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City Administrative Code Provision Requiring a Building Owner to Maintain and Be Responsible for the Safe Condition of a Building Is Not Specific Enough to Form the Basis of Negligence Cause of Action

The Second Department determined plaintiffs did not raise a question of fact on a premises liability cause of action based upon alleged city administrative code violations, but did raise a question of fact concerning the building owner’s common law negligence.  Infant plaintiff fell over a railing on a landing to a set of stairs outside of the apartment building:

Administrative Code §§ 27-375 and 27-376 do not apply to the subject exterior stairs because the stairs were not [*2]”used as exits in lieu of interior stairs” (Administrative Code § 27-376…). “Exit” is defined by the Administrative Code as a “means of egress from the interior of a building to an open exterior space” (Administrative Code of City of NY § 27-232). The stairway was outside the parameters of the building and did not provide a means of egress from the interior of the building to an open exterior space … . Moreover, the plaintiffs’ contention that the stairs violated Administrative Code §§ 27-127 and 27-128 is without merit. Those sections “merely require that the owner of a building maintain and be responsible for its safe condition,” and do not constitute a sufficiently specific statutory predicate for liability … . In addition, Administrative Code § 17-123, which concerns window guards, is inapplicable to the facts of this case. Friedman v 1953 Realty Co, 2014 NY Slip Op 03480, 2nd Dept 5-14-14

 

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