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Tag Archive for: Fourth Department

Court of Claims, Negligence

SKATER DID NOT ASSUME THE RISK CREATED BY A NEGLIGENTLY MAINTAINED ICE SURFACE AND SKATER’S AWARENESS OF THE CONDITION RELATES ONLY TO COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE, DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing the Court of Claims, determined defendant’s motion for summary judgment in this ice-skating slip and fall case should not have been granted. The claimant could not assume the risk created by a negligently maintained ice surface, and claimant’s awareness of the dangerous condition relates only to the issue of comparative fault (which does not preclude summary judgment):

We … agree with claimant that her claim is not barred by the doctrine of assumption of the risk. It is well settled that “[a claimant] will not be held to have assumed those risks that are not inherent . . . , i.e., not ordinary and necessary in the sport” … . Although the risk of falling while ice skating is ” inherent in and arise[s] out of the nature of the sport generally’ ” … , we conclude that skating on a negligently maintained ice surface is not a risk that is inherent in the sport. Contrary to defendant’s contention, under the circumstances presented here, claimant’s awareness of the poor ice conditions and her decision to continue skating for some period of time, apparently to have a photograph taken, relate only to the issue of her comparative fault, if any … . Wyzykowski v State of New York, 2018 NY Slip Op 04875, Fourth Dept 6-29-18

​NEGLIGENCE (SKATER DID NOT ASSUME THE RISK CREATED BY A NEGLIGENTLY MAINTAINED ICE SURFACE AND SKATER’S AWARENESS OF THE CONDITION RELATES ONLY TO COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE, DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT))/SLIP AND FALL  (SKATER DID NOT ASSUME THE RISK CREATED BY A NEGLIGENTLY MAINTAINED ICE SURFACE AND SKATER’S AWARENESS OF THE CONDITION RELATES ONLY TO COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE, DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT))/ICE SKATING (SKATER DID NOT ASSUME THE RISK CREATED BY A NEGLIGENTLY MAINTAINED ICE SURFACE AND SKATER’S AWARENESS OF THE CONDITION RELATES ONLY TO COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE, DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT))/ASSUMPTION OF RISK (ICE SKATING, (SKATER DID NOT ASSUME THE RISK CREATED BY A NEGLIGENTLY MAINTAINED ICE SURFACE AND SKATER’S AWARENESS OF THE CONDITION RELATES ONLY TO COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE, DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT))/COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE (ICE SKATING, SKATER DID NOT ASSUME THE RISK CREATED BY A NEGLIGENTLY MAINTAINED ICE SURFACE AND SKATER’S AWARENESS OF THE CONDITION RELATES ONLY TO COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE, DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT))/SUMMARY JUDGMENT (COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE, SKATER DID NOT ASSUME THE RISK CREATED BY A NEGLIGENTLY MAINTAINED ICE SURFACE AND SKATER’S AWARENESS OF THE CONDITION RELATES ONLY TO COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE, DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT))/COURT OF CLAIMS (SKATER DID NOT ASSUME THE RISK CREATED BY A NEGLIGENTLY MAINTAINED ICE SURFACE AND SKATER’S AWARENESS OF THE CONDITION RELATES ONLY TO COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE, DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT))

June 29, 2018
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2018-06-29 09:41:282020-01-27 17:23:05SKATER DID NOT ASSUME THE RISK CREATED BY A NEGLIGENTLY MAINTAINED ICE SURFACE AND SKATER’S AWARENESS OF THE CONDITION RELATES ONLY TO COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE, DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT).
Battery, Medical Malpractice, Negligence

COMPLAINT ALLEGING A MEDICAL PROCEDURE WAS PERFORMED TO WHICH PLAINTIFF DID NOT CONSENT STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR BATTERY (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff had stated a cause of action for battery alleging a medical procedure was performed without her consent:

“It is well settled that a medical professional may be deemed to have committed battery, rather than malpractice, if he or she carries out a procedure or treatment to which the patient has provided no consent at all’ ” … . Here, in moving under CPLR 3211 (a) (7), defendants attached all of the pleadings, which alleged, inter alia, that defendants “performed a procedure upon the Plaintiff while she was under general anesthesia without informing her or obtaining any consent, which conduct constituted a battery upon her.” Defendants also referenced and provided to the court the informed consent form executed by plaintiff that explicitly authorized the performance of a flexible sigmoidoscopy, but not a colonoscopy. The form further noted in relevant part that, “[i]f any unforeseen condition arises during the procedure calling for, in the physician’s judgment, additional procedures, treatments, or operations, [defendant is] authorize[d] . . . to do whatever he . . . deems advisable.” We conclude that plaintiff has sufficiently asserted a cause of action sounding in battery by alleging that she provided no consent to the performance of a colonoscopy … , and that the evidentiary submissions considered by the court, including the consent form, do not “establish conclusively that plaintiff has no cause of action” sounding in battery … . McCarthy v Shah, 2018 NY Slip Op 04887, Fourth Dept 6-29-18

​MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (BATTERY, COMPLAINT ALLEGING A MEDICAL PROCEDURE WAS PERFORMED TO WHICH PLAINTIFF DID NOT CONSENT STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR BATTERY (FOURTH DEPT))/NEGLIGENCE (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, BATTERY, COMPLAINT ALLEGING A MEDICAL PROCEDURE WAS PERFORMED TO WHICH PLAINTIFF DID NOT CONSENT STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR BATTERY (FOURTH DEPT))/BATTERY (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE,  COMPLAINT ALLEGING A MEDICAL PROCEDURE WAS PERFORMED TO WHICH PLAINTIFF DID NOT CONSENT STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR BATTERY (FOURTH DEPT))

June 28, 2018
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2018-06-28 15:18:542020-01-26 10:18:56COMPLAINT ALLEGING A MEDICAL PROCEDURE WAS PERFORMED TO WHICH PLAINTIFF DID NOT CONSENT STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR BATTERY (FOURTH DEPT).
Municipal Law, Negligence

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM AGAINST A PUBLIC CORPORATION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED FOR ONE OF TWO ACCIDENTS, CLAIMANT FAILED TO SHOW DEFENDANT HAD TIMELY ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE FIRST OF TWO ACCIDENTS (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, modifying Supreme Court, determined that claimant’s motion for leave to file a late notice of claim against defendant public corporation was properly granted for only one of two accidents. The Fourth Department held that the defendant did not have timely actual knowledge of the first accident because there was no evidence defendant was provided with the relevant accident report:

While we agree with respondent that claimant failed to establish a reasonable excuse for the delay … , “[t]he failure to offer an excuse for the delay is not fatal where . . . actual notice was had and there is no compelling showing of prejudice to [respondent]” … . …

… [W]e agree with claimant that he established that respondent would not be substantially prejudiced by any delay in serving the notice of claim. “[B]ecause the injur[ies] allegedly resulted from . . . fall[s] at a construction site, it is highly unlikely that the conditions existing at the time of the accident[s] would [still] have existed’ ” had the notice of claim been timely filed … . …

… [C]laimant failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that respondent had timely actual knowledge of the first accident. Despite having engaged in pre-action discovery, claimant is unable to provide any evidence that the incident report related to the first accident was ever transmitted to respondent, and there was no mention of the first accident in the construction closeout report submitted to respondent. Inasmuch as there is no evidence that respondent received timely actual knowledge of the occurrence of the first accident, respondent could not have received timely actual knowledge of ” the injuries or damages’ ” resulting therefrom … . Matter of Szymkowiak v New York Power Auth., 2018 NY Slip Op 04482, Fourth Dept 6-15-18

​NEGLIGENCE (MUNICIPAL LAW, LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM, MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM AGAINST A PUBLIC CORPORATION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED FOR ONE OF TWO ACCIDENTS, CLAIMANT FAILED TO SHOW DEFENDANT HAD TIMELY ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE FIRST OF TWO ACCIDENTS (FOURTH DEPT))/MUNICIPAL LAW (MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM AGAINST A PUBLIC CORPORATION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED FOR ONE OF TWO ACCIDENTS, CLAIMANT FAILED TO SHOW DEFENDANT HAD TIMELY ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE FIRST OF TWO ACCIDENTS (FOURTH DEPT))/NOTICE OF CLAIM (MUNICIPAL LAW, LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM, MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM AGAINST A PUBLIC CORPORATION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED FOR ONE OF TWO ACCIDENTS, CLAIMANT FAILED TO SHOW DEFENDANT HAD TIMELY ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE FIRST OF TWO ACCIDENTS (FOURTH DEPT))/PUBLIC CORPORATION (NOTICE OF CLAIM,  MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM AGAINST A PUBLIC CORPORATION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED FOR ONE OF TWO ACCIDENTS, CLAIMANT FAILED TO SHOW DEFENDANT HAD TIMELY ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE FIRST OF TWO ACCIDENTS (FOURTH DEPT))

