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TAX CERTIORARI PROCEEDING DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO TIMELY NOTIFY THE SCHOOL DISTRICT CANNOT BE RECOMMENCED PURSUANT TO CPLR 205 (a).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Fahey, determined that a Real Property Tax Law (RPTL) proceeding (challenging a tax assessment) which is dismissed for failure to provide timely notice to the school district cannot be restarted pursuant to CPLR 205 (a). Standard statutory-construction analysis led to the result:

By amending RPTL 708 (3), the legislature allowed school districts to reserve funds to satisfy judgments in tax certiorari proceedings. That right of reservation, however, extended only to the extent funds reserved “might reasonably be deemed necessary to [pay] anticipated judgments and claims” (Education Law § 3651 [1-a]). A school district of necessity must know of a proceeding in order to be able to estimate the amount it is permitted to set aside. The notice requirements the legislature included in RPTL 708 (3) act to balance the strictures of the Education Law. A petitioner who ignores the mailing requirements of RPTL 708 (3) and simultaneously denies a school district the opportunity to economically address a tax certiorari proceeding is not permitted to recommence a proceeding dismissed based upon such noncompliance. To do so would be to undermine the aims of fairness and efficiency that prompted the amendments to RPTL 708 (3) … . Matter of Westchester Joint Water Works v Assessor of City of Rye, 2016 NY Slip Op 04438, CtApp 6-9-16

REAL PROPERTY TAX LAW (TAX CERTIORARI PROCEEDING DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO TIMELY NOTIFY THE SCHOOL DISTRICT CANNOT BE RECOMMENCED PURSUANT TO CPLR 305 (a))/EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW (TAX CERTIORARI PROCEEDING DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO TIMELY NOTIFY THE SCHOOL DISTRICT CANNOT BE RECOMMENCED PURSUANT TO CPLR 305 (a))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (TAX CERTIORARI PROCEEDING DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO TIMELY NOTIFY THE SCHOOL DISTRICT CANNOT BE RECOMMENCED PURSUANT TO CPLR 305 (a))

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MEDICAL RECORDS DOCUMENTING THE MEDICAL CARE DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE HOSPITAL HAD TIMELY NOTICE OF THE NATURE OF THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIM; MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM PROPERLY DENIED.

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Pigott, over a three-judge dissenting opinion, determined plaintiff's motion for leave to serve a late notice of claim was properly denied. Plaintiff alleged medical malpractice on the part of defendant New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation (HHC). The majority concluded that the mere existence of medical records documenting the hospital care did not demonstrate timely knowledge of the nature of the claim:

… [T]he medical records must do more than “suggest” that an injury occurred as a result of malpractice. [The plaintiff's] argument implies that so long as medical experts reasonably disagree as to whether, based on their respective interpretations of the medical records, the medical staff deviated from the standard of care, a factual question is present and an application for service of late notice must be granted as a matter of law. … [T]he medical records must “evince that the medical staff, by its acts or omissions, inflicted an[] injury on plaintiff . . .” in order for the medical provider to have actual knowledge of the essential facts … . Wally G. v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp. (Metropolitan Hosp.), 2016 NY Slip Op 04443, CtApp 6-9-16

MUNICIPAL LAW (NOTICE OF CLAIM, MEDICAL RECORDS DOCUMENTING THE MEDICAL CARE DID NOT DEMOSTRATE THE HOSPITAL HAD TIMELY NOTICE OF THE NATURE OF THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIM; MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM PROPERLY DENIED)/NOTICE OF CLAIM (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIM AGAINST CITY HOSPITAL, MEDICAL RECORDS DOCUMENTING THE MEDICAL CARE DID NOT DEMOSTRATE THE HOSPITAL HAD TIMELY NOTICE OF THE NATURE OF THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIM; MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM PROPERLY DENIED)/MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (CLAIM AGAINST CITY HOSPITAL, MEDICAL RECORDS DOCUMENTING THE MEDICAL CARE DID NOT DEMOSTRATE THE HOSPITAL HAD TIMELY NOTICE OF THE NATURE OF THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIM; MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM PROPERLY DENIED)

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STANDARD FOR THE NEED FOR A HEARING TO DETERMINE CUSTODY CLARIFIED; HERE SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE RULED ON CUSTODY WITHOUT A HEARING.

