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ALTHOUGH THE COURT FOUND THAT THE DEPUTY DID NOT SOUND HER AIR HORN BEFORE THE INTERSECTION COLLISION WITH PLAINTIFFS’ VEHICLE, THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE THAT THE DEPUTY TOOK PRECAUTIONS BEFORE ENTERING THE INTERSECTION; THEREFORE THE COUNTY DEMONSTRATED THE DEPUTY DID NOT ACT WITH RECKLESS DISREGARD FOR THE SAFETY OF OTHERS IN VIOLATION OF VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW 1104 (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, affirming the Appellate Division, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Wilson, over an extensive dissent, determined the county was entitled to summary judgment in this negligence suit stemming from an intersection accident involving a sheriff’s deputy (Wong) who was responding to an emergency call. Although the court found that Wong did not sound her air horn prior to the collision with plaintiffs’ (Granaths’) car, the evidence demonstrated Wong did not act with reckless disregard for the safety of others:

It is undisputed that, before proceeding through the intersection, Deputy Fong slowed down, came to a complete stop at least once, observed northbound traffic, waited for that traffic to yield to her, and turned on her overheard lights. The Granaths contend that a jury could nonetheless find that Deputy Fong exhibited reckless disregard for the safety of others by failing to activate her air horn or siren; declining to call in a “Code 77” as required by MCSD [sheriff’s department] policy; and proceeding into the intersection despite having an obstructed view of southbound traffic.

We agree with the Appellate Division that defendants met their initial burden on their summary judgment motion and that, in opposition, the Granaths failed to raise a material triable issue of fact. Even assuming Deputy Fong failed to activate her air horn or siren, call in a “Code 77,” or observe southbound traffic—either because her view was obstructed or she neglected to look to her right—taken together with the actions she undisputably did take—slowing down, stopping, activating her emergency lights and proceeding only once she observed northbound traffic yield to her—we cannot conclude that Deputy Fong, with “conscious indifference to the outcome,” “reckless[ly] disregard[ed] . . . a highly probable risk of harm” … . Granath v Monroe County, 2026 NY Slip Op 01586, CtApp 3-19-26

Practice Point: Consult this opinion for insight into the meaning of “reckless disregard for the safety of others” in the context of an intersection traffic accident involving a sheriff’s deputy responding to an emergency call.

 

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