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​ IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION, THE REQUEST FOR A SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE PURSUANT TO CPLR 3408 WAS NOT APPROPRIATE BECAUSE THE BORROWER WAS DECEASED; BECAUSE, UNDER THE FACTS, A SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE WAS NOT A PREREQUISITE FOR FILING A DEFAULT JUDGMENT, THE REQUEST FOR A CONFERENCE DID NOT HOLD THE FORECLOSURE ACTION IN ABEYANCE AND IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED AS ABANDONED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the foreclosure action must be dismissed as abandoned. Plaintiff argued that its request for a settlement conference pursuant to CPLR 3408 constituted “the taking of proceedings” within one year of the default and therefore dismissal of the action as abandoned was precluded. The First Department agreed that, under the circumstances contemplated by CPLR 3408, requesting a settlement conference would demonstrate the action was not abandoned. Here, however, CPLR 3408 did not apply because the borrower was deceased and the action was brought by an executor. Because CPLR 3408 did not apply, the request for a settlement conference did not qualify as “the taking of proceedings:”

… [T]his foreclosure action must be dismissed as abandoned, because plaintiff’s argument is premised on its mistaken assumption that it was required to file an RJI seeking a mandatory conference before it could move for a default judgment. …

… CPLR 3408(a)(1) requires a mandatory settlement conference in “a residential foreclosure action involving a home loan” where “the defendant is a resident of the property subject to foreclosure.” A mandatory conference is not required where the defendant does not reside at the property when the foreclosure action is commenced … . Watkins, the borrower, was not a resident of the property when the foreclosure action was commenced because he died two years earlier.

Additionally, a mandatory conference is required for “a home loan” which is defined, among other things, to include a requirement that “[t]he borrower is a natural person” (RPAPL 1304[6][a][1][i]). Here, the borrower was deceased when plaintiff commenced this action against Thomas in her capacity of executrix of Watkins’s estate. Thomas is neither a borrower, nor a natural person in this context … . Municipal Credit Union v Thomas, 2025 NY Slip Op 06260, First Dept 11-13-25

Practice Point: In a foreclosure action, where the criteria for a settlement conference pursuant to CPLR 3408 are met, a request for a conference within one year of a default will constitute “the taking of proceedings” and preclude dismissal of the action as abandoned. However where, as here, CPLR 3408 is inapplicable because the borrower is deceased, the request for a settlement conference did not constitute “the taking of proceedings” and did not preclude a finding of abandonment.

 

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