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THE CONTEMPT AND GAG ORDERS ISSUED IN THIS TRIAL WHERE FORMER PRESIDENT TRUMP IS THE DEFENDANT ARE NOT APPROPRIATELY CHALLENGED BY A DEMAND FOR A WRIT OF PROHIBITION OR AN ARTICLE 78 REVIEW; MOTIONS TO VACATE THE ORDERS SHOULD BE MADE; ANY DENIAL OF THE MOTIONS COULD THEN BE APPEALED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined demand for a writ of prohibition (CPLR 7803(2)) and an article 78 review (CPLR 7801(2)) of Contempt Orders and Gag Orders issued by the judge in this trial (where former President Donald Trump is the defendant) were not the proper procedural vehicles. The proper procedure would be to move the vacate the orders and then appeal the denial of the motion:

In determining whether to exercise the court’s discretion and grant a writ of prohibition, several factors are to be considered, including “the gravity of the harm which would be caused by an excess of power” and “whether the excess of power can be adequately corrected on appeal or by other ordinary proceedings at law or in equity” … . Here, the gravity of potential harm is small, given that the Gag Order is narrow, limited to prohibiting solely statements regarding the court’s staff … . Further, while the Gag Order and Contempt Orders were not issued pursuant to formal motion practice, they are reviewable through the ordinary appellate process (see CPLR 5701[a][3] …). For these reasons, a writ of prohibition is not the proper vehicle for challenging the Gag Order and Contempt Orders.

As to the first cause of action, CPLR 7801(2) clarifies that article 78 review is not permitted in a civil or criminal action where it can be reviewed by other means, “unless it is an order summarily punishing a contempt committed in the presence of the court” (CPLR 7801[2]). The Contempt Orders here were not issued “summarily,” nor was the contempt “committed in the presence of the court.” To the extent there may have been appealable issues with respect to any of the procedures the court implemented in imposing the financial sanctions, the proper method of review would be to move to vacate the Contempt Orders, and then to take an appeal from the denial of those motions. Matter of Trump v Engoron, 2023 NY Slip Op 06461, First Dept 12-14-23

Practice Point: The contempt and gag orders issued in this trial of former president Donald Trump cannot be challenged by a demand for a writ of prohibition or an Article 78 review. The proper procedure is to move to vacate the orders and appeal any denial.

 

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