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PLAINTIFF RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT RE: THE NEGLIGENT APPLICATION OF FLOOR WAX IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined plaintiff raised a question of fact whether the area where she slipped and fell was excessively waxed:

… [P]laintiff raised an issue of fact as to “the negligent application of wax . . . by evidence that a dangerous residue of wax was present” … . Plaintiff testified that the waxy substance on the floor was on the side of her clothing and that where she fell there was an indentation into the substance. This testimony is sufficient to establish an issue of fact as to whether wax was negligently applied … . This evidence “conflicted with [defendants’] assertions that the area was never waxed, creating triable issues of fact precluding the grant of summary judgment” … . Scaccia v Brookfield Props. One WFC Co., LLC, 2024 NY Slip Op 02677, First Dept 5-14-23

Practice Point: The negligent application of floor wax can result in liability for a slip and fall.

 

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FORMER PRESIDENT TRUMP’S PETITION FOR A WRIT OF PROHIBITION CHALLENGING A RESTRAINING ORDER RESTRICTING HIS ABILITY TO MAKE STATEMENTS DIRECTED AT POTENTIAL WITNESSES IN A CRIMINAL TRIAL DENIED (FIRST DEPT). ​

The First Department determined the restraining order restricting former President Donald Trump’s speech during his criminal trial was valid. Trump’s petition for a writ of prohibition was denied:

The Federal Restraining Order is nearly identical to the Restraining Order issued against petitioner in the underlying criminal case … .

Petitioner brings this petition because he disagrees with where the circuit court drew the line in balancing the competing considerations of his First Amendment rights to free expression and the effective functioning of the judicial, prosecutorial and defense processes … . Weighing these concerns, the circuit court ultimately concluded that, given the record, the court had “a duty to act proactively to prevent the creation of an atmosphere of fear or intimidation aimed at preventing trial participants and staff from performing their functions within the trial process” … . This Court adopts the reasoning in the circuit court’s Federal Restraining Order Decision.

The Federal Restraining Order Decision properly found that the order was necessary under the circumstances, holding that “Trump’s documented pattern of speech and its demonstrated real-time, real-world consequences pose a significant and imminent threat to the functioning of the criminal trial process” … . First, the circuit court concluded that petitioner’s directed statements at potential witnesses concerning their participation in the criminal proceeding posed a significant and imminent threat to their willingness to participate fully and candidly, and that courts have a duty to shield witnesses from influences that could affect their testimony and undermine the integrity of the trial process … . Justice Merchan properly determined that petitioner’s public statements posed a significant threat to the integrity of the testimony of witnesses and potential witnesses in this case as well. Matter of Trump v Merchan, 2024 NY Slip Op 02680, First Dept 5-14-24

Practice Point: A court has the power to restrict speech by a defendant in a criminal trial which is directed at potential trial witnesses and which could threaten the witnesses’ willingness to testify.

 

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ALTHOUGH PLAINTIFF WAS AWARDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS QUANTUM MERUIT CASE. DEFENDANT DID NOT WAIVE A JURY TRIAL AND WAS THEREFORE ENTITLED TO A JURY TRIAL ON DAMAGES; BENCH-TRIAL VERDICT REVERSED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined defendant never waived a jury trial in this quantum-meruit action. Therefore, although plaintiff was granted summary judgment, defendant was entitled to a jury trial on damages:

… [T]he order awarding damages must be reversed, and the judgment vacated … . Upon granting plaintiff summary judgment for liability on its quantum meruit claim, Supreme Court conducted a hearing on attorneys’ fees. However, claims seeking recovery under the “quasi-contractual theory of quantum meruit” for “only money damages” are considered “actions at law” entitling parties to a trial by jury … . Defendant did not waive a jury trial, but instead filed his jury demand “within fifteen days after service of the note of issue,” and more than a year before the purported attorney fee hearing was held (CPLR 4102[a]). Defendant’s “right to a jury trial [wa]s not lost, when [the] motion [and cross-motion] for summary judgment [were] decided against [him]” … , yet Supreme Court deprived him of this right by conducting a bench trial on damages … . Hilton Wiener LLC v Zenk, 2024 NY Slip Op 02595, First Dept 5-9-24

Practice Point: Quantum meruit is an action at law entitling parties to a jury trial.

