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IN THE FACE OF A COMPLETE WRITTEN AGREEMENT, EVIDENCE OF A RELATED ORAL AGREEMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED, DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS FOUNDED UPON DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE (THE WRITTEN AGREEMENT) SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the written consulting (retainer) agreement was complete and evidence of an oral agreement to form a joint venture should not have been considered. Defendant’s motion to dismiss founded on documentary evidence (the written retainer agreement), therefore, should have been granted. Plaintiff had alleged defendant breached the oral agreement:

“To succeed on a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1), the documentary evidence that forms the basis of the defense must be such that it resolves all factual issues as a matter of law, and conclusively disposes of the plaintiff’s claim”… . A written agreement that is complete, clear, and unambiguous on its face must be enforced to give effect to the meaning of its terms and the reasonable expectations of the parties, and the court should determine the intent of the parties from within the four corners of the contract without looking to extrinsic evidence to create ambiguities … . The parol evidence rule generally operates to preclude evidence of a prior or contemporaneous communication during negotiations of an agreement that contradicts, varies, or explains a written agreement which is clear and unambiguous in its terms and expresses the parties’ entire agreement and intentions … . Where, as here, there is no merger clause, the court must examine the surrounding circumstances and the writing itself to determine whether the agreement constitutes a complete, integrated instrument … .

Here, both a reading of the written retainer agreement and a consideration of the surrounding circumstances lead to the conclusion that the written retainer agreement is a complete written instrument, and, thus, evidence of what may have been agreed orally between the parties prior to the execution of this integrated written instrument cannot be received to vary the terms of the writing … . Hoeg Corp. v Peebles Corp., 2017 NY Slip Op 06066, Second Dept 8-9-17

 

CONTRACT LAW (PAROL EVIDENCE RULE, IN THE FACE OF A COMPLETE WRITTEN AGREEMENT, EVIDENCE OF A RELATED ORAL AGREEMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED, DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS FOUNDED UPON DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE (THE WRITTEN AGREEMENT) SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (DISMISSAL FOUNDED ON DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE,  IN THE FACE OF A COMPLETE WRITTEN AGREEMENT, EVIDENCE OF A RELATED ORAL AGREEMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED, DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS FOUNDED UPON DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE (THE WRITTEN AGREEMENT) SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/EVIDENCE (PAROL EVIDENCE RULE, IN THE FACE OF A COMPLETE WRITTEN AGREEMENT, EVIDENCE OF A RELATED ORAL AGREEMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED, DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS FOUNDED UPON DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE (THE WRITTEN AGREEMENT) SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/PAROL EVIDENCE RULE (IN THE FACE OF A COMPLETE WRITTEN AGREEMENT, EVIDENCE OF A RELATED ORAL AGREEMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED, DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS FOUNDED UPON DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE (THE WRITTEN AGREEMENT) SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))

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DECEASED PLAINTIFF’S LAWSUIT DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO TIMELY SUBSTITUTE A REPRESENTATIVE OF PLAINTIFF’S ESTATE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined the causes of action brought by plaintiff’s decedent were properly dismissed because counsel did not timely substitute a representative for the deceased plaintiff:

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“CPLR 1021 requires a motion for substitution to be made within a reasonable time”… . “The determination of reasonableness requires consideration of several factors, including the diligence of the party seeking substitution, the prejudice to the other parties, and whether the party to be substituted has shown that the action or the defense has potential merit” … .

