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DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR MAY APPLY TO WINDOW FALLING ONTO PLAINTIFF, DEFENDANT BUILDING MANAGER’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined there were questions of fact whether defendant building manager was liable for the injuries to plaintiff from a window which fell out and onto his head when he attempted to close it. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may apply:

… [P]laintiff used the locker room to change and opened one of the windows half a foot to cool down. When he attempted to close the window, he used a “little bit more force than [he] did when [he] lifted it.” As the window closed, it reverberated a bit and then the whole window structure came out and crashed over plaintiff’s head. …

The defendant met its prima facie burden on lack of constructive notice of a dangerous condition. While it is disputed that defendant never inspected the windows since installation in 2004, it did not have an affirmative duty to conduct reasonable inspections … .

We find that an issue of fact exists as to the applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which allows for an inference of negligence to be drawn on the occurrence of an accident. The doctrine requires that a plaintiff must demonstrate that the “event is the kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of negligence, that it was caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant, and [that] it was not due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the plaintiff” … .

Here, “common experience” dictates that a window being shut does not simply fall out absent negligence. In order to establish exclusive control, plaintiff is not required to show that defendant “had sole physical access” to the window… . Further, here remains a question of fact whether plaintiff did something to contribute to the window falling on him. Wilkins v West Harlem Group Assistance, Inc., 2018 NY Slip Op 08247, First Dept 12-4-18

NEGLIGENCE (RES IPSA LOQUITUR, DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR MAY APPLY TO WINDOW FALLING ONTO PLAINTIFF, DEFENDANT BUILDING MANAGER’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT))/RES IPSA LOQUITUR (DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR MAY APPLY TO WINDOW FALLING ONTO PLAINTIFF, DEFENDANT BUILDING MANAGER’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT))

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ALTHOUGH THE RULES OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK REQUIRED THAT TIME WARNER MAINTAIN ONLY THE AREA 12 INCHES AROUND A METAL BOX COVER IN THE SIDEWALK, THERE WERE QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER TIME WARNER OR A PREDECESSOR CREATED THE DEFECT OR HAD CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE DEFECT OUTSIDE THE 12 INCH AREA, SUPREME COURT REVERSED IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that defendant Time Warner’s motion for summary judgment in this sidewalk slip and fall case should not have been granted. Although the sidewalk defect was outside 12 inch area around the metal box cover in the sidewalk which the Rules of the City of New York (RCNY) require Time Warner to maintain, there were questions of fact whether Time Warner created the defect or had constructive notice of the defect:

Time Warner … has a common-law duty not to create a hazardous condition on the sidewalk … , and, further, as a special user of the public sidewalk, has a “duty to maintain the area of the special use in a reasonably safe condition”… . Additionally, constructive notice may be imputed where, as here, there is a duty under the administrative code to conduct inspections of the box covers … .

Here, the evidence, including the testimony of Time Warner’s construction manager, shows that Time Warner did not regularly inspect its box covers, as required by the regulation it relied upon … , and that, if the area had been inspected, Time Warner would have repaired the cracked sidewalk condition around the box cover and replaced the sidewalk flag, which extends to the spot where plaintiff tripped. Time Warner also submitted the affidavit of an engineer who measured the distance between plaintiff’s fall and the box cover as more than 12 inches, but did not address whether or not the metal box installed in the sidewalk created the cracked condition around the box cover that extended to the spot where plaintiff fell. Furthermore, the fact that Time Warner did not install the box cover itself has no bearing since the duty to maintain the area of the special use “runs with the land as long as it is maintained for the benefit of a special user” … . Robles v Time Warner Cable Inc., 2018 NY Slip Op 08244, First Dept 12-4-18

