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THE WILL BEQUEATHED THE REAL PROPERTY TO PLAINTIFF ALONE; THE DEFENDANT ADMINSTRATOR DREW UP A DEED WHICH TRANSFERRED THE PROPERTY TO PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT AS JOINT TENANTS; THE ISSUE WAS WHETHER THE DEED IS VOID AB INITIO OR VOIDABLE; THE SECOND DEPARTMENT DETERMINED THE DEED WAS VOIDABLE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Landicino, determined that the deed drawn up by defendant, the administrator of the decedent’s estate, which was inconsistent with a specific bequest in the will, was voidable, not void ab initio. The will bequeathed the real property to plaintiff alone. The defendant administrator drew up a deed which transferred the property to plaintiff and defendant as joint tenants. Supreme Court determined deed was void ab initio. The Second Department reversed and determined the deed was voidable. The opinion is complex and cannot be fairly summarized here:

The primary question presented in this appeal is whether a transfer of property by an administrator c.t.a. in a manner that is inconsistent with a specific bequest in a will is voidable or void ab initio. In our view, an administrator c.t.a. who receives letters of administration c.t.a. from the Surrogate’s Court is cloaked with apparent authority to make a transfer of property from the estate, even if that transfer is contrary to the terms of the decedent’s will. As such, the transfer is voidable, not void ab initio.

The undisputed facts of this case are as follows: On April 13, 1998, Floribel Nelson (hereinafter the decedent) died. Prior to her death, the decedent owned real property located in Brooklyn (hereinafter the subject property). In her will, the decedent bequeathed her entire estate, including the subject property, to the plaintiff, who was the decedent’s grandniece, and two other family members who had apparently predeceased the decedent. Because the will further provided that, “if any [of the named heirs] do not survive [the decedent], then his or her share shall be divided equally among the survivors, and if there is only one survivor, said survivor shall take the whole estate,” the plaintiff was the sole surviving beneficiary of the decedent’s estate at the time of the decedent’s death. Rhiney v Rhiney, 2026 NY Slip Op 02428, Second Dept 4-22-26

Practice Point: Here a deed drawn up by the administrator of the estate conveyed decedent’s real property to the administrator and the plaintiff as joint tenants. However, the will bequeathed the property to plaintiff alone. The court was asked to determine if the deed was void ab initio or voidable. The deed was deemed voidable.

 

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