Practice Point: Here defendant never waived a jury trial and, although summary judgment was awarded to plaintiff, defendant was entitled to a jury trial on damages.

 

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WHEN DEFENDANT MADE STATEMENTS AT THE TIME OF THE PLEA WHICH RAISED A POSSIBLE INTOXICATION DEFENSE THE JUDGE SHOULD HAVE INQUIRED FURTHER; THE ISSUE NEEDN’T BE PRESERVED FOR APPEAL (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, vacating defendant’s guilty plea, determined the defendant’s statement at the time of the plea raised questions the judge should have explored. A narrow exception to the preservation requirement applies here:

The narrow exception to the preservation requirement applies in this “rare case” where defendant made statements that cast doubt upon his guilt and the court failed to satisfy its duty of inquiring further to ensure that defendant’s plea was knowing and voluntary … . Although defendant’s statements at sentencing raised a possible intoxication defense, the court did not make any inquiry regarding the statements or the applicability of the defense. The court’s failure to ensure that defendant understood the defense and was waiving his right to pursue it at trial requires vacatur of the plea … . People v Dozier, 2024 NY Slip Op 02602, First Dept 5-9-24

Practice Point: If a defendant makes statements at the time of a plea which indicates a possible defense, the judge must make inquiries sufficient to ensure the plea is voluntary and intelligent.

Practice Point: When a defendant makes statements at the time of the plea which indicate a possible defense and the judge fails to make sufficient inquiries, the issue is appealable in the absence of preservation.

 

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THE JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE REJECTED PLAINTIFF’S EXPERT’S OPINION BECAUSE SHE WAS A REGISTERED NURSE, NOT A DOCTOR; THE REGISTERED NURSE WAS QUALIFIED TO OFFER AN OPINION ON FALL PREVENTION; AN EXPERT’S QUALIFICATIONS SPEAK TO THE WEIGHT OF THE OPINION EVIDENCE, NOT ADMISSIBILITY (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the evidence submitted by plaintiff’s expert, a registered nurse, should not have been rejected because she was not a physician. Plaintiff’s decedent was a nursing-home patient with dementia who fell. The registered nurse was qualified to offer opinion evidence about measures to prevent elderly patients from falling:

Supreme Court disregarded plaintiff’s nursing expert’s opinion because she is not a medical doctor. However, the standard of care at issue clearly falls within the duties and expertise of a registered nurse. At the defendant nursing home, patient assessments were performed by registered nurses and evaluated by a team which included registered nurses. The nursing expert’s curriculum vitae demonstrates that she has a Bachelor of Science in nursing from the University of the State of New York, is licensed as a registered nurse in New York, and has worked in nursing since 1980. In particular, she has over fifteen years of experience conducting plan of care assessments for high-risk nursing home patients. Therefore, plaintiff’s nursing expert demonstrated that she has the requisite experience and expertise to opine as to the proper medical standard for preventing falls in elderly patients with dementia residing in skilled nursing facilities and whether defendant deviated from that standard … .

Furthermore, challenges regarding an expert witness’s qualifications affect the weight to be accorded the expert’s views, not their admissibility … . Rodriguez v Isabella Geriatric Ctr. Inc., 2024 NY Slip Op 02608, First Dept 5-9-24

Practice Point: Here the registered nurse was qualified to offer an opinion on the measures necessary to prevent geriatric patients from falling.

Practice Point: An expert’s qualifications speak to the weight of the opinion evidence, not its admissibility. Here the registered nurses opinion should not have been rejected because she was not a physician.

 

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ALTHOUGH PLAINTIFF MADE OUT A PRIMA FACIE CASE IN THIS LABOR LAW 240(1) LADDER-FALL ACTION, DEFENDANTS RAISED TRIABLE ISSUES OF FACT BY POINTING TO INCONSISTENCIES IN PLAINTIFF’S ACCOUNT (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendants were able to raise triable issues of fact in this ladder-fall Labor Law 240(1) cause by pointing to inconsistencies in the plaintiff’s version of events:

Plaintiff was allegedly injured while removing and replacing bricks on a building at a construction site. At his deposition, plaintiff testified that while working, he climbed up an extension ladder to retrieve materials necessary for the project. According to plaintiff, when he reached a point around seven to eight feet off the ground, the ladder suddenly moved, causing him to fall.