NEGLIGENCE (SLIP AND FALL, ALTHOUGH THE RULES OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK REQUIRED THAT TIME WARNER MAINTAIN ONLY THE AREA 12 INCHES AROUND A METAL BOX COVER IN THE SIDEWALK, THERE WERE QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER TIME WARNER OR A PREDECESSOR CREATED THE DEFECT OR HAD CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE DEFECT OUTSIDE THE 12 INCH AREA, SUPREME COURT REVERSED  IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE (FIRST DEPT))/SLIP AND FALL (ALTHOUGH THE RULES OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK REQUIRED THAT TIME WARNER MAINTAIN ONLY THE AREA 12 INCHES AROUND A METAL BOX COVER IN THE SIDEWALK, THERE WERE QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER TIME WARNER OR A PREDECESSOR CREATED THE DEFECT OR HAD CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE DEFECT OUTSIDE THE 12 INCH AREA, SUPREME COURT REVERSED  IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE (FIRST DEPT))/SIDEWALKS (SLIP AND FALL, ALTHOUGH THE RULES OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK REQUIRED THAT TIME WARNER MAINTAIN ONLY THE AREA 12 INCHES AROUND A METAL BOX COVER IN THE SIDEWALK, THERE WERE QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER TIME WARNER OR A PREDECESSOR CREATED THE DEFECT OR HAD CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE DEFECT OUTSIDE THE 12 INCH AREA, SUPREME COURT REVERSED  IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE (FIRST DEPT))/SPECIAL USE (SIDEWALKS, SLIP AND FALL,  ALTHOUGH THE RULES OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK REQUIRED THAT TIME WARNER MAINTAIN ONLY THE AREA 12 INCHES AROUND A METAL BOX COVER IN THE SIDEWALK, THERE WERE QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER TIME WARNER OR A PREDECESSOR CREATED THE DEFECT OR HAD CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE DEFECT OUTSIDE THE 12 INCH AREA, SUPREME COURT REVERSED  IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE (FIRST DEPT))

NEW JERSEY FORGED INSTRUMENT CONVICTION WAS NOT THE EQUIVALENT OF A NEW YORK FELONY AND SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN THE BASIS OF SECOND FELONY OFFENDER STATUS (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Renwick, ordering the resentencing of defendant, determined the defendant’s prior New Jersey forged instrument conviction was not the equivalent of a New York felony and therefore could not be the basis of second felony offender status:

The first mens rea element of both New York and New Jersey’s crime of uttering a forged instrument are the same: that the defendant had knowledge that the subject instrument was forged. However, the second mens rea element of the New Jersey crime of uttering a forged instrument is broader than the second mens rea element of the New York crime of uttering a forged instrument. Because the New Jersey statute uses the disjunctive “or,” the second mens rea element of the NJ crime of uttering a forged instrument can be satisfied in two different ways: that one who utters a forged instrument must act either with the intent to defraud (purpose to defraud or injure anyone) or with the knowledge that one is facilitating a fraud. By contrast, the second mens rea element of the New York crime of uttering a forged instrument can be satisfied only one way: that the person who utters a forged instrument acted with the “intent to defraud.” Since the New Jersey statute punishes a broader range of mental states than its New York counterpart, it fails New York’s strict equivalency test … . People v Allison, 2018 NY Slip Op 08194, First Dept 11-29-18

CRIMINAL LAW (NEW JERSEY FORGED INSTRUMENT CONVICTION WAS NOT THE EQUIVALENT OF A NEW YORK FELONY AND SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN THE BASIS OF SECOND FELONY OFFENDER STATUS (FIRST DEPT))/SENTENCING (NEW JERSEY FORGED INSTRUMENT CONVICTION WAS NOT THE EQUIVALENT OF A NEW YORK FELONY AND SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN THE BASIS OF SECOND FELONY OFFENDER STATUS (FIRST DEPT))/SECOND FELONY OFFENDER  (NEW JERSEY FORGED INSTRUMENT CONVICTION WAS NOT THE EQUIVALENT OF A NEW YORK FELONY AND SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN THE BASIS OF SECOND FELONY OFFENDER STATUS (FIRST DEPT))

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JURY SHOULD HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED TO CONSIDER A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE AND AN ADVERSE INFERENCE INSTRUCTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN CONCERNING SURVEILLANCE PHOTOS DESTROYED BY THE POLICE, CONVICTION REVERSED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing defendant’s conviction, determined the jury should have been instructed to consider a lesser included offense and an adverse inference instruction should have been given concerning photographs destroyed by the police:

The court’s first-degree robbery charge, consistent with the indictment, required the People to prove that defendant used or threatened to use a knife; it is undisputed that a finding that defendant wielded some weapon or object other than a knife would not support first-degree robbery in this case. There was a reasonable view of the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to defendant, that he forcibly stole property from the victim, but did not use or threaten to use a knife in the course of doing so… . On the facts presented, the jury could have reasonably reached these findings by generally crediting the victim’s account, but finding that her testimony about seeing defendant using a knife was mistaken. Moreover, while this circumstance is not controlling, we note that the People joined in defendant’s request for submission of third-degree robbery.