June 15, 2018
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2018-06-15 12:47:552020-02-06 17:09:39MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM AGAINST A PUBLIC CORPORATION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED FOR ONE OF TWO ACCIDENTS, CLAIMANT FAILED TO SHOW DEFENDANT HAD TIMELY ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE FIRST OF TWO ACCIDENTS (FOURTH DEPT).
Civil Procedure, Evidence, Medical Malpractice, Negligence

MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE VERDICT IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant’s motion to set aside the verdict as against the weight of the evidence should not have been granted:

“It is well established that [a] verdict rendered in favor of a defendant may be successfully challenged as against the weight of the evidence only when the evidence so preponderated in favor of the plaintiff that it could not have been reached on any fair interpretation of the evidence”… . “Where a verdict can be reconciled with a reasonable view of the evidence, the successful party is entitled to the presumption that the jury adopted that view” … .

Here, there was sharply conflicting expert testimony with respect to whether plaintiff’s postoperative symptoms could have occurred without negligence on the part of defendant, and the jury was entitled to credit the testimony of defendants’ experts and reject the testimony of plaintiff’s expert … . We conclude that the court erred in setting aside the verdict as against the weight of the evidence inasmuch as “the jury had ample basis to conclude that plaintiff’s postoperative condition was not attributable to any deviation from accepted community standards of medical practice by defendant” … , and thus the jury’s finding that defendant was not negligent was not “palpably irrational or wrong” … . Clark v Loftus, 2018 NY Slip Op 04473, Fourth Dept 6-15-18

​NEGLIGENCE (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE VERDICT IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT))/MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE VERDICT IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT))/EVIDENCE (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE,  MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE VERDICT IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (SET ASIDE THE VERDICT, MOTION TO, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE VERDICT IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT))/VERDICT, MOTION TO SET ASIDE (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE VERDICT IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT))

June 15, 2018
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2018-06-15 12:41:072020-01-26 19:45:02MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE VERDICT IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT).
Evidence, Insurance Law, Negligence, Vehicle and Traffic Law

DEFENDANT’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION IN THIS VEHICLE-PEDESTRIAN ACCIDENT CASE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, DEFENDANT MAY HAVE VIOLATED THE DUTY TO SEE WHAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN SEEN, AND PLAINTIFF’S FRACTURED FOOT CONSTITUTED A SERIOUS INJURY AS A MATTER OF LAW (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant’s motion for summary judgment in this vehicle-pedestrian traffic accident case should not have been granted. Plaintiff demonstrated she suffered a serious injury within the meaning of the Insurance Law (fractures in her foot). And defendant did not demonstrate plaintiff’s negligence was the sole proximate cause of the accident:

Plaintiff commenced this negligence action seeking damages for injuries that she sustained when a vehicle operated by defendant struck her foot while she was walking her bicycle on the street beneath an overpass. We agree with plaintiff, as limited by her brief, that Supreme Court erred in granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and denying that part of plaintiff’s cross motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of serious injury.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff and affording her the benefit of every reasonable inference  … , we conclude that defendant failed to meet his initial burden on his motion of establishing as a matter of law that plaintiff’s negligence was the sole proximate cause of the accident … . Defendant’s own submissions raise triable issues of fact, including whether he violated his ” common-law duty to see that which he should have seen [as a driver] through the proper use of his senses’ ” … and his statutory duty to “exercise due care to avoid colliding with any bicyclist[ or] pedestrian” (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1146 [a]).

Finally, it is uncontested that plaintiff established as a matter of law on her cross motion that she sustained fractures in her foot as a result of the accident and, therefore, she is entitled to partial summary judgment on the issue of serious injury (see Insurance Law § 5102 [d]). Luttrell v Vega, 2018 NY Slip Op 04468, Fourth Dept 6-15-18

