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PROMPT MOTION TO STRIKE NOTE OF ISSUE AND CERTIFICATE OF READINESS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, DISCOVERY WAS NOT COMPLETE.

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendants’ motion to strike the note of issue and certificate of readiness should have been granted on the ground discovery was incomplete:

The Supreme Court should have granted the defendants’ motion to strike the note of issue and certificate of readiness and to compel the plaintiff to appear for an independent medical examination … . “While discovery determinations rest within the sound discretion of the trial court, the Appellate Division is vested with a corresponding power to substitute its own discretion for that of the trial court” … . Under the circumstances of this case, including the defendants’ prompt motion to strike the note of issue and certificate of readiness on the ground that discovery was incomplete, and the plaintiff’s failure to demonstrate any prejudice in opposition, the note of issue and certificate of readiness should be stricken, and the plaintiff compelled to appear for an independent medical examination so that discovery may be completed. Moses v B & E Lorge Family Trust, 2017 NY Slip Op 01349, 2nd Dept 2-22-17

CIVIL PROCEDURE (PROMPT MOTION TO STRIKE NOTE OF ISSUE AND CERTIFICATE OF READINESS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, DISCOVERY WAS NOT COMPLETE)/NOTE OF ISSUE (PROMPT MOTION TO STRIKE NOTE OF ISSUE AND CERTIFICATE OF READINESS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, DISCOVERY WAS NOT COMPLETE)/CERTIFICATE OF READINESS (PROMPT MOTION TO STRIKE NOTE OF ISSUE AND CERTIFICATE OF READINESS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, DISCOVERY WAS NOT COMPLETE)/STRIKE, MOTION TO (PROMPT MOTION TO STRIKE NOTE OF ISSUE AND CERTIFICATE OF READINESS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, DISCOVERY WAS NOT COMPLETE)/DISCOVERY (PROMPT MOTION TO STRIKE NOTE OF ISSUE AND CERTIFICATE OF READINESS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, DISCOVERY WAS NOT COMPLETE)

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PLAINTIFFS’ EXPERTS RAISED ISSUES OF FACT REQUIRING DENIAL OF DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION.

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Renwick, over a two-justice dissenting opinion, determined Supreme Court properly denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment in this medical malpractice action. The dissent found the plaintiffs’ experts’ opinions too speculative to raise a question of fact. The opinion is fact-specific and cannot be fairly summarized here:

In sum, defendants submitted expert affirmations that established prima facie that they did not depart from good and accepted medical practice or that any such departure was not a proximate cause of [plaintiff’s]  injuries … . In opposition, plaintiffs submitted expert opinions that raised issues of fact as to the following alleged departures: the premature release of [plaintiff] from postanesthesia care unit, the failure to identify and treat his overdose or adverse reaction to morphine, and the failure to timely respond to his cardiorespiratory arrest … . Severino v Weller, 2017 NY Slip Op 01325, 1st Dept 2-21-17

NEGLIGENCE (PLAINTIFFS’ EXPERTS RAISED ISSUES OF FACT REQUIRING DENIAL OF DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION)/MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (PLAINTIFFS’ EXPERTS RAISED ISSUES OF FACT REQUIRING DENIAL OF DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION)/EVIDENCE (PLAINTIFFS’ EXPERTS RAISED ISSUES OF FACT REQUIRING DENIAL OF DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION)/EXPERT OPINION (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, (PLAINTIFFS’ EXPERTS RAISED ISSUES OF FACT REQUIRING DENIAL OF DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION)

REAR DRIVER MUST TAKE WEATHER CONDITIONS INTO ACCOUNT WHEN FOLLOWING ANOTHER CAR, PLANTIFF’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION PROPERLY GRANTED IN THIS REAR-END COLLISION CASE.