… [T]the court should also have granted defendant’s request for an adverse inference charge as to surveillance photos taken in the victim’s livery cab after other photos, introduced at trial, were taken. The photos in evidence showed defendant in the back seat before he left and allegedly returned to rob the driver. The Police Department collected the photos but destroyed all but a few of them, which were introduced at trial through a detective who alleged that other members of his team selected them as the most relevant. Defendant established that the missing photos were “reasonably likely to be material” … , since they might have shown what type of weapon or object was used by the perpetrator. The record fails to support the People’s assertion that the camera could not have recorded the incident … . People v Holmes, 2018 NY Slip Op 08178, First Dept 11-29-18

CRIMINAL LAW (JURY SHOULD HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED TO CONSIDER A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE AND AN ADVERSE INFERENCE INSTRUCTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN CONCERNING SURVEILLANCE PHOTOS DESTROYED BY THE POLICE, CONVICTION REVERSED (FIRST DEPT))/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, JURY SHOULD HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED TO CONSIDER A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE AND AN ADVERSE INFERENCE INSTRUCTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN CONCERNING SURVEILLANCE PHOTOS DESTROYED BY THE POLICE, CONVICTION REVERSED (FIRST DEPT))/JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CRIMINAL LAW, JURY SHOULD HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED TO CONSIDER A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE AND AN ADVERSE INFERENCE INSTRUCTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN CONCERNING SURVEILLANCE PHOTOS DESTROYED BY THE POLICE, CONVICTION REVERSED (FIRST DEPT))/LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE (JURY SHOULD HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED TO CONSIDER A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE AND AN ADVERSE INFERENCE INSTRUCTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN CONCERNING SURVEILLANCE PHOTOS DESTROYED BY THE POLICE, CONVICTION REVERSED (FIRST DEPT))/ADVERSE INFERENCE (DESTRUCTION OF PHOTOS, CRIMINAL LAW, (JURY SHOULD HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED TO CONSIDER A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE AND AN ADVERSE INFERENCE INSTRUCTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN CONCERNING SURVEILLANCE PHOTOS DESTROYED BY THE POLICE, CONVICTION REVERSED (FIRST DEPT))

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THE ACTUAL DIMENSIONS OF THE COOPERATIVE APARTMENT WERE SMALLER THAN THE DIMENSIONS DESCRIBED IN THE LISTING, THE LISTING COULD NOT BE DEEMED INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE INTO THE PURCHASE AGREEMENT, THE COMPLAINT ALLEGING BREACH OF CONTRACT, FRAUD AND DECEPTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES PROPERLY DISMISSED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined the misrepresentation of the dimensions of the cooperative apartment in the listing could not be deemed incorporated by reference into the purchase agreement. The complaint was therefore properly dismissed:

… [P]laintiffs allege that defendants prepared a floor plan, which accompanied the listing for the unit at issue, that stated that the unit was “~1,966” square feet, when it was, in fact, approximately 1,495 square feet. Plaintiffs contend that the floor plan was incorporated into the offering plan by reference, and the offering plan, in turn, was incorporated into the purchase agreement. …

The doctrine of incorporation by reference “is appropriate only where the document to be incorporated is referred to and described in the instrument as issued so as to identify the referenced document beyond all reasonable doubt'”… . Here, the listing is not identified in any of the relevant purchase documents … .