Here, the plaintiff’s counsel failed to demonstrate that he made any diligent efforts to substitute a representative for the deceased plaintiff. Additionally, the plaintiff’s counsel did not demonstrate a reasonable excuse for failing to seek a substitution. Further, the plaintiff’s counsel failed to submit an affidavit of merit, and did not rebut the contention of  [defendants] that they were prejudiced in their ability to defend the case. Howlader v Lucky Star Grocery, Inc., 2017 NY Slip Op 06067, Second Dept 8-9-17

 

CIVIL PROCEDURE (TRUSTS AND ESTATES, SUBSTITUTION FOR DECEASED PLAINTIFF, DECEASED PLAINTIFF’S LAWSUIT DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO TIMELY SUBSTITUTE A REPRESENTATIVE OF PLAINTIFF’S ESTATE (SECOND DEPT))/TRUSTS AND ESTATES (CIVIL PROCEDURE,  SUBSTITUTION FOR DECEASED PLAINTIFF, DECEASED PLAINTIFF’S LAWSUIT DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO TIMELY SUBSTITUTE A REPRESENTATIVE OF PLAINTIFF’S ESTATE (SECOND DEPT))/ATTORNEYS (TRUSTS AND ESTATES, SUBSTITUTION FOR DECEASED PLAINTIFF, DECEASED PLAINTIFF’S LAWSUIT DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO TIMELY SUBSTITUTE A REPRESENTATIVE OF PLAINTIFF’S ESTATE (SECOND DEPT))

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DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION SEEKING A DETERMINATION OF THE OWNERSHIP OF A STOCK CERTIFICATE REPRESENTING SHARES IN A COOPERATIVE APARTMENT IS GOVERNED BY A THREE-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, THE STOCK CERTIFICATE IS PERSONAL NOT REAL PROPERTY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department noted that the declaratory judgment action which sought a determination of the ownership of a stock certificate representing shares in a cooperative apartment was governed by the three-year statute of limitation. The stock certificate was personal property, not real estate:

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The defendants established that the action was barred by the three-year statute of limitations for recovery of a chattel (see CPLR 214[3]). “In order to determine the Statute of Limitations applicable to a particular declaratory judgment action, the court must examine the substance of that action to identify the relationship out of which the claim arises and the relief sought'”

… . “If the court determines that the underlying dispute can be or could have been resolved through a form of action or proceeding for which a specific limitation period is statutorily provided, that limitation period governs the declaratory judgment action” … . Here, the plaintiff seeks to recover a stock certificate representing shares in a cooperative apartment corporation. An action to recover a stock certificate is governed by the three-year statute of limitations for recovery of a chattel … . “Shares of stock issued in connection with cooperative apartments are personal property, not real property” … . Loscalzo v 507-509 President St. Tenants Assn. Hous. Dev. Fund Corp., 2017 NY Slip Op 06070, Second Dept 8-9-17

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CIVIL PROCEDURE (DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION SEEKING A DETERMINATION OF THE OWNERSHIP OF A STOCK CERTIFICATE REPRESENTING SHARES IN A COOPERATIVE APARTMENT IS GOVERNED BY A THREE-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, THE STOCK CERTIFICATE IS PERSONAL NOT REAL PROPERTY (SECOND DEPT))/DECLARATORY JUDGMENT (STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION SEEKING A DETERMINATION OF THE OWNERSHIP OF A STOCK CERTIFICATE REPRESENTING SHARES IN A COOPERATIVE APARTMENT IS GOVERNED BY A THREE-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, THE STOCK CERTIFICATE IS PERSONAL NOT REAL PROPERTY (SECOND DEPT))/SECURITIES (SHARES IN COOPERATIVE APARTMENT, DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION SEEKING A DETERMINATION OF THE OWNERSHIP OF A STOCK CERTIFICATE REPRESENTING SHARES IN A COOPERATIVE APARTMENT IS GOVERNED BY A THREE-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, THE STOCK CERTIFICATE IS PERSONAL NOT REAL PROPERTY (SECOND DEPT))/COOPERATIVES (DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION SEEKING A DETERMINATION OF THE OWNERSHIP OF A STOCK CERTIFICATE REPRESENTING SHARES IN A COOPERATIVE APARTMENT IS GOVERNED BY A THREE-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, THE STOCK CERTIFICATE IS PERSONAL NOT REAL PROPERTY (SECOND DEPT))

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REQUIREMENTS FOR SERVICE ON AN UNAUTHORIZED FOREIGN LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY NOT MET, DEFAULT JUDGMENT PROPERLY DENIED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined the Limited Liability Company Law requirements for a default judgment against an unauthorized foreign limited liability company were not met:

A plaintiff seeking leave to enter a default judgment must file proof of proper service of the summons and the complaint, the defendant’s default, and the facts constituting the claim (see CPLR 3215[f] …).