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Garcia, reversing the Appellate Division, determined Supreme Court should not have awarded sole custody to father without a hearing. The “adequate relevant information” standard used by the Appellate Division was not the correct one:

… [W]e hold only that, on this record, the Appellate Division erred in holding that a hearing was not required based on an application of the “adequate relevant information” standard. In doing so, we reaffirm the long-established principle that, as a general matter, custody determinations should be rendered only after a full and plenary hearing. We decline, however, to fashion a “one size fits all” rule mandating a hearing in every custody case statewide. However, where, as here, facts material to the best interest analysis, and the circumstances surrounding such facts, remain in dispute, a custody hearing is required. Accordingly, a court opting to forego a plenary hearing must take care to clearly articulate which factors were — or were not — material to its determination, and the evidence supporting its decision. Under the circumstances of this case, a plenary hearing was necessary. S.L. v J.R., 2016 NY Slip Op 04442, CtApp 6-9-16

FAMILY LAW (STANDARD FOR THE NEED FOR A HEARING TO DETERMINE CUSTODY CLARIFIED; HERE SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE RULED ON CUSTODY WITHOUT A HEARING)/CUSTODY (STANDARD FOR THE NEED FOR A HEARING TO DETERMINE CUSTODY CLARIFIED; HERE SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE RULED ON CUSTODY WITHOUT A HEARING)/EVIDENCE (FAMILY LAW, STANDARD FOR THE NEED FOR A HEARING TO DETERMINE CUSTODY CLARIFIED; HERE SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE RULED ON CUSTODY WITHOUT A HEARING)

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EVIDENCE OF A SIMILAR UNCHARGED CRIME AGAINST THE SAME VICTIM PROPERLY ADMITTED.

The Court of Appeals determined the admission of evidence of an assault on the same victim (A.H.) a week before the charged assault was not error. The defendant acknowledged the evidence was relevant but argued the evidence should have been summarized because it was unduly prejudicial to allow the jury to hear the details:

We cannot say that both defects necessary for reversible error are present in defendant's case, namely, that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to limit A.H.'s testimony and that such error substantially prejudiced the defendant so as to foreclose a determination of harmlessness. … A.H.'s testimony concerned the same parties, and served the nonpropensity purpose of directly explaining her relationship with the defendant and his motive. This is far from a case where “the jury did not require a recital of such a prologue to understand fully what had taken place in the defendant's encounters with [the victim]” … . In the same vein, testimony that the defendant previously attacked A.H. would not have led the jury to marginalize, relegate to the background, or ignore the grievous nature of the New York City assault, which was characterized by physical violence and several failed attempts at immolation.

Under these circumstances, we perceive no error that requires a reversal of defendant's conviction. People v Frankline, 2016 NY Slip Op 04441, CtApp 6-9-16

CRIMINAL LAW (EVIDENCE OF A SIMILAR UNCHARGED CRIME AGAINST THE SAME VICTIM PROPERLY ADMITTED)/EVIDENCE (EVIDENCE OF A SIMILAR UNCHARGED CRIME AGAINST THE SAME VICTIM PROPERLY ADMITTED/MOLINEUX EVIDENCE (EVIDENCE OF A SIMILAR UNCHARGED CRIME AGAINST THE SAME VICTIM PROPERLY ADMITTED)/UNCHARGED CRIMES (EVIDENCE OF A SIMILAR UNCHARGED CRIME AGAINST THE SAME VICTIM PROPERLY ADMITTED)

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MOTION TO VACATE CONVICTION PROPERLY DENIED WITHOUT A HEARING; DEFENDANT DID NOT PRESENT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF ACTUAL OR POTENTIAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST ON THE PART OF DEFENSE COUNSEL.

