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WHEN DOES A RESTRICTIVE COVENANT RUN WITH THE LAND? WHEN IS A RESTRICIVE COVENANT EXTINGUISHED BY MERGER? WHEN IS A RESTRICTIVE COVENANT RENDERED UNENFORCEABLE PURSUANT TO RPAPL 1951?

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined a restrictive covenant prohibiting the development of land in a conservation district ran with the land, although there remains a question of fact whether the covenant was rendered unenforceable pursuant to RPAPL 1951. Plaintiff sought to build a home on the land:​

“[A] restrictive covenant will run with the land and will be enforceable against a subsequent purchaser of the land when the following requirements are satisfied: (1) it must appear that grantor and grantee intended that the covenant should run with the land; (2) it must appear that the covenant is one touching or concerning the land with which it runs; [and] (3) it must appear that there is privity of estate between the promisee or party claiming the benefit of the covenant and the right to enforce it, and the promisor or party who rests under the burden of the covenant” … . The only one of these requirements at issue on this appeal is the intent of the parties, “which must be determined from the instrument and, if necessary, by looking also to the surrounding circumstances” … .

Here, the 2000 deed did not expressly recite that the restrictive covenant was to run with the land. Although that deed contained language providing that the County conveyed to BPC Holding, and to its “heirs or successors and assigns,” the right to have and to hold the property, subject to the restrictive covenant, the mere presence of that language was not sufficient, standing alone, to establish that the grantor and the grantee intended that the restrictive covenant run with the land … .

Nevertheless, the County defendants and the Town defendants established, prima facie, that the restrictive covenant was intended to run with the land based upon the surrounding circumstances…. . * * *

“In order to state a cause of action pursuant to RPAPL 1951, a plaintiff seeking a declaration that a restrictive covenant is unenforceable must allege that, upon a balancing of the equities, the restrictive covenant is of no actual and substantial benefit to the party seeking to enforce it” … . Here, the County defendants and the Town defendants failed to establish, prima facie, that the plaintiff’s alleged hardships due to the restrictive covenant did not “tip the balance of equities in favor of extinguishing [the restrictive covenant]” pursuant to RPAPL 1951(2) … . U & Me Homes, LLC v County of Suffolk, 2026 NY Slip Op 03331, Second Dept 5-27-26

Practice Point: Consult this decision for an in-depth discussion of the criteria for a restrictive covenant which runs with the land, the criteria for extinguishing a restrictive covenant by merger, and the criteria for rendering a restrictive covenant unenforceable pursuant to RPAPL 1951 because of the hardship it imposes.

 

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