​NEGLIGENCE (DEFENDANT’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION IN THIS VEHICLE-PEDESTRIAN ACCIDENT CASE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, DEFENDANT MAY HAVE VIOLATED THE DUTY TO SEE WHAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN SEEN, AND PLAINTIFF’S FRACTURED FOOT CONSTITUTED A SERIOUS INJURY AS A MATTER OF LAW (FOURTH DEPT))/EVIDENCE (NEGLIGENCE, TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, DEFENDANT’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION IN THIS VEHICLE-PEDESTRIAN ACCIDENT CASE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, DEFENDANT MAY HAVE VIOLATED THE DUTY TO SEE WHAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN SEEN, AND PLAINTIFF’S FRACTURED FOOT CONSTITUTED A SERIOUS INJURY AS A MATTER OF LAW (FOURTH DEPT))/TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS (DEFENDANT’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION IN THIS VEHICLE-PEDESTRIAN ACCIDENT CASE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, DEFENDANT MAY HAVE VIOLATED THE DUTY TO SEE WHAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN SEEN, AND PLAINTIFF’S FRACTURED FOOT CONSTITUTED A SERIOUS INJURY AS A MATTER OF LAW (FOURTH DEPT))/PEDESTRIANS (TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, DEFENDANT’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION IN THIS VEHICLE-PEDESTRIAN ACCIDENT CASE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, DEFENDANT MAY HAVE VIOLATED THE DUTY TO SEE WHAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN SEEN, AND PLAINTIFF’S FRACTURED FOOT CONSTITUTED A SERIOUS INJURY AS A MATTER OF LAW (FOURTH DEPT))/INSURANCE LAW (TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, SERIOUS INJURY, DEFENDANT’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION IN THIS VEHICLE-PEDESTRIAN ACCIDENT CASE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, DEFENDANT MAY HAVE VIOLATED THE DUTY TO SEE WHAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN SEEN, AND PLAINTIFF’S FRACTURED FOOT CONSTITUTED A SERIOUS INJURY AS A MATTER OF LAW (FOURTH DEPT))/SERIOUS INJURY (TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, SERIOUS INJURY, DEFENDANT’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION IN THIS VEHICLE-PEDESTRIAN ACCIDENT CASE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, DEFENDANT MAY HAVE VIOLATED THE DUTY TO SEE WHAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN SEEN, AND PLAINTIFF’S FRACTURED FOOT CONSTITUTED A SERIOUS INJURY AS A MATTER OF LAW (FOURTH DEPT))/VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW (TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, (DEFENDANT’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION IN THIS VEHICLE-PEDESTRIAN ACCIDENT CASE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, DEFENDANT MAY HAVE VIOLATED THE DUTY TO SEE WHAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN SEEN, AND PLAINTIFF’S FRACTURED FOOT CONSTITUTED A SERIOUS INJURY AS A MATTER OF LAW (FOURTH DEPT))

June 15, 2018
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2018-06-15 12:38:462020-02-05 14:57:48DEFENDANT’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION IN THIS VEHICLE-PEDESTRIAN ACCIDENT CASE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, DEFENDANT MAY HAVE VIOLATED THE DUTY TO SEE WHAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN SEEN, AND PLAINTIFF’S FRACTURED FOOT CONSTITUTED A SERIOUS INJURY AS A MATTER OF LAW (FOURTH DEPT).
Labor Law-Construction Law, Negligence

QUESTIONS OF FACT ON THE LABOR LAW 240 (1), LABOR LAW 241 (6), AND COMMON LAW NEGLIGENCE CAUSES OF ACTION, PLAINTIFF WAS USING THE TOP HALF OF AN EXTENSION LADDER AND THE LADDER SLIPPED OUT FROM UNDER HIM (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, modifying Supreme Court, determined neither party was entitled to summary judgment on Labor Law 240 (1), Labor Law 241 (6) and common law negligence causes of action stemming from plaintiff’s use of the top half of an extension ladder that slipped out from under him. With respect to the common law negligence cause of action against the property owner, the court explained:

Where the injured worker’s employer provides the allegedly defective equipment, the analysis turns on whether the defendant owner had the authority to supervise or control the work … . Where, however, the defendant owner provides the allegedly defective equipment, the legal standard “is whether the owner created the dangerous or defective condition or had actual or constructive notice thereof” … , because in that situation the defendant property owner “is possessed of the authority, as owner, to remedy the condition” of the defective equipment … . Contrary to defendants’ contention, they failed to establish as a matter of law that they did not create the dangerous condition of the ladder or have either actual or constructive notice of it. Moreover, “the absence of rubber shoes on a ladder is a visible and apparent defect,’ evidence of which may be sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact on the issue of constructive notice” … . Sochan v Mueller, 2018 NY Slip Op 04457, Fourth Dept 6-15-18

​LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (QUESTIONS OF FACT ON THE LABOR LAW 240 (1), LABOR LAW 241 (6), AND COMMON LAW NEGLIGENCE CAUSES OF ACTION, PLAINTIFF WAS USING THE TOP HALF OF AN EXTENSION LADDER AND THE LADDER SLIPPED OUT FROM UNDER HIM (FOURTH DEPT))/LADDERS (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, QUESTIONS OF FACT ON THE LABOR LAW 240 (1), LABOR LAW 241 (6), AND COMMON LAW NEGLIGENCE CAUSES OF ACTION, PLAINTIFF WAS USING THE TOP HALF OF AN EXTENSION LADDER AND THE LADDER SLIPPED OUT FROM UNDER HIM (FOURTH DEPT))/NEGLIGENCE (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, QUESTIONS OF FACT ON THE LABOR LAW 240 (1), LABOR LAW 241 (6), AND COMMON LAW NEGLIGENCE CAUSES OF ACTION, PLAINTIFF WAS USING THE TOP HALF OF AN EXTENSION LADDER AND THE LADDER SLIPPED OUT FROM UNDER HIM (FOURTH DEPT))

June 15, 2018
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2018-06-15 12:33:382020-02-06 16:36:34QUESTIONS OF FACT ON THE LABOR LAW 240 (1), LABOR LAW 241 (6), AND COMMON LAW NEGLIGENCE CAUSES OF ACTION, PLAINTIFF WAS USING THE TOP HALF OF AN EXTENSION LADDER AND THE LADDER SLIPPED OUT FROM UNDER HIM (FOURTH DEPT).
Labor Law-Construction Law

DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, PLAINTIFF FELL FROM A SCAFFOLD AND HAD NOT TIED OFF HIS LANYARD (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, modifying Supreme Court, over a two-justice dissent, determined that defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the Labor Law 240 (1) should not have been granted. There were questions of fact whether plaintiff’s fall could have been prevented by an available safety device. Plainitiff was not tied off, but there was testimony he couldn’t have accomplished the work if he were tied off with a six foot lanyard. Although a 25 foot lanyard was available, plaintiff fell 25 to 30 feet and the retractable lanyard may not have prevented the injury:

“A violation occurs where a scaffold or elevated platform is inadequate in and of itself to protect workers against the elevation-related hazards encountered while assembling or dismantling that device, and it is the only safety device supplied or any additional safety device is also inadequate” … . …

We conclude that defendants’ own submissions raised triable issues of fact with respect to the Labor Law § 240 (1) claim. In support of their contentions that plaintiff’s conduct was the sole proximate cause of his injuries, defendants submitted plaintiff’s deposition testimony in which he testified that he chose to unhook his safety lanyard and detach the bridge scaffolding sheet without the benefit of the lanyard or other safety device. The six-foot lanyard given to him was not an adequate safety device, however, because plaintiff also testified that it was too short to permit plaintiff to reach the final clip anchoring the bridge scaffolding sheet, even if he had moved the fall arrest system cable to a location closer to that clip. Furthermore, although defendants submitted evidence that other safety devices were generally available on the work site, they failed to establish as a matter of law that an adequate safety device was present that would have prevented plaintiff “from harm directly flowing from the application of the force of gravity to . . . [his] person” … . For example, defendants failed to establish as a matter of law that a 20- or 25-foot lanyard, which appears to have been the next length available on the work site, would have prevented plaintiff’s fall by virtue of the fact that it was retractable. It therefore cannot be concluded on this record that plaintiff’s use of that alternative lanyard would have made any substantial difference in plaintiff’s injuries … . Martin v Niagara Falls Bridge Commn., 2018 NY Slip Op 04452, Fourth Dept 6-15-18

​LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, PLAINTIFF FELL FROM A SCAFFOLD AND HAD NOT TIED OFF HIS LANYARD (FOURTH DEPT))/SCAFFOLDS (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, PLAINTIFF FELL FROM A SCAFFOLD AND HAD NOT TIED OFF HIS LANYARD (FOURTH DEPT))

June 15, 2018
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2018-06-15 12:30:232020-02-06 16:36:35DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, PLAINTIFF FELL FROM A SCAFFOLD AND HAD NOT TIED OFF HIS LANYARD (FOURTH DEPT).
Criminal Law, Evidence

FAILURE TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON TWO REMOTE LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES WAS HARMLESS ERROR, JURY WAS INSTRUCTED ON THE HIGHEST LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE AND CONVICTED DEFENDANT OF THE TOP COUNT OF THE INDICTMENT (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, over a two-justice dissent, determined that the trial court’s error in refusing the instruct the jury on manslaughter second and criminally negligent homicide was harmless error. The defendant was charged with murder and the trial court instructed the jury on manslaughter first degree as a lesser included offense. The jury convicted the defendant of both murder and manslaughter first. Because the jury convicted on the top count, and the jury was instructed on the top lesser included offense, the failure to instruct on the more remote lesser included offenses was deemed harmless error. The manslaughter first conviction was reversed as a lesser concurrent count:

