You are here: / / Police Officer Struck by Plaintiffs’ Decedents When the Officer Was...
,

Police Officer Struck by Plaintiffs’ Decedents When the Officer Was Making a U-Turn to Follow a Car Was Entitled to Summary Judgment Under the Statutory “Reckless Disregard” Standard

The Fourth Department determined summary judgment should have been granted in favor of a police officer (Bluman) who was struck by plaintiffs' decedents when the officer was attempting to make a u-turn to follow a vehicle.  The court determined the reckless disregard standard of Vehicle and Traffic Law 1104 applied and that the officer's “momentary judgment lapse” did not rise to the level of reckless disregard as a matter of law:

At the time of the accident, Bluman was operating an “authorized emergency vehicle” (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104 [a]) and was engaged in an emergency operation by virtue of the fact that he was attempting a U-turn in order to “pursu[e] an actual or suspected violator of the law” (§ 114-b). As the Court of Appeals recognized …, “the reckless disregard standard of care in Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104 (e) only applies when a driver of an authorized emergency vehicle involved in an emergency operation engages in the specific conduct exempted from the rules of the road by Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104 (b). Any other injury-causing conduct of such a driver is governed by the principles of ordinary negligence.” We conclude that, by attempting to execute a U-turn, Bluman's conduct was exempted from the rules of the road by section 1104 (b) (4). As a result, his conduct is governed by the reckless disregard standard of care in section 1104 (e).

It is well settled that a ” momentary judgment lapse' does not alone rise to the level of recklessness required of the driver of an emergency vehicle in order for liability to attach” (Szczerbiak v Pilat, 90 NY2d 553, 557). Here, Bluman acted under the mistaken belief that the other southbound vehicles were sufficiently behind him and that it was, at that moment, safe to execute a U-turn. This “constituted a momentary lapse in judgment not rising to the level of reckless disregard for the safety of others' “… . Dodds v Town of Hamburg, 2014 NY Slip Op 03060, 4th Dept 5-2-14

 

You might also like
A RULING ON A MOTION TO DISMISS DEALS ONLY WITH THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE PLEADINGS AND DOES NOT CONSTITUTE THE LAW OF THE CASE WITH RESPECT TO A SUBSEQUENT MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (FOURTH DEPT). ​
References to Fingerprint Evidence Processed by Non-testifying Technician Did Not Violate Right to Confrontation
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE SUBMITTED BY DEFENDANT SUBCONTRACTOR DEMONSTRATED IT DID NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO SUPERVISE OR CONTROL THE WORK THAT CAUSED PLAINTIFF’S INJURY; THEREFORE THE LABOR LAW 240 (1) AND 200 CAUSES OF ACTION WERE PROPERLY DISMISSED AND THE COMMON LAW NEGLIGENCE CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (FOURTH DEPT).
Arbitrator’s Misapplication of Law Is Not Reviewable by a Court
BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY CAUSE OF ACTION MUST BE PLED WITH PARTICULARITY (FOURTH DEPT).
ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT DID NOT VIOLATE THE VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW IN MAKING A LEFT TURN, THE OFFICER REASONABLY BELIEVED THERE WAS A VIOLATION; THE TRAFFIC STOP WAS JUSTIFIED AND THE SUPPRESSION MOTION WAS PROPERLY DENIED (FOURTH DEPT).
Insufficient Evidence of History of Alcohol and Drug Abuse in SORA Proceeding
PLAINTIFF ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION, PLAINTIFF DEMONSTRATED THE FAILURE OF A TOE BOARD WAS AT LEAST A CONTRIBUTING CAUSE OF PLAINTIFF’S FALL FROM A ROOF, CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE IS NOT A BAR TO RECOVERY AS A MATTER OF LAW (FOURTH DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2025 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

Company Exercised Sufficient Control Over “Agents” to Justify Finding... Pretrial Motion to Dismiss the Accusatory Instrument, Arguing the Facts Alleged...