Plaintiff established prima facie entitlement to summary judgment by submitting his deposition testimony describing the accident, along with photographic evidence of the accident site.

… [D]efendants raised triable issues of fact sufficient to defeat the motion by identifying various inconsistencies in plaintiffs account of the accident, thus calling into question his overall credibility and the circumstances underlying his claimed injuries … . For example, plaintiff testified inconsistently about the day that he was allegedly injured, whether he continued working after his alleged accident, and whether he promptly reported his accident. Further, the record evidence shows that plaintiff first went to the hospital at least several days after his employer had allegedly terminated him for unexplained, repeated absenteeism. Simpertegui v Carlyle House Inc., 2024 NY Slip Op 02609, First Dept 5-9-24

Practice Point: Credibility issues can defeat a motion for summary judgment.

 

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PLAINTIFF’S ALLOWING HIS ATTACKER INTO HIS APARTMENT WAS AN INTERVENING ACT AND A SUPERSEDING PROXIMATE CAUSE WHICH RELIEVED THE BUILDING DEFENDANTS OF ANY LIABILITY FOR LAPSES IN SECURITY (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that there was evidence building security was lax, but plaintiff’s allowing the attacker, whom plaintiff knew, into to plaintiff’s apartment was an intervening act relieving the building defendants from liability:

Plaintiff, a psychiatrist, was conducting a patient session in his home office when Jacob Nolan, the cousin of his estranged former partner barged unannounced into the office. He was carrying a large black duffel bag and demanded that plaintiff give him certain financial documents required for the child shared by plaintiff and the former partner.… Plaintiff reproached Nolan, successfully expelled him from the apartment and locked the door. After the session, the patient departed but quickly returned to advise the plaintiff that the man who barged in was loitering in a common area of the building. Plaintiff then escorted his patient to the elevator and again engaged Nolan in dialogue. Nolan again communicated that his purported purpose was to retrieve some financial documents for the former partner and asked to use the bathroom in plaintiff’s apartment (which plaintiff made available to patients). Plaintiff then permitted Nolan into his locked apartment to use the bathroom, while plaintiff printed the form Nolan had requested. Nolan then suddenly emerged from the bathroom and attacked plaintiff, hitting him with a sledgehammer and stabbing him multiple times with a knife. Nolan and the former partner were both arrested and convicted for felony assaults upon the plaintiff.

… Supreme Court should have granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. … [P]laintiff raised legitimate issues regarding lapses in the defendants’ security protocols, such as defendants’ allowing Nolan to enter and wander around the building for over twenty minutes before exiting, only to re-enter the building minutes later without being challenged by the building staff about his continued presence. Plaintiff’s conduct in re-admitting Nolan into the apartment after earlier expelling him, however, constituted an intervening act and a superseding proximate cause … . Weiss v Park Towers S. Co., LLC, 2024 NY Slip Op 02612, First Dept 5-9-24

Practice Point: Here plaintiff knew his attacker and allowed the attacker into his apartment. That was an intervening act and a superseding proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries which insulated the building defendants from liability for lapses in security.

 

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PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT COMMITTED SUICIDE BY JUMPING FROM A LEDGE OUTSIDE HIS HOTEL ROOM; HOTEL STAFF DID NOT ASSUME A DUTY OF CARE FOR PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT; A DELAY AFTER A FAMILY MEMBER’S REQUEST THAT HOTEL STAFF CALL THE POLICE WAS NOT DEMONSTRATED BY EXPERT OPINION TO HAVE CAUSED THE SUICIDE (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Pitt-Burke, over an extensive dissenting opinion, determined the defendant hotel did not assume a duty of care for a hotel guest who committed suicide and did not proximately cause plaintiff-decedent’s suicide. Hotel staff had been made aware of decedent’s family’s fear that decedent, who was in a room at the hotel, was suicidal. Hotel staff checked on the decedent, who indicated he was “fine.” Subsequently a family member, who had been communicating with decedent, asked hotel staff to call the police. The crux of the lawsuit is the allegation that a delay in calling the police caused decedent to commit suicide. After breaking into decedent’s locked room, the police found decedent on a ledge outside the window and unsuccessfully tried to talk him back into the room:

An entity in control of a premises, “whether [it] be a landowner or a leaseholder, is not an insurer of the visitor’s safety” … . Absent a duty of care, there is no breach and no liability, regardless of how careless the conduct … . * * *

Plaintiffs … contend that defendants breached an assumed duty of care when they agreed to check on the decedent after being informed of his suicidal ideations and failed to act carefully or reasonably in contacting the police.

While “one who assumes a duty to act, even though gratuitously, may thereby become subject to the duty of acting carefully” … , a defendant can only be held “liable for a breach of an assumed duty where the plaintiff shows reliance on the defendant’s course of conduct, such that the defendant’s conduct placed him or her in a more vulnerable position than he or she would otherwise have been in had the defendant done nothing” … . * * *

… [T]he record on appeal clearly shows … that despite defendants’ delay in calling the police, a period of at least thirty minutes elapsed from the time the police entered the hotel and decedent jumped from the ledge in the police officer’s presence. Beadell v Eros Mgt. Reality, LLC, 2024 NY Slip Op 02496, First De[t 5-7-24

Practice Point: A landowner or leaseholder in control of a hotel is not an insurer of a hotel guest’s safety and does not owe a duty of care to hotel guests absent the assumption of a duty to act (not the case here where a hotel guest committed suicide).

Practice Point: The expert opinion evidence here fell short of demonstrating that hotel staff’s delay in calling the police at the request of decedent’s family was the proximate cause of plaintiff’s decedent’s suicide.

 

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COMPLAINT ALLEGING THE NEW YORK CITY PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEM DISCRIMINATES AGAINST STUDENTS OF COLOR AND SEEKING INJUNCTIVE RELIEF SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Moulton, reversing Supreme Court, determined the complaint alleging the New York City public school system discriminates against Black and Latinx students and seeking injunctive relief was justiciable and stated valid causes of action. Therefore the complaint, which had been dismissed, is now reinstated. The opinion is comprehensive and far too detailed to fairly summarize here:

Plaintiffs allege that State and City policies create a “racialized” admission pipeline. According to plaintiffs, the pipeline begins with a single standardized test for the City’s Gifted & Talented (G&T) programs taken by children as young as four-years-old. The G&T test, plaintiffs assert, disproportionately benefits “privileged” white students and their “in-the-know” parents, who have the “navigational capital” to understand the admissions process and the economic capital to pay for expensive test preparation. The G&T programs, plaintiffs allege, provide superior academic preparation, which allows primarily white and Asian students to continue through the pipeline to academically screened middle and high schools, relegating Black and Latinx students to unscreened schools, often in poorly maintained buildings with limited extracurricular programs. The end of the pipeline, or “zenith” as plaintiffs describe it, is admission to one of eight New York City specialized high schools based on the results of the Special High School Admissions Test (the SHSAT).* * *

The pipeline, plaintiffs claim, is designed to exclude Black and Latinx students from the City’s prime educational opportunities. According to plaintiffs, the State and the City “intentionally adopted” and “for decades have intentionally retained—with no pedagogical basis—testing-based sorting that they know excludes students of color from equal educational opportunities.” This knowledge was acquired, plaintiffs allege, “through decades of experience and reflected in [defendants] own admissions” including the knowledge of the public school system’s “racist character and outcomes.” Despite this knowledge, plaintiffs allege that the State and the City “intentionally refuse to dismantle . . . its racialized channeling system.” IntegrateNYC, Inc. v State of New York, 2024 NY Slip Op 02369, First Dept 5-2-24

Practice Point: Here Supreme Court’s conclusion that the suit seeking injunctive relief from discriminatory education policies and procedures in the New York City public school system was not “justiciable” was rejected.

 

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