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TO THE EXTENT VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW SECTION 370 HAS BEEN INTERPRETED TO REQUIRE RENTAL-CAR COMPANIES TO PROVIDE PRIMARY LIABILITY INSURANCE COVERAGE TO RENTER-DRIVERS, SECTION 370 IS PREEMPTED BY THE FEDERAL “GRAVES AMENDMENT” (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Singas, affirming the Appellate Division, over a three-judge dissent, determined the federal “Graves Amendment (49 USC 30106),” which relieves rental-car companies of vicarious liability for the negligence of the renter-drivers, preempts Vehicle and Traffic Law 370 to the extent that section 370 has been interpreted to require rental companies to provide primary liability insurance coverage to renters. But section 370’s requirement that rental-car companies carry a specified minimum amount of insurance is not preempted by the Graves Amendment:

The Appellate Division [held] that “the Graves Amendment does not supersede Vehicle and Traffic Law § 370 insofar as it is a state law that requires rental car companies to carry a specified minimum amount of insurance for each of their vehicles” but “is superseded to the extent it requires a rental car company to ‘provide primary insurance to their renters up to the minimum liability limits provided by the statute’ ” … . The Court reasoned that “[t]o hold otherwise would rescue every vicarious liability claim up to statutory minimum insurance amounts and render the Graves Amendment’s preemption clause a nullity” … . The Court further held that section 370 does not reverse preempt the Graves Amendment under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, because the Graves Amendment “does not entirely ‘invalidate, impair, or supersede’ ” section 370 … . * * *

We note that the Graves Amendment does not free car rental companies from all liability arising from the use of a rented vehicle. On the contrary, it expressly permits States to impose liability on rental companies for damages arising from their own negligence or criminal wrongdoing (see 49 USC § 30106 [a] [2]). Nor does the Graves Amendment restrict New York’s ability to require rental companies to obtain insurance, no matter what kind, “for the privilege of registering and operating a motor vehicle” (id. § 30106 [b] [1]). Our decision today does not affect section 370’s requirement that car rental companies obtain insurance coverage for such other liability or for the privilege of registering vehicles in New York. Rather, we narrowly hold that the Graves Amendment preempts Vehicle and Traffic Law § 370 to the extent that it requires car rental companies to provide primary liability insurance to their renters up to the statute’s minimum liability amounts. Second Child v Edge Auto, Inc., 2026 NY Slip Op 02436, CtApp 4-23-26

Practice Point: The interpretation of Vehicle and Traffic Law 370 which required rental-car companies to provide primary liability insurance to renter-drivers has been preempted by the federal “Graves Amendment.”​

 

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DEFENDANT’S 30.30 (“SPEEDY TRIAL”) MOTION WAS MADE ON THE DAY TRIAL WAS TO BEGIN; THE ARGUMENT THAT THE MOTION WAS UNTIMELY BECAUSE THE PEOPLE WERE STATUTORILY ENTITLED TO “REASONABLE NOTICE” WAS REJECTED; THE TRIAL JUDGE IS FREE TO ADJOURN THE TRIAL, OR PROCEED WITH THE TRIAL AND HEAR THE SPEEDY TRIAL MOTION SUBSEQUENTLY (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Garcia, reversing the Appellate Division, determined defendant’s 30.30 (“speedy trial”) motion was timely made right before trial. The argument that bringing the motion right before trial violated the statutory provision that the motion be made upon “reasonable notice” to the People was rejected. Once the motion is made, the trial court can opt to proceed with the trial and determine the motion subsequently:

… [A] defendant seeking a dismissal based on a speedy trial violation may wish to accumulate as many chargeable days as possible. The facts here reinforce the wisdom of this approach. Defendant made his motion on the date trial was set to begin, eleven months after his arraignment, and alleged 326 days chargeable to the People. That motion contained 9 pages of detailed calculations of days and arguments about why each period should be charged to the People, including the days immediately leading up to the July 23 court date. The People for their part now claim that only 54 of those days were chargeable to them. In other words, every day counts—and many may be contested—in the speedy trial context, and the statute affords a defendant flexibility to decide when best in the time leading up to the start of trial to make a CPL 30.30 (1) (b) motion.

