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CLAIM ALLEGING NEGLIGENT PLACEMENT OF A GUARDRAIL PROPERLY DISMISSED, STATE ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED IMMUNITY.

The Second Department determined the claim alleging negligent highway design was properly dismissed after trial:

“[A] municipality owes to the public the absolute duty of keeping its streets in a reasonably safe condition” … . However, “in the field of traffic design engineering, the State is accorded a qualified immunity from liability arising out of a highway planning decision” … . Under the qualified immunity doctrine, liability may arise where there is proof that the State’s traffic design plan “evolved without adequate study or lacked a reasonable basis” … . Moreover, “something more than a mere choice between conflicting opinions of experts is required before the State . . . may be charged with a failure to discharge its duty to plan highways for the safety of the traveling public” … .

Here, the Court of Claims properly dismissed the claim based upon the evidence the State submitted at trial, which showed that the design and placement of the guardrail were the result of a deliberate decision-making process after an adequate study and had a reasonable basis … . Gagliardi v State of New York, 2017 NY Slip Op 01845, 2nd Dept 3-15-17

 

COURT OF CLAIMS (CLAIM ALLEGING NEGLIGENT PLACEMENT OF A GUARDRAIL PROPERLY DISMISSED, STATE ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED IMMUNITY)/IMMUNITY (HIGHWAY DESIGN, CLAIM ALLEGING NEGLIGENT PLACEMENT OF A GUARDRAIL PROPERLY DISMISSED, STATE ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED IMMUNITY)/NEGLIGENCE (HIGHWAY DESIGN, CLAIM ALLEGING NEGLIGENT PLACEMENT OF A GUARDRAIL PROPERLY DISMISSED, STATE ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED IMMUNITY)/HIGWAYS AND ROADS (CLAIM ALLEGING NEGLIGENT PLACEMENT OF A GUARDRAIL PROPERLY DISMISSED, STATE ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED IMMUNITY)/GUARDRAILS (CLAIM ALLEGING NEGLIGENT PLACEMENT OF A GUARDRAIL PROPERLY DISMISSED, STATE ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED IMMUNITY)

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PLAINTIFF ENTITLED TO AMEND BILL OF PARTICULARS AS OF RIGHT PRIOR TO FILING OF NOTE OF ISSUE.

The Second Department, over a two-justice dissent, determined plaintiff properly amended his bill of particulars as of right prior to the filing of the note of issue, despite labeling the document a “supplemental” bill of particulars. The amended bill of particulars added the failure to diagnose appendicitis as a basis for the lawsuit:

The defendant’s contentions regarding the plaintiff’s delay in amending his bill of particulars are misplaced. While it is true that “once discovery has been completed and the case has been certified as ready for trial, [a] party will not be permitted to amend the bill of particulars except upon a showing of special and extraordinary circumstances'” … , no such showing is required where a bill of particulars is amended as of right before the note of issue and certificate of readiness have been filed. The as-of-right amendment of a bill of particulars has been appropriately compared to the as-of-right amendment of a pleading: “Presumably this amendment [pursuant to CPLR 3042(b)] can make any change in the bill, just as an amendment as of course can make any change in a pleading under CPLR 3025(a). But the latter is restricted in time to the outset of the action while CPLR 3042(b) keeps the bill’s amendment time open during the whole pre-note of issue period” … . Mackauer v Parikh, 2017 NY Slip Op 01847, 2nd Dept 3-15-17

CIVIL PROCEDURE (PLAINTIFF ENTITLED TO AMEND BILL OF PARTICULARS AS OF RIGHT PRIOR TO FILING OF NOTE OF ISSUE)/NEGLIGENCE (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, PLAINTIFF ENTITLED TO AMEND BILL OF PARTICULARS AS OF RIGHT PRIOR TO FILING OF NOTE OF ISSUE)/MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (PLAINTIFF ENTITLED TO AMEND BILL OF PARTICULARS AS OF RIGHT PRIOR TO FILING OF NOTE OF ISSUE)

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ALTHOUGH PLAINTIFF INJURED BY CO-WORKER, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANT’S ACTIONS WERE GROSSLY NEGLIGENT AND THEREFORE NOT WITHIN THE SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT, ALSO A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER EMPLOYER CONDONED DEFENDANT’S ACTIONS, PLAINTIFF’S SUIT NOT PRECLUDED BY WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW.