The First Department determined plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment in this rear-end collision case was properly granted. The driver of the rear vehicle must take weather conditions into account when following another car. The emergency doctrine is not available because the driver was aware of the weather conditions. An allegation that the plaintiff’s car stopped suddenly is not enough to rebut the presumption of negligence:

A rear-end collision with a stopped or stopping vehicle establishes a prima facie case of negligence on the part of the driver of the rear vehicle, and imposes a duty on the part of the operator of the moving vehicle to come forward with an adequate, nonnegligent explanation for the accident … . Plaintiff made a prima facie showing of his entitlement to partial summary judgment on the issue of liability by establishing that defendant Angel Sanchez, the driver of defendant Basics Development Group’s vehicle, was negligent.

Although plaintiff came to a sudden stop and defendants contend that icy road conditions that day provide a valid, non-negligent explanation for why the accident occurred (i.e., that Sanchez’s car skidded), a driver is expected to maintain enough distance between himself and cars ahead of him so as to avoid collisions with stopped vehicles, taking into account weather and road conditions … . Furthermore, defendants’ reliance on the emergency doctrine is misplaced, since that defense is unavailable where, as here, defendant driver was aware of inclement weather conditions and should have properly accounted for them … .

Defendants’ alternative argument, that plaintiff stopped suddenly, is insufficient to rebut the presumption of Sanchez’s negligence … . Matos v Sanchez, 2017 NY Slip Op 01306, 1st Dept 2-21-17

 

NEGLIGENCE (REAR DRIVER MUST TAKE WEATHER CONDITIONS INTO ACCOUNT WHEN FOLLOWING ANOTHER CAR, PLANTIFF’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION PROPERLY GRANTED IN THIS REAR-END COLLISION CASE)/TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS (REAR-END COLLISIONS, REAR DRIVER MUST TAKE WEATHER CONDITIONS INTO ACCOUNT WHEN FOLLOWING ANOTHER CAR, PLANTIFF’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION PROPERLY GRANTED IN THIS REAR-END COLLISION CASE)/REAR-END COLLISIONS (REAR DRIVER MUST TAKE WEATHER CONDITIONS INTO ACCOUNT WHEN FOLLOWING ANOTHER CAR, PLANTIFF’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION PROPERLY GRANTED IN THIS REAR-END COLLISION CASE)

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MENTAL HEALTH, HIV, SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND ALCOHOL ABUSE MEDICAL RECORDS NOT DISCOVERABLE IN THIS PERSONAL INJURY CASE.

The First Department, over a two-justice dissent, determined the defendants in this personal injury case did not demonstrate a need for plaintiff’s mental health, alcohol abuse, substance abuse and HIV-related medical records. Supreme Court properly issued a protective order to that effect:

Defendants did not meet their burden of showing a “compelling need” for medical records concerning HIV; they failed to submit evidence that would establish a connection between plaintiff’s claimed HIV status and her future enjoyment of life (Public Health Law § 2785[2][a]…). Similarly, defendants failed to meet their burden of showing that “the interests of justice significantly outweigh the need for confidentiality” such to permit discovery of mental health, alcohol abuse, or substance abuse records (Mental Hygiene Law § 33.13[c][1]; Mental Hygiene Law § 22.05 [b] …).

As the dissent notes, as a rule, “all matter material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action” should be fully disclosed (CPLR 3101[a] …). However, plaintiff’s alleged general anxiety and mental anguish from back and leg injuries do not place her entire mental and physical health into contention … . She has not, as argued by the dissent, waived any protection applicable to such records. James v 1620 Westchester Ave. LLC, 2017 NY Slip Op 01303, 1st Dept 2-21-17

 

