day of trial and, although the psychologist’s reports were admitted into evidence, petitioner was not precluded from subpoenaing the psychologist for purposes of cross-examination. Moreover, petitioner represented that it intended to call the child’s therapist as a witness. Although we are mindful that the psychologist spoke to the therapist as a collateral source and was highly critical of the interview methods utilized by petitioner’s caseworkers, this record should have been further developed before a determination was made as to whether it was in the child’s best interests to allow respondent unsupervised, overnight parenting time. This is particularly so given respondent’s ongoing, threatening behavior towards the mother and others via text message and on social media. Matter of Andreija N. (Michael N.), 2019 NY Slip Op 53957, Third Dept 11-27-19

 

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JURY SHOULD HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED ON THE “INNOCENT POSSESSION OF A WEAPON” DEFENSE, CONVICTIONS REVERSED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing defendant’s possession of a weapon convictions, determined the jury should have been instructed on the “innocent possession of a weapon” defense. Defendant testified the person who had just robbed him dropped the sweatshirt, which had a handgun in the pocket. According to the defendant’s testimony, just as defendant picked up the sweatshirt the police pulled up:

The Criminal Jury Instructions provide, in relevant part, that “[a] person has innocent possession of a weapon when he or she comes into possession of the weapon in an excusable manner and maintains possession, or intends to maintain possession, of the weapon only long enough to dispose of it safely. There is no single factor that by itself determines whether there was innocent possession. In making that determination, [the jury] may consider any evidence which establishes that the defendant had knowing possession of a weapon, the manner in which the weapon came into the defendant’s possession, the length of time the weapon remained in his/her possession, whether the defendant had an intent to use the weapon unlawfully or to safely dispose of it, the defendant’s opportunity, if any, to turn the weapon over to the police or other appropriate authority, and whether and how the defendant disposed of the weapon” (CJI2d[NY] Temporary and Lawful Possession).

Here, defendant’s testimony, if credited, provides sufficient facts from which the jury could find a lawful basis for defendant having temporarily and innocently possessed the subject pistol without having had any intent to use it in a dangerous manner or an opportunity to subsequently turn it over to police … . People v Mack, 2019 NY Slip Op 53930, Third Dept 11-27-19

 

PROBATION SENTENCE WHICH EFFECTIVELY EXTENDED THE PROBATION-PERIOD TO SIX YEARS WAS ILLEGAL (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined that defendant’s probation sentence was illegal because it exceeded five years. Defendant’s probation was continued after the violation:

When a probation violation is sustained and the court continues the sentence, the court may extend the sentence for a period constituting the time from when a defendant is declared delinquent to when a determination is made on such delinquency, which in this case was from September 2016 to September 2017 (see CPL 410.70 [5]). The record reflects that defendant was originally sentenced to the maximum term of probation of five years (see Penal Law § 65.00 [3] [a] [i]), and County Court continued that sentence. Although the court was authorized to extend the sentence to account for the time between September 2016 and September 2017 (see CPL 410.70 [5]), by doing so in this case and having defendant’s probation end in 2022, it impermissibly expanded the term of probation beyond the statutory maximum. In other words, assuming that defendant served the whole term of probation, he would have been on probation from September 2015 to September 2016 and then again from September 2017 to September 2022, which is six years total. Given that the sentence imposed was illegal, the matter must be remitted for resentencing. People v Vanhyning, 2019 NY Slip Op 08451, Third Dept 11-21-19

 

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SANDOVAL RULING THAT DEFENDANT COULD BE CROSS-EXAMINED ABOUT A 1991 BURGLARY WAS ERROR; DEFENDANT HAD AN UNBLEMISHED RECORD FOR THE LAST 23 YEARS; ERROR DEEMED HARMLESS (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined County Court should not have ruled defendant could be cross-examined about a 1991 burglary conviction in this assault, DWI and reckless driving case arising from a single car accident. The defendant’s record had been unblemished for 23 years, when he was released from prison. The defendant argued that, but for the Sandoval ruling, he would have testified. The Third Department found the error harmless, however:

In gauging whether a conviction is too remote, courts often consider the period of time during which the defendant was incarcerated, as County Court did here. For instance, in People v Wright (38 AD3d 1004 [2007], lv denied 9 NY3d 853 [2007]), this Court allowed inquiry about 20-year-old rape and robbery convictions where the defendant had been released from prison “only nine months prior to the present offense” … .