The plaintiff averred that it served the defendant, a foreign limited liability company not authorized to conduct business in New York, pursuant to Limited Liability Company Law § 304. As relevant to the plaintiff’s contentions, that statute requires three things. First, service upon the unauthorized foreign limited liability company may be made by personal delivery of the summons and complaint, with the appropriate fee, to the Secretary of State … . Second, in order for the personal delivery to the Secretary of State to be “sufficient,” the plaintiff must also give the defendant direct notice of its delivery of the process to the Secretary of State, along with a copy of the process. The direct notice may be sent to the defendant by registered mail, return receipt requested, to the defendant’s last known address … . Third, after process has been delivered to the Secretary of State and direct notice of that service has been sent to the defendant, the plaintiff must file proof of service with the clerk of the court. That proof of service must be in the form of an “affidavit of compliance.” The affidavit of compliance must be filed with the return receipt within 30 days after the plaintiff has received the return receipt from the post office. Service of process shall be complete 10 days after the affidavit of compliance has been filed with the clerk with a copy of the summons and complaint … . Strict compliance with Limited Liability Company Law § 304 is required, including as to the filing of an “affidavit of compliance” … . Where the plaintiff has failed to demonstrate strict compliance, the plaintiff will not be entitled to a default judgment … . Here, the plaintiff failed to submit an affidavit of compliance with the return receipt within 30 days after it received the return receipt from the post office. Accordingly, the plaintiff’s unopposed motion for leave to enter a default judgment was properly denied … . Global Liberty Ins. Co. v Surgery Ctr. of Oradell, LLC, 2017 NY Slip Op 06065, Second Dept 8-9-17

CIVIL PROCEDURE (LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY LAW, DEFAULT JUDGMENT, REQUIREMENTS FOR SERVICE ON AN UNAUTHORIZED FOREIGN LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY NOT MET, DEFAULT JUDGMENT PROPERLY DENIED (SECOND DEPT))/LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY LAW (DEFAULT JUDGMENT, REQUIREMENTS FOR SERVICE ON AN UNAUTHORIZED FOREIGN LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY NOT MET, DEFAULT JUDGMENT PROPERLY DENIED (SECOND DEPT))/DEFAULT JUDGMENTS (UNAUTHORIZED FOREIGN LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, REQUIREMENTS FOR SERVICE ON AN UNAUTHORIZED FOREIGN LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY NOT MET, DEFAULT JUDGMENT PROPERLY DENIED (SECOND DEPT))

JUDICIARY LAW 487 ACTION AGAINST ATTORNEYS, ALLEGING AN INTENTION TO DECEIVE THE COURT IN A DIVORCE PROCEEDING, PROPERLY DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined the suit against plaintiff’s divorce attorneys alleging a violation of Judiciary Law 487 was properly dismissed, both because of the failure to prove an intent to deceive the court, and the failure to prove pecuniary damage:

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Judiciary Law § 487(1) provides that “[a]n attorney or counselor who . . . [i]s guilty of any deceit or collusion, or consents to any deceit or collusion, with intent to deceive the court or any party . . . [i]s guilty of a misdemeanor, and in addition to the punishment prescribed therefor by the penal law, he [or she] forfeits to the party injured treble damages, to be recovered in a civil action.” “A violation of Judiciary Law § 487 requires an intent to deceive” …  Here, the evidence adduced at trial, including the testimony of [plaintiff’s attorney], supports the trial court’s determination that [the attorney] did not act with the requisite “intent to deceive the court or any party” in applying for the receivership … .