CIVIL PROCEDURE (MENTAL HEALTH, HIV, SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND ALCOHOL ABUSE MEDICAL RECORDS NOT DISCOVERABLE IN THIS PERSONAL INJURY CASE)/NEGLIGENCE (CIVIL PROCEDURE, (MENTAL HEALTH, HIV, SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND ALCOHOL ABUSE MEDICAL RECORDS NOT DISCOVERABLE IN THIS PERSONAL INJURY CASE)/DISCOVERY (MEDICAL RECORDS, MENTAL HEALTH, HIV, SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND ALCOHOL ABUSE MEDICAL RECORDS NOT DISCOVERABLE IN THIS PERSONAL INJURY CASE)/MEDICAL RECORDS (MENTAL HEALTH, HIV, SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND ALCOHOL ABUSE MEDICAL RECORDS NOT DISCOVERABLE IN THIS PERSONAL INJURY CASE)/HIV (MEDICAL RECORDS, MENTAL HEALTH, HIV, SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND ALCOHOL ABUSE MEDICAL RECORDS NOT DISCOVERABLE IN THIS PERSONAL INJURY CASE)/MENTAL HEALTH (MEDICAL RECORDS, MENTAL HEALTH, HIV, SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND ALCOHOL ABUSE MEDICAL RECORDS NOT DISCOVERABLE IN THIS PERSONAL INJURY CASE)/SUBSTANCE ABUSE (MEDICAL RECORDS, MENTAL HEALTH, HIV, SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND ALCOHOL ABUSE MEDICAL RECORDS NOT DISCOVERABLE IN THIS PERSONAL INJURY CASE)/ALCOHOL ABUSE (MEDICAL RECORDS, MENTAL HEALTH, HIV, SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND ALCOHOL ABUSE MEDICAL RECORDS NOT DISCOVERABLE IN THIS PERSONAL INJURY CASE)/PRIVILEGE (MEDICAL RECORDS, MENTAL HEALTH, HIV, SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND ALCOHOL ABUSE MEDICAL RECORDS NOT DISCOVERABLE IN THIS PERSONAL INJURY CASE)

SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT FACILITY OWED NO DUTY TO PLAINTIFF WHO WAS ASSAULTED BY A RESIDENT SHORTLY AFTER THE RESIDENT WAS DISMISSED FROM THE TREATMENT PROGRAM.

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Abdus-Salaam, reversing the Appellate Division, determined a mental health and substance abuse treatment facility, JCAP, owed no duty of care to plaintiff who was assaulted by Velentzas, who had just been dismissed from the treatment program for violation of the program’s rules. The facility’s  motion for summary judgment, therefore, should have been granted:

JCAP had some control or authority over its residents while they remained participants of the program. But, JCAP residents could leave the facility and terminate their participation in the program against medical advice. Although voluntary departure from the program would trigger adverse legal consequences — namely, dismissal from the TASC program and potential prosecution in criminal court for the charges against them — residents could leave at any time. In short, facilities like JCAP cannot force a participant to remain on the premises. These facilities are not prisons; JCAP’s control over Velentzas was, “in fact entirely dependent upon [his] willingness to comply with and carry out” its directives … . In the absence of the authority to prevent a participant from leaving, it follows that, when a participant is discharged from JCAP for violating facility rules, or withdraws from the program, he or she is no longer under the facility’s control. Oddo v Queens Vil. Comm. for Mental Health for Jamaica Community Adolescent Program, Inc., 2017 NY Slip Op 01256, CtApp 2-16-17

NEGLGENCE (SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT FACILITY OWED NO DUTY TO PLAINTIFF WHO WAS ASSAULTED BY A RESIDENT SHORTLY AFTER THE RESIDENT WAS DISMISSED FROM THE TREATMENT PROGRAM)/ASSAULT (NEGLIGENCE, SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT FACILITY OWED NO DUTY TO PLAINTIFF WHO WAS ASSAULTED BY A RESIDENT SHORTLY AFTER THE RESIDENT WAS DISMISSED FROM THE TREATMENT PROGRAM)/DUTY (NEGLIGENCE, SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT FACILITY OWED NO DUTY TO PLAINTIFF WHO WAS ASSAULTED BY A RESIDENT SHORTLY AFTER THE RESIDENT WAS DISMISSED FROM THE TREATMENT PROGRAM)/DRUG TREATMENT FACILITY (NEGLIGENCE, SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT FACILITY OWED NO DUTY TO PLAINTIFF WHO WAS ASSAULTED BY A RESIDENT SHORTLY AFTER THE RESIDENT WAS DISMISSED FROM THE TREATMENT PROGRAM)

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STRIKING DEFENDANTS’ ANSWERS WAS AN APPROPRIATE REMEDY FOR SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE.