By comparison, here, defendant had been released from prison for 23 years, with an unblemished record leading up to this event. Under these circumstances, we conclude that County Court abused its discretion in allowing inquiry into the 1991 conviction, which was simply too remote … . People v Cole, 2019 NY Slip Op 08452, Third Dept 11-21-19

 

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BASED UPON EXECUTIVE LAW 63 AND TWO EXECUTIVE ORDERS ISSUED BY GOVERNOR CUOMO, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL HAS THE AUTHORITY TO INVESTIGATE AND CHARGE PERJURY ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED BY A DISTRICT ATTORNEY BEFORE A GRAND JURY CONVENED BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL TO INVESTIGATE THE POLICE SHOOTING OF AN UNARMED CIVILIAN (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Mulvey, reversing Supreme Court, determined that defendant, a district attorney, could be prosecuted by the Attorney General (OAG) for perjury allegedly committed by the district attorney before a grand jury convened by the Attorney General. The grand jury was convened to investigate whether the district attorney had engaged in misconduct when investigating the police shooting of an unarmed civilian. The authority of the Attorney General’s investigation and indictment is Executive Law 63 and two Executive Orders issued by Gov. Cuomo:

Executive Law § 63 (13) provides that the Attorney General “shall . . . [p]rosecute any person for perjury committed during the course of any investigation conducted by the [A]ttorney[][G]eneral pursuant to statute . . . [and] [i]n all such proceedings, the [A]ttorney[][G]eneral may appear . . . before any court or any grand jury and exercise all the powers and perform all the duties necessary or required to be exercised or performed in prosecuting any such person for such offense.” * * *

Although Executive Law § 63 (2) permits and requires the Governor to define — in the pertinent executive order — the scope of OAG’s authority regarding a particular investigation or prosecution … , the investigation is still conducted pursuant to that statute, albeit within a scope defined by the executive order. The Legislature, by enacting Executive Law § 63 (2), statutorily gave power to the Governor to call upon OAG to conduct investigations. That the statute and executive order must necessarily work in tandem does not diminish or eliminate the statute as a source of authority for OAG to conduct the investigation.

Here, as typical under these situations, OAG obtained authority to conduct the 2017 grand jury investigation through a combination of Executive Law § 63 (2) and EO163. The statute gives OAG power, but only when the Governor “require[s]” OAG to act … . Relatedly, the Governor would have no authority to give powers to the Attorney General — through an executive order or otherwise — without the Legislature having granted the Governor that ability. Indeed, the Court of Appeals has noted “that the Attorney[]General has no general authority to conduct [criminal] prosecutions and is without any prosecutorial power except when specifically authorized by statute” … . Therefore, we reject the conclusion that the phrase “pursuant to statute” excludes investigations conducted by OAG pursuant to an executive order issued by the Governor under the authority granted to him by statute, namely, Executive Law § 63 (2). OAG’s authority to investigate defendant was derived from that statute, at least indirectly through the conduit of an executive order issued thereunder. People v Abelove, 2019 NY Slip Op 08453, Third Dept 11-21-19

 

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FOUR CLASSES PROPERLY CERTIFIED TO BRING CLASS ACTION SUITS BASED UPON THE CONTAMINATION OF AIR, WATER, REAL PROPERTY AND PEOPLE WITH TOXIC CHEMICALS (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Lynch, determined that Supreme Court properly certified four classes bring class action suits against a manufacturer alleging the contamination of water, air, real property and people with toxic chemicals, PFOA and PFOS:

Plaintiffs, residents of the Town, commenced this action as a proposed class action, alleging that defendant’s use and improper disposal of PFOA and PFOS caused personal injury and property damage. In their complaint, plaintiffs proposed four classes: (1) a public water property damage class; (2) a private well water property damage class; (3) a private well nuisance class; and (4) a PFOA invasion injury class. Generally, the putative class members were individuals who owned or leased property in the Town or who ingested contaminated municipal or well water or inhaled PFOA or PFOS particulates in the Town and had demonstrable evidence of elevated levels of the chemical in their blood system. * * *

We agree with Supreme Court’s determination that, in addition to those questions common to the property classes, the answers to certain additional common questions will be applicable to all members of the invasion injury class, for example: (1) whether medical monitoring is an available remedy; (2) the extent of the health hazard presented by exposure to PFOA; and (3) whether the members of the class are at significant increased risk for disease based on the excess accumulation of PFOA in their bodies. Although defendant contends that there are myriad factual questions that are not common to the class, we do not agree that those predominate. Importantly, this is not a case where there is an issue of fact regarding exposure — rather, each class member must establish exposure and accumulation through blood work … . Burdick v Tonoga, Inc., 2019 NY Slip Op 08461, Third Dept 11-21-19

