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Tag Archive for: Court of Appeals

Social Services Law

THE FEDERAL “SUPPLEMENTAL SECURITY INCOME (SSI)” PROGRAM PROPERLY USES AN SSI APPLICANT’S BENEFITS TO REIMBURSE NEW YORK FOR “SAFETY NET ASSISTANCE (SNA)” PAID BY NEW YORK TO THE APPLICANT DURING THE SSI APPLICATION PROCESS, WHICH CAN TAKE MONTHS OR YEARS (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Cannataro, over a three-judge dissent, affirming the Appellate Division, determined New York’s Safety Net Assistance program (SNA program) was entitled to reimbursement of the funds provided to applicants awaiting the receipt of the federal Supplemental Security Income program (SSI program) benefits. It may take months or years before an SSI applicant starts receiving SSI payments. During the waiting period an SSI applicant may apply for New York’s SNA program benefits. The applicant is required to work to receive the SNA payments which are based on the federal minimum wage.  The SSI applicants, who are required to work for the SNA benefits during the waiting period, receive the same payments as SNA recipients who do not work. The SSI applicants (the petitioners in this case) argued that using an SSI applicant’s federal SSI benefits to reimburse New York’s SNA program violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) by depriving them of the wages earned during the waiting period. The majority rejected that argument:

… 42 USC § 1383 (g) [SSI program] expressly authorizes the government to withhold benefits payable to an applicant in “an amount sufficient to reimburse the State (or political subdivision) for . . . assistance financed from State or local funds and furnished for meeting basic needs” … . Petitioners do not dispute that SNA generally qualifies as interim assistance, or that 42 USC § 1383 (g) authorizes states to be reimbursed for interim assistance from a retroactive SSI award … . Instead, petitioners effectively ask us to read an exception into 42 USC § 1383 (g) for interim assistance that is conditioned on participation in work activities. But the plain language of the statute does not distinguish between assistance that is conditioned on work activities and assistance that is not so conditioned (e.g., because the recipient is unable to work). Nor is there an obvious reason why Congress would have wished to distinguish between the two types of assistance. Both fulfill the same portion of an SSI applicant’s basic needs during the relevant waiting period, which the federal government would otherwise be financially obligated to cover. Matter of Andersen v Hein, 2026 NY Slip Op 03259, CtApp 5-26-26

 

May 26, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-05-26 14:30:562026-05-29 22:45:33THE FEDERAL “SUPPLEMENTAL SECURITY INCOME (SSI)” PROGRAM PROPERLY USES AN SSI APPLICANT’S BENEFITS TO REIMBURSE NEW YORK FOR “SAFETY NET ASSISTANCE (SNA)” PAID BY NEW YORK TO THE APPLICANT DURING THE SSI APPLICATION PROCESS, WHICH CAN TAKE MONTHS OR YEARS (CT APP).
Attorneys, Criminal Law, Judges

THE AGREEMENT WHICH PROMPTED DEFENDANT’S GUILTY PLEA WAS SUBSEQUENTLY DETERMINED TO BE ILLEGAL BECAUSE IT PROMISED PROBATION FOR A D FELONY; ONCE IT WAS CLEAR DEFENDANT MUST BE SENTENCED TO INCARCERATION, THE JUDGE GAVE THE DEFENDANT THE OPTION TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA, WHICH HE DECLINED TO DO; SENTENCE AFFIRMED (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Rivera, over a two-judge dissent, affirming the Appellate Division, determined defendant’s guilty plea should not be vacated. Defendant unsuccessfully argued that the plea agreement had not been honored by the prosecutor. The plea agreement was unenforceable because it called for an illegal sentence—probation for a D felony. Once it was clear defendant must be sentenced to incarceration, the judge gave defendant the option of withdrawing his guilty plea, which he declined to do. The opinion is fact-intensive and cannot be fairly summarized here. People v Flesch, 2026 NY Slip Op 03258, CtApp 5-26-26

 

May 26, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-05-26 13:09:462026-05-29 14:30:46THE AGREEMENT WHICH PROMPTED DEFENDANT’S GUILTY PLEA WAS SUBSEQUENTLY DETERMINED TO BE ILLEGAL BECAUSE IT PROMISED PROBATION FOR A D FELONY; ONCE IT WAS CLEAR DEFENDANT MUST BE SENTENCED TO INCARCERATION, THE JUDGE GAVE THE DEFENDANT THE OPTION TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA, WHICH HE DECLINED TO DO; SENTENCE AFFIRMED (CT APP).
Labor Law-Construction Law