As set forth by the Court of Appeals, “where a court charges the next lesser included offense of the crime alleged in the indictment, but refuses to charge lesser degrees than that, . . . the defendant’s conviction of the crime alleged in the indictment forecloses a challenge to the court’s refusal to charge the remote lesser included offenses” (People v Boettcher, 69 NY2d 174, 180 [1987]). The premise underlying a determination of harmless error is that, when a jury convicts the defendant of the top (i.e., highest) charged offense and thereby excludes from the case the next lesser (i.e., intermediate) included offense, the verdict dispels any significant probability that the jury, had it been given the option, would have acquitted the defendant of both the highest and intermediate charged offenses and instead convicted the defendant of the even lesser (i.e., remote) included offense that was erroneously not charged … . Thus, cases applying the analysis set forth in Boettcher hold that where the trial court charges the jury with the highest offense of murder in the second degree and the intermediate offense of manslaughter in the first degree, and the jury convicts the defendant of murder in the second degree, the defendant’s challenge on appeal to the court’s denial of a request to charge the remote offenses of manslaughter in the second degree and/or criminally negligent homicide is foreclosed, i.e., any error is harmless … . People v Mcintosh, 2018 NY Slip Op 04455, Fourth Dept 6-15-18

​CRIMINAL LAW (FAILURE TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON TWO REMOTE LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES WAS HARMLESS ERROR, JURY WAS INSTRUCTED ON THE FIRST LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE AND CONVICTED DEFENDANT OF THE TOP COUNT OF THE INDICTMENT (FOURTH DEPT))/LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES (FAILURE TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON TWO REMOTE LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES WAS HARMLESS ERROR, JURY WAS INSTRUCTED ON THE FIRST LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE AND CONVICTED DEFENDANT OF THE TOP COUNT OF THE INDICTMENT (FOURTH DEPT))/JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CRIMINAL LAW, LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES, FAILURE TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON TWO REMOTE LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES WAS HARMLESS ERROR, JURY WAS INSTRUCTED ON THE FIRST LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE AND CONVICTED DEFENDANT OF THE TOP COUNT OF THE INDICTMENT (FOURTH DEPT))

June 15, 2018
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2018-06-15 12:11:162020-01-28 15:06:28FAILURE TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON TWO REMOTE LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES WAS HARMLESS ERROR, JURY WAS INSTRUCTED ON THE HIGHEST LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE AND CONVICTED DEFENDANT OF THE TOP COUNT OF THE INDICTMENT (FOURTH DEPT).
Criminal Law, Evidence

AT THE SUPPRESSION HEARING THE PEOPLE DID NOT PROVE THE VALIDITY OF THE COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE ARRESTING OFFICERS ABOUT THE EXISTENCE OF AN ACTIVE WARRANT FOR DEFENDANT’S ARREST, MOTION TO SUPPRESS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing the conviction by guilty plea and dismissing the indictment, determined the People did not present sufficient proof at the suppression hearing to allow the suppression court to find there was probable cause for defendant’s arrest. After a traffic stop, defendant was arrested based upon information from the 911 Center and the Cortland Police Department about an active warrant for defendant’s arrest in Cortland. Cocaine seized in a search incident to arrest was the basis for the instant charges against the defendant. The defendant specifically challenged the validity of the communications with the arresting officers concerning the warrant. At the suppression hearing, the People did not present the warrant or any witness with first-hand knowledge about the warrant. The cocaine should have been suppressed:

Despite defendant’s explicit challenge to the reliability of the information justifying his arrest … , the People did not produce the arrest warrant itself prior to the conclusion of the hearing … . Instead, the People relied upon the officer’s testimony concerning his communications with an unidentified person or persons at the 911 Center and his assumptions about how the 911 Center confirmed the existence of an active and valid warrant. That testimony, however, rested “on a pyramid of hearsay, the information having been passed from” the arresting officer to unidentified persons at the 911 Center and the Cortland Police Department and back to the officer… . “In making an arrest, a police officer may rely upon information communicated to him by another police officer that an individual is the subject named in a warrant and should be taken into custody in the execution of the warrant . . . However, if the warrant turns out to be invalid or vacated . . . [,] or nonexistent . . . , any evidence seized as a result of the arrest will be suppressed notwithstanding the reasonableness of the arresting officer’s reliance upon the communication” … . Here, without producing the arrest warrant itself or reliable evidence that the warrant was active and valid, the People did not meet their burden of establishing that defendant’s arrest was based on probable cause … . People v Searight, 2018 NY Slip Op 04466, Fourth Dept 6-15-18