Moreover, any purported representation or warranty is refuted by the clear terms of the purchase agreement, which contains a merger clause, states that no representations are being made by the sponsor, that the unit was being purchased “as is” and that the onus was on the buyer to inspect “to determine the actual dimensions” prior to purchasing  … . …

Reasonable reliance is an element of claims for fraud, aiding and abetting fraud and negligent misrepresentation… . Plaintiffs cannot as a matter of law establish reasonable reliance on a representation concerning the condition of the apartment since they had the means to ascertain the truth of the condition … . …

… [P]plaintiffs’ allegations based on purported representations made in the listing fail to set forth a viable claim under General Business Law §§ 349 or 350, as they do not fall within the type of deceptive acts, that, if permitted to continue, would have a broad impact on consumers at large … . Von Ancken v 7 E. 14 L.L.C., 2018 NY Slip Op 08097, First Dept 11-27-18

CONTRACT LAW (THE ACTUAL DIMENSIONS OF THE COOPERATIVE APARTMENT WERE SMALLER THAN THE DIMENSIONS DESCRIBED IN THE LISTING, THE LISTING COULD NOT BE DEEMED INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE INTO THE PURCHASE AGREEMENT, THE COMPLAINT ALLEGING BREACH OF CONTRACT, FRAUD AND DECEPTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES PROPERLY DISMISSED (FIRST DEPT))/INCORPORATION BY REFERENCE (CONTRACT LAW, (THE ACTUAL DIMENSIONS OF THE COOPERATIVE APARTMENT WERE SMALLER THAN THE DIMENSIONS DESCRIBED IN THE LISTING, THE LISTING COULD NOT BE DEEMED INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE INTO THE PURCHASE AGREEMENT, THE COMPLAINT ALLEGING BREACH OF CONTRACT, FRAUD AND DECEPTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES PROPERLY DISMISSED (FIRST DEPT))/FRAUD (THE ACTUAL DIMENSIONS OF THE COOPERATIVE APARTMENT WERE SMALLER THAN THE DIMENSIONS DESCRIBED IN THE LISTING, THE LISTING COULD NOT BE DEEMED INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE INTO THE PURCHASE AGREEMENT, THE COMPLAINT ALLEGING BREACH OF CONTRACT, FRAUD AND DECEPTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES PROPERLY DISMISSED (FIRST DEPT))/CONSUMER LAW (THE ACTUAL DIMENSIONS OF THE COOPERATIVE APARTMENT WERE SMALLER THAN THE DIMENSIONS DESCRIBED IN THE LISTING, THE LISTING COULD NOT BE DEEMED INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE INTO THE PURCHASE AGREEMENT, THE COMPLAINT ALLEGING BREACH OF CONTRACT, FRAUD AND DECEPTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES PROPERLY DISMISSED (FIRST DEPT))/PURCHASE AGREEMENTS (COOPERATIVES, THE ACTUAL DIMENSIONS OF THE COOPERATIVE APARTMENT WERE SMALLER THAN THE DIMENSIONS DESCRIBED IN THE LISTING, THE LISTING COULD NOT BE DEEMED INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE INTO THE PURCHASE AGREEMENT, THE COMPLAINT ALLEGING BREACH OF CONTRACT, FRAUD AND DECEPTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES PROPERLY DISMISSED (FIRST DEPT))/LISTING (REAL ESTATE, THE ACTUAL DIMENSIONS OF THE COOPERATIVE APARTMENT WERE SMALLER THAN THE DIMENSIONS DESCRIBED IN THE LISTING, THE LISTING COULD NOT BE DEEMED INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE INTO THE PURCHASE AGREEMENT, THE COMPLAINT ALLEGING BREACH OF CONTRACT, FRAUD AND DECEPTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES PROPERLY DISMISSED (FIRST DEPT))/REAL ESTATE (LISTING, (THE ACTUAL DIMENSIONS OF THE COOPERATIVE APARTMENT WERE SMALLER THAN THE DIMENSIONS DESCRIBED IN THE LISTING, THE LISTING COULD NOT BE DEEMED INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE INTO THE PURCHASE AGREEMENT, THE COMPLAINT ALLEGING BREACH OF CONTRACT, FRAUD AND DECEPTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES PROPERLY DISMISSED (FIRST DEPT))/COOPERATIVES (THE ACTUAL DIMENSIONS OF THE COOPERATIVE APARTMENT WERE SMALLER THAN THE DIMENSIONS DESCRIBED IN THE LISTING, THE LISTING COULD NOT BE DEEMED INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE INTO THE PURCHASE AGREEMENT, THE COMPLAINT ALLEGING BREACH OF CONTRACT, FRAUD AND DECEPTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES PROPERLY DISMISSED (FIRST DEPT))