… [T]he People are entitled to a fair opportunity to prepare a response. * * * A court in receipt of such motion has discretion whether to proceed with trial and when to resolve the motion. While proceeding in this way may lead to inefficiencies … , such a result may in certain cases be necessary. The trial court is in the best position to determine when proceeding to trial is warranted to avoid inconvenience to witnesses and unnecessary delay. People v Roper, 2026 NY Slip Op 02365, CtApp 4-21-26

Practice Point: Here a 30.30 (speedy trial) motion was timely despite being made on the day of the trial. The argument that the motion was untimely because the “reasonable notice” provision in the statute was violated was rejected. The court can proceed with the trial and hear the motion later.​

 

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THE FOURTH TRIAL, AT WHICH DEFENDANT WAS CONVICTED OF MURDER AND WEAPON POSSESSION, TOOK PLACE THREE YEARS AFTER THE LAST OF THREE MISTRIALS; DEFENDANT WAS DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL; CHARGES DISMISSED (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, dismissing defendant’s murder and weapon possession charges, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Rivera, over the three-judge dissent, determined that the three-year delay between the third mistrial and the fourth trial violated defendant’s right to a speedy trial:

… [W]e conclude that the three-year delay to retry defendant a fourth time was unjustified and violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial. … “[W]hile the greater the delay, the more likely the harm to the defendant, there is no specific length of time that automatically results in a due process violation … . Here, the delay was lengthy—more than three years and one month between the third and fourth trials, and 36 months between the third trial and when the prosecution declared readiness for the fourth trial. … The delay is even more stark when compared to the dramatically shorter time between the prior trials: six months between the first and second trials and eleven months between the second and third trials.

The “reason for the delay” factor is critical. Thus, in cases involving post-indictment delays, the prosecution’s “good faith will not insulate their decision to delay trial from judicial review on constitutional speedy trial grounds” … . “[O]nce having instituted the prosecution . . ., [the prosecution has] the obligation of advancing it unless there is a reasonable ground for delay” … . By the time of the delay preceding the fourth trial, defendant had already been indicted and tried three times. That indictment remained pending throughout the three-year delay. Accordingly, the prosecution had the obligation of advancing its case in the absence of a reasonable justification … .

A lengthy delay “demands close scrutiny of the other factors, especially the question of why the delay occurred” … . Here, the prosecution’s justifications for the delay lack record support and in any case are not persuasive. The prosecution’s claim that the delay was attributable to its consideration of defense counsel’s request for dismissal after three mistrials cannot, without more, account for the three-year delay. The prosecution did not provide any particular reasons for why its deliberations of whether to retry defendant took so long given its failure to obtain a conviction three times in a row on the murder and weapon possession charges. Nor did the prosecution assert that an internal “changing of the guard” impacted its ability to render a decision on whether to retry the case. People v Woods, 2026 NY Slip Op 02364, CtApp 4-22-26

Practice Point: Here defendant was convicted of murder and weapon possession at his fourth trial, There was a three-year delay between the last mistrial and the fourth trial. The delay violated defendant’s speedy trial rights. The charges were dismissed by the Court of Appeals.

 

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A POLICE OFFICER INTERVIEWED AN EYEWITNESS AND CREATED A “PROBABLE CAUSE I-CARD” FOR THE ARREST OF THE DEFENDANT; THE ARRESTING OFFICER DID NOT TESTIFY AT THE SUPPRESSION HEARING; THEREFORE THE PEOPLE DID NOT PROVE THE ARRESTING OFFICER SAW AND RELIED ON THE I-CARD, WHICH THE “FELLOW OFFICER” RULE REQUIRES FOR A LAWFUL ARREST; DEFENDANT’S STATEMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED (CT APP). ​

The Court of Appeals, reversing the Appellate Division, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Halligan, determined the motion to suppress defendant’s statement should have been granted because the People failed to prove the arrest was based upon the “fellow officer” rule, An officer who interviewed a witness created a probable-cause I-card which was posted to inform other police officers of the probable cause for defendant’s arrest. But the People did not prove the arresting officer relied on the I-card as the basis of the arrest:

Whether the People presented sufficient evidence of a communication under the fellow officer rule is a fact-specific question that requires examination of the record before the suppression court. Here, the People presented no direct evidence that prior to arresting the defendant, the arresting officers were aware of the I-card and relied upon it in effectuating the defendant’s arrest. The arresting officers did not testify at the suppression hearing, nor did the detective testify about the circumstances of the arrest. * * *

We conclude that the People failed to provide evidence sufficient to show a communication between the officers based on the I-card, and therefore failed to meet their burden at the suppression hearing to establish probable cause for the defendant’s arrest. Absent the requisite showing of probable cause, the defendant’s statement must be suppressed as the fruit of an unlawful arrest. People v Palacios, 2026 NY Slip Op 02360, CtApp 4-16-26

Practice Point: Here the required proof for the application of the “fellow officer” rule was not presented by the People. To prove the arrest was based on a “probable cause I-card” the People were required to show the arresting officer saw the I-card and relied on it. The arresting officer did not testify, so there was a failure of proof requiring suppression of the defendant’s statement.