​CRIMINAL LAW (AT THE SUPPRESSION HEARING THE PEOPLE DID NOT PROVE THE VALIDITY OF THE COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE ARRESTING OFFICERS ABOUT THE EXISTENCE OF AN ACTIVE WARRANT FOR DEFENDANT’S ARREST, MOTION TO SUPPRESS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT))/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, AT THE SUPPRESSION HEARING THE PEOPLE DID NOT PROVE THE VALIDITY OF THE COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE ARRESTING OFFICERS ABOUT THE EXISTENCE OF AN ACTIVE WARRANT FOR DEFENDANT’S ARREST, MOTION TO SUPPRESS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT))/SUPPRESS, MOTION TO (AT THE SUPPRESSION HEARING THE PEOPLE DID NOT PROVE THE VALIDITY OF THE COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE ARRESTING OFFICERS ABOUT THE EXISTENCE OF AN ACTIVE WARRANT FOR DEFENDANT’S ARREST, MOTION TO SUPPRESS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT))

June 15, 2018
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2018-06-15 12:09:392020-01-28 15:06:29AT THE SUPPRESSION HEARING THE PEOPLE DID NOT PROVE THE VALIDITY OF THE COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE ARRESTING OFFICERS ABOUT THE EXISTENCE OF AN ACTIVE WARRANT FOR DEFENDANT’S ARREST, MOTION TO SUPPRESS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT).
Appeals, Criminal Law, Evidence

DEFENDANT’S EVIDENTIARY ARGUMENTS ARE VIEWED ON APPEAL THROUGH THE LENS OF THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS TO WHICH NO OBJECTIONS WERE MADE, NO NEED TO PRESENT SPECIFIC PROOF THE CAR DEALERSHIP WHICH WAS VANDALIZED WAS A PERSON (A CORPORATION IN THIS CONTEXT) WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE CRIMINAL MISCHIEF STATUTE, NO NEED TO PROVE THE PRECISE AMOUNT OF DAMAGE CAUSED BY THE DEFENDANT AS OPPOSED TO THE DAMAGE CAUSED BY ALL PARTICIPANTS, ORDERING RESTITUTION IN THE FULL AMOUNT OF THE DAMAGES, AS OPPOSED TO APPORTIONING THE DAMAGES AMONG ALL THE PARTICIPANTS, WAS NOT ERROR (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice NeMoyer, affirming defendant’s criminal mischief conviction and the restitution order, looked at the evidentiary issues raised on appeal through the lens of the relevant jury instructions. Where there is no objection to the jury instructions, the proof required of the People is that which is laid out in the jury instructions. The indictment alleged that the defendant and several others vandalized cars at a dealership by scratching the cars with keys causing total damage in the amount of $40,000. On appeal defendant argued (1) the charged offense requires damage to property owned by a “person” and the People did not demonstrate that the car dealership was a “person” within the meaning of the statute, (2) the precise amount of damage attributable to the defendant was not proven, and (3) ordering defendant to pay restitution in the full amount of the damages was error. All of defendant’s arguments were rejected:

The court told the jury that defendant must have damaged the property of “another person” — not “another human being” — and it is common knowledge that personhood can and sometimes does attach to nonhuman entities like corporations or animals …. Indeed, the Court of Appeals has written that personhood is “not a question of biological or natural’ correspondence”…, and we can “presume[]” that the jurors had ” sufficient intelligence’ to make [the] elementary logical inferences presupposed by the language of [the court’s] charge” … . In short, defendant’s personhood argument effectively transforms an undefined but commonly understood term into an incorrectly defined term, and we decline to follow him down that path. …

… [T]he jury was instructed — without objection — that “[i]f it is proven . . . that the defendant acted in concert with others, he is thus criminally liable for their conduct. The extent or degree of the defendant’s participation in the crime does not matter” … . Perhaps this instruction was inconsistent with section 20.15 … but it still forecloses defendant’s claim of factual insufficiency as to value. …

… [T]he Court of Appeals previously upheld a restitution award that imposed the full value of the victim’s loss on a single perpetrator, instead of apportioning the loss among the defendant and his accomplices …— as defendant appears to seek here. People v Graves, 2018 NY Slip Op 04503, Fourth Dept 6-15-18

