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DEFENDANT COUNTY CORONER TOOK PLAINTIFF’S SON’S BRAIN MATTER FOR USE IN TRAINING CADAVER DOGS AND FATHER SUED, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER COUNTY OBLIGATED UNDER THE PUBLIC OFFICERS LAW TO DEFEND AND INDEMNIFY THE CORONER (I.E., WAS THE CORONER ACTING WITHIN THE SCOPE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT?) (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant’s motion for summary judgment on his cross claim against the county (seeking a determination that the county is obligated to defend and indemnify him) should not have been granted. Plaintiff’s son was killed in a car accident. Defendant, who was then a county coroner, without permission, took plaintiff’s son’s brain matter for use in training cadaver dogs. There was a question of fact whether the county was obligated to defend the coroner pursuant to the Public Officers Law, which applies to actions within the scope of employment:

A county’s duty to defend an employee “turns on whether [the employee was] acting within the scope of [his or her] employment,” and whether the obligation to defend the employee “was formally adopted by a local governing body” … . In order to establish its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law under Public Officers Law § 18, it was incumbent on defendant to establish the applicability of that section … . Here, the court erred in granting summary judgment to defendant while still finding that there are issues of fact that bear on the applicability of Public Officers Law § 18 to defendant’s claims … . Dunn v County of Niagara, 2018 NY Slip Op 03271, Fourth Dept 5-4-18

​MUNICIPAL LAW (PUBLIC OFFICERS LAW, DEFENDANT COUNTY CORONER TOOK PLAINTIFF’S SON’S BRAIN MATTER FOR USE IN TRAINING CADAVER DOGS, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER COUNTY OBLIGATED UNDER THE PUBLIC OFFICERS LAW TO DEFEND AND INDEMNIFY THE CORONER (I.E., WAS THE CORONER ACTING WITHIN THE SCOPE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT?) (FOURTH DEPT))/EMPLOYMENT LAW (MUNICIPAL LAW, PUBLIC OFFICERS LAW, DEFENDANT COUNTY CORONER TOOK PLAINTIFF’S SON’S BRAIN MATTER FOR USE IN TRAINING CADAVER DOGS, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER COUNTY OBLIGATED UNDER THE PUBLIC OFFICERS LAW TO DEFEND AND INDEMNIFY THE CORONER (I.E., WAS THE CORONER ACTING WITHIN THE SCOPE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT?) (FOURTH DEPT))/PUBLIC OFFICERS LAW (DEFEND AND INDEMNIFY, DEFENDANT COUNTY CORONER TOOK PLAINTIFF’S SON’S BRAIN MATTER FOR USE IN TRAINING CADAVER DOGS, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER COUNTY OBLIGATED UNDER THE PUBLIC OFFICERS LAW TO DEFEND AND INDEMNIFY THE CORONER (I.E., WAS THE CORONER ACTING WITHIN THE SCOPE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT?) (FOURTH DEPT))

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THE DETECTIVE DID NOT READ THE MIRANDA RIGHTS TO DEFENDANT AND IT IS CLEAR FROM THE VIDEOTAPE THAT DEFENDANT COULD NOT HAVE READ THE WRITTEN EXPLANATION OF THOSE RIGHTS BEFORE HE WAIVED THEM; THE PEOPLE, THEREFORE, DID NOT PROVE DEFENDANT KNOWINGLY, INTELLIGENTLY AND VOLUNTARILY WAIVED THE MIRANDA RIGHTS; THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS DEFENDANT’S STATEMENTS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT). ​
DEFENDANT WAS NOT IN CUSTODY WHEN HIS STATEMENTS WERE MADE, SUPPRESSION MOTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT).
DEFENDANT’S SENTENCE DEEMED TOO HARSH BASED UPON DEFENDANT’S CRIMINAL HISTORY, THE PLEA DEAL DEFENDANT WAS OFFERED BEFORE TRIAL, AND THE ABSENCE OF ANY NEW EVIDENCE REVEALED BY THE TRIAL (FOURTH DEPT).
THE JUDGE ADOPTED A DECISION DRAFTED BY COUNSEL AS THE FINAL DETERMINATION OF THE CASE AND THEREBY VITIATED THE PURPOSE SERVED BY JUDICIAL OPINIONS; THE FOURTH DEPARTMENT VACATED THE JUDGMENT (FOURTH DEPT).

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