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MOTION TO DEEM NOTICE OF CLAIM FILED ONE DAY LATE TIMELY SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT)

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined petitioner’s motion to deem the notice of claim timely filed should have been granted even if the excuse for the delay was not reasonable. The notice of claim was one day late:

CUCF [defendant City University Construction Fund] acquired actual notice of the essential facts constituting the claim within a reasonable time after the expiration of the 90-day statute of limitations period due to the fact that petitioner filed his notice of claim only one day late, on the 91st day after the accident occurred. Moreover, the notice of claim provides the essential facts constituting the claim and further describes CUCF’s alleged negligence and alleged violations of Labor Law §§ 240(1), 241(6) and 200, and certain Industrial Code provisions.

Additionally, petitioner has demonstrated that his one-day delay in serving the notice of claim on CUCF did not substantially prejudice CUCF’s defense on the merits. CUCF had actual knowledge of the facts constituting petitioner’s claim only one day after the expiration of the 90-day statutory period and thus, had ample opportunity to conduct a thorough investigation. …

Even if petitioner’s excuse for the delay in filing the notice of claim, specifically, that such delay was due to a clerical error made by the process server, was unreasonable, “the absence of a reasonable excuse is not, standing alone, fatal to the application,” especially in a case such as this one where respondent had actual notice of the essential facts constituting petitioner’s claim and where respondent was not prejudiced by the delay … . Matter of Dominguez v City Univ. of N.Y., 2018 NY Slip Op 08084, First Dept 11-27-18

MUNICIPAL LAW (NOTICE OF CLAIM, MOTION TO DEEM NOTICE OF CLAIM FILED ONE DAY LATE TIMELY SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT))/NEGLIGENCE (MUNICIPAL LAW, NOTICE OF CLAIM, MOTION TO DEEM NOTICE OF CLAIM FILED ONE DAY LATE TIMELY SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT))/LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (MUNICIPAL LAW, (NOTICE OF CLAIM, MOTION TO DEEM NOTICE OF CLAIM FILED ONE DAY LATE TIMELY SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT))/NOTICE OF CLAIM (MUNICIPAL LAW,  MOTION TO DEEM NOTICE OF CLAIM FILED ONE DAY LATE TIMELY SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT))

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MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT AND BILL OF PARTICULARS TO CHANGE THE DATE OF THE ALLEGED SLIP AND FALL PROPERLY DENIED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined the motion to amend the complaint and bill of particulars in this slip and fall case was properly denied. Plaintiff sought to change the dare of the accident from October 12, 2012, to August 15, 2012:

Plaintiff alleges that she slipped and fell on rainwater that came in through negligently maintained windows in the hallway of defendants’ building. In support of her motion to amend, plaintiff stated that she originally alleged that the accident occurred on October 13, 2012, but that after reviewing her medical records she realized that she was mistaken and that the accident actually occurred on August 15, 2012, the day before she sought treatment at the hospital.

The motion court providently exercised its discretion in denying plaintiff’s motion, as defendants demonstrated that the delay in notifying them that plaintiff had incorrectly identified the date of the accident prejudiced their ability to investigate the incident and to defend the action using surveillance videotapes of the hallway … . Defendants showed that, after learning of plaintiff’s claim, they retrieved surveillance tapes of the alleged accident date of October 13th, which showed that no accident occurred on that date, but that they were no longer able to retrieve videotapes from August 2012 by the time plaintiff informed them of the claimed error in the pleadings. Furthermore, the August 2012 hospital record plaintiff relies upon reflects that she sought treatment from a podiatrist for an unrelated foot condition, and does not reference any fall the previous day … . Otero v Walton Ave. Assoc. LLC, 2018 NY Slip Op 08083, First Dept 11-27-18