The Third Department determined plaintiff could sue in negligence, despite the fact that defendant was a co-worker. Defendant struck plaintiff with a golf club inflicting an injury that required the removal of a testicle. There was a question of fact whether defendant’s actions were grossly negligent or reckless and there not within the scope of defendant’s employment. There was also a question of fact whether the employer condoned defendant’s actions:

There is no dispute that plaintiff and defendant were coemployees, that plaintiff was injured in the course of his employment and that he collected workers’ compensation benefits for his injuries. Pursuant to Workers’ Compensation Law § 29 (6), these benefits are the exclusive remedy for an employee injured “by the negligence or wrong of another in the same employ.” Having the same employer is not synonymous with being “in the same employ” and, to be shielded from liability, a defendant “must himself [or herself] have been acting within the scope of his [or her] employment and not have been engaged in a willful or intentional tort” … . Here, there is no indication that plaintiff was involved in any horseplay … . The differing versions of the event presented by the parties, as well as the two club employees who supported plaintiff’s version, raise genuine questions of fact as to whether defendant intended to strike plaintiff and did so in an excessive manner given the sensitive area of impact. Although defendant was not directly disciplined by the club and resigned to take a new position a few months after the incident, a question of fact also remains as to whether the club condoned defendant’s actions. As such, we conclude that Supreme Court properly determined that questions of fact existed as to whether defendant acted in a “grossly negligent and/or reckless” manner when he swung the golf club shaft and struck plaintiff, as alleged in the complaint … . Montgomery v Hackenburg, 2017 NY Slip Op 01744, 3rd Dept 3-9-17

NEGIGENCE (WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW, ALTHOUGH PLAINTIFF INJURED BY CO-WORKER, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANT’S ACTIONS WERE GROSSLY NEGLIGENT AND THEREFORE NOT WITHIN THE SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT, ALSO A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER EMPLOYER CONDONED DEFENDANT’S ACTIONS, PLAINTIFF’S SUIT NOT PRECLUDED BY WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW)/WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW (NEGLIGENCE, (ALTHOUGH PLAINTIFF INJURED BY CO-WORKER, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANT’S ACTIONS WERE GROSSLY NEGLIGENT AND THEREFORE NOT WITHIN THE SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT, ALSO A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER EMPLOYER CONDONED DEFENDANT’S ACTIONS, PLAINTIFF’S SUIT NOT PRECLUDED BY WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW)/EMPLOYMENT LAW (WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW, ALTHOUGH PLAINTIFF INJURED BY CO-WORKER, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANT’S ACTIONS WERE GROSSLY NEGLIGENT AND THEREFORE NOT WITHIN THE SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT, ALSO A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER EMPLOYER CONDONED DEFENDANT’S ACTIONS, PLAINTIFF’S SUIT NOT PRECLUDED BY WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW)

WRONGFUL DEATH VERDICT AWARDING ZERO DAMAGES FOR LOSS OF PARENTAL GUIDANCE NOT AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.