THE INDUSTRIAL CODE PROVISION WHICH GENERALLY PROHIBITS WORK IN AN AREA WHERE A WORKER CAN BE STRUCK BY EXCAVATION EQUIPMENT IS NOT SPECIFIC ENOUGH TO HOLD A CONSTRUCTION SITE OWNER VICARIOUSLY LIABLE PURSUANT TO LABOR LAW 241(6); PLAINTIFF WAS STRUCK BY AN EXCAVATOR WHICH ROTATED INTO HIM (CT APP)

The Court of Appeals, affirming the Appellate Division, over a three-judge dissent, determined the Industrial Code provision at issue was not specific enough to support a Labor Law 241(6) cause of action for plaintiff’s injury. Plaintiff was struck by the back corner of an excavator which rotated into him. Industrial Code 23-4.2 (k) provides “[p]ersons shall not be suffered or permitted to work in any area where they may be struck or endangered by any excavation equipment or by any material being dislodged by or falling from such equipment” … :

The references to “area” and “endangered” in section 23-4.2 (k) represent the type of “broad, nonspecific regulatory standard[s]” that this Court has held insufficient to support “an action against a non-supervising owner or general contractor” … . Section 23-4.2 (k) does not include a minimum distance that must be maintained between a worker and any excavation equipment, and its protections are not limited to any specific class of worker. The section also does not identify any protective measures or reasonable precautions that a site owner must take in order to comply with the section. Nor does section 23-4.2 (k) provide clear guidance about how owners and contractors should provide reasonable and adequate protection and safety for workers. It merely states a general prohibition with broad applicability, lacking any specific directions. While the safety of workers is a critical concern, the language of section 23-4.2 (k) does not meet the legal standard for specificity required to hold site owners vicariously liable under the Labor Law.  Mann v Mezuyon, LLC, 2026 NY Slip Op 03257, CtApp 5-26-26

Practice Point: Consult this opinion for insight into the level of specificity required before an Industrial Code provision can be the basis for holding a construction site owner vicariously liable for a worker’s injury pursuant to Labor Law 241(6). Here the Industrial Code’s general prohibition against allowing workers in an area where they can be struck by excavation equipment was not specific enough to render the owner vicariously liable.

 

May 26, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-05-26 10:08:562026-05-29 10:45:56THE INDUSTRIAL CODE PROVISION WHICH GENERALLY PROHIBITS WORK IN AN AREA WHERE A WORKER CAN BE STRUCK BY EXCAVATION EQUIPMENT IS NOT SPECIFIC ENOUGH TO HOLD A CONSTRUCTION SITE OWNER VICARIOUSLY LIABLE PURSUANT TO LABOR LAW 241(6); PLAINTIFF WAS STRUCK BY AN EXCAVATOR WHICH ROTATED INTO HIM (CT APP)
Appeals, Criminal Law

THE STENOGRAPHER DELIBERATELY FAILED TO TRANSCRIBE PORTIONS OF THE TRIAL TESTIMONY, INSTEAD RECORDING “BLAH, BLAH, BLAH,” “OMITTED,” AND “UNTRANSCIBABLE;” THE APPELLATE DIVISION PROPERLY SENT THE MATTER BACK FOR A RECONSTRUCTION HEARING AND THE RECONSTRUCTED TESTIMONY WAS SUFFICIENT TO PROTECT DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO AN APPEAL (CT APP). ​

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Wilson, affirming the Appellate Division, determined (1) the Appellate Division, holding the appeal in abeyance, properly sent the matter back for a reconstruction hearing because the seriously flawed trial transcript omitted testimony, and (2) the reconstruction of the transcript was adequate to allow appellate review. Defendant’s conviction was affirmed:

During the trial of Joseph A. Meyers, the primary stenographer failed to capture substantial portions of the proceedings and frequently recorded “blah blah blah,” “blah blah,” “omitted,” “untranscribable” or undecipherable characters instead of the words actually spoken. Those transgressions by the court reporter were first discovered during the pendency of Mr. Meyers’s appeal. The Appellate Division ordered a reconstruction hearing, at which Supreme Court took testimony from the trial judge who heard the case, the attorneys who tried it and court clerks who helped administer it, and also supplemented the record with the extensive notes the judge took during the trial. Although Supreme Court did not, at the conclusion of the reconstruction hearing, identify the contents of the reconstructed record, the Appellate Division affirmed Mr. Meyers’s convictions based on the original trial record as supplemented by the proof established at the reconstruction hearing. The core issues before us are: (1) whether the Appellate Division appropriately ordered a reconstruction hearing instead of summarily reversing Mr. Meyers’s criminal convictions and ordering a new trial; and (2) if the Appellate Division properly required a reconstruction hearing, whether that hearing produced a record sufficient to protect Mr. Meyers’s right to an appeal that comported with due process. Although the transcript prepared by the court reporter at trial is utterly inexcusable, we affirm the Appellate Division’s holding that, on the unique facts of this case, the results of the reconstruction hearing were sufficient to protect Mr. Meyers’s right to an appeal. People v Meyers, 2026 NY Slip Op 03261, CtApp 5-26-26

Practice Point: Consult this opinion for insight into how trial testimony omitted from the transcribed record can be reconstructed such that defendant’s right to an appeal is protected.

 

May 26, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-05-26 09:50:192026-05-30 10:14:01THE STENOGRAPHER DELIBERATELY FAILED TO TRANSCRIBE PORTIONS OF THE TRIAL TESTIMONY, INSTEAD RECORDING “BLAH, BLAH, BLAH,” “OMITTED,” AND “UNTRANSCIBABLE;” THE APPELLATE DIVISION PROPERLY SENT THE MATTER BACK FOR A RECONSTRUCTION HEARING AND THE RECONSTRUCTED TESTIMONY WAS SUFFICIENT TO PROTECT DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO AN APPEAL (CT APP). ​
Criminal Law, Evidence

THE MURDER TOOK PLACE ON NOVEMBER 20; DEFENDANT WAS ARRESTED FOR POSSESSION OF A WEAPON ON NOVEMBER 21 AND INDICTED ON THAT CHARGE ALONE; SUBSEQUENTLY, BASED ON FORENSIC EVIDENCE (BALLISTIC AND DNA), DEFENDANT WAS SEPARATELY INDICTED FOR MURDER COMMITTED WITH THE SAME WEAPON ON NOVEMBER 20; THE MAJORITY CONCLUDED DEFENDANT WAS PROPERLY INDICTED SEPARATELY BECAUSE THE TWO OFFENSES WERE NOT PART OF “THE SAME CRIMINAL TRANSACTION” (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Rivera, over a two-judge dissent, affirming the Appellate Division, determined defendant was properly separately indicted for (1) possession of a weapon and (2) using that weapon to commit murder. Criminal Procedure Law 40.40(2) prohibits separate indictments for joinable offenses. The majority concluded that the possession-of-a-weapon was not part of the “same criminal transaction” as the murder:

Defendant contends that County Court properly dismissed the murder indictment under CPL 40.40 (2) and, as relevant here, argues that the charges were part of the same criminal transaction because there was no break in possession between her use of the weapon in the murder on November 20, 2021 and her possession of the weapon the next day, November 21. The prosecution responds that the passage of time between defendant’s completion of the homicide on November 20 and her subsequent apprehension on November 21 while in possession of the firearm used to commit the offense separates the criminal acts into different criminal incidents, allowing separate prosecution of the possession and the murder charges. The prosecution has the better argument. We conclude that the Appellate Division properly denied defendant’s motion to dismiss and reinstated the murder indictment. People v Harris, 2026 NY Slip Op 03260, CtApp 5-26-26

Practice Point: Here criminal possession of a weapon on November 21 and murder using that same weapon on November 20 were deemed offenses which were not part of the same criminal transaction. Therefore the two offenses were properly indicted separately. The separate indictments did not violate the prohibition of separate indictments for joinable offenses in CPL 40.40(2).