The First Department determined the striking of defendants’ answers was the proper remedy for spoliation of evidence. Plaintiff was injured on a staircase. The staircase was removed and destroyed days before a scheduled inspection:

Plaintiffs’ pre-action service of preservation letters on the daycare, the initiation of this action, and the issuance of the preliminary conference order, placed defendants on notice of the need to preserve the staircase. The staircase was removed and destroyed in November 2013, days before the scheduled court-ordered inspection. As found by the motion court, “[I]t is clear that the individual defendants destroyed the stairs in question in violation of the order of th[e] court, knowing that plaintiff’s inspection was to take place a few days later.”

The intentional destruction of the staircase, key physical evidence, severely prejudices plaintiffs’ ability to prove their case, and warrants the extreme sanction of striking defendants’ answers … . The record contains no evidence that photographs depicting the staircase exist. Nor is this a case where plaintiffs sat on their rights … . Rookwood v Busy B’s Child Care Daycare Inc., 2017 NY Slip Op 01281, 1st Dept 2-16-17

 

CIVIL PROCEDURE (SPOLIATION, STRIKING DEFENDANTS’ ANSWERS WAS AN APPROPRIATE REMEDY FOR SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE)/EVIDENCE (SPOLIATION, STRIKING DEFENDANTS’ ANSWERS WAS AN APPROPRIATE REMEDY FOR SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE)/SPOLIATION (STRIKING DEFENDANTS’ ANSWERS WAS AN APPROPRIATE REMEDY FOR SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE)/NEGLIGENCE (EVIDENCE, SPOLIATION, STRIKING DEFENDANTS’ ANSWERS WAS AN APPROPRIATE REMEDY FOR SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE)

TREE ROOT OVER WHICH PLAINTIFF TRIPPED WAS A NON-ACTIONABLE OPEN AND OBVIOUS DEFECT.

The Second Department determined the tree root over which plaintiff tripped and fell was open obvious and not actionable:

“A landowner has a duty to exercise reasonable care in maintaining [its] property in a safe condition under all of the circumstances, including the likelihood of injury to others, the seriousness of the potential injuries, the burden of avoiding the risk, and the foreseeability of a potential plaintiff’s presence on the property” … . However, a landowner has no duty to protect or warn against an open and obvious condition that is inherent or incidental to the nature of the property, and that could be reasonably anticipated by those using it … .

Here, the defendant established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the complaint by demonstrating that the tree root was an open and obvious condition and inherent or incidental to the nature of the property, and was known to the plaintiff … . Dottavio v Aspen Knolls Estates Home Owners Assn., 2017 NY Slip Op 01182, 2nd Dept 2-15-17

NEGLIGENCE (TREE ROOT OVER WHICH PLAINTIFF TRIPPED WAS A NON-ACTIONABLE OPEN AND OBVIOUS DEFECT)/SLIP AND FALL (TREE ROOT OVER WHICH PLAINTIFF TRIPPED WAS A NON-ACTIONABLE OPEN AND OBVIOUS DEFECT)/OPEN AND OBVIOUS (TREE ROOT OVER WHICH PLAINTIFF TRIPPED WAS A NON-ACTIONABLE OPEN AND OBVIOUS DEFECT)/TREE ROOT (TREE ROOT OVER WHICH PLAINTIFF TRIPPED WAS A NON-ACTIONABLE OPEN AND OBVIOUS DEFECT)

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CITY DID NOT DEMONSTRATE IT DID NOT CREATE THE ROADWAY DEPRESSION WHICH CAUSED PLAINTIFF’S BICYCLE ACCIDENT, SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY DENIED.