 

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DEFENDANT, BY FIRING HIS ATTORNEY AND REFUSING TO BE PRESENT AT TRIAL, WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AND HIS RIGHT TO BE PRESENT AT HIS TRIAL (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Singas, over a concurrence and an extensive dissent, determined defendant, by firing his attorney and refusing to be present during the trial, waived his right to effective assistance of counsel and his right to be present at his trial. The court further determined that the consecutive sentences for two counts of criminal possession of a weapon were improper because both offenses arose from the same act of possession:

“Waiver is a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary relinquishment of a known right” … . Like other fundamental rights, a defendant’s right to effective assistance of counsel may be waived … . We have explained that “[a]n accused awaiting trial . . . has only two choices regarding legal representation—proceed with counsel or waive the protection of the Sixth Amendment and proceed pro se” … . Accordingly, when a defendant “refuse[s] self-representation and restrict[s] the participation of counsel . . . [they] hav[e] voluntarily waived the right to the effective assistance of counsel” … .

Whether the waiver of a fundamental right is valid “depend[s], in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused” … . “In many instances, the requisite affirmative showing that . . . [a] right[ ] ha[s] been knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived will include a direct colloquy between the court and the defendant” … . We have also long held that a defendant may waive certain fundamental rights by their conduct, most notably in the context of the right to be present … . In determining whether such a waiver occurred, relevant circumstances include the warnings provided by the trial court, the defendant’s actions in response, and whether, in light of the defendant’s conduct, the trial court could practicably have administered additional warnings or attempted to secure an oral waiver. * * *

In light of the trial court’s many warnings to defendant and defendant’s obstructive behavior in response, there is record support for the conclusion that, by his conduct, defendant waived the right to effective assistance of counsel. A trial court must be cautious not to conflate waiver of the right to be present at trial with waiver of the right to effective assistance of counsel. These rights are separate, and a trial court has distinct duties to ensure the validity of a defendant’s waiver of each. However, in certain circumstances, as in this case, the same conduct may amount to a waiver of both rights. People v Lewis, 2026 NY Slip Op 01588, CtApp 3-19-26

Practice Point: A defendant by his behavior (here firing his attorney and walking out of the trial), in the face of sufficient warnings by the judge, may waive both the right to effective assistance of counsel and the right to be present at the trial.

 

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THE ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT’S PRIOR POSSESSION OF DRUGS TO PROVE CONSTRUCTIVE POSSESSION OF DRUGS FOUND IN A SHARED APARTMENT WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR; THE PRIOR POSSESSION CONVICTION STEMMED FROM DRUGS FOUND IN DEFENDANT’S VEHICLE, TWO YEARS BEFORE; THEREFORE THE PRIOR CRIME WAS NOT LOGICALLY CONNECTED TO ANY ISSUE IN THE CASE; THE EVIDENCE WAS ERRONEOUSLY ADMITTED SOLELY TO PROVE DEFENDANT’S PROPENSITY TO POSSESS DRUGS (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, reversing the Appellate Division, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Troutman, over a three-judge dissent, determined the evidence of defendant’s prior possession of drugs found in his vehicle two years before was erroneously admitted to prove defendant’s constructive possession of drugs found in a shared apartment:

Generally, evidence of a defendant’s prior possession of drugs is inadmissible at trial to show their intent to sell drugs or knowing possession of drugs on another occasion … . This follows from our longstanding Molineux rule, which provides that “evidence of a defendant’s uncharged crimes or prior misconduct is not admissible if it cannot logically be connected to some specific material issue in the case, and tends only to demonstrate the defendant’s propensity to commit the crime charged” … . When evidence of prior uncharged crimes or misconduct is logically connected to some specific material issue in the case—such as intent, motive, knowledge, common scheme or plan, or identity of the defendant—the evidence falls under an exception to the Molineux rule, and a court may admit the evidence if its probative value outweighs its potential for prejudice to the defendant … .