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge DiFiore, determined defendant's motion to set aside his conviction was properly denied without a hearing. Defendant's allegations of defense counsel's conflict of interest were deemed insufficient. Defendant alleged his lawyer represented both him and the District Attorney simultaneously:

CPL 440.30 requires that, where the motion to vacate a judgment of conviction “is based upon the existence or occurrence of facts,” sworn allegations thereof must be included in the motion papers (see CPL 440.30 [1] [a]). The sworn allegations can be based on personal knowledge or on information and belief, but in support of the latter, “the affiant must state the sources of such information and the grounds of such belief” (CPL 440.30 [1] [a]). The People “may” file an answer “denying or admitting any or all of the allegations” (see CPL 440.30 [1] [a]). The statute permits a court to deny the motion without a hearing in certain circumstances, including if it “is based upon the existence or occurrence of facts and the moving papers do not contain sworn allegations substantiating or tending to substantiate all the essential facts” (CPL 440.30 [4] [b]). * * *

Here, defendant's actual conflict claim consists of unsubstantiated and conclusory allegations of simultaneous representation. * * *

… [T]he statute is plain that the initial failure by a defendant to carry his or her burden of coming forward with sworn allegations substantiating the essential facts in the 440 motion does not shift the burden to the People in their responsive pleadings. * * *

To the extent defendant's allegations are sufficient to establish a potential conflict — based on the successive representation — his papers do not attempt to demonstrate that such a conflict operated on the defense. People v Wright, 2016 NY Slip Op 04440, CtApp 6-9-16

CRIMINAL LAW (MOTION TO VACATE CONVICTION PROPERLY DENIED WITHOUT A HEARING; DEFENDANT DID NOT PRESENT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF ACTUAL OR POTENTIAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST ON THE PART OF DEFENSE COUNSEL)/ATTORNEYS (CRIMINAL LAW, MOTION TO VACATE CONVICTION PROPERLY DENIED WITHOUT A HEARING; DEFENDANT DID NOT PRESENT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF ACTUAL OR POTENTIAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST ON THE PART OF DEFENSE COUNSEL)/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, MOTION TO VACATE CONVICTION PROPERLY DENIED WITHOUT A HEARING; DEFENDANT DID NOT PRESENT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF ACTUAL OR POTENTIAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST ON THE PART OF DEFENSE COUNSEL)

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APPELLATE DIVISION WRONGLY EXTENDED COMMON INTEREST ATTORNEY CLIENT PRIVILEGE TO MERGER NEGOTIATIONS WHEN THERE WAS NO PENDING LITIGATION.

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Pigott, over an extensive two-judge dissenting opinion, reversing the Appellate Division, determined the common interest attorney-client privilege should only apply when there is litigation or pending litigation involving the parties with a common interest. The 1st Department had extended to privilege to merger negotiations between Countrywide and Bank of America at a time when the failure of mortgage-backed securities was in the air but there was no litigation or pending litigation:

Disclosure is privileged between codefendants, coplaintiffs or persons who reasonably anticipate that they will become colitigants, because such disclosures are deemed necessary to mount a common claim or defense, at a time when parties are most likely to expect discovery requests and their legal interests are sufficiently aligned that “the counsel of each [i]s in effect the counsel of all” … . When two or more parties are engaged in or reasonably anticipate litigation in which they share a common legal interest, the threat of mandatory disclosure may chill the parties’ exchange of privileged information and therefore thwart any desire to coordinate legal strategy. In that situation, the common interest doctrine promotes candor that may otherwise have been inhibited.

The same cannot be said of clients who share a common legal interest in a commercial transaction or other common problem but do not reasonably anticipate litigation. Ambac Assur. Corp. v Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 2016 NY Slip Op 04439, CtApp 6-9-16

CIVIL PROCEDURE (ATTORNEY CLIENT PRIVILEGE, APPELLATE DIVISION WRONGLY EXTENDED COMMON INTEREST ATTORNEY CLIENT PRIVILEGE TO MERGER NEGOTIATIONS WHEN THERE WAS NO PENDING LITIGATION)/ATTORNEYS (ATTORNEY CLIENT PRIVILEGE, APPELLATE DIVISION WRONGLY EXTENDED COMMON INTEREST ATTORNEY CLIENT PRIVILEGE TO MERGER NEGOTIATIONS WHEN THERE WAS NO PENDING LITIGATION)/PRIVILEGE (ATTORNEY CLIENT PRIVILEGE, APPELLATE DIVISION WRONGLY EXTENDED COMMON INTEREST ATTORNEY CLIENT PRIVILEGE TO MERGER NEGOTIATIONS WHEN THERE WAS NO PENDING LITIGATION)/COMMON INTEREST PRIVILEGE (ATTORNEY CLIENT PRIVILEGE, APPELLATE DIVISION WRONGLY EXTENDED COMMON INTEREST ATTORNEY CLIENT PRIVILEGE TO MERGER NEGOTIATIONS WHEN THERE WAS NO PENDING LITIGATION)

FAMILY COURT PROPERLY IMPOSED THREE CONSECUTIVE SIX-MONTH JAIL TERMS UPON FATHER WHO WILFULLY FAILED TO PAY CHILD SUPPORT.