CIVIL PROCEDURE (MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT AND BILL OF PARTICULARS TO CHANGE THE DATE OF THE ALLEGED SLIP AND FALL PROPERLY DENIED (FIRST DEPT))/COMPLAINT (MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT AND BILL OF PARTICULARS TO CHANGE THE DATE OF THE ALLEGED SLIP AND FALL PROPERLY DENIED (FIRST DEPT))/BILL OF PARTICULARS (MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT AND BILL OF PARTICULARS TO CHANGE THE DATE OF THE ALLEGED SLIP AND FALL PROPERLY DENIED (FIRST DEPT))/NEGLIGENCE (SLIP AND FALL, MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT AND BILL OF PARTICULARS TO CHANGE THE DATE OF THE ALLEGED SLIP AND FALL PROPERLY DENIED (FIRST DEPT))/SLIP AND FALL  (MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT AND BILL OF PARTICULARS TO CHANGE THE DATE OF THE ALLEGED SLIP AND FALL PROPERLY DENIED (FIRST DEPT))/EVIDENCE (SLIP AND FALL, MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT AND BILL OF PARTICULARS TO CHANGE THE DATE OF THE ALLEGED SLIP AND FALL PROPERLY DENIED (FIRST DEPT))

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ADMITTING INTO EVIDENCE A PISTOL ALLEGED TO BE THE SAME TYPE OF WEAPON USED IN THE CRIME WAS NOT ERROR (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined the introduction of a handgun alleged to be the same type used in the crime and recovered three months after the crime was not error:

The court providently exercised its discretion in admitting a black nine millimeter pistol, the same type of weapon that, according to other evidence, was used in the crime. The pistol was recovered, pursuant to a search warrant, from defendant’s girlfriend’s apartment three months after the commission of the crime, and the evidence showed that defendant resided in that apartment. This evidence was relevant to show that defendant had access to that type of weapon, and it thus tended to establish his involvement in the charged crimes … . The jury could have drawn a reasonable inference that the weapon was in defendant’s possession at the time of the crime, and the availability of other inferences went to weight rather than admissibility. Furthermore, the probative value of this evidence, which the court carefully limited, outweighed any prejudicial effect. People v Birkett, 2018 NY Slip Op 08072, First Dept 11-27-18

CRIMINAL LAW (ADMITTING INTO EVIDENCE A PISTOL ALLEGED TO BE THE SAME TYPE OF WEAPON USED IN THE CRIME WAS NOT ERROR (FIRST DEPT))/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, ADMITTING INTO EVIDENCE A PISTOL ALLEGED TO BE THE SAME TYPE OF WEAPON USED IN THE CRIME WAS NOT ERROR (FIRST DEPT))/HANDGUNS (CRIMINAL LAW, EVIDENCE, ADMITTING INTO EVIDENCE A PISTOL ALLEGED TO BE THE SAME TYPE OF WEAPON USED IN THE CRIME WAS NOT ERROR (FIRST DEPT))/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, ADMITTING INTO EVIDENCE A PISTOL ALLEGED TO BE THE SAME TYPE OF WEAPON USED IN THE CRIME WAS NOT ERROR (FIRST DEPT))

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ALTHOUGH CPLR 2104 DOES NOT APPLY TO STIPULATIONS IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS, THE STIPULATION SIGNED BY PLAINTIFF, IN WHICH HE AGREED TO RETIRE IN RETURN FOR THE CESSATION OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS, WAS ENFORCEABLE UNDER CONTRACT PRINCIPLES DESPITE PLAINTIFF’S SUBSEQUENT CHANGE OF HEART (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined the stipulation signed by plaintiff teacher, who agreed to resign in return for discontinuing the disciplinary hearing, was binding under contract principles, despite the inapplicability of CPLR 2104 to administrative proceedings. After signing the stipulation, plaintiff changed his mind:

In the stipulation, DOE (Department of Education] agreed to discontinue the disciplinary hearing on the pending misconduct charges and to take no further disciplinary action against plaintiff, in exchange for which plaintiff agreed “to irrevocably retire from his employment with [DOE] … .” The agreement was signed by plaintiff, his counsel, and DOE’s counsel … . Annexed to the stipulation was a letter signed by plaintiff and addressed to District Superintendent Karen Watts stating, “I hereby irrevocably retire from [DOE] … .” The stipulation contained a signature line for Superintendent Watts, who signed it several days later.