The Second Department determined the city’s motion for summary judgment in this bicycle accident case was properly denied. Although the city demonstrated it did not receive written notice of the alleged defective condition (a depression in the road), the city did not demonstrate it did not create the defective condition when street work was done:

Where, as here, the plaintiff has alleged that the affirmative negligence exception applies, the City was required to show, prima facie, that the exception does not apply … . Although the City established that it did not receive prior written notice of the alleged defect, it failed to establish, prima facie, that it did not create the alleged defect when its Sewer Maintenance Department opened up the street in the area of the plaintiff’s fall prior to the accident … . Since the City did not establish its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, the burden never shifted to the plaintiff to submit evidence sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact. Lewak v Town of Hempstead, 2017 NY Slip Op 01189, 2nd Dept 2-15-17

NEGLIGENCE (MUNICIPAL LAW, CITY DID NOT DEMONSTRATE IT DID NOT CREATE THE ROADWAY DEPRESSION WHICH CAUSED PLAINTIFF’S BICYCLE ACCIDENT, SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY DENIED)/MUNICIPAL LAW (NEGLIGENCE, CITY DID NOT DEMONSTRATE IT DID NOT CREATE THE ROADWAY DEPRESSION WHICH CAUSED PLAINTIFF’S BICYCLE ACCIDENT, SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY DENIED)/BICYCLE ACCIDENT (MUNICIPAL LAW, CITY DID NOT DEMONSTRATE IT DID NOT CREATE THE ROADWAY DEPRESSION WHICH CAUSED PLAINTIFF’S BICYCLE ACCIDENT, SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY DENIED)/HIGHWAYS AND ROADS (NEGLIGENCE, MUNICIPAL LAW, CITY DID NOT DEMONSTRATE IT DID NOT CREATE THE ROADWAY DEPRESSION WHICH CAUSED PLAINTIFF’S BICYCLE ACCIDENT, SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY DENIED)

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ALTHOUGH DEFENDANTS WERE ENTITLED TO EXEMPTION FROM SNOW-ICE SIDEWALK-FALL LIABILITY UNDER THE NYC ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, THEY DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE HAZARD WAS NOT CREATED BY THEIR SNOW REMOVAL EFFORTS, SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY DENIED.

The Second Department determined defendants’ summary judgment motion in this ice/snow sidewalk slip and fall action was properly denied. Although the defendants demonstrated they were entitled to NYC’s exemption from liability for owners of one, two and three family residences, they did not demonstrate they did not create the dangerous condition by their snow removal efforts:

Here, the defendants established, prima facie, that as owners of a two-family residential property which was owner occupied, they were exempt from liability pursuant to section 7-210(b) of the Administrative Code … . The defendants failed, however, to establish, prima facie, that they did not engage in snow and ice removal work prior to the accident or that their snow and ice removal work did not create or exacerbate the hazardous condition which allegedly caused the plaintiff to fall … . Ming Hsia v Valle, 2017 NY Slip Op 01193, 2nd Dept 2-15-17