​CRIMINAL LAW (DEFENDANT’S EVIDENTIARY ARGUMENTS ARE VIEWED ON APPEAL THROUGH THE LENS OF THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS TO WHICH NO OBJECTIONS WERE MADE, NO NEED TO PRESENT SPECIFIC PROOF THE CAR DEALERSHIP WHICH WAS VANDALIZED WAS A PERSON (A CORPORATION IN THIS CONTEXT) WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE CRIMINAL MISCHIEF STATUTE, NO NEED TO PROVE THE PRECISE AMOUNT OF DAMAGE CAUSED BY THE DEFENDANT AS OPPOSED TO THE DAMAGE CAUSED BY ALL THE PARTICIPANTS, ORDERING RESTITUTION IN THE FULL AMOUNT OF THE DAMAGES, AS OPPOSED TO APPORTIONING THE DAMAGES AMONG ALL THE PARTICIPANTS, WAS NOT ERROR (FOURTH DEPT))/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, (DEFENDANT’S EVIDENTIARY ARGUMENTS ARE VIEWED ON APPEAL THROUGH THE LENS OF THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS TO WHICH NO OBJECTIONS WERE MADE, NO NEED TO PRESENT SPECIFIC PROOF THE CAR DEALERSHIP WHICH WAS VANDALIZED WAS A PERSON (A CORPORATION IN THIS CONTEXT) WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE CRIMINAL MISCHIEF STATUTE, NO NEED TO PROVE THE PRECISE AMOUNT OF DAMAGE CAUSED BY THE DEFENDANT AS OPPOSED TO THE DAMAGE CAUSED BY ALL THE PARTICIPANTS, ORDERING RESTITUTION IN THE FULL AMOUNT OF THE DAMAGES, AS OPPOSED TO APPORTIONING THE DAMAGES AMONG ALL THE PARTICIPANTS, WAS NOT ERROR (FOURTH DEPT))/APPEALS (CRIMINAL LAW, DEFENDANT’S EVIDENTIARY ARGUMENTS ARE VIEWED ON APPEAL THROUGH THE LENS OF THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS TO WHICH NO OBJECTIONS WERE MADE, NO NEED TO PRESENT SPECIFIC PROOF THE CAR DEALERSHIP WHICH WAS VANDALIZED WAS A PERSON (A CORPORATION IN THIS CONTEXT) WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE CRIMINAL MISCHIEF STATUTE, NO NEED TO PROVE THE PRECISE AMOUNT OF DAMAGE CAUSED BY THE DEFENDANT AS OPPOSED TO THE DAMAGE CAUSED BY ALL THE PARTICIPANTS, ORDERING RESTITUTION IN THE FULL AMOUNT OF THE DAMAGES, AS OPPOSED TO APPORTIONING THE DAMAGES AMONG ALL THE PARTICIPANTS, WAS NOT ERROR (FOURTH DEPT))/RESTITUTION (CRIMINAL LAW, (DEFENDANT’S EVIDENTIARY ARGUMENTS ARE VIEWED ON APPEAL THROUGH THE LENS OF THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS TO WHICH NO OBJECTIONS WERE MADE, NO NEED TO PRESENT SPECIFIC PROOF THE CAR DEALERSHIP WHICH WAS VANDALIZED WAS A PERSON (A CORPORATION IN THIS CONTEXT) WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE CRIMINAL MISCHIEF STATUTE, NO NEED TO PROVE THE PRECISE AMOUNT OF DAMAGE CAUSED BY THE DEFENDANT AS OPPOSED TO THE DAMAGE CAUSED BY ALL THE PARTICIPANTS, ORDERING RESTITUTION IN THE FULL AMOUNT OF THE DAMAGES, AS OPPOSED TO APPORTIONING THE DAMAGES AMONG ALL THE PARTICIPANTS, WAS NOT ERROR (FOURTH DEPT))

June 15, 2018
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2018-06-15 12:07:312020-01-28 15:06:29DEFENDANT’S EVIDENTIARY ARGUMENTS ARE VIEWED ON APPEAL THROUGH THE LENS OF THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS TO WHICH NO OBJECTIONS WERE MADE, NO NEED TO PRESENT SPECIFIC PROOF THE CAR DEALERSHIP WHICH WAS VANDALIZED WAS A PERSON (A CORPORATION IN THIS CONTEXT) WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE CRIMINAL MISCHIEF STATUTE, NO NEED TO PROVE THE PRECISE AMOUNT OF DAMAGE CAUSED BY THE DEFENDANT AS OPPOSED TO THE DAMAGE CAUSED BY ALL PARTICIPANTS, ORDERING RESTITUTION IN THE FULL AMOUNT OF THE DAMAGES, AS OPPOSED TO APPORTIONING THE DAMAGES AMONG ALL THE PARTICIPANTS, WAS NOT ERROR (FOURTH DEPT).
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