 

May 26, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-05-26 09:21:502026-05-30 09:50:11THE MURDER TOOK PLACE ON NOVEMBER 20; DEFENDANT WAS ARRESTED FOR POSSESSION OF A WEAPON ON NOVEMBER 21 AND INDICTED ON THAT CHARGE ALONE; SUBSEQUENTLY, BASED ON FORENSIC EVIDENCE (BALLISTIC AND DNA), DEFENDANT WAS SEPARATELY INDICTED FOR MURDER COMMITTED WITH THE SAME WEAPON ON NOVEMBER 20; THE MAJORITY CONCLUDED DEFENDANT WAS PROPERLY INDICTED SEPARATELY BECAUSE THE TWO OFFENSES WERE NOT PART OF “THE SAME CRIMINAL TRANSACTION” (CT APP).
Appeals, Attorneys, Family Law

RESOLVING A SPLIT OF AUTHORITY, THE COURT OF APPEALS HELD THE ATTORNEY FOR THE CHILD (AFC) HAS THE AUTHORITY TO APPEAL A CUSTODY DETERMINATION (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Singas, reversing the Fourth Department and addressing a split of authority, determined the attorney for the child (AFC) has the authority to appeal a custody determination if the child is aggrieved:

The Appellate Division Departments have split over whether an AFC can appeal a custody determination on behalf of their client when neither parent-party has appealed. The Second Department has endorsed the AFC’s authority to appeal on behalf of their client, emphasizing that the Family Court Act expressly “recognizes that an [AFC] has the right to pursue an appeal on behalf of the child” because it permits the AFC to file a notice of appeal … . The First and Third Departments have adopted the Second Department’s reasoning … . The Fourth Department has taken a different approach, dismissing appeals taken solely by an AFC when neither parent-party appeals or otherwise indicates their support for the child’s appeal, reasoning that a “child in a custody matter does not have ‘full-party status’ ” and therefore cannot force their parent to ” ‘litigate a petition that [they] ha[ve] since abandoned’ … . * * *

The Family Court Act plainly authorizes an AFC to appeal on behalf of the subject child even though the child is not a full party to the custody proceedings. However, the subject child—like any appealing party—must still meet the CPLR’s aggrievement requirement and other applicable jurisdictional requirements (see CPLR 5511 [only an “aggrieved party” may appeal]; Family Ct Act § 165 [a] [Family Court proceedings follow the provisions of the CPLR unless a different procedure is set forth in the Family Court Act]). Here, the children were aggrieved as the AFC argued against modifying the original custody order designating mother as the primary custodial parent and advocated that the children wished to remain primarily with her, but Family Court modified the custody order by awarding mother and father joint custody and shared residency. Matter of Abdoch v Abdoch, 2026 NY Slip Op 03219, CtApp 5-21-26

Practice Point: The attorney for the child (AFC) can appeal a custody determination where the child is aggrieved.

 

May 21, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-05-21 15:21:182026-05-23 15:37:01RESOLVING A SPLIT OF AUTHORITY, THE COURT OF APPEALS HELD THE ATTORNEY FOR THE CHILD (AFC) HAS THE AUTHORITY TO APPEAL A CUSTODY DETERMINATION (CT APP).
Administrative Law, Family Law, Social Services Law

THE NYS OFFICE OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES (OCFS) DID NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO CREATE THE “HOST FAMILY HOME” PROGRAM AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE STATUTORY FOSTER CARE PROGRAM (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Cannataro, reversing the Appellate Division, determined the NYS Office of Children and Family Services (OCFS) did not have the authority to create the “Host Family Home” program as an alternative to the state’s statutory foster care regime:

The voluntary foster care statutes … mandate judicial involvement and oversight at several key junctures. At the outset, OCFS must petition Family Court to approve any placement expected to last longer than 30 days. The court may only do so after assessing that the placement was “knowingly and voluntarily” sought by the parent; that the placement would be “in the best interest of the child”; that “reasonable efforts were made . . . to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the child from [their] home;” and that OCFS complied with the other miscellaneous requirements of Social Services Law § 384-a … . If placement lasts for at least eight months, the Family Court Act requires that Family Court hold a “permanency hearing” where it assesses the child’s well-being in the foster home and determines what, if any, further action would serve the best interests of the child … . These hearings must be held every six months thereafter until termination of the placement, or until the child ages out of foster care. Both parents and children are entitled to assigned counsel during these proceedings … . * * *

The Host Family Home program … purports to relieve its participants from some of the most important protections in the foster care system. Under the program, courts need not approve placements lasting longer than 30 days, nor are they required to assess the well-being of the child if they have been left in foster care for over eight months. Because the courts are not involved, the State need not provide assigned counsel to parents or children to advocate for them during these otherwise mandatory hearings. OCFS is likewise not required to identify known friends or relatives who might care for the child, nor offer any government-paid preventive services, before allowing parents to access host family care.