NEGLIGENCE (ALTHOUGH DEFENDANTS WERE ENTITLED TO EXEMPTION FROM SNOW-ICE SIDEWALK-FALL LIABILITY UNDER THE NYC ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, THEY DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE HAZARD WAS NOT CREATED BY THEIR SNOW REMOVAL EFFORTS, SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY DENIED)/MUNICIPAL LAW (NYC) (SIDEWALKS, SNOW-ICE, ALTHOUGH DEFENDANTS WERE ENTITLED TO EXEMPTION FROM SNOW-ICE SIDEWALK-FALL LIABILITY UNDER THE NYC ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, THEY DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE HAZARD WAS NOT CREATED BY THEIR SNOW REMOVAL EFFORTS, SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY DENIED)/SIDEWALKS (NEGLIGENCE, MUNICIPAL LAW (NYC), ALTHOUGH DEFENDANTS WERE ENTITLED TO EXEMPTION FROM SNOW-ICE SIDEWALK-FALL LIABILITY UNDER THE NYC ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, THEY DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE HAZARD WAS NOT CREATED BY THEIR SNOW REMOVAL EFFORTS, SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY DENIED)/SLIP AND FALL (SIDEWALKS, NEGLIGENCE, MUNICIPAL LAW (NYC), ALTHOUGH DEFENDANTS WERE ENTITLED TO EXEMPTION FROM SNOW-ICE SIDEWALK-FALL LIABILITY UNDER THE NYC ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, THEY DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE HAZARD WAS NOT CREATED BY THEIR SNOW REMOVAL EFFORTS, SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY DENIED)/SNOW-ICE (SIDEWALKS, NEGLIGENCE, MUNICIPAL LAW (NYC), ALTHOUGH DEFENDANTS WERE ENTITLED TO EXEMPTION FROM SNOW-ICE SIDEWALK-FALL LIABILITY UNDER THE NYC ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, THEY DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE HAZARD WAS NOT CREATED BY THEIR SNOW REMOVAL EFFORTS, SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY DENIED)

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BASEMENT OFFICE DID NOT DEPRIVE DEFENDANT HOMEOWNERS OF RESIDENTIAL EXEMPTION FROM LIABILITY FOR A DEFECTIVE SIDEWALK.

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determine a basement business office did not deprive defendants of the residential exemption (for one, two and three family residences) from liability for a defective sidewalk:

In 2003, the New York City Council enacted section 7-210 of the Administrative Code of the City of New York to shift tort liability for injuries resulting from defective sidewalks from the City to abutting property owners … . This liability shifting provision does not, however, apply to “one-, two- or three-family residential real property that is (i) in whole or in part, owner occupied, and (ii) used exclusively for residential purposes” … . “The purpose of the exception in the Code is to recognize the inappropriateness of exposing small-property owners in residence, who have limited resources, to exclusive liability with respect to sidewalk maintenance and repair” … .

Here, the defendants established, prima facie, that they were exempt from liability pursuant to the subject code exception. Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, the defendants’ partial use of the basement as an office space was merely incidental to their residential use of the property … . [Defendant] Alexander Dembitzer was the director of a summer camp located in upstate New York, and during the off-season, he used the basement to conduct the camp’s business. The defendants did not claim the home office as a tax deduction, their home address was only used to receive the camp’s mail during the off-season, and they did not use the office space with any regularity. Koronkevich v Dembitzer, 2017 NY Slip Op 01187, 2nd Dept 2-15-17

 

NEGLIGENCE (BASEMENT OFFICE DID NOT DEPRIVE DEFENDANT HOMEOWNERS OF RESIDENTIAL EXEMPTION FROM LIABILITY FOR A DEFECTIVE SIDEWALK)/NEGLIGENCE (BASEMENT OFFICE DID NOT DEPRIVE DEFENDANT HOMEOWNERS OF RESIDENTIAL EXEMPTION FROM LIABILITY FOR A DEFECTIVE SIDEWALK)/MUNICIPAL LAW (NYC) (SIDEWALKS, BASEMENT OFFICE DID NOT DEPRIVE DEFENDANT HOMEOWNERS OF RESIDENTIAL EXEMPTION FROM LIABILITY FOR A DEFECTIVE SIDEWALK)/SIDEWALKS (MUNICIPAL LAW (NYC), BASEMENT OFFICE DID NOT DEPRIVE DEFENDANT HOMEOWNERS OF RESIDENTIAL EXEMPTION FROM LIABILITY FOR A DEFECTIVE SIDEWALK)/SLIP AND FALL (SIDEWALKS, MUNICIPAL LAW (NYC), BASEMENT OFFICE DID NOT DEPRIVE DEFENDANT HOMEOWNERS OF RESIDENTIAL EXEMPTION FROM LIABILITY FOR A DEFECTIVE SIDEWALK)

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