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One- and Two- Family Homeowners’ Exemption Precluded Labor Law 240 (1) and 246 (1) Causes of Action/Defendant-Owner’s Failure to Demonstrate He Did Not Create or Have Notice of the Alleged Dangerous Condition Precluded Summary Judgment on the Labor Law 200 and Common-Law Negligence Causes of Action

After finding that the Labor Law 240(1) and 246(1) causes of action were properly dismissed (one- and two-family homeowner exemption), the Second Department determined the summary judgment should not have been granted to the homeowner on the Labor Law 200 and common-law negligence causes of action.  The motion for summary judgment failed to address the allegation the owner created or had notice of the dangerous condition:

The plaintiff alleged that his injuries were caused both by a dangerous condition on the premises and the “means and methods” of construction. Accordingly, in order to be entitled to judgment as a matter of law dismissing those causes of action, Elias was required to address both theories … . Since Elias failed to establish, prima facie, that he neither created nor had actual or constructive notice of a dangerous condition on the premises, that branch of his motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the causes of action alleging common-law negligence and violation of Labor Law § 200 insofar as asserted against him should have been denied, without regard to the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s papers submitted in opposition… . Pineda v Elias, 2015 NY Slip Op 01254, 2nd Dept 2-11-15

 

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Criteria for Review of State Liquor Authority (SLA) Determination Explained

In affirming Supreme Court’s determination that the State Liquor Authority (SLA) should have granted petitioner’s application for a liquor license, the Second Department explained its review powers:

In reviewing the SLA’s determination of whether the public convenience and advantage would be served by granting or denying an application for a retail liquor license, the inquiry of the court is strictly limited to whether the SLA acted arbitrarily and capriciously … . A determination is “arbitrary and capricious when it is taken without sound basis in reason or regard to the facts” … .

Judicial review of a determination by the SLA “is limited to the grounds invoked by the agency” … . “If those grounds are inadequate or improper, the court is powerless to affirm the administrative [determination] by substituting what it considers to be a more adequate or proper basis” … . Furthermore, reliance upon an improper basis for its determination requires that the determination be annulled, regardless of whether the SLA also relied, in part, upon valid considerations … . Matter of Costco Wholesale Corp v New York State Liquor Auth, 2015 NY Slip Op 01274, 2nd Dept 2-11-15

 

Dismissal for Failure to State a Cause of Action Is Not Given Res Judicata Effect

The Second Department noted that a dismissal for failure to state a cause of action is not a determination on the merits and will not be given res judicata effect:

“As a general rule, a dismissal for failure to state a cause of action is not on the merits and, thus, will not be given res judicata effect” … . Since the dismissal of the prior action was not on the merits, the Supreme Court should have denied that branch of the moving defendants’ motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(5) to dismiss, on the ground of res judicata… . Hock v Cohen, 2015 NY Slip Op 01243, 2nd Dept 2-11-15

 

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Failure to Timely Respond to a Notice to Admit Not an Admission of the Matters Stated Therein—Notice Improperly Sought Admissions that Went to the Heart of the Controversy

12The Second Department determined defendants’ failure to timely respond to plaintiff’s notice to admit was not an admission of the matters stated therein because the notice sought admissions which went to the heart of the controversy:

“The purpose of a notice to admit is only to eliminate from the issues in litigation matters which will not be in dispute at trial. It is not intended to cover ultimate conclusions, which can only be made after a full and complete trial” … . Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, his notice to admit improperly sought the defendants’ admissions concerning a matter that went to the heart of the controversy in this case … . Since the admissions sought were improper, the defendants’ failure to timely respond to the subject notice should not be deemed an admission of the matters stated therein … . Williams v City of New York, 2015 NY Slip Op 01268, 2nd Dept 2-11-15

 

Process Servers Outside of New York City Are Not Required to Keep a “Log Book

The Second Department explained that, under the relevant provisions of the General Business Law, process servers outside the City of New York are not required to keep a “log book” for recording service:

General Business Law § 89-u, which applies to process servers outside of the City of New York, requires process servers to “maintain a legible record of all service made by him [or her] as prescribed in this section” (General Business Law § 89-u[1]). Unlike General Business Law § 89-cc(1), which is applicable in the City of New York, General Business Law § 89-u, which is applicable outside the City of New York, does not expressly require that the “legible record” be “kept in chronological order in a bound, paginated volume” (General Business Law § 89-cc[1]), i.e., a log book. “Pursuant to the maxim of statutory construction expressio unius est exclusio alterius, where a law expressly describes a particular act, thing or person to which it shall apply, an irrefutable inference must be drawn that what is omitted or not included was intended to be omitted and excluded” … . Since the Legislature did not include a log book requirement for process servers in counties outside of the City of New York, the Supreme Court erred in determining that the process server in Nassau County was required to maintain such log book. Moret Partnership v Spickerman, 2015 NY Slip Op 01248, 2nd Dept 2-11-15

 

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Police May Direct Occupants to Step Out of the Car After a Vehicle-Stop

In affirming the denial of a motion to suppress evidence seized after a vehicle stop the Second Department determined the police properly requested that the occupants step out of the car:

“In light of the heightened dangers faced by investigating police officers during traffic stops, a police officer may, as a precautionary measure and without particularized suspicion, direct the occupants of a lawfully stopped vehicle to step out of the car” … . People v Mitchell, 2015 NY Slip Op 01292, 2nd Dept 2-11-15

 

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Four-Year Statute of Limitations Under Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act Started to Run When the Vehicle Was Delivered, I.E., When the Vehicle Was Leased===Three-Year Statute of Limitations for the General Business Law 349 Cause of Action Started to Run When the Vehicle Was Subsequently Purchased (After the Lease-Period)

