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UNDER THE LIEN LAW, THE GENERAL CONTRACTOR IN A FAILED SOLAR ENERGY PROJECT, AS TRUSTEE OF THE SETTLEMENT FUNDS, WAS PROPERLY PRECLUDED FROM USING THE FUNDS TO PAY ITSELF FIRST; THE SUBCONTRACTORS MUST BE PAID FIRST; THERE WAS A TWO JUSTICE DISSENT (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, affirming Supreme Court, over a two-justice dissent, in a matter of first impression, determined the subcontractors’ motion to enjoin the general contractor from using settlement funds to pay itself for expenditures in a failed solar-energy project was properly granted. The Lien Law created a trust for the settlement funds and required the general contractor, as trustee, to pay the subcontractors before paying itself:

“Article 3-A of the Lien Law impresses with a trust any funds paid or payable to a contractor ‘under or in connection with a contract for an improvement of real property’ ” ( … Lien Law § 70 [1]). Given this statutory definition, we readily conclude that the settlement funds at issue constitute trust funds under Lien Law article 3-A … . The Court of Appeals has “repeatedly recognized that the primary purpose of [Lien Law] article 3-A . . . is to ensure that those who have directly expended labor and materials to improve real property . . . at the direction of the owner or a general contractor receive payment for the work actually performed” … . With respect to a contractor’s trust, the parties entitled to a beneficial status are expressly enumerated in Lien Law § 71 (2) (a)-(f) … Pursuant to Lien Law § 71 (2) (a), “[t]he trust assets of which a contractor . . . is trustee shall be held and applied for [enumerated] expenditures arising out of the improvement of real property,” including “payment of claims of subcontractors, architects, engineers, surveyors, laborers and materialmen” (Lien Law § 71 [2] [a] … ). The language is mandatory and does not include the “cost[s] of improvement,” which is a term specifically defined to address an owner’s costs (Lien Law § 2 [5]; see Lien §§ 70 [5]; 71 [1] …).  L.C. Whitford Co., Inc. v Babcock & Wilcox Solar Energy, Inc., 2025 NY Slip Op 07063, Third Dept 12-18-25

Practice Point: Under the Lien Law the general contractor here is the trustee of the settlement funds and must use the funds to pay the subcontractors before paying itself.

 

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