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Where Defendant Abutting Property Owner Has Cleared a Snow-Free Path on the Abutting Sidewalk There Will Be No Liability for a Fall in “Non-Cleared” Area

The First Department determined the clearance of a snow-free path on a sidewalk by the defendant abutting property owner created a reasonably safe condition and defendant could not be held liable for plaintiff’s fall in a non-cleared area:

A property owner … has a duty to keep a sidewalk abutting its property sufficiently clear of snow and ice so that the sidewalk is maintained in a “reasonably safe condition” (see Administrative Code of City of NY § 7-210). The property owner will have discharged its duty if a snow-free path is cleared between the street and the sidewalk within a reasonable walking distance of the property, since it is not reasonably foreseeable that a person would attempt to climb over a significantly obstructive curbside mound of snow rather than walk to a nearby unobstructed path … . Since plaintiff’s accident resulted, by his own account, from his unforeseeable decision to climb over the knee-high heap of snow, it is of no moment whether he lost his footing before or after he planted his foot on the sidewalk. McKenzie v City of New York, 2014 NY Slip Op 02533, 1st Dept 4-15-14

 

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Service of a Notice of Claim on the City Did Not Constitute the Service of a Notice of Claim on the New York City Transit Authority

The First Department determined the service of a notice of claim on the City did not constituted the service of a notice of claim on the New York City Transit Authority:

It is well settled that service of a notice of claim on the City through the Comptroller’s Office is not service upon a separate public authority … . Since plaintiff did not comply with the condition precedent of service of a notice of claim upon the Transit Authority defendants, and they deny having received the notice of claim from the Comptroller’s Office, dismissal is required.  Glasheen v Valera, 2014 NY Slip Op 02512, 1st Dept 4-10-14

 

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Breach of Contract Allegations Did Not Give Rise to Tort Causes of Action—No Duty Independent of the Contract Itself

The First Department determined that the negligence causes of action were subsumed in the breach of contract allegations and could not be separately pled:

Breach of contract is not to be considered a tort unless a legal duty independent of the contract itself has been violated … . Allegations of negligence based on defects in construction of a condominium sound in breach of contract rather than tort … . A claim for negligent misrepresentation is not separate from a breach of contract claim where the plaintiff fails to allege a breach of any duty independent from contractual obligations … . Here, plaintiff failed to allege any legal duty that would give rise to an independent tort cause of action. Neither General Business Law art 23-A nor its regulations create a special duty or support a private right of action. Thus, the negligence and negligent misrepresentation claims were duplicative of the breach of contract claim and did not state a cause of action. Board of Mgrs of Soho N 267 W 124th St Condominium v NW 124 LLC, 2014 NY Slip Op 02513, 1st Dept 4-10-14

 

Question of Fact About Whether Golfer, Who Was Injured When the Golf Cart He Was Driving Tipped Over, Was Subject to More than the Normal Hazards Associated with Golfing

The Third Department determined there were triable issues of fact about whether the occupants of a golf cart were exposed to more than the usual hazards associated with golf.  The cart tipped over on an incline.  There was (disputed) evidence indicating wet leaves were on the ground and the tires of the cart were “bald:”

A person who chooses to participate in an athletic or recreational activity “‘consents to those commonly appreciated risks which are inherent in and arise out of the nature of the sport generally and flow from such participation'” … . “[G]olfers are deemed to assume the risks of open topographical features of a golf course” …and they are “held to a common appreciation of the fact that there is a risk of injury from improperly used carts” … . Nevertheless, liability may be found where the participant proves “a dangerous condition over and above the usual dangers that are inherent in the sport” … .

Although plaintiff was an experienced golfer, he had not previously played on this particular course. He claimed that he was driving slowly and cautiously when the car simply slid out of control on wet leaves. Defendant acknowledged that the golf course path where the accident occurred was steep and winding. While defendant disputes the amount of wet leaves that plaintiff contends were on the path, it is uncontested that there were leaves present and that defendant’s employees had inspected the area earlier in the day. Significantly, plaintiff produced proof via the testimony of the person with whom he was golfing that, after the accident, he observed that the tires on the golf cart were “bald.” Rose v Tee-Bird Golf Club Inc, 2014 NY Slip Op 02481, 3rd Dept 4-10-14

 

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No Negligence Cause of Action Against Commissioner of Mental Health (Based Upon Alleged Statutory Violations)