Plaintiff leased a car (from BMW) for several years and then purchased it.  After the purchase plaintiff sought coverage for repairs under the Magnuson-Moss … Warranty Act (Warranty Act) and sought damages pursuant to General Business Law 349 (deceptive business practices).  The Second Department determined the Warranty Act cause of action accrued on the date the car was delivered (leased) and therefore was time-barred.  However, the General Business Law cause of action accrued when the car was purchased and was timely:

In moving to dismiss a cause of action as barred by the applicable statute of limitations, a defendant bears the initial burden of demonstrating, prima facie, that the time within which to commence the action has expired … . The burden then shifts to the plaintiff to raise a question of fact as to whether the statute of limitations was tolled or was otherwise inapplicable, or whether the action was actually commenced within the applicable limitations period … . To make a prima facie showing, the defendant must establish, inter alia, when the plaintiff’s cause of action accrued … .

Claims brought under the Warranty Act are covered by the four-year statute of limitations prescribed by UCC 2-725 … . That statute specifically defines the date of accrual to be “when the breach occurs, regardless of the aggrieved party’s lack of knowledge of the breach. A breach of warranty occurs when tender of delivery is made, except that where a warranty explicitly extends to future performance of the goods and discovery of the breach must await the time of such performance, the cause of action accrues when the breach is or should have been discovered” (UCC 2-725[2]).

Here, BMW met its prima facie burden by establishing that the plaintiff had four years from November 10, 2007, the date she accepted delivery of the vehicle, to commence the Warranty Act cause of action, but that this action was not commenced until November 22, 2011. … The “New Vehicle Limited Warranty” did not guarantee future performance but only promised to repair or replace defective parts for a specified period of time… . …

Actions pursuant to General Business Law § 349 must be commenced within three years of the date of accrual … , which first occurs when the plaintiff has been injured by a deceptive act or practice that is in violation of section 349 … . As this cause of action is predicated on the sale of the vehicle, which took place in October 2010, it was timely commenced on November 22, 2011, within the three-year statute of limitations … . Loiodice v BMW of N Am LLC, 2015 NY Slip Op 01244, 2nd Dept 2-11-15

 

Comments Made by Dean and Assistant Dean in Their Professional Capacities Protected by a Qualified Privilege

The Second Department determined comments made about plaintiff-coach by the dean and assistant dean of the school where plaintiff worked were protected by a qualified privilege:

“Generally, a statement is subject to a qualified privilege when it is fairly made by a person in the discharge of some public or private duty, legal or moral, or in the conduct of his [or her] own affairs, in a matter where his interest is concerned” … . The defendants demonstrated that the statements at issue made by [defendants] in their official capacities as Dean and Assistant Dean of the School, respectively, and that the persons to whom they made the statements, had corresponding interests in the subject matter of the statements … .  Melious v Besignano, 2015 NY Slip Op 01247, 2nd Dept 2-11-15

 

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abor Law Definition of “General Contractor” Applies In Subrogation Action

The Second Department, over a dissent, determined that the Style defendants, whose role in a building project was limited to procuring the building permit and some minor carpentry, were not the general contractor for the project and were therefore entitled to summary judgment.  After paying the fire-related claim, plaintiff insurance company brought a subrogation action against the Style defendants (as the alleged general contractor). In finding the Style defendants were not the general contractor, the Second Department used the definition of “general contractor” applied under the Labor Law:

The Style defendants established, prima facie, that they were not the general contractor on the … renovation project through the submission of evidence showing that they did not undertake general contractor duties such as supervising, hiring, or paying contractors … . The evidence submitted in support of the Style defendants’ motion demonstrated, prima facie, that the Berensons hired the Baruch defendants as the general contractor on the project, and that the Baruch defendants undertook general contractor duties by coordinating and supervising the project, and hiring and paying subcontractors … . The evidence demonstrated that the only function the Style defendants performed in connection with the renovation project was obtaining the work permit and, at most, performing some minor carpentry and molding work at the beginning of the project … . * * *

…. [T]he rule enunciated in [the] Labor Law cases, which is based on the basic definition of a general contractor as one who, for instance, coordinates and supervises the work and hires and pays subcontractors … , applies equally to this subrogation action. To ignore our Labor Law precedent in this action would, in effect, create a different definition of a general contractor in the subrogation/property damage context, one that would confer general contractor status on an entity simply by virtue of it being listed as the contractor on a work permit. There is no persuasive reason for having two separate definitions of a general contractor, one for the Labor Law/personal injury context and another for the subrogation/property damage context… . Utica Mut Ins Co v Style Mgt Assoc Corp, 2015 NY Slip Op 01266, 2nd Dept 2-11-15

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Failure to Inform Defendant of His Right to Counsel for an Appeal Taken by the People Deprived Defendant of that Right

The Second Department determined that a defendant must be informed of his right to counsel on an appeal taken by the People:

A defendant has important interests at stake on an appeal by the People, and is thus entitled to certain protections, including “the right to appellate counsel of defendant’s choice and the right to seek appointment of counsel upon proof of indigency” … . “The ultimate duty of informing the defendant of his right to have counsel on appeal rests with the State” … and, absent record evidence that the defendant was informed of the right to counsel and waived that right, the Appellate Division should not proceed to consider and decide an appeal by the People … . Since there is no such record evidence in this case, we agree with the defendant’s contention that he was deprived of his constitutional right to counsel on the People’s appeal to this Court … . Accordingly, we assign counsel to represent the defendant on the People’s appeal …, and will consider and decide the remainder of the application upon the submission of all briefs. People v Clemente, 2015 NY Slip Op 01287, 2nd Dept 2-11-15

 

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