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LABOR LAW 240(1) NOT APPLICABLE TO INJURY FROM A PORTION OF A FENCE WHICH FELL ON PLAINTIFF (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined defendant property owner was entitled to summary judgment dismissing the Labor Law 240(1) cause of action. Plaintiff alleged a portion of a plywood fence around the work site fell on him. The “falling object” provisions of the Labor Law 240(1) did not apply:

To prevail on a cause of action pursuant to section 240(1) in a ” falling object’ case, the injured worker must demonstrate the existence of a hazard contemplated under that statute and the failure to use, or the inadequacy of, a safety device of the kind enumerated therein'”… . This requires a showing that at the time the object fell, it either was being hoisted or secured, or required securing for the purposes of the undertaking … . Labor Law § 240(1) “does not automatically apply simply because an object fell and injured a worker” … . In support of their cross motion, the defendants made a prima facie showing of their entitlement to summary judgment dismissing the Labor Law § 240(1) cause of action by demonstrating that the plywood fence was not an object being hoisted or that required securing for the purpose of the undertaking, and that it did not fall because of the absence or inadequacy of an enumerated safety device … . Berman-Rey v Gomez, 2017 NY Slip Op 06151, 2nd Dept 8-16-17

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (LABOR LAW 240(1) NOT APPLICABLE TO INJURY FROM A PORTION OF A FENCE WHICH FELL ON PLAINTIFF (SECOND DEPT))/FALLING OBJECTS (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, LABOR LAW 240(1) NOT APPLICABLE TO INJURY FROM A PORTION OF A FENCE WHICH FELL ON PLAINTIFF (SECOND DEPT))

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