Here, because the People’s evidence of a prior incident involving defendant’s possession of drugs was not logically connected to any specific material issue in this drug possession case, apart from defendant’s propensity for possessing drugs, the trial court erred in admitting that evidence. Inasmuch as this error was not harmless, we reverse and remit for defendant to receive a new trial. * * *

The main issue at trial was whether defendant had constructive or knowing possession of the contraband distributed throughout three rooms in the apartment. We agree with the dissenting Justices below that defendant’s possession of cocaine in his car in 2017 was not relevant to that issue. The two incidents involved different locations, different circumstances, different theories of possession, and took place around two years apart. People v Henderson, 2026 NY Slip Op 01627, CtApp 3-19-26

Practice Point: Here defendant’s conviction for possession of drugs found in his vehicle was admitted to prove he had constructive possession of drugs found in a shared apartment two years later. Because the prior crime evidence was not connected to any issue in the case on trial other than defendant’s propensity to possess drugs, it was reversible error to admit it.

 

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ALTHOUGH THE COURT FOUND THAT THE DEPUTY DID NOT SOUND HER AIR HORN BEFORE THE INTERSECTION COLLISION WITH PLAINTIFFS’ VEHICLE, THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE THAT THE DEPUTY TOOK PRECAUTIONS BEFORE ENTERING THE INTERSECTION; THEREFORE THE COUNTY DEMONSTRATED THE DEPUTY DID NOT ACT WITH RECKLESS DISREGARD FOR THE SAFETY OF OTHERS IN VIOLATION OF VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW 1104 (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, affirming the Appellate Division, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Wilson, over an extensive dissent, determined the county was entitled to summary judgment in this negligence suit stemming from an intersection accident involving a sheriff’s deputy (Wong) who was responding to an emergency call. Although the court found that Wong did not sound her air horn prior to the collision with plaintiffs’ (Granaths’) car, the evidence demonstrated Wong did not act with reckless disregard for the safety of others:

It is undisputed that, before proceeding through the intersection, Deputy Fong slowed down, came to a complete stop at least once, observed northbound traffic, waited for that traffic to yield to her, and turned on her overheard lights. The Granaths contend that a jury could nonetheless find that Deputy Fong exhibited reckless disregard for the safety of others by failing to activate her air horn or siren; declining to call in a “Code 77” as required by MCSD [sheriff’s department] policy; and proceeding into the intersection despite having an obstructed view of southbound traffic.

We agree with the Appellate Division that defendants met their initial burden on their summary judgment motion and that, in opposition, the Granaths failed to raise a material triable issue of fact. Even assuming Deputy Fong failed to activate her air horn or siren, call in a “Code 77,” or observe southbound traffic—either because her view was obstructed or she neglected to look to her right—taken together with the actions she undisputably did take—slowing down, stopping, activating her emergency lights and proceeding only once she observed northbound traffic yield to her—we cannot conclude that Deputy Fong, with “conscious indifference to the outcome,” “reckless[ly] disregard[ed] . . . a highly probable risk of harm” … . Granath v Monroe County, 2026 NY Slip Op 01586, CtApp 3-19-26

Practice Point: Consult this opinion for insight into the meaning of “reckless disregard for the safety of others” in the context of an intersection traffic accident involving a sheriff’s deputy responding to an emergency call.

 

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TWO PEOPLE WERE SHOT IN A DRIVE-BY SHOOTING; DEFENDANT, IN THE PLEA ALLOCUTIONS, DID NOT ADMIT TO FIRING SEPARATELY AT EACH VICTIM; THEREFORE THE PEOPLE DID NOT MEET THEIR BURDEN TO SHOW THE COMMISSION OF TWO DISTINCT CRIMES; CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES COULD NOT BE IMPOSED (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, affirming the Appellate Division, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Rivera, over a two-judge dissent, determined the prosecutor did not demonstrate that the two victims of this drive-by shooting were struck by different bullets fired separately at each, causing separate injuries to each. Therefore the judge could not impose consecutive sentences. The court noted that this issue need be preserved for appeal:​

… [T]he prosecutor should have been aware at the time of the plea, based on our unambiguous caselaw, that they had the burden of ensuring defendant allocuted to sufficient facts to establish that he separately shot at the two victims or that the victims were injured by separate bullets, in order for consecutive sentencing to be legally authorized. But because the prosecutor failed to satisfy their burden and place on the record the alleged “separate and distinct” acts underlying the two crimes … , the trial court had no legal authority to impose consecutive sentences in this case. People v Sabb, 2026 NY Slip Op 01590, CtApp 3-19-26

Practice Point: Here the defendant was never asked during the plea allocutions whether he fired two shots separately injuring the two victims. Therefore the People did not meet their burden to prove the commission of two separate crimes and consecutive sentences could not be imposed.

