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WHILE WORKING ON A SIGN AT EYE LEVEL PLAINTIFF SLIPPED OFF A LANDSCAPING ROCK WHICH HE DID NOT NEED TO STAND ON TO DO THE WORK, PLAINTIFF’S LABOR LAW 240 (1) AND 241 (6) CAUSES OF ACTION PROPERLY DISMISSED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department determined plaintiff’s Labor Law 240 (1) and 241 (6) causes of action were properly dismissed. Plaintiff slipped off a landscaping rock while working on a business sign. Plaintiff did not need to stand on the rock to do the work, which involved removing letters from the sign. The Labor Law 241 (6) causes of action were not viable because plaintiff did not alleged the rock was slippery or that he tripped over the rock, plaintiff was not engaged in demolition work, and the rock could not be considered debris:

… [T]he court properly denied that part of his motion and granted those parts of defendants’ motions with respect to the Labor Law § 240 (1) cause of action. The record establishes that plaintiff was not “obliged to work at an elevation”… , which is a necessary element for recovery under section 240 (1). Indeed, plaintiff’s own deposition testimony submitted in support of his motion established that the work he was performing was at eye level and that he could have reached the sign from the ground. Thus, inasmuch as it was not necessary for plaintiff to stand on the rock to perform his work, he was not exposed to an elevation-related hazard of the type contemplated by section 240 (1) … . Even assuming, arguendo, that a safety device was required to protect plaintiff from such a hazard, we note that plaintiff further testified during his deposition that either of the A-frame ladders that had been provided for his use probably could have straddled the rock, but he thought that a ladder was not necessary … . Maracle v Autoplace Infiniti, Inc., 2018 NY Slip Op 03252, Fourth Dept 5-4-18

​LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (WHILE WORKING ON A SIGN AT EYE LEVEL PLAINTIFF SLIPPED OFF A LANDSCAPING ROCK WHICH HE DID NOT NEED TO STAND ON TO DO THE WORK, PLAINTIFF’S LABOR LAW 240 (1) AND 241 (6) CAUSES OF ACTION PROPERLY DISMISSED (FOURTH DEPT))

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