 

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THIS EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED WITHOUT A HEARING (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined petitioner’s employment discrimination claim should not have been dismissed without a hearing by the State Division of Human Rights (SDHR):

SDHR is free to dismiss a complaint without conducting a formal hearing where it finds no probable cause to conclude that an employer engaged in discriminatory practices, and we will only disturb that determination “if it is arbitrary, capricious or lacks a rational basis” … . Those flaws are present in a determination that stems from “an inadequate or abbreviated investigation” by SDHR … , such as one in which the agency does not afford the complainant “a full and fair opportunity to present evidence on his [or her] behalf and to rebut the evidence presented by the employer” … . Petitioner argues, among other things, that she was deprived of that opportunity when SDHR refused to consider her response to the notes of a one-party conference at which various individuals associated with [the employer] gave their accounts of her tenure with the firm.

We agree. … [T]he determination must be annulled and the matter remitted so that SDHR may conduct an investigation that is “neither abbreviated nor one-sided” and affords petitioner “a full and fair opportunity to . . . rebut the submissions of [the employer] in opposition to her complaint” … . Matter of Hong Wang v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 2019 NY Slip Op 08463, Third Dept 11-21-19

 

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DEFENDANTS DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THAT THE DOCTRINE OF ECONOMIC DISTRESS VOIDED THE PURCHASE AGREEMENT; DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS BREACH OF CONTRACT ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined that the criteria for the doctrine of economic duress to void a contract were not met by the defendants. The defendants had entered an agreement to purchase four McDonald’s restaurants from plaintiffs. The defendants alleged they agreed to an amendment of the contract because of the actions of the plaintiffs which amounted to economic distress:

A party seeking to void a contract on the basis of economic duress must show that he or she was compelled to agree to it because of a wrongful threat precluding the exercise of his or her free will … . “The existence of economic duress is demonstrated by proof that one party to a contract has threatened to breach the agreement by withholding performance unless the other party agrees to some further demand” … . A mere threat to breach a contract, however, does not amount to economic duress if the party who has been threatened can obtain performance of the contract from another source and pursue normal legal remedies for a breach of contract … . …

As the parties relying on economic duress, defendants bore the burden of proving that the agreement could not have been performed by another party. Defendants, however, failed to tender any proof in this regard. …

The record also fails to establish that other legal remedies were not available to defendants. Indeed, [one defendant] testified that, before agreeing to the amendment, [defendants]  weighed whether to take possession of the restaurants and then sue to have the original agreement enforced or not to take possession and then sue plaintiffs for specific performance. The fact that neither of those options was ultimately desirable does not mean that defendants did not have available legal remedies. Because defendants could resort to legal recourse, they cannot claim economic duress … . CRG at Arnot Mall, Inc. v Feehan, 2019 NY Slip Op 08467, Third Dept 11-21-19

 

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NEW YORK DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION OVER FATHER, A KENTUCKY RESIDENT, IN THIS DIVORCE ACTION: THE COUPLE HAD NOT LIVED TOGETHER IN NEW YORK STATE FOR 23 YEARS (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined New York did not have jurisdiction over father, a Kentucky resident, in this divorce action. The couple had last lived in New York in 1995 and had resided in Kentucky from 2003 to 2015:

Assuming, without deciding, that the wife established one of the predicates for jurisdiction under CPLR 302 (b), we find that the quality and nature of the husband’s activities in New York were such that it would be unreasonable and unfair to require him to defend an action in this state. Although the parties married in New York in 1991 and resided here until 1995, they have not resided together in this state in over 23 years. From 2003 until 2015, the parties resided together in Kentucky, where, at the time of commencement of this action, the husband was employed as a university professor and the parties owned real property. With the husband’s consent, the wife moved to New York with the parties’ son  in August 2015 and, as vaguely asserted by the wife, the husband has visited them in New York. The parties have not rented or purchased a home in New York. Rather, the wife and the son have lived rent-free with the wife’s parents, with the husband providing additional financial support. In our view, the husband’s contacts with New York are insufficient to warrant the exercise of personal jurisdiction over him … .Accordingly, Supreme Court should have granted the husband’s motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. Crosby v Crosby, 2019 NY Slip Op 08469, Third Dept 11-21-19

 

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