In any event, to succeed on a cause of action to recover damages under Judiciary Law § 487, the plaintiff must demonstrate that he or she “suffered . . . damages which were proximately caused by the deceit allegedly perpetrated on him [or her] or on the court” … .  The evidence adduced at trial also supports the trial court’s conclusion that the plaintiff failed to establish that she suffered pecuniary damages as a result of the alleged deceit. Dupree v Voorhees, 2017 NY Slip Op 06062, Second Dept 8-9-17

 

ATTORNEYS (JUDICIARY LAW 487 ACTION AGAINST ATTORNEYS, ALLEGING AN INTENTION TO DECEIVE THE COURT IN A DIVORCE PROCEEDING, PROPERLY DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT))/JUDICIARY LAW 487 (ATTORNEYS, JUDICIARY LAW 487 ACTION AGAINST ATTORNEYS, ALLEGING AN INTENTION TO DECEIVE THE COURT IN A DIVORCE PROCEEDING, PROPERLY DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT))

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UNION’S CLAIM MEDICAL TREATMENT FOR LINE OF DUTY INJURIES WAS BEING UNDULY DELAYED OR DENIED WAS ARBITRABLE, WHETHER THE UNDERLYING GRIEVANCE WAS TIMELY BROUGHT MUST BE DETERMINED BY THE ARBITRATOR, NOT THE COURT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined that the city’s petition to permanently stay arbitration was properly dismissed. The court described the criteria for determining whether a matter is arbitrable pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement (CBA). The court further held that whether the underlying grievance was timely brought must be determined by the arbitrator because the CBA was silent on the issue. The city firefighters (Local 628) sought arbitration of whether medical treatment for line of duty injuries (General Municipal Law 207-a) was being unduly delayed or denied:

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“In analyzing whether the parties in fact agreed to arbitrate the particular dispute, a court is merely to determine whether there is a reasonable relationship between the subject matter of the dispute and the general subject matter of the CBA'” … . Here, the relevant arbitration provisions of the CBA are broad, as they provide for arbitration of any grievance “involving the interpretation or application of any provision of this Agreement,” which remains unresolved following completion of step two of the grievance procedure. Moreover, there is a reasonable relationship between the subject matter of the dispute, which involves the processing of General Municipal Law § 207-a benefits to firefighters injured in the line of duty, and Appendix C of the CBA which sets forth the procedures regulating “the application for, and the award of, benefits under section 207-a of the General Municipal Law” … .

The City’s contention that arbitration was precluded because Local 628’s grievance was not timely pursuant to step one of the grievance procedure is without merit. The “threshold determination of whether a condition precedent to arbitration exists and whether it has been complied with, is for the court to determine” … . By contrast, “[q]uestions concerning compliance with a contractual step-by-step grievance process have been recognized as matters of procedural arbitrability to be resolved by the arbitrators, particularly in the absence of a very narrow arbitration clause or a provision expressly making compliance with the time limitations a condition precedent to arbitration” … . Matter of City of Yonkers v Yonkers Fire Fighters, Local 628, IAFF, AFL-CIO, 2017 NY Slip Op 06073, Second Dept 8-9-17

 