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Garcia, determined Family Court had the power to order father to serve three consecutive six-month jail terms for willful failure to pay child support. Father never claimed an inability to pay:

The father in this case demonstrated the willful flaunting of support orders the Legislature sought to address in passing the Support Enforcement Act. Without making any attempt at an excuse for inability to pay, the father repeatedly failed to meet his court-ordered support obligations. His conduct resulted in a substantial amount owed in arrears and two suspended orders of commitment, one each in 2010 and 2012, for willfully violating Family Court support orders. Both suspended commitments were conditioned upon the father making timely child support payments. In 2013, Family Court found yet a third willful violation of a prior order, revoked the two suspended orders for the past violations, sentenced the father to a new six-month sentence, resulting in three consecutive six-month sentences. Once again, the father made no attempt to plead an inability to pay or seek modification of the support orders.

In ordering the term of incarceration, Family Court determined that the father willfully failed to comply with his child support obligations on three separate violation petitions and found good cause existed to revoke the father’s two suspended commitments. Matter of Columbia County Support Collection Unit v Risley, 2016 NY Slip Op 04325, CtApp 6-7-16

FAMILY LAW (FAMILY COURT PROPERLY IMPOSED THREE CONSECUTIVE SIX-MONTH JAIL TERMS UPON FATHER WHO WILFULLY FAILED TO PAY CHILD SUPPORT)/CHILD SUPPORT (FAMILY COURT PROPERLY IMPOSED THREE CONSECUTIVE SIX-MONTH JAIL TERMS UPON FATHER WHO WILFULLY FAILED TO PAY CHILD SUPPORT)

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SPECIAL PROSECUTOR HAS AUTHORITY TO BRING CRIMINAL ACTIONS IN LOCAL COURTS PURSUANT TO THE PROTECTION OF PEOPLE WITH SPECIAL NEEDS ACT.

The Court of Appeals, over an extensive two-judge dissent, determined, under the Executive Law, a special prosecutor has the authority to bring a criminal case in local court concerning the abuse of vulnerable persons pursuant to the “Protection of People with Special Needs Act.” Defendant unsuccessfully argued the Executive Law limited the power of the special prosecutor to criminal prosecutions in County and Supreme Court:

There is no indication from the statute that the special prosecutor’s powers are limited by section 552 (2) (c). That section merely sets forth the requirement that the special prosecutor consult with the district attorney of the pertinent county should the special prosecutor wish to appear in County Court or Supreme Court, or before the grand jury, for the purposes of managing or conducting before such court or grand jury a criminal action or proceeding involving the abuse or neglect of a vulnerable person. There is no indication that the statute governs proceedings in local courts at all. People v Davidson, 2016 NY Slip Op 04326, CtApp 6-7-16

 

CRIMINAL LAW (SPECIAL PROSECUTOR HAS AUTHORITY TO BRING CRIMINAL ACTIONS IN LOCAL COURTS PURSUANT TO THE PROTECTION OF PEOPLE WITH SPECIAL NEEDS ACT)/EXECUTIVE LAW (SPECIAL PROSECUTOR HAS AUTHORITY TO BRING CRIMINAL ACTIONS IN LOCAL COURTS PURSUANT TO THE PROTECTION OF PEOPLE WITH SPECIAL NEEDS ACT)/SOCIAL SERVICES LAW (SPECIAL PROSECUTOR HAS AUTHORITY TO BRING CRIMINAL ACTIONS IN LOCAL COURTS PURSUANT TO THE PROTECTION OF PEOPLE WITH SPECIAL NEEDS ACT)/VULNERABLE PERSONS (SPECIAL PROSECUTOR HAS AUTHORITY TO BRING CRIMINAL ACTIONS IN LOCAL COURTS PURSUANT TO THE PROTECTION OF PEOPLE WITH SPECIAL NEEDS ACT)/PROTECTION OF PERSONS WITH SPECIAL NEEDS ACT (SPECIAL PROSECUTOR HAS AUTHORITY TO BRING CRIMINAL ACTIONS IN LOCAL COURTS PURSUANT TO THE PROTECTION OF PEOPLE WITH SPECIAL NEEDS ACT)