 

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THE ACT OF SIMPLE POSSESSSION OF A WEAPON WAS COMPLETE BEFORE THE WEAPON WAS USED TO SHOOT THE VICTIM DURING A ROBBERY; THEREFORE, DESPITE THE OVERLAP OF THE ELEMENTS OF SIMPLE POSSESSION OF A WEAPON AND THE ELEMENTS OF FELONY MURDER AND ROBBERY, CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES WERE PROPERLY IMPOSED (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Garcia, affirming the Appellate Division, determined the sentence for simple possession of a weapon was properly imposed to run consecutively to the concurrent sentences for felony murder and robbery:

Penal Law § 70.25 (2) governs consecutive sentencing, providing that “[w]hen more than one sentence of imprisonment is imposed on a person for two or more offenses committed through a single act or omission, or through an act or omission which in itself constituted one of the offenses and also was a material element of the other, the sentences . . . must run concurrently.” Otherwise, the decision to impose consecutive sentences is a matter of discretion; the statute provides that “when multiple sentences of imprisonment are imposed on a person at the same time . . . the sentence or sentences imposed by the court shall run either concurrently or consecutively . . . in such manner as the court directs at the time of sentence” … .

To determine whether consecutive sentences are permitted, a sentencing court must first examine the statutory elements of the crimes and determine whether those elements overlap “under either prong” of Penal Law § 70.25 (2) and, if they do, “the People may yet establish the legality of consecutive sentencing by showing that the ‘acts or omissions’ committed by defendant were separate and distinct acts” … . That is, where sufficient evidence of separate and distinct acts is presented by the People, “consecutive sentences are possible regardless of whether the statutory elements of the offenses overlap” … .

… [T]he convictions at issue here have overlapping material elements. * * * Whatever the overlap, however, we conclude that the People met their burden of establishing that the defendant’s acts here were separate and distinct and therefore the consecutive sentences imposed were legal.

The People demonstrated that defendant’s possession of the gun in violation of Penal Law § 265.03 (3) was an act distinct from the commission of the robbery. Defendant obtained the gun, at minimum, more than one hour before the robbery, carried it across approximately 15 city blocks, and placed it under a bed in a co-conspirator’s home for “a little while” before eventually retrieving the gun and walking over to the intended victim’s building. Evidence that defendant obtained the gun and then used it to commit the substantive crime provided a sufficient basis for the sentencing judge to impose consecutive sentences. … ” ‘[t]he evidence clearly established that defendant was carrying the weapon at the time he encountered and shot the victim,’ ” and therefore ” ‘the act of possession was complete before the shooting, and consecutive sentences were authorized by’ ” the statute … . People v Billups, 2026 NY Slip Op 01589, CtApp 3-19-26

Practice Point: Consult this opinion for insight into when a judge may impose consecutive sentences despite an overlap of the elements of the crimes.

 

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HERE A “CERTIFICATE OF DELINQUENCY” WAS NEVER FILED FOR ANY VIOLATION OF PROBATION BY THE DEFENDANT AND THE PERIOD OF PROBATION EXPIRED WHILE DEFENDANT WAS STILL UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF THE DRUG TREATMENT COURT; WHEN DEFENDANT VIOLATED THE TERMS OF PROBATION AGAIN, PROBATION WAS REVOKED AND DEFENDANT WAS SENTENCED TO INCARCERATION; BECAUSE THE REVOCATION AND SENTENCE TOOK PLACE AFTER THE PERIOD OF PROBATION EXPIRED, THE SENTENCING COURT HAD BEEN STRIPPED OF JURISDICTION (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Wilson, reversing the Appellate Division, determined that, because no “declaration of delinquency” had ever been filed, defendant’s [Mr. Curry’s] period of probation was never tolled. Therefore the court did not have jurisdiction to revoke his probation and sentence him to incarceration after his probationary period expired:

From 2019 through 2021, Mr. Curry participated in the drug treatment program with mixed results. The DTC [drug treatment court] made efforts to support a positive outcome, permitting Mr. Curry’s continued release after positive drug screens and ensuring he received outpatient treatment. July 5, 2021—the date at which Mr. Curry’s probation was set to expire—passed while Mr. Curry continued to participate in DTC. On December 14, 2021, due to another positive drug screen and missed court dates, the DTC revoked Mr. Curry’s probation and sentenced him to two years of incarceration and three years of post-release supervision. People v Curry, 2026 NY Slip Op 01448, CtApp 3-17-26

Practice Point: If a defendant violates probation but no certificate of delinquency is filed, the probationary period continues to run is not tolled. Here, despite probation violations by the defendant, no certificate of delinquency was ever filed. The court therefore did not have jurisdiction to revoke defendant’s probation and sentence him to incarceration after the expiration of his probationary period.​

 

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