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MOTION TO DISMISS SUIT SEEKING RETURN OF A PAINTING ALLEGEDLY LOOTED BY THE NAZI-OCCUPIED FRENCH GOVERNMENT DURING WORLD WAR II PROPERLY DENIED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined defendants’ motion to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds was properly denied. The suit seeks the return of a painting allegedly looted by the Nazi-occupied French government:

In weighing the relevant factors, the court correctly observed that plaintiff and several defendants maintained residences in New York … . Although defendants suggest that France is the more appropriate forum, they also argued below, and submitted expert affidavits in support of the position, that this action would be time-barred in that jurisdiction, an important factor to consider … . This Court observes that retaining this action would not be particularly burdensome; New York has previously entertained actions concerning Nazi looting of art during World War II … . That the originals of some documents are located abroad does not require dismissal, and it is noted that the key documents have already been translated for the court… . In light of the foregoing, defendants failed to meet their heavy burden of establishing that the action should be dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds … . Gowen v Helly Nahmad Gallery, Inc., 2019 NY Slip Op 01350, First Dept 2-26-19

 

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QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE RECKLESS STANDARD APPLIED IN THIS PEDESTRIAN-POLICE CAR ACCIDENT CASE (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined there was a question of fact whether the reckless standard applied in this pedestrian-police car traffic accident case. The court noted that the governmental function immunity doctrine does not apply to this scenario:

The governmental function immunity doctrine does not apply in this case where plaintiff pedestrian was injured when she was struck by a police vehicle that was allegedly pursuing a vehicle that had committed a traffic infraction … . Instead, where a plaintiff alleges that a municipality and/or its employees were negligent in the ownership or operation of an authorized emergency vehicle while engaged in one of the activities protected by Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104(b), the “reckless disregard” standard set forth in Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104(e) applies … .

Here, a factual issue exists as to whether defendants were engaged in a protected activity under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104(b), namely, proceeding past a steady red signal (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104[b][2]), while pursuing a vehicle for a traffic violation so as to apply the reckless standard of care as opposed to ordinary negligence principles … . Santana v City of New York, 2019 NY Slip Op 01348, First Dept 2-26-19

 

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$1 MILLION ATTORNEY’S FEE REQUEST CUT IN HALF BY SURROGATE’S COURT AND REDUCED A FURTHER $100,000 BY THE FIRST DEPT CITING EXCESSIVE CHARGES FOR IN-FIRM DISCUSSIONS AND UNNECESSARY WORK (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined Surrogate’s Court properly reduced by half the $1 million attorney’s-fees request, which represented 1/3 of the estate and trust assets. First Department further reduced the fees by another $100,000:

Respondent’s counsel sought approval for legal fees in the amount of $1,037,183 for their representation of respondent. The amount requested represented 33.7% of the estate and trust assets. The Surrogate noted that the fees were far in excess of a typical fee for the services performed by respondent’s counsel, concluded that the fees were excessive, and fixed the fees in the total amount of $520,000.

Although the Surrogate reduced the fees from the exorbitant amount originally requested, we conclude that the fees as reduced are still excessive given the size of the estate … . While there is no set formula for fee awards, upon our review of counsel’s time records and in the exercise of discretion, we conclude that a further reduction in the amount of $100,000 is warranted. This additional reduction is necessary to properly account for excessive charges for inter-office communications and discussions amongst members of the firm, and unnecessary work performed … . Matter of SR, 2019 NY Slip Op 01343, First Dept 2-26-19

 

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PHOTOGRAPH OF DEFENDANT WITH A WEAPON PROPERLY ADMITTED DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE THE DEPICTED WEAPON WAS USED IN THE CHARGED OFFENSE, JURY WAS PROPERLY INSTRUCTED ON ACCESSORIAL LIABILITY DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF AN ALLEGATION OF ACCESSORIAL LIABILITY IN THE INDICTMENT AND DESPITE THE PEOPLE’S THEORY THAT DEFENDANT WAS THE SHOOTER (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined a photograph depicting defendant with a weapon was properly admitted into evidence despite the absence of evidence that the weapon in the photograph was the weapon used in the offense. The trial court properly instructed the jury on accessorial liability despite the absence of an allegation of accessorial liability in the indictment and the People’s theory that defendant shot the victim:

The court providently exercised its discretion in admitting in evidence a photograph, taken less than two months before the shooting, showing a person, sufficiently established to be defendant, holding a revolver of the type used in the crime. This evidence was relevant to show that defendant had access to such a weapon, thus tending to establish his identity as the perpetrator, and there was no requirement of proof that the revolver in the photograph was the actual weapon used in the crime … . …