ARBITRATION (UNION’S CLAIM MEDICAL TREATMENT FOR LINE OF DUTY INJURIES WAS BEING UNDULY DELAYED OR DENIED WAS ARBITRABLE, WHETHER THE UNDERLYING GRIEVANCE WAS TIMELY BROUGHT MUST BE DETERMINED BY THE ARBITRATOR, NOT THE COURT (SECOND DEPT))/EMPLOYMENT LAW (ARBITRATION, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, UNION’S CLAIM MEDICAL TREATMENT FOR LINE OF DUTY INJURIES WAS BEING UNDULY DELAYED OR DENIED WAS ARBITRABLE, WHETHER THE UNDERLYING GRIEVANCE WAS TIMELY BROUGHT MUST BE DETERMINED BY THE ARBITRATOR, NOT THE COURT (SECOND DEPT))/MUNICIPAL LAW (ARBITRATION, UNION’S CLAIM MEDICAL TREATMENT FOR LINE OF DUTY INJURIES WAS BEING UNDULY DELAYED OR DENIED WAS ARBITRABLE, WHETHER THE UNDERLYING GRIEVANCE WAS TIMELY BROUGHT MUST BE DETERMINED BY THE ARBITRATOR, NOT THE COURT (SECOND DEPT))/COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT (ARBITRATION, (UNION’S CLAIM MEDICAL TREATMENT FOR LINE OF DUTY INJURIES WAS BEING UNDULY DELAYED OR DENIED WAS ARBITRABLE, WHETHER THE UNDERLYING GRIEVANCE WAS TIMELY BROUGHT MUST BE DETERMINED BY THE ARBITRATOR, NOT THE COURT (SECOND DEPT)) 

PLAINTIFF, AFTER A SUBSTANTIAL VERDICT IN A TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE, WAS ASSIGNED DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO SUE DEFENDANT’S INSURER ALLEGING A BAD FAITH FAILURE TO SETTLE, THE INSURER’S MOTION TO DISMISS WAS PROPERLY DENIED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined there was no basis for the dismissal of Rios’s complaint alleging defendant insurer’s (Tri State’s) bad faith refusal to settle the underlying traffic-accident action for the policy limit of $100,000. Rios had collided with Weathers, who sued Rios. Weathers won a substantial verdict which was reduced by the Second Department. The Second Department ordered a new trial unless Weathers stipulated to the reduced award (which remained substantial and well above the policy limit). Weathers stipulated to most of the reduced award, but not the award for future physical therapy and medical costs. Rios then assigned his “bad faith” action against defendant insurer (Tri State) to Weathers. In moving to dismiss the Rios complaint, the insurer argued that because Weathers did not stipulate to all of the reduced award, his only remedy was a new trial:

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Weathers, as assignee of Rios’s rights, … commenced this action alleging that Tri State acted in bad faith by refusing to settle this case before the trial for the policy limit of $100,000 and breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in handling the defense of the personal injury action on behalf of Rios. Tri State moved, in effect, pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against it. Tri State argued that this Court’s decision and order in the personal injury action did not permit Weathers, the personal injury plaintiff, to pick and choose which modified awards he would accept and which awards he would reject. Tri State contended that, because Weathers did not “unconditionally accept” the reduced awards set forth in this Court’s decision and order within 30 days, he “has the right to a new trial, nothing else.” Tri State argued that the instant “bad faith” action is premature “because there is no jury verdict on damages at this stage,” and therefore, it cannot be said “that Tri State acted in bad faith for refusing to settle [the personal injury] case.” The Supreme Court denied the motion.

Under the particular circumstances of this case, Tri State has failed to establish any ground to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against it. Although there are outstanding questions as to the total award of damages in the personal injury action, Tri State has failed to demonstrate why that prevents Weathers from maintaining an action against Tri State alleging bad faith refusal to settle and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing … . Weathers v Tri State Consumer Ins. Co., 2017 NY Slip Op 06099, Second Dept 8-9-17

 

INSURANCE LAW (BAD FAITH, PLAINTIFF, AFTER A SUBSTANTIAL VERDICT IN A TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE, WAS ASSIGNED DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO SUE DEFENDANT’S INSURER ALLEGING A BAD FAITH FAILURE TO SETTLE, THE INSURER’S MOTION TO DISMISS WAS PROPERLY DENIED (SECOND DEPT))/TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS (INSURANCE LAW, BAD FAITH,  PLAINTIFF, AFTER A SUBSTANTIAL VERDICT IN A TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE, WAS ASSIGNED DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO SUE DEFENDANT’S INSURER ALLEGING A BAD FAITH FAILURE TO SETTLE, THE INSURER’S MOTION TO DISMISS WAS PROPERLY DENIED (SECOND DEPT))/BAD FAITH (INSURANCE LAW, TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS,  PLAINTIFF, AFTER A SUBSTANTIAL VERDICT IN A TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE, WAS ASSIGNED DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO SUE DEFENDANT’S INSURER ALLEGING A BAD FAITH FAILURE TO SETTLE, THE INSURER’S MOTION TO DISMISS WAS PROPERLY DENIED (SECOND DEPT))