The Third Department determined claimant, an insanity acquittee, could not bring a negligence cause of action against the Commissioner of Mental Health based upon alleged violations of Criminal Procedure Law 330.20.  The court explained the applicable law re: the liability of a governmental agency (special duty/special relationship):

The rule is well established “that an agency of government is not liable for the negligent performance of a governmental function unless there existed a special duty to the injured person, in contrast to a general duty owed to the public” … . A special duty will only arise from a special relationship, which can be formed in three ways: “(1) when the [governmental entity] violates a statutory duty enacted for the benefit of a particular class of persons; (2) when it voluntarily assumes a duty that generates justifiable reliance by the person who benefits from the duty; or (3) when the [governmental entity] assumes positive direction and control in the face of a known, blatant and dangerous safety violation” … . Inasmuch as claimant asserts that CPL 330.20 creates a statutory duty for the benefit of the class of which he is a member, i.e., insanity acquittees, only the first of these categories is potentially applicable.

Significantly, “[t]o form a special relationship through breach of a statutory duty, the governing statute must authorize a private right of action” … . Because CPL 330.20 does not expressly confer upon insanity acquittees the right to seek civil damages for any failure by the Commissioner to follow the statute’s provisions, “recovery may be had only if a private right of action can be implied” … . A private right of action may be fairly implied when all of the prerequisites are fulfilled, namely: “(1) the [claimant] is one of the class for whose particular benefit the statute was enacted; (2) recognition of a private right of action would promote the legislative purpose of the governing statute; and (3) to do so would be consistent with the legislative scheme” … . In our view, the legislative history supports the finding of the Court of Claims that CPL 330.20 was primarily enacted to benefit the public, rather than insanity acquittees … . Justice v State of New York, 2014 NY Slip Op 02483, 3rd Dept 4-10-14

 

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Failure to Allege a Favorable Result Would Have Obtained “But For” the Attorney’s Alleged Malpractice Required Dismissal of the Complaint

The Second Department determined a legal malpractice action was properly dismissed because the plaintiff failed to adequately allege that but for the malpractice the result would have been favorable to the plaintiff.  The court explained the elements of a legal malpractice action:

To recover damages in a legal malpractice action, a plaintiff must establish “that the attorney failed to exercise the ordinary reasonable skill and knowledge commonly possessed by a member of the legal profession’ and that the attorney’s breach of this duty proximately caused plaintiff to sustain actual and ascertainable damages” … . “To establish causation, a plaintiff must show that he or she would have prevailed in the underlying action or would not have incurred any damages, but for the lawyer’s negligence” … . ” A claim for legal malpractice is viable, despite settlement of the underlying action, if it is alleged that settlement of the action was effectively compelled by the mistakes of counsel'” … . Nonetheless, a plaintiff’s conclusory allegations that merely reflect a subsequent dissatisfaction with the settlement, or that the plaintiff would be in a better position but for the settlement, without more, do not make out a claim of legal malpractice … . Benishai v Epstein, 2014 NY Slip Op 02404, 2nd Dept 4-9-14

 

Open and Obvious Condition Precluded Slip and Fall Suit

The Second Department determined a slip and fall case was properly dismissed because the condition which caused the fall, seed pods which had fallen on the steps from a tree, was open and obvious:

The plaintiff allegedly was injured when she slipped and fell on the back steps of the defendant’s residence. The plaintiff testified that, prior to her fall, she felt a “hard cone” or “ball” underneath her foot. After her fall, she observed a crushed seed ball, about the size of a golf ball, on the step. Two or three other seed balls and some leaves were scattered about the steps and landing. The seed balls and leaves apparently had fallen from a nearby tree belonging to the defendant’s neighbor.

The defendant made a prima facie showing that the complained-of condition was both open and obvious, i.e., readily observable by those employing the reasonable use of their senses, and not inherently dangerous … . In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact. Scalice v Braisted, 2014 NY Slip Op 02421, 2nd Dept 4-9-14

 

Plaintiff’s Allegation of Inadequate Lighting Was a Sufficient Indication She Was Aware of the Cause of Her Fall

The Second Department determined summary judgment should not have been granted to the defendants in a slip and fall case.  The court found that plaintiff had presented evidence of the cause of the fall (inadequate lighting) and the defendants did not demonstrate that they neither created the dangerous condition nor had constructive notice of it:

“In order for a landowner to be liable in tort to a plaintiff who is injured as a result of an allegedly defective condition upon property, it must be established that a defective condition existed and that the landowner affirmatively created the condition or had actual or constructive notice of its existence” … . A plaintiff’s inability in a premises liability case to identify the cause of the fall is fatal to the cause of action because a finding that the defendant’s negligence, if any, proximately caused the plaintiff’s injuries would be based on speculation

Here, the respondents failed to establish, prima facie, that the injured plaintiff did not know what had caused her to fall. The injured plaintiff testified during her deposition that the lighting in the hallway was so poor that she could hardly see her surroundings and that she kept her hand on the wall to guide her down the hallway. This testimony, which the respondents submitted with their motion, itself demonstrated the existence of a triable issue of fact as to whether the alleged lack of adequate lighting was a proximate cause of the accident … . Additionally, the respondents failed to establish that they neither created the allegedly dangerous condition nor had actual or constructive notice of it … . Since the respondents failed to satisfy their initial burden of establishing their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, their motion should have been denied without regard to the papers submitted in opposition … .  Palahnuk v Tiro Rest Corp, 2014 NY Slip Op 02418, 2nd Dept 4-9-14

 

Driver of Middle Car in Chain Collision May Not Be Negligent

The Second Department explained the status of the “middle car” in a “chain” rear-end collision. The driver of a vehicle which is struck from behind and pushed into the rear of plaintiff’s vehicle may not be negligent:

“The driver of a motor vehicle shall not follow another vehicle more closely than is reasonable and prudent, having due regard for the speed of such vehicles and the traffic upon and the condition of the highway” (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1129[a]…). Hence, a rear-end collision with a stopped or stopping vehicle establishes a prima facie case of negligence on the part of the operator of the rear vehicle, thereby requiring that operator to rebut the inference of negligence by providing a nonnegligent explanation for the collision … . In chain collision accidents, the operator of the middle vehicle may establish prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that the middle vehicle was struck from behind by the rear vehicle and propelled into the lead vehicle … .Here, in support of her motion, the plaintiff submitted evidence including the deposition testimony of the defendant driver, who testified that an unidentified vehicle struck his vehicle in the rear, causing his vehicle to move forward and strike the rear of the plaintiff’s vehicle. This testimony revealed the existence of a triable issue of fact as to whether the defendant driver was at fault in the happening of the accident … . Kuris v El Sol Contr & Contr Corp, 2014 NY Slip Op 02268, 2nd Dept 4-2-14

 

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A Third-Party’s Removal of a Safety Device Did Not Require Summary Judgment In Favor of the Manufacturer, Even though the Safety Device Would Have Prevented the Injury/There Was Evidence the Safety Device Itself Was Defective, Leading to Its Removal by the Third Party/Therefore, the “Substantial Modification” Defense Did Not Insulate the Manufacturer from Liability as a Matter of Law

In a full-fledged opinion by Judge Abdus-Salaam, over a dissent, the Court of Appeals determined the defendant manufacturer of a post-hole digger did not demonstrate entitlement to summary judgment dismissing the product liability suit because a plastic safety shield (which would have prevented the injury) had been removed by a third party after the sale (the “substantial modification” defense).  There was evidence that the plastic shield was defective in that it wore out prematurely:

If the defendant establishes prima facie entitlement to summary judgment based on substantial modification, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to come forward with evidentiary proof in admissible form demonstrating “the existence of material issues of fact which require a trial of the action” …. . The plaintiff may overcome a substantial modification defense by demonstrating that the post-sale modification did not render a “safe product defective” because the product incorporated a defectively designed safety feature at the time of sale … . In other words, the plaintiff must raise a triable issue of fact whether the safety feature “was not reasonably safe and that the defective design was a substantial factor in causing plaintiff’s injury” … . * * *

…[I]f a plaintiff establishes the existence of material issues of fact concerning the defective design of a safety feature, the defendant will not automatically prevail on summary judgment simply because that safety feature was modified post sale. The substantial modification defense is intended to insulate manufacturers and others in the distribution chain from liability for injuries that would never have arisen but for the post-sale modification of a safety feature on an otherwise safe product. [It] does not, however, mandate summary disposal of cases where the plaintiff raises a colorable claim that the product was dangerous because of a defectively designed safety feature and notwithstanding the modification by the third party. We agree with the Appellate Division that, on this record, plaintiff established the existence of material issues of fact sufficient to overcome defendants’ substantial modification defense. Hoover v New Holland N Am Inc, 2014 NY Slip Op 02215, CtApp 4-1-14

 

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