You are here: / / THE JURY RENDERED A VERDICT IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF, FINDING THAT DEFENDANT...
, ,

THE JURY RENDERED A VERDICT IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF, FINDING THAT DEFENDANT UNDULY INFLUENCED DECEDENT TO NAME HIM AS THE SOLE BENEFICIARY OF TWO BROKERAGE ACCOUNTS; THE CONCLUSORY AND SPECULATIVE PROOF OF UNDUE INFLUENCE DID NOT SUPPORT THE VERDICT; DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the defendant’s post-verdict motion for judgment as a matter of law (CPLR 4401) dismissing the complaint should have been granted. Plaintiff alleged defendant unduly influenced the decedent to remove plaintiff as a beneficiary of two brokerage accounts and name defendant as the sole beneficiary. The court explained the shifting burdens of proof:

“‘A motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to CPLR 4401 or 4404 may be granted only when the trial court determines that, upon the evidence presented, there is no valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences which could possibly lead rational persons to the conclusion reached by the jury upon the evidence presented at trial, and no rational process by which the jury could find in favor of the nonmoving party'” … . “In determining whether the defendant has met this burden, a court must accept the plaintiff’s evidence as true and accord the plaintiff the benefit of every reasonable inference which can reasonably be drawn from the evidence presented at trial” … .

“Generally, the burden of proving undue influence rests with the party asserting its existence” … . “Where, however, the existence of a confidential relationship is established, the burden shifts to the beneficiary of the transaction to show that the transaction is fair and free from undue influence” … . “‘In order to demonstrate the existence of a confidential relationship, there must be evidence of circumstances that demonstrate inequality or a controlling influence'” … .

… [T]he plaintiff did not establish that a confidential relationship existed between the decedent and the defendant … . * * *

As a result, the burden of proving undue influence remained upon the plaintiff … . * * *

… [P]laintiff presented only conclusory and speculative evidence that the defendant exercised undue influence over the decedent … . “‘[A] mere showing of opportunity and even of a motive to exercise undue influence does not justify a submission of that issue to the jury, unless there is in addition evidence that such influence was actually utilized'” … . Collins v Denaro, 2026 NY Slip Op 03142, Second Dept 5-20-26

Practice Point: Consult this decision for insight into  the shifting burdens of proof applied to a motion for a judgment as a matter of law made by a defendant after a plaintiff’s verdict. Here the appellate court determined the conclusory and speculative evidence did not support the jury’s verdict.

 

You might also like
ALTHOUGH FATHER HAD THE RIGHT TO WAIVE COUNSEL AND PROCEED PRO SE IN THIS TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS PROCEEDING, FAMILY COURT PROPERLY REFUSED HIS UNTIMELY REQUEST (SECOND DEPT).
PLAINTIFF FELL THROUGH AN INADEQUATELY PROTECTED HOLE IN DEFENDANT’S BUILDING WHEN HE (APPARENTLY) WAS DOING WORK ON BEHALF OF HIS EMPLOYER, APPARENTLY A TENANT IN THE BUILDING; PLAINTIFF SHOULD HAVE BEEN AWARDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE BUILDING OWNER; BUT PLAINTIFF PRESENTED NO PROOF HIS EMPLOYER HAD ASSUMED THE DUTIES OF AN AGENT OF THE OWNER FOR SUPERVISION OF HIS WORK, THEREFORE SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 240 (1) ACTION AGAINST THE EMPLOYER WAS PROPERLY DENIED (SECOND DEPT).
MOTION TO DISMISS THE NEGLIGENCE ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANT SECURITY COMPANY IN THIS THIRD PARTY ASSAULT CASE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, THE EVIDENCE SUBMITTED BY THE DEFENDANT DID NOT RULE OUT LIABILITY BASED UPON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE DEFENDANT SECURITY COMPANY AND THE COMPANY PROVIDING SECURITY AT THE TIME OF THE ASSAULT (SECOND DEPT).
DEFENDANT OUT-OF-POSSESSION LANDLORD DID NOT DEMONSTRATE IT DID NOT HAVE RESPONSIBILITY FOR MAINTENANCE OF THE AREA WHERE PLAINTIFF FELL (PARKING LOT RAMP); THE LANDLORD’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
Court’s Arbitration-Award Review Powers Explained
IN THIS STREET STOP CASE, THE POLICE OFFICER’S CLAIM TO HAVE SEEN THE OUTLINE OF A GUN UNDER DEFENDANT’S SWEAT PANTS WAS DEEMED INCREDIBLE AS A MATTER OF LAW; THE PEOPLE THEREFORE DID NOT MEET THEIR “BURDEN OF GOING FORWARD” AT THE SUPPRESSION HEARING; THE GUN SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED (SECOND DEPT).
THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT ENSURE THAT DEFENDANT’S WAIVER OF HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL WAS KNOWING AND INTELLIGENT, CRITERIA EXPLAINED; NEW TRIAL ORDERED (SECOND DEPT).
THE APPENDIX SUBMITTED BY THE APPELLANT WAS INCOMPLETE; APPEAL DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

THIS LAWSUIT BY A PENNSYLVANIA PENSION FUND AGAINST A LONDON BANKING AND FINANCIAL... THE SCAFFOLD FROM WHICH PLAINTIFF FELL HAD NO SAFETY RAILINGS AND THE SCAFFOLD...