CHILD WAS ENTITLED TO A FINDING THAT REUNIFICATION WITH HIS MOTHER IN EL SALVADOR WAS NOT VIABLE DUE TO PARENTAL NEGLECT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, over a dissent, determined the child was entitled to a finding that reunification with his mother in El Salvador would not be viable in this special juvenile immigrant status proceeding:

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… [W]here, as here, the Family Court’s credibility determination is not supported by the record, this Court is free to make its own credibility assessments and overturn the determination of the hearing court … . Based upon our independent factual review, we conclude that the record supports a finding that reunification of the child with his mother is not a viable option based upon parental neglect. The record reflects that the mother failed to meet the educational needs of the child… . The child testified that, although he was prevented from attending school by gang members who beat him while walking to school, the mother did not arrange for transportation, which was within her financial means, but instead, told him to stay home. Additionally, the child was expelled from one school due to excessive tardiness, and he failed the seventh grade … . Further, the mother did not provide adequate supervision, often leaving the then eight-year-old child home alone at night in the neighborhood where he had encountered the gang violence … . …

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Since the record is sufficient for this Court to make its own findings of fact and conclusions of law, we find that reunification of the child with one or both of his parents is not viable due to parental neglect … . Matter of Dennis X.G.D.V., 2017 NY Slip Op 06080, Second Dept 8-9-17

 

FAMILY LAW (SPECIAL JUVENILE IMMIGRANT STATUS, CHILD WAS ENTITLED TO A FINDING THAT REUNIFICATION WITH HIS MOTHER IN EL SALVADOR WAS NOT VIABLE DUE TO PARENTAL NEGLECT (SECOND DEPT))/SPECIAL JUVENILE IMMIGRANT STATUS (FAMILY LAW, CHILD WAS ENTITLED TO A FINDING THAT REUNIFICATION WITH HIS MOTHER IN EL SALVADOR WAS NOT VIABLE DUE TO PARENTAL NEGLECT (SECOND DEPT))

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(HARMLESS) ERROR TO ALLOW DETECTIVE TO TESTIFY AS AN EXPERT ABOUT THE STRUCTURE OF THE GANG AND THE RELATIONSHIPS AMONG SPECIFIC MEMBERS, (HARMLESS) ERROR TO ALLOW IN EVIDENCE A CHART DESCRIBING THE STRUCTURE AND MEMBERSHIP OF THE GANG (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined it was (harmless) error to allow a detective to testify as an expert about the structure of the gang and the relationships among specific gang members. It was also (harmless) error to admit a chart describing the structure and membership of the gang:

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The defendant correctly contends that the Supreme Court erred by, in effect, permitting the investigating detective in the case to testify as an expert not only regarding the general hierarchy of the gang to which the defendant belonged, but also as to the relationships between specific gang members, which he knew only as a result of his own participation in the investigation. Allowing the detective, who was intimately involved in the investigation into the gang-related arson, to testify as an expert created a danger that he would end up testifying beyond any cognizable field of expertise as an apparently omniscient expositor of the facts of the case, thereby usurping the fact-finding role of the jury … . It was also improper, under the circumstances here, to admit into evidence a summary chart depicting the gang hierarchy and membership of the gang, which identified the gang’s members by name and their associated arrest photos … . People v Vazquez, 2017 NY Slip Op 06092, Second Dept 8-9-17