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FAILURE TO MOVE TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE AND FAILURE TO CHALLENGE A FRISK DID NOT CONSTITUTE INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Garcia, determined defense counsel's failure to make a motion to suppress, failure to contest a frisk of defendant's person, and brief statement at sentencing did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. The suppression motion would have had little chance of success, the failure to object to the frisk may have been part of a defense strategy and the non-frisk-related evidence was substantial, and the sentencing court was aware of the defendant's position through the pre-sentence report and defendant's statement at sentencing. With respect to the “defense strategy” and “no challenge to the frisk” issues, the court wrote:

Assuming a colorable challenge to the legality of the frisk incident to defendant's detention could be grounded in this record, as the Appellate Division noted, counsel may have made a legitimate strategic decision not to move to suppress … . On this record alone, we have no reason to discount the possible strategic explanations for counsel's decision. Because defendant “made no showing that counsel's failure to seek a suppression hearing was not premised on strategy,” his claim must be rejected … . In addition, because the remaining evidence demonstrated that defendant was in a vehicle containing a number of recently-stolen items, a challenge to the frisk would have had little to no effect on the outcome. People v Carver, 2016 NY Slip Op 04322, CtApp 6-7-16

CRIMINAL LAW (INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE, FAILURE TO MOVE TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE AND FAILURE TO CHALLENGE A FRISK DID NOT CONSTITUTE INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL)/ATTORNEYS (CRIMINAL LAW, FAILURE TO MOVE TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE AND FAILURE TO CHALLENGE A FRISK DID NOT CONSTITUTE INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL)/INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE (CRIMINAL LAW, FAILURE TO MOVE TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE AND FAILURE TO CHALLENGE A FRISK DID NOT CONSTITUTE INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL)

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COURT’S FAILURE TO ORDER READBACK OF CROSS-EXAMINATION IN ADDITION TO DIRECT WAS NOT A MODE OF PROCEEDINGS ERROR, PRESERVATION REQUIRED.

The Court of Appeals, reversing the Appellate Division, determined (1) the trial court properly notified all parties of the contents of a jury note, and (2), the response to the jury note, in which only the direct testimony of a witness was read back, was not a mode of proceedings error. Therefore the failure to read the cross-examination was an error which must be preserved for appellate review (no preservation here):

Counsel had meaningful notice of the precise content of the jury's note and was in the courtroom as the readback was conducted. Counsel was therefore aware that the court had failed to read the witness's cross-examination testimony. Counsel's knowledge of the precise content of the note and of the court's actual response, or lack thereof, removes the claimed error from the very narrow class of mode of proceedings errors for which preservation is not required … . “[C]ounsel's silence at a time when any error by the court could have been obviated by timely objection renders the claim unpreserved and unreviewable here” … . People v Morris, 2016 NY Slip Op 04327, CtApp 6-7-16

CRIMINAL LAW (COURT'S FAILURE TO ORDER READBACK OF CROSS-EXAMINATION IN ADDITION TO DIRECT WAS NOT A MODE OF PROCEEDINGS ERROR, PRESERVATION REQUIRED)/APPEALS (COURT'S FAILURE TO ORDER READBACK OF CROSS-EXAMINATION IN ADDITION TO DIRECT WAS NOT A MODE OF PROCEEDINGS ERROR, PRESERVATION REQUIRED)/MODE OF PROCEEDINGS ERROR  (COURT'S FAILURE TO ORDER READBACK OF CROSS-EXAMINATION IN ADDITION TO DIRECT WAS NOT A MODE OF PROCEEDINGS ERROR, PRESERVATION REQUIRED)/PRESERVATION OF ERROR (COURT'S FAILURE TO ORDER READBACK OF CROSS-EXAMINATION IN ADDITION TO DIRECT WAS NOT A MODE OF PROCEEDINGS ERROR, PRESERVATION REQUIRED)

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