The Host Family Home program’s elimination of these protections risks diverting children away from the voluntary foster care system. Matter of Lawyers for Children v New York State Off. of Children & Family Servs.. 2026 NY Slip Op 03218, CtApp 5-21-26

 

 

 

May 21, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-05-21 12:17:232026-05-23 15:21:08THE NYS OFFICE OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES (OCFS) DID NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO CREATE THE “HOST FAMILY HOME” PROGRAM AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE STATUTORY FOSTER CARE PROGRAM (CT APP).
Civil Procedure, Negligence, Workers' Compensation

THE JUSTICE FOR INJURED WORKERS ACT (JIWA) PROHIBITS GIVING COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL EFFECT TO WORKERS’ COMMPENSATION BOARD RULINGS IN SUBSEQUENT PERSONAL INJURY ACTIONS STEMMING FROM THE SAME INCIDENT, EVEN WHEN THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD RULING PREDATES THE ENACTMENT OF THE JIWA (CT APP). ​

The Court of Appeals, affirming the Appellate Division’s reversal of Supreme Court on a different ground, determined the Justice for Injured Workers Act (JIWA), which prohibits giving a Workers’ Compensation Board’s ruling collateral estoppel effect in a subsequent personal injury action, applies to Workers’ Compensation Board rulings which predate the enactment of the JIWA. The Appellate Division described the application of collateral estoppel in this context as the retroactive application of the JIWA. The Court of Appeals disagreed, stating that a “statute does not operate ‘retrospectively’ merely because it is applied in a case arising from conduct antedating the statute’s enactment:”

At the time Supreme Court rendered its decision, JIWA had been in effect for several months. By its plain terms, JIWA, as of its effective date, prohibits courts from giving collateral estoppel effect to workers’ compensation decisions arising out of the same occurrence, except with respect to the existence of an employer-employee relationship (see Workers’ Compensation Law § 118-a). Pursuant to a straightforward prospective application of JIWA, Supreme Court therefore erred in giving collateral estoppel effect to the 2021 [pre-enactment] decision of the Workers’ Compensation Board. * * *

As of JIWA’s effective date of December 30, 2022, courts are prohibited from giving collateral estoppel effect to workers’ compensation decisions in pending or future lawsuits, except as to the existence of an employer-employee relationship. Because the statute applied at the time Supreme Court rendered its decision, the court erred in granting defendant’s motion.  Garcia v Monadnock Constr., Inc., 2026 NY Slip Op 03217, CtApp 5-21-26

Practice Point: Here, although the JIWA was applied to a Workers’ Compensation Board ruling which predated the enactment of the JIWA, it was not necessary to apply the JIWA “retroactively.” Only a straightforward prospective application of the JIWA was required.

 

May 21, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-05-21 11:45:332026-05-23 12:17:12THE JUSTICE FOR INJURED WORKERS ACT (JIWA) PROHIBITS GIVING COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL EFFECT TO WORKERS’ COMMPENSATION BOARD RULINGS IN SUBSEQUENT PERSONAL INJURY ACTIONS STEMMING FROM THE SAME INCIDENT, EVEN WHEN THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD RULING PREDATES THE ENACTMENT OF THE JIWA (CT APP). ​
Appeals, Criminal Law

THE NEGOTIATED PLEA TO A MISDEMEANOR INFORMATION WAS VACATED AND THE DISMISSAL OF THE FELONY CHARGES WAS REVERSED; THE INFORMATION WAS JURISDICTIONALLY DEFECTIVE BECAUSE IT DID NOT ALLEGE EVERY ELEMENT OF THE CHARGED OFFENSE, HERE THE OPERABILITY OF THE FIREARM; THE FELONY CHARGES WERE REINSTATED (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Halligan, reversing the Appellate Term, over a two-judge dissent, determined the misdemeanor information to which defendant pled guilty was jurisdictionally defective in that it did not allege every element of the offense, here the operability of the firearm:

At arraignment, the People stated that while there had not yet been grand jury action, the parties had agreed to a pre-indictment plea bargain whereby the defendant would plead guilty to the misdemeanor count in satisfaction of all charges in exchange for a sentence of two years’ probation. With the People’s consent, Criminal Court purported to dismiss the two felony counts by crossing them off the felony complaint. The court did not adhere to the procedure set forth in CPL 180.50 for reducing felony charges, the People did not file a superseding accusatory instrument, and the defendant did not waive prosecution by information. He nonetheless pleaded guilty to the remaining misdemeanor count, and the court later imposed the bargained-for sentence. The defendant subsequently appealed the judgment of conviction, arguing that the felony complaint was jurisdictionally defective as to the count to which he pleaded due to the absence of any allegation that the firearm was operable. * * *

We agree with the defendant that the instrument to which he pleaded guilty did not meet the prima facie case requirement because it lacked any allegations of operability. As such, it was jurisdictionally defective and could not serve as the basis for his plea. Consequently, the case should be “restored to its pre-pleading status” (CPL 470.55 [2] …). The record reflects that the felony counts were dismissed when the parties informed the court of their agreed-upon disposition, and thus the purported dismissal is best understood as an integral component of the defendant’s plea. The pre-pleading posture therefore restores the felony complaint … . The defendant fails to identify a sufficient basis for dismissal of the original, pre-pleading felony complaint, and we therefore remit for further proceedings. People v Burgess, 2026 NY Slip Op 02438, CtApp 4-23-26

Practice Point: Consult this opinion for insight into the consequences of failing to follow the proper procedure for reducing felony charges as part of a negotiated plea to an information. Here the information was deemed jurisdictionally defective on appeal, the plea was vacated, and the felony charges were reinstated.

April 23, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-04-23 09:52:342026-04-24 10:14:34THE NEGOTIATED PLEA TO A MISDEMEANOR INFORMATION WAS VACATED AND THE DISMISSAL OF THE FELONY CHARGES WAS REVERSED; THE INFORMATION WAS JURISDICTIONALLY DEFECTIVE BECAUSE IT DID NOT ALLEGE EVERY ELEMENT OF THE CHARGED OFFENSE, HERE THE OPERABILITY OF THE FIREARM; THE FELONY CHARGES WERE REINSTATED (CT APP).
Criminal Law

A HEARING REGARDING A REDUCED SENTENCE PURSUANT TO THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE SURVIVORS JUSTICE ACT (DVSJA) CANNOT BE WAIVED AS A CONDITION OF A PLEA AGREEMENT (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, reversing the Appellate Division, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Rivera, over a concurring opinion and a three-judge dissent, determined the hearing regarding a reduced sentence pursuant to the Domestic Violence Survivors Justice Act (DVSJA) cannot be waived as part of a plea agreement:

The issue on appeal is whether, as a condition of a negotiated plea agreement, a defendant may waive a Penal Law § 60.12 hearing to determine their eligibility for an alternative sentence under the Domestic Violence Survivors Justice Act (DVSJA). The Legislature designed the DVSJA’s alternative sentencing framework to remedy a systemic injustice of the criminal legal system. Specifically, the Legislature recognized that the standard sentencing scheme fails to adequately consider how domestic violence impacts a survivor defendant’s criminal conduct, and their potential for rehabilitation, resulting in harsh and unfair sentences for many survivors. The DVSJA, in Penal Law § 60.12, provides a survivor defendant with the opportunity to request a hearing to establish the impacts of domestic violence in their case and their eligibility for a lesser sentence that accords with the legislative purpose of fair and compassionate treatment of survivors.

Here, defendant N.H. requested a reduced sentence under the DVSJA sentencing framework or, in the alternative, a section 60.12 hearing to demonstrate her eligibility for such a sentence. The prosecution subsequently offered, and N.H. accepted, a plea bargain contingent on N.H.’s waiver of a section 60.12 hearing. We hold that section 60.12 hearings are not waivable as a condition of a plea agreement. People v N.H., 2026 NY Slip Op 02437, CtApp 4-23-26

Practice Point: A defendant eligible for a reduced sentence hearing pursuant to the Domestic Violence Survivors Justice Act cannot waive the hearing as a condition for a plea agreement.

 

April 23, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-04-23 09:36:382026-04-24 09:52:25A HEARING REGARDING A REDUCED SENTENCE PURSUANT TO THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE SURVIVORS JUSTICE ACT (DVSJA) CANNOT BE WAIVED AS A CONDITION OF A PLEA AGREEMENT (CT APP).
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