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THE FORECLOSURE ABUSE PREVENTION ACT (FAPA) APPLIES RETROACTIVELY; THE DEFENDANT MORTGAGE COMPANY IS ESTOPPED BY CPLR 213(4)(A) FROM ASSERTING THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR A FORECLOSURE HAS NOT EXPIRED; PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT SEEKING DISCHARGE AND CANCELLATION OF THE MORTGAGE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Higgitt, determined (1) the Foreclosure Abuse Prevention Act (FAPA) applies retroactively; and (2) because the defendant mortgage company is estopped by CPLR 213(4)(b) from asserting the six-year statute of limitations for foreclosure had not expired, plaintiff’s RPAPL 1501(4) complaint (seeking cancellation and discharge of the mortgage) should not have been dismissed:

Having concluded that FAPA applies retroactively, we must next consider whether defendant is estopped under CPLR 213(4)(b) from asserting that the statute [*6]of limitations for the commencement of a mortgage foreclosure action has not expired because the debt secured by the mortgage was not validly accelerated in connection with the prior foreclosure action. CPLR 213(4)(b)’s potent estoppel bar will not be imposed, and a defendant will be free to assert that the debt secured by the mortgage was not validly accelerated in connection with a prior action, if, and only if, the prior action was dismissed based on an express judicial determination, made upon a timely interposed defense, that the instrument was not validly accelerated.

Here, defendant is estopped from asserting that the statute of limitations on a cause of action to foreclose on the mortgage has not expired. An action to foreclose on the mortgage was previously commenced and dismissed. Defendant is not saved by the limited exception afforded by CPLR 213(4)(b) because Supreme Court, in dismissing the foreclosure action, did not make an express determination that the debt secured by the mortgage was not validly accelerated. Rather, the court dismissed the foreclosure action on the ground that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendants therein … . Genovese v Nationstar Mtge. LLC, 2023 NY Slip Op 06477, First Dept 12-19-23

Practice Point: The Foreclosure Abuse Prevention Act (FAPA) applies retroactively. Here the defendant mortgage company was estopped by CPLR 214(4)(b) from asserting the six-year statute of limitations for a foreclosure action had not expired.

 

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