The court properly instructed the jury on accessorial liability, notwithstanding that no such language appeared in the indictment and the People’s main theory was that defendant personally shot the victim. There was no improper amendment of the indictment, because an indictment charging a defendant as a principal is “not unlawfully amended by the admission of proof and instruction to the jury that a defendant is additionally charged with acting-in-concert to commit the same crime, nor does it impermissibly broaden a defendant’s basis of liability, as there is no legal distinction between liability as a principal or criminal culpability as an accomplice” … . A theory that defendant intentionally aided a particular other person, who did the actual shooting, was supported by defendant’s own testimony. Although defendant claimed he had not shared the gunman’s intent, such intent could be inferred from the totality of the evidence. We reject defendant’s claim of unfair surprise, particularly because the theory of accessorial liability arose from defendant’s own testimony … . People v Alexander, 2019 NY Slip Op 01341, First Dept 2-26-19

 

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PLAINTIFF’S DEPLORABLE MISCONDUCT, INCLUDING ACCESSING DEFENDANT’S ATTORNEY-CLIENT COMMUNICATIONS, DELETING RELEVANT DOCUMENTS AND LYING UNDER OATH, IN DELAWARE COURT PROCEEDINGS REQUIRED DISMISSAL OF PLAINTIFF’S PERSONAL INJURY ACTION AGAINST THE SAME DEFENDANT IN NEW YORK (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that the plaintiff’s personal injury action should have been dismissed because of plaintiff’s misconduct in a Delaware court proceeding. The New York personal injury action alleged plaintiff was injured in an physical fight with the defendant which stemmed from the Delaware litigation. The Delaware court found that plaintiff had engaged in deplorable misconduct by accessing defendant’s privileged attorney-client communications, deleting relevant documents and lying under oath:

Plaintiff’s improper and willful access of defendant’s privileged communications and spoliation of evidence supports dismissal of his claims in this action (CPLR 3103[c]; CPLR 3126[3]; Lipin v Bender , 84 NY2d 562 [1994] [dismissing the plaintiff’s complaint because her improper taking of the defendant’s attorney/client documents and work product caused prejudice to the defendant and irreparably tainted the litigation process]). Among the materials improperly accessed here was a privileged memorandum from defendant’s counsel about his strategy concerning the incident underlying this action. Further, plaintiff’s counsel referred to the contents of some of the privileged communications during motion practice in this litigation. Since “[p]laintiff’s knowledge . . . can never be purged,” and he would “carry [that knowledge] into any new attorney-client relationship,” we find that dismissal of the complaint is “the only practicable remedy here” … . Shawe v Elting, 2019 NY Slip Op 01374, First Dept 2-26-19

 

SOLICITATIONS FOR NEWSPAPER AND MAGAZINE SUBSCRIPTIONS WERE MATERIALLY MISLEADING IN VIOLATION OF GENERAL BUSINESS 349, THE SOLICITATIONS IMPLIED THEY WERE SENT DIRECTLY FROM THE PUBLISHER (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined solicitations for newspaper and magazine subscriptions were materially misleading, violating the General Business Law and the Executive Law:

… [W]e conclude as a matter of law that solicitations for newspaper and magazine subscriptions promulgated by respondents are materially misleading (… see generally General Business Law §§ 349; 350; Executive Law § 63[12]). The solicitations implied that they were sent directly from the publishers or their authorized agents and offered their lowest available rates. However, the record demonstrates that respondents had at best indirect relationships with publishers (some of whom expressly forbade respondents to sell their publications) and offered rates well above the standard subscription prices. …

The disclaimer on the back of the solicitations is insufficiently prominent or clear to negate the overall misleading impression that consumers are being offered standard publisher rates … . The disclaimer appears on the back of the solicitation, is not referenced on the front, and consists of two dense paragraphs of block text all in the same typeface, making it unlikely to be read by consumers. In addition, the disclaimer either does not address or directly contradicts several claims made on the front of the solicitation, and its use of the term “agent” implies a closer relationship with the publishers than respondents actually have. Matter of People of the State of N.Y. v Orbital Publ. Group, Inc., 2019 NY Slip Op 01329, First Dept 2-21-19

 

THE MOTION TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT WAS MADE BEFORE THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS RAN, BUT THE SUPPLEMENTAL SUMMONS WAS NOT ATTACHED TO THE MOTION PAPERS, THEREFORE THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS WAS NOT TOLLED BY THE MOTION (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined the statute of limitations was not tolled by the motion to amend the complaint, which was made before the statute ran, because the supplemental summons was not attached to the motion papers:

Although plaintiffs sought leave to amend the complaint before the applicable statute of limitations had expired, their motion did not toll the statute, because they failed to annex the supplemental summons to their papers (see Karagiannis v North Shore Long Is. Jewish Health Sys., Inc., 80 AD3d 569, 569 [2d Dept 2011]). Bossung v Rebaco Realty Holding Co., N.V., 2019 NY Slip Op 01188 [169 AD3d 538], First Dept 2-19-19

 

