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You are here: Home1 / Criminal Law2 / A POLICE OFFICER INTERVIEWED AN EYEWITNESS AND CREATED A “PROBABLE...
Criminal Law, Evidence

A POLICE OFFICER INTERVIEWED AN EYEWITNESS AND CREATED A “PROBABLE CAUSE I-CARD” FOR THE ARREST OF THE DEFENDANT; THE ARRESTING OFFICER DID NOT TESTIFY AT THE SUPPRESSION HEARING; THEREFORE THE PEOPLE DID NOT PROVE THE ARRESTING OFFICER SAW AND RELIED ON THE I-CARD, WHICH THE “FELLOW OFFICER” RULE REQUIRES FOR A LAWFUL ARREST; DEFENDANT’S STATEMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED (CT APP). ​

The Court of Appeals, reversing the Appellate Division, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Halligan, determined the motion to suppress defendant’s statement should have been granted because the People failed to prove the arrest was based upon the “fellow officer” rule, An officer who interviewed a witness created a probable-cause I-card which was posted to inform other police officers of the probable cause for defendant’s arrest. But the People did not prove the arresting officer relied on the I-card as the basis of the arrest:

Whether the People presented sufficient evidence of a communication under the fellow officer rule is a fact-specific question that requires examination of the record before the suppression court. Here, the People presented no direct evidence that prior to arresting the defendant, the arresting officers were aware of the I-card and relied upon it in effectuating the defendant’s arrest. The arresting officers did not testify at the suppression hearing, nor did the detective testify about the circumstances of the arrest. * * *

We conclude that the People failed to provide evidence sufficient to show a communication between the officers based on the I-card, and therefore failed to meet their burden at the suppression hearing to establish probable cause for the defendant’s arrest. Absent the requisite showing of probable cause, the defendant’s statement must be suppressed as the fruit of an unlawful arrest. People v Palacios, 2026 NY Slip Op 02360, CtApp 4-16-26

Practice Point: Here the required proof for the application of the “fellow officer” rule was not presented by the People. To prove the arrest was based on a “probable cause I-card” the People were required to show the arresting officer saw the I-card and relied on it. The arresting officer did not testify, so there was a failure of proof requiring suppression of the defendant’s statement.

 

April 16, 2026
Tags: Court of Appeals
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https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-04-16 09:34:572026-04-19 10:43:55A POLICE OFFICER INTERVIEWED AN EYEWITNESS AND CREATED A “PROBABLE CAUSE I-CARD” FOR THE ARREST OF THE DEFENDANT; THE ARRESTING OFFICER DID NOT TESTIFY AT THE SUPPRESSION HEARING; THEREFORE THE PEOPLE DID NOT PROVE THE ARRESTING OFFICER SAW AND RELIED ON THE I-CARD, WHICH THE “FELLOW OFFICER” RULE REQUIRES FOR A LAWFUL ARREST; DEFENDANT’S STATEMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED (CT APP). ​
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