CRIMINAL LAW (EVIDENCE, (HARMLESS) ERROR TO ALLOW DETECTIVE TO TESTIFY AS AN EXPERT ABOUT THE STRUCTURE OF THE GANG AND THE RELATIONSHIPS AMONG SPECIFIC MEMBERS, (HARMLESS) ERROR TO ALLOW IN EVIDENCE A CHART DESCRIBING THE STRUCTURE AND MEMBERSHIP OF THE GANG (SECOND DEPT))/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, HARMLESS) ERROR TO ALLOW DETECTIVE TO TESTIFY AS AN EXPERT ABOUT THE STRUCTURE OF THE GANG AND THE RELATIONSHIPS AMONG SPECIFIC MEMBERS, (HARMLESS) ERROR TO ALLOW IN EVIDENCE A CHART DESCRIBING THE STRUCTURE AND MEMBERSHIP OF THE GANG (SECOND DEPT))/EXPERT OPINION (CRIMINAL LAW, GANGS, (HARMLESS) ERROR TO ALLOW DETECTIVE TO TESTIFY AS AN EXPERT ABOUT THE STRUCTURE OF THE GANG AND THE RELATIONSHIPS AMONG SPECIFIC MEMBERS, (HARMLESS) ERROR TO ALLOW IN EVIDENCE A CHART DESCRIBING THE STRUCTURE AND MEMBERSHIP OF THE GANG (SECOND DEPT))/GANGS (CRIMINAL LAW, EVIDENCE, (HARMLESS) ERROR TO ALLOW DETECTIVE TO TESTIFY AS AN EXPERT ABOUT THE STRUCTURE OF THE GANG AND THE RELATIONSHIPS AMONG SPECIFIC MEMBERS, (HARMLESS) ERROR TO ALLOW IN EVIDENCE A CHART DESCRIBING THE STRUCTURE AND MEMBERSHIP OF THE GANG (SECOND DEPT))

FAMILY COURT HAD THE POWER TO RETROACTIVELY DISMISS A NEGLECT PETITION AND IMPOSE A SUSPENDED JUDGMENT AFTER MOTHER DEMONSTRATED THE ABILITY TO CARE FOR HER CHILDREN (FIRST DEPT).

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Renwick, in a matter of first impression, determined that Family Court had the power to retroactively impose a suspended judgment and dismiss a neglect petition. Mother had consented to a neglect finding but subsequently turned her life around and demonstrated the ability to care for her four children:

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This Family Court Act article 10 child neglect proceeding raises an issue of apparent first impression for this Court: whether the Family Court properly granted respondent mother a suspended judgment, “retroactively,” in order to vacate a neglect finding and dismiss a neglect proceeding. Initially, the mother consented to a neglect finding and the Family Court’s dispositional order released the children to the mother, under the supervision of petitioner, Administration for Children Services (ACS), for 12 months. At the end of this period, upon satisfactorily completing the terms of the dispositional order, the mother made a postdisposition motion to modify the dispositional order. The court granted a suspended judgment, retroactively, due to the mother’s compliance with the conditions of the dispositional order, and vacated the neglect finding, as consistent with the children’s best interest. [W]e find not only that the Family Court Act permits such a retroactive remedy, but that the remedy served the children’s best interest under the circumstances of this case. Matter of Leenasia C. (Lamarriea C.–Maxie B.), 2017 NY Slip Op 06050, First Dept 8-8-17

FAMILY LAW (NEGLECT, FAMILY COURT HAD THE POWER TO RETROACTIVELY DISMISS A NEGLECT PETITION AND IMPOSE A SUSPENDED JUDGMENT AFTER MOTHER DEMONSTRATED THE ABILITY TO CARE FOR HER CHILDREN (FIRST DEPT))/NEGLECT (FAMILY COURT HAD THE POWER TO RETROACTIVELY DISMISS A NEGLECT PETITION AND IMPOSE A SUSPENDED JUDGMENT AFTER MOTHER DEMONSTRATED THE ABILITY TO CARE FOR HER CHILDREN (FIRST DEPT))

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