The Second Department determined the jury verdict in this wrongful death case which awarded zero damages for loss of parental guidance was not against the weight of the evidence:

“In a wrongful death action, an award of damages is limited to the fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injuries resulting from the decedent’s death to the persons for whose benefit the action is brought” …. “In the case of a decedent who was not a wage earner, pecuniary injuries may be calculated, in part, from the increased expenditures required to continue the services she [or he] provided, as well as the compensable losses of a personal nature, such as loss of guidance” … . “The determination of pecuniary damages in a wrongful death action is peculiarly within the province of the jury” … . Here, we find that the evidence on the issue of the loss of the decedent’s parental guidance did not so preponderate in favor of the plaintiff such that the verdict could not have been reached on any fair interpretation of the evidence … . Estevez v Tam, 2017 NY Slip Op 01675, 2nd Dept 3-8-17

NEGLIGENCE (WRONGFUL DEATH VERDICT AWARDING ZERO DAMAGES FOR LOSS OF PARENTAL GUIDANCE NOT AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE)/WRONGFUL DEATH (WRONGFUL DEATH VERDICT AWARDING ZERO DAMAGES FOR LOSS OF PARENTAL GUIDANCE NOT AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE)/DAMAGES (WRONGFUL DEATH VERDICT AWARDING ZERO DAMAGES FOR LOSS OF PARENTAL GUIDANCE NOT AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE)/PARENTAL GUIDANCE (WRONGFUL DEATH VERDICT AWARDING ZERO DAMAGES FOR LOSS OF PARENTAL GUIDANCE NOT AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE)

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REVERSIBLE ERROR TO REFUSE TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON RES IPSA LOQUITUR AND MULTIPLE DWELLING LAW LIABILITY IN THIS ELEVATOR ACCIDENT CASE.

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Manzanet-Daniels, reversing Supreme Court and ordering a new trial, determined the trial judge should have instructed the jury on res ipsa loquitur and Multiple Dwelling Law 78 in this elevator accident case. Plaintiff alleged the elevator door closed on her causing her to fall to the floor. There was evidence the door had malfunctioned the day before and a building representative was made aware of the malfunction. There was evidence the door would not have struck plaintiff absent a malfunction, and there was a log of incidents with the elevator which was erroneously excluded from evidence:

Res ipsa loquitur is an evidentiary doctrine which “permits the inference of negligence to be drawn from the circumstances of the occurrence” when a plaintiff can establish that (1) the event is of a kind that ordinarily does not occur in the absence of negligence; (2) the event was caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control of defendant; and (3) the event was not caused by the plaintiff’s actions … . “To rely on res ipsa loquitur a plaintiff need not conclusively eliminate the possibility of all other causes of the injury. It is enough that the evidence supporting the three conditions afford a rational basis for concluding that it is more likely than not’ that the injury was caused by the defendant’s negligence” … .

The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has frequently been applied in cases involving elevator malfunctions, including those involving doors which unexpectedly closed upon and injured plaintiffs while attempting to enter and exit an elevator … . * * *

The trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury regarding the owner’s nondelegable duty under Multiple Dwelling Law § 78. A building owner’s duty under the statute extends to elevator maintenance and repair … . The court’s refusal to charge section 78 erroneously led the jury to believe that the owner’s negligence could only be predicated on its actual or constructive notice of an elevator problem. Barkley v Plaza Realty Invs. Inc., 2017 NY Slip Op 01664, 1st Dept 3-7-17

NEGLIGENCE (ELEVATORS, REVERSIBLE ERROR TO REFUSE TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON RES IPSA LOQUITUR AND MULTIPLE DWELLING LAW LIABILITY IN THIS ELEVATOR ACCIDENT CASE)/EVIDENCE (RES IPSA LOQUITUR, MULTIPLE DWELLING LAW, (ELEVATORS, REVERSIBLE ERROR TO REFUSE TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON RES IPSA LOQUITUR AND MULTIPLE DWELLING LAW LIABILITY IN THIS ELEVATOR ACCIDENT CASE)/ELEVATORS (REVERSIBLE ERROR TO REFUSE TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON RES IPSA LOQUITUR AND MULTIPLE DWELLING LAW LIABILITY IN THIS ELEVATOR ACCIDENT CASE)/RES IPSA LOQUITUR (ELEVATORS, REVERSIBLE ERROR TO REFUSE TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON RES IPSA LOQUITUR AND MULTIPLE DWELLING LAW LIABILITY IN THIS ELEVATOR ACCIDENT CASE)/MULