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ALTHOUGH VOLUNTARY PAYMENTS ON A DEFAULT JUDGMENT MAY WAIVE THE PERSONAL JURISDICTION DEFENSE TO THE FAILURE TO MOVE TO VACATE A DEFAULT JUDGMENT WITHIN A YEAR, HERE THE GARNISHMENT OF DEFENDANT’S WAGES FOR MORE THAN A YEAR DID NOT WAIVE THE DEFENSE (FIRST DEPT). ​

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant did not waive the personal jurisdiction defense (CPLR 5015(a)(4)) by waiting more that a year to move to vacate the default judgment, despite the garnishment of defendant’s wages during that time. Voluntary payments on a default judgment would have waived the defense, but not garnishment:

The proper approach for determining whether a defendant has waived the CPLR 5015(a)(4) personal jurisdiction defense involves the consideration of whether the defendant’s particular actions amount to “an intentional relinquishment of a known right” … , and results from the taking of some affirmative action evincing the intent to accept a judgment’s validity — such as the making of voluntary payments to satisfy a default judgment prior to moving to vacate … . The mere fact that a defendant, like defendant here, was subject to payments pursuant to a wage garnishment order for more than one year without taking some action is not, without more, a proper basis for finding waiver of the ability to seek relief under CPLR 5015(a)(4) … . Esgro Capital Mgt., LLC v Banks, 2023 NY Slip Op 06312, First Dept 12-7-23

Practice Practice: Making voluntary payments on a default judgment would waive a defendant’s personal-jurisdiction defense to the failure to move to vacate a default judgment within a year. But the garnishment of defendant’s wages for more than a year did not waive the defense.

 

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ALTHOUGH PLAINTIFFS DO NOT CONTEST THE APPEALS AND WILL NOT PURSUE THE LITIGATION, THE APPEALS ARE NOT MOOT BECAUSE THE ORDER MAY AFFECT RELATED ACTIONS AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS; THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION, BROUGHT BEFORE DEFENDANTS ANSWERED THE COMPLAINT, WAS PREMATURE (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined (1) despite the fact that the plaintiffs indicated they do not contest the appeals and will not pursue the action which had been dismissed, the appeals are not moot because the dismissal may affect related actions against the defendants; and (2) the plaintiff’s summary judgment motion, brought before the defendants had answered the amended complaint, was premature:

While plaintiffs do not contest the appeals and have represented that they will not be pursuing the underlying litigation, this does not render defendants’ appeals moot. The mootness doctrine will deprive a court of the ability to review a case where a change in circumstances between the parties has eliminated the controversy that once existed … . However, an appeal is not moot where “the rights of the parties will be directly affected by the determination of the appeal and the interest of the parties is an immediate consequence of the judgment” … . Defendants have the right to appeal the order addressing the motion to dismiss because it may serve as unfavorable precedent in related cases that have been brought against them. Hutcher v Madison Sq. Garden Entertainment Corp., 2023 NY Slip Op 06314, First Dept 12-7-23

Practice Point: An appeal is not moot when it is not contested if the order appealed from could affect related actions against the appellants.

 

THE SPA PATRON WHO SEXUALLY ASSAULTED PLAINTIFF WAS INVOLVED IN A FIGHT IN THE SPA BUT WAS ALLOWED TO REMAIN; THE FIGHT DID NOT RENDER THE SUBSEQUENT SEXUAL ASSAULT OF THE PLAINTIFF FORESEEABLE BY THE DEFENDANT SPA (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s action against defendant spa based on a sexual assault by a spa patron should have been dismissed. The patron pretended to be an employee of the spa and offered plaintiff a massage. From the standpoint of the defendant spa, the patron’s assault was not foreseeable. The fact that the assailant was involved in a fight before the sexual assault and was allowed to remain in the spa did not render the sexual assault foreseeable:

While landowners in general have a duty to act in a reasonable manner to prevent harm to those on their property, an owner’s duty to control the conduct of persons on its premises arises only when it has the opportunity to control such persons and is reasonably aware of the need for such control … . Thus the owner of a public establishment has no duty to protect patrons against unforeseeable and unexpected assaults … . To establish foreseeability based upon prior history of third-party criminal behavior, the criminal conduct at issue must be shown to be reasonably predictable based on the prior occurrence of the same or similar criminal activity at a location sufficiently proximate to the subject location … .

Contrary to plaintiff’s allegations, it was not reasonably foreseeable that a fight occurring amongst male patrons, who had been drinking there, could lead to the alleged assailant pretending to be an employee of the spa and then sexually assaulting her … . The prior altercation noted by plaintiff was completely unrelated to her situation and thus cannot support a claim that the instant assault was a foreseeable consequence of defendant permitting the men involved in the altercation [to remain at the premises … . Memeh v Spa 88, LLC, 2023 NY Slip Op 06315, First Dept 12-7-23

Practice Point: Here a spa patron pretending to be a masseuse employed by the spa sexually assaulted the plaintiff. The facts that the patron had been drinking and was involved in a fight but was allowed to remain in the spa did not render the subsequent sexual assault foreseeable.

 

AN ESCAPE LADDER BOLTED TO THE CEILING OF A PERSONNEL HOIST DETACHED AND FELL ON PLAINTIFF; PLAITIFF WAS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION (FIRST DEPT). ​

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment in this Labor Law 240(1) action should have been granted. Plaintiff was in a personnel hoist when an escape ladder bolted to the ceiling detached and fell on him:

The injured plaintiff … demonstrated that the access ladder “required securing for the purposes of the undertaking” … . … [T]he hoist — an enumerated safety device — was “inadequate for its purpose of keeping plaintiff safe while engaged in an elevation-related activity” … .Safeway’s [defendant’s] hoist mechanic testified that the hoists were inspected every ninety days, which involved the performance of a drop test to ensure the car stopped, a check that all switches and safety features were operational, and a visual inspection of the ladder, including the wingnut, washer, and bolt, to confirm it was secured to the ceiling. He further testified that the ladder was provided as an “escape ladder” for workers to exit the hoist, thus rendering it an “essential component of the hoist” … . Tisselin v Memorial Hosp. for Cancer & Allied Diseases, 2023 NY Slip Op 06210, First Dept 11-30-23

Practice Point: Here an escape ladder bolted to the ceiling of a personnel hoist fell on plaintiff. Plaintiff should have been awarded summary judgment on the Labor Law 240(1) cause of action.

 

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IN A REAR-END COLLISION CASE, DEFENDANT’S ALLEGATION PLAINTIFF STOPPED SUDDENLY DOES NOT RAISE A QUESTION OF FACT (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment in this rear-end traffic accident cause should have been granted. Defendant’s allegation plaintiff stopped suddenly did not raise a question of fact:

It is well established that a rear-end collision with a slowing or stopping vehicle establishes a prima facie case of negligence on the part of the operator of the rear vehicle … .

… [D]efendant failed to provide a nonnegligent explanation for the accident … . Defendant failed to establish that she maintained a safe following distance (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1129[a] … ) and that any repeated braking by plaintiff was not foreseeable due to the existence of the construction zone and 15 mile per hour speed limit. Defendant failed to establish that given the circumstances she could have “reasonably expected that traffic would continue unimpeded” … . While defendant claims that plaintiff made a sudden stop, a “claim by the rear driver that the lead vehicle made a sudden stop, standing alone, is insufficient to rebut the presumption of negligence” … . Ahmad v Behal, 2023 NY Slip Op 06196, First Dept 11-30-23

Practice Point: In a rear-end collision case, alleging the car in front stopped suddenly does not defeat the presumption that the rear driver was negligent.

 

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THE JURY’S FINDING THAT THE SCAFFOLD PROVIDED ADEQUATE PROTECTION FOR THE PLAINTIFF IN THIS SCAFFOLD-FALL CASE WAS AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE; NEW TRIAL REQUIRED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, setting aside the defense verdict and ordering a new trial in this Labor Law 240(1) scaffold-fall action, determined the scaffold did not adequately protect the plaintiff:

The scaffold on which plaintiff was working at the time of his accident failed to adequately protect him from a height-related hazard when his core drill jerked, causing him to fall backward … . “It does not matter whether plaintiff’s fall was the result of the scaffold . . . tipping, or was due to plaintiff misstepping off its side. In [either] of those circumstances, either defective or inadequate protective devices constituted a proximate cause of the accident” …  Since the remedy for a verdict that is against the weight of the evidence is a new trial … , the issues of whether defendants violated Labor Law § 240 (1), whether such violation proximately caused plaintiff’s accident and injuries, and damages should be retried. Isaac v 135 W. 52nd St. Owner LLC, 2023 NY Slip Op 06085, First Dept 11-28-23

Practice Point: In this Labor Law 240(1) scaffold-fall case, the jury’s finding that the scaffold provided plaintiff with adequate protection was deemed against the weight of the evidence. Where a jury verdict is against the weight of the evidence, a new trial is required.

 

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THE CIVIL RIGHTS LAW, NOT THE CPLR, CONTROLS COUNTERCLAIMS FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN A STRATEGIC LAWSUIT AGAINST PUBLIC PARTICIPATION (SLAPP) ACTION (FIRST DEPT). ​

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court in this Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (SLAPP) proceeding, determined that the criteria for dismissal of counterclaims are those in the Civil Rights Law, not the CPLR:

In this Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (SLAPP) action, the court’ s application of CPLR 3212(h) to the underlying summary judgment motion was improper, because the counterclaims “subject to the motion” were not SLAPP claims, but affirmative counterclaims for punitive damages and attorneys’ fees … .The award of attorneys’ fees and punitive damages in SLAPP actions are subject to their own statutory regime found in Civil Rights Law §§ 70-a and 76-a (anti-SLAPP statutes). The anti-SLAPP statutes contain their own requirements and evidentiary burdens that have nothing to do with CPLR 3212(h) … .

With respect to punitive damages, Civil Rights Law § 70-a(1)(c) provides that they may only be recovered upon “an additional demonstration” that the SLAPP action was commenced or continued for the sole purpose of “harassing, intimidating, punishing or otherwise maliciously inhibiting the free exercise of speech, petition or association rights.” Thus, when the court improperly applied the burden-shifting mechanism of 3212(h) to the punitive damages analysis, it effectively negated the requirement that defendants make this “additional demonstration.” …

With respect to attorneys’ fees, the pre-amendment version of Civil Rights Law § 70-a(1)(a) squarely put the burden of proof on the party advancing counterclaims to recover damages in the context of a SLAPP suit. As the November 2020 amendments to the anti-SLAPP statutes do not apply retroactively, this pre-amendment version of the statute applies … .

The pre-amendment version of Civil Rights Law § 70-a(1)(a) provided that “attorney’s fees may be recovered upon a demonstration . . . that the action involving public petition and participation was commenced or continued without a substantial basis in fact and law.” Courts have held that attorneys’ fees are discretionary under the pre-amendment statutory framework, and that it is not necessary to award attorneys’ fees “in every situation in which [an anti-SLAPP] claim is interposed” … . … [W]e find that the court providently exercised its discretion in awarding attorneys’ fees here … . 161 Ludlow Food, LLC v L.E.S. Dwellers, Inc., 2023 NY Slip Op 06076, First Dept 11-28-23

Practice Point: The analysis of counterclaims for attorney’s fees and punitive damages in a SLAPP action is controlled by the Civil Rights Law, not the CPLR.

 

THE ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE REQUIRED SERVICE BY OVERNIGHT EXPRESS; THE ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WAS SERVED BY PRIORITY MAIL; THE FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE SPECIFIED MANNER OF SERVICE DEPRIVED THE COURT OF JURISDICTION TO HEAR THE MOTION.

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff did not serve the order to show cause in the manner specified in the order. Therefore the court did not have jurisdiction to hear the motion and the order was vacated:

Despite the express provision requiring overnight express service, in the March 16, 2020, order to show cause, plaintiff served the order to show cause and related papers by Priority Mail, which only guarantees delivery in one to three days. Failure to comply strictly with the service provision of the order to show cause deprived the court of jurisdiction to hear the motion … . Therefore, the resulting July 15, 2020 order should be vacated. Colonial Funding Network, Inc. v Finley, 2023 NY Slip Op 05980, First Dept 11-21-23

Practice Point: If the order to show cause specifies the manner of service and service is not made in that manner, the court is deprived of jurisdiction to hear the motion.

 

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THE SENTENCE FOR MANSLAUGHTER SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN BASED UPON THE INTENT TO KILL WHICH IS NOT AN ELEMENT OF THE CRIME; THE SENTENCES FOR MANSLAUGHTER AND POSSESSION OF A WEAPON SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN IMPOSED CONSECUTIVELY; REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, remanding the matter for resentencing, determined the judge improperly based the sentence for manslaughter on the belief defendant intended to kill the victim. Intent to kill is not an element of manslaughter. It is an element of murder second degree. Defendant was acquitted of murder second degree. In addition, the judge should not have imposed consecutive sentences for manslaughter and possession of a weapon:

… [T]he court improperly based the sentence on the manslaughter conviction on its stated belief that defendant intended to kill the victim. Intent to kill is an element of murder in the second degree, of which defendant was acquitted, and not manslaughter in the first degree, of which defendant was convicted … . Because the sentence was based on conduct of which defendant had been acquitted, resentencing on the manslaughter conviction is required … . Although defendant’s challenge to this sentence is unpreserved, we reach it in the exercise of our interest of justice power … .

… [t]he imposition of consecutive sentences on the conviction for manslaughter and the conviction for simple possession of a weapon under Penal Law § 265.03(3) was improper. The sentences should have run concurrently, since the People did not demonstrate that the act of weapon possession was separate from the act of manslaughter … . There was no evidence presented at the trial establishing that defendant possessed the firearm before shooting the victim  … . People v Anonymous, 2023 NY Slip Op 05990, First Dept 11-21-23

Practice Point: The defendant was acquitted of second degree murder and convicted of manslaughter. The judge erroneously sentence defendant based on the belief defendant intended to kill the victim. But intent to kill is not an element of manslaughter. Resentencing was required.

Practice Point: There was no evidence the possession of a weapon by defendant was separate from the conduct underlying the manslaughter conviction. Therefore the sentences should not have been imposed consecutively.

 

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THE COMPLAINT ALLEGED DECEDENT, WHO WAS SUFFERING SHORTNESS OF BREATH, SHOULD HAVE BEEN PROVIDED AN ADVANCE LIFE SUPPORT AMBULANCE; THE COMPLAINT SOUNDED IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, NOT NEGLIGENCE, AND WAS TIME-BARRED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that the complaint alleging decedent, who was suffering shortness of breath, should have been provided an advance life support (ALS) ambulance sounded in medical malpractice, not negligence. Therefore the 2 1/2 year statute of limitations applied and the action was time-barred:

… [T]he allegations in the complaint sound in medical malpractice rather than ordinary negligence. Plaintiffs seek to hold defendant liable for its failure to provide decedent with an advance life support (ALS) ambulance after being advised that decedent was suffering from shortness of breath. The type of ambulance provided by defendant “bears a substantial relationship to the rendition of medical treatment,” and thus plaintiffs’ claims must be viewed within a medical malpractice framework … . The dispatcher would need to understand the significance of “shortness of breath,” have specialized knowledge of the equipment or devices that could treat or care for the possible conditions arising from this symptom and be familiar with accepted practice in providing an ALS ambulance … . Trofimova v Seniorcare Emergency Med. Servs., Inc., 2023 NY Slip Op 05997, First Dept 11-21-23

Practice Point: Where the complaint alleges the need for and failure to provide an ambulance with advance life support, it sounds in medical malpractice, not negligence.

 

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