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SORA COURT MAY HAVE OVERASSESSED THE RISK IN A STATUTORY RAPE CASE, MATTER REMITTED FOR PROPER APPLICATION OF THE CRITERIA ANNOUNCED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS IN PEOPLE V GILLOTTI (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department sent the matter back to the SORA court for further consideration of the request for a downward department where defendant was convicted of statutory rape:

In People v Gillotti (23 NY3d 841 [2014]), the Court of Appeals outlined a three-step process for determining whether to grant a defendant’s request for a downward departure. First, the hearing court is to determine whether alleged mitigating circumstances are “of a kind or degree not adequately taken into account by the guidelines”… . If so, the court applies a preponderance of the evidence standard (id. at 863) to determine whether the defendant has proven the existence of those circumstances … . Finally, if the first two steps are satisfied, the court must “exercise its discretion by weighing the aggravating and mitigating factors to determine whether the totality of the circumstances warrants” a downward departure to avoid an overassessment of the defendant’s dangerousness and risk of sexual reoffense … .

While not entirely clear on this point, the decision of the hearing court in this case suggests that, in this case of statutory rape, the court considered itself bound, as a matter of law, to conclude that the various details of the offense urged as mitigating circumstances by defendant were adequately accounted for by the guidelines. Thus, the court appeared to consider itself unable to engage in the discretionary weighing prescribed in Gillotti’s third step. To the extent that the court acted based on this reasoning, it operated on an inaccurate premise that is contradicted by numerous cases that have granted downward departures in a similar context … , as well as the Guidelines themselves (see Sex Offender Registration Act: Risk Assessment Guidelines and Commentary at 9 [2006]).

“In cases of statutory rape, the Board has long recognized that strict application of the Guidelines may in some instances result in overassessment of the offender’s risk to public safety” … . Accordingly, the fact that in such a case the offender is not assessed any points for force or injury should not be the end of the discussion of whether to grant a downward departure. People v Soto, 2019 NY Slip Op 01184, First Dept 2-19-19

 

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POLICE OFFICER WAS PROPERLY ALLOWED TO IDENTIFY DEFENDANTS AS THE PERSONS DEPICTED IN VIDEOTAPES (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department noted that a police officer was properly allowed to identify defendants as persons depicted in videotapes:

The circumstances … warranted testimony by the officer identifying defendants as persons depicted in videotapes … . Notwithstanding the fact that defendants had not changed their appearance subsequent to having been videotaped, the testimony was permissible, because “[the] testimony served to aid the jury in making an independent assessment regarding whether the [men] in the [were] indeed the defendant[s]'”… . Furthermore, the circumstances suggested that the jury would be less able than the officer to determine whether the defendants were seen in the videotapes, given the poor quality of the surveillance tapes, which showed groups of young men, mostly from a distance, thus rendering his testimony appropriate … . The trial court instructed the jurors that the officer’s testimony concerning the identities of those seen on video was his opinion and that the ultimate identification determination belonged exclusively to the jury. Furthermore, none of the officer’s testimony violated the hearsay rule or defendants’ right of confrontation. People v Pinkston, 2019 NY Slip Op 01171, First Dept 2-19-19

 

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FOOTAGE FROM A POLICE OFFICER’S BODY-WORN CAMERA IS NOT A PERSONNEL RECORD AND THEREFORE IS NOT PROTECTED FROM DISCLOSURE BY CIVIL RIGHTS LAW 50-a (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined that footage from a police officer’s body-worn camera was not a “personnel record” protected from disclosure by Civil Rights Law 50-a:

While we recognize petitioner’s valid concerns about invasion of privacy and threats to the safety of police officers, we are tasked with considering the record’s general “nature and use,” and not solely whether it may be contemplated for use in a performance evaluation. Otherwise, that could sweep into the purview of § 50-a many police records that are an expected or required part of investigations or performance evaluations, such as arrest reports, stop reports, summonses, and accident reports, which clearly are not in the nature of personnel records so as to be covered by § 50-a.

We find that given its nature and use, the body-worn-camera footage at issue is not a personnel record covered by the confidentiality and disclosure requirements of § 50-a … . The purpose of body-worn-camera footage is for use in the service of other key objectives of the program, such as transparency, accountability, and public trust-building.

Although the body-worn-camera program was designed, in part, for performance evaluation purposes, and supervisors are required, at times, to review such footage for the purpose of evaluating performance, the footage being released here is not primarily generated for, nor used in connection with any pending disciplinary charges or promotional processes. New York Civil Liberties Union v New York City Police Department, __NY3d__, 2018 NY Slip Op 8423 [2018], which involved disciplinary matters, does not constrain this analysis. The footage, here, rather, is more akin to arrest or stop reports, and not records primarily generated for disciplinary and promotional purposes. To hold otherwise would defeat the purpose of the body-worn-camera program to promote increased transparency and public accountability. Matter of Patrolmen’s Benevolent Assn. of the City of N.Y., Inc. v De Blasio, 2019 NY Slip Op 01170, First Dept 2-19-19

 

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