Before Superintendent Watts signed the stipulation, plaintiff notified DOE that he had changed his mind and wanted to rescind the stipulation. He argues that the stipulation was unenforceable when he changed his mind because not all the parties had signed it. …

Although CPLR 2104 is not applicable to agreements entered into in administrative proceedings, the stipulation signed by plaintiff and counsel acting on behalf of DOE is binding under general contract principles … . Plaintiff failed to show the existence of fraud, collusion, mistake or accident, or that counsel lacked DOE’s consent to enter into the stipulation … . Plaintiff’s agreement to retire was irrevocable, and plaintiff understood its consequences. His change of mind is not a cause sufficient to set aside his agreement … . Nor is his parol evidence, offered to show that the parties did not intend to be bound by the stipulation until Superintendent Watts had signed it, admissible to add to or vary the terms of the writing … . Matter of Nobile v Board of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist. of the City of N.Y., 2018 NY Slip Op 08065, First Dept 11-27-18

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (ALTHOUGH CPLR 2104 DOES NOT APPLY TO STIPULATIONS IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS, THE STIPULATION SIGNED BY PLAINTIFF, IN WHICH HE AGREED TO RETIRE IN RETURN FOR THE CESSATION OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS, WAS ENFORCEABLE UNDER CONTRACT PRINCIPLES DESPITE PLAINTIFF’S SUBSEQUENT CHANGE OF HEART (FIRST DEPT))/CONTRACT LAW  (ALTHOUGH CPLR 2104 DOES NOT APPLY TO STIPULATIONS IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS, THE STIPULATION SIGNED BY PLAINTIFF, IN WHICH HE AGREED TO RETIRE IN RETURN FOR THE CESSATION OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS, WAS ENFORCEABLE UNDER CONTRACT PRINCIPLES DESPITE PLAINTIFF’S SUBSEQUENT CHANGE OF HEART (FIRST DEPT))/EMPLOYMENT LAW  (ALTHOUGH CPLR 2104 DOES NOT APPLY TO STIPULATIONS IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS, THE STIPULATION SIGNED BY PLAINTIFF, IN WHICH HE AGREED TO RETIRE IN RETURN FOR THE CESSATION OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS, WAS ENFORCEABLE UNDER CONTRACT PRINCIPLES DESPITE PLAINTIFF’S SUBSEQUENT CHANGE OF HEART (FIRST DEPT))/EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW  (ALTHOUGH CPLR 2104 DOES NOT APPLY TO STIPULATIONS IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS, THE STIPULATION SIGNED BY PLAINTIFF, IN WHICH HE AGREED TO RETIRE IN RETURN FOR THE CESSATION OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS, WAS ENFORCEABLE UNDER CONTRACT PRINCIPLES DESPITE PLAINTIFF’S SUBSEQUENT CHANGE OF HEART (FIRST DEPT))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (ALTHOUGH CPLR 2104 DOES NOT APPLY TO STIPULATIONS IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS, THE STIPULATION SIGNED BY PLAINTIFF, IN WHICH HE AGREED TO RETIRE IN RETURN FOR THE CESSATION OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS, WAS ENFORCEABLE UNDER CONTRACT PRINCIPLES DESPITE PLAINTIFF’S SUBSEQUENT CHANGE OF HEART (FIRST DEPT))/CPLR 2104  (ALTHOUGH CPLR 2104 DOES NOT APPLY TO STIPULATIONS IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS, THE STIPULATION SIGNED BY PLAINTIFF, IN WHICH HE AGREED TO RETIRE IN RETURN FOR THE CESSATION OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS, WAS ENFORCEABLE UNDER CONTRACT PRINCIPLES DESPITE PLAINTIFF’S SUBSEQUENT CHANGE OF HEART (FIRST DEPT))

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BECAUSE THE PETITIONERS CHOSE TO APPEAL THEIR TERMINATION FROM EMPLOYMENT AS CORRECTION OFFICERS TO THE NYC CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION INSTEAD OF BRINGING AN ARTICLE 78, THE COURT’S REVIEW POWERS ARE EXTREMELY LIMITED, THE TERMINATION WAS UPHELD (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined the NYC Civil Service Commission (CSC) properly upheld the termination of  the petitioner correction officers for using excessive force against an inmate. The court noted that, because the petitioners chose to appeal the determination of the administrative law judge to the CSC, instead of bringing an Article 78, the court’s review powers are extremely limited:

Civil Service Law § 76(1) permits a person whose civil service employment has been terminated to “appeal from such determination either by an application to the state or municipal commission having jurisdiction, or by an application to the court in accordance with [article 78].” If the former option is chosen, “[t]he decision of such civil service commission shall be final and conclusive, and not subject to further review in any court” … . The Court of Appeals has clarified that, despite the plain language in the statute, judicial review is not completely foreclosed … . Rather, the article 78 court, instead of being guided by the substantial evidence or arbitrary and capricious standards of review, is limited to reviewing whether “the agency has acted illegally, unconstitutionally, or in excess of its jurisdiction” … .

Petitioners argue that CSC acted unconstitutionally because it relied on the statements of the inmates, who never testified, thus depriving petitioners of any chance to cross-examine them. However, this point is unpreserved. Petitioners fail to point to anything in the record showing that they ever sought to cross-examine or call the inmates and were denied that opportunity. More importantly, they never protested that their constitutional rights were being violated. This Court has “no discretionary authority” to “reach[] an unpreserved issue in the interest of justice” in an article 78 proceeding challenging an administrative determination … , including issues touching on due process … and evidentiary challenges … . Matter of Almanzar v City of New York City Civ. Serv. Commn., 2018 NY Slip Op 08062, First Dept 11-27-18

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (BECAUSE THE PETITIONERS CHOSE TO APPEAL THEIR TERMINATION FROM EMPLOYMENT AS CORRECTION OFFICERS TO THE NYC CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION INSTEAD OF BRINGING AN ARTICLE 78, THE COURT’S REVIEW POWERS ARE EXTREMELY LIMITED, THE TERMINATION WAS UPHELD (FIRST DEPT))/CIVIL PROCEDURE  (BECAUSE THE PETITIONERS CHOSE TO APPEAL THEIR TERMINATION FROM EMPLOYMENT AS CORRECTION OFFICERS TO THE NYC CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION INSTEAD OF BRINGING AN ARTICLE 78, THE COURT’S REVIEW POWERS ARE EXTREMELY LIMITED, THE TERMINATION WAS UPHELD (FIRST DEPT))/EMPLOYMENT LAW (BECAUSE THE PETITIONERS CHOSE TO APPEAL THEIR TERMINATION FROM EMPLOYMENT AS CORRECTION OFFICERS TO THE NYC CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION INSTEAD OF BRINGING AN ARTICLE 78, THE COURT’S REVIEW POWERS ARE EXTREMELY LIMITED, THE TERMINATION WAS UPHELD (FIRST DEPT))/APPEALS (CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, BECAUSE THE PETITIONERS CHOSE TO APPEAL THEIR TERMINATION FROM EMPLOYMENT AS CORRECTION OFFICERS TO THE NYC CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION INSTEAD OF BRINGING AN ARTICLE 78, THE COURT’S REVIEW POWERS ARE EXTREMELY LIMITED, THE TERMINATION WAS UPHELD (FIRST DEPT))/MUNICIPAL LAW (EMPLOYMENT LAW, BECAUSE THE PETITIONERS CHOSE TO APPEAL THEIR TERMINATION FROM EMPLOYMENT AS CORRECTION OFFICERS TO THE NYC CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION INSTEAD OF BRINGING AN ARTICLE 78, THE COURT’S REVIEW POWERS ARE EXTREMELY LIMITED, THE TERMINATION WAS UPHELD (FIRST DEPT))

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