You are here: / / Four-Year Statute of Limitations Under Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act Started...
,

Four-Year Statute of Limitations Under Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act Started to Run When the Vehicle Was Delivered, I.E., When the Vehicle Was Leased===Three-Year Statute of Limitations for the General Business Law 349 Cause of Action Started to Run When the Vehicle Was Subsequently Purchased (After the Lease-Period)

Plaintiff leased a car (from BMW) for several years and then purchased it.  After the purchase plaintiff sought coverage for repairs under the Magnuson-Moss … Warranty Act (Warranty Act) and sought damages pursuant to General Business Law 349 (deceptive business practices).  The Second Department determined the Warranty Act cause of action accrued on the date the car was delivered (leased) and therefore was time-barred.  However, the General Business Law cause of action accrued when the car was purchased and was timely:

In moving to dismiss a cause of action as barred by the applicable statute of limitations, a defendant bears the initial burden of demonstrating, prima facie, that the time within which to commence the action has expired … . The burden then shifts to the plaintiff to raise a question of fact as to whether the statute of limitations was tolled or was otherwise inapplicable, or whether the action was actually commenced within the applicable limitations period … . To make a prima facie showing, the defendant must establish, inter alia, when the plaintiff’s cause of action accrued … .

Claims brought under the Warranty Act are covered by the four-year statute of limitations prescribed by UCC 2-725 … . That statute specifically defines the date of accrual to be “when the breach occurs, regardless of the aggrieved party’s lack of knowledge of the breach. A breach of warranty occurs when tender of delivery is made, except that where a warranty explicitly extends to future performance of the goods and discovery of the breach must await the time of such performance, the cause of action accrues when the breach is or should have been discovered” (UCC 2-725[2]).

Here, BMW met its prima facie burden by establishing that the plaintiff had four years from November 10, 2007, the date she accepted delivery of the vehicle, to commence the Warranty Act cause of action, but that this action was not commenced until November 22, 2011. … The “New Vehicle Limited Warranty” did not guarantee future performance but only promised to repair or replace defective parts for a specified period of time… . …

Actions pursuant to General Business Law § 349 must be commenced within three years of the date of accrual … , which first occurs when the plaintiff has been injured by a deceptive act or practice that is in violation of section 349 … . As this cause of action is predicated on the sale of the vehicle, which took place in October 2010, it was timely commenced on November 22, 2011, within the three-year statute of limitations … . Loiodice v BMW of N Am LLC, 2015 NY Slip Op 01244, 2nd Dept 2-11-15

 

You might also like
RESPONSE TO A JURY NOTE MAY HAVE MISLED THE JURY TO CONCLUDE THEY COULD MAKE THEIR OWN LAY JUDGMENT, AS OPPOSED TO RELYING ON EXPERT OPINION, ABOUT WHETHER DEFENDANT SEX OFFENDER SUFFERED FROM A MENTAL ABNORMALITY IN THIS CIVIL MANAGEMENT PROCEEDING, ISSUE REVIEWED ON APPEAL IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE, NEW TRIAL ORDERED (SECOND DEPT).
Valid Cause of Action Stated in Slip and Fall Suit Against Abutting Property Owner for Obstruction in Sidewalk (Gas Cap Cover)
Defect Was Trivial As a Matter of Law—Criteria Explained
SORA Court Has Discretion to Deny Downward Departure Even When Mitigating Factor Demonstrated by Preponderance of Evidence
Arbitrator’s Award Should Not Have Been Vacated—No Clear and Convincing Evidence of Arbitrator’s Bias or Misconduct or that the Arbitrator Exceeded His Power
Bank Properly Reversed Wire Transfer to Plaintiff’s Account After Learning Payment Was Not Authorized by the Holder of the Account from Which the Money Was Transferred—Plaintiff, Which Had Provided the Fake Buyer with Products Ostensibly Purchased with the Funds Initially Transferred to Plaintiff’s Account, Was Not Entitled to Those Funds Because the Funds Had Been Properly Returned by the Defendant Banks Pursuant to the Wire-Transfer Provisions of the UCC
ALTHOUGH PLAINTIFF BEARS THE BURDEN OF PROOF AT TRIAL, A DEFENDANT BRINGING A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BEARS THE BURDEN OF PROOF, GAPS IN DEFENDANT’S PROOF REQUIRE DENIAL OF THE MOTION WITHOUT CONSIDERING THE OPPOSING PAPERS (SECOND DEPT).
IN THIS LABOR LAW 240(1), 241(6) AND 200 ACTION, THERE WAS A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANT WAS AN OWNER OF THE PROPERTY WHERE PLAINTIFF WAS INJURED BY A FALLING OBJECT, DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

Analytical Criteria for Confirmation of an Arbitration Award Described Process Servers Outside of New York City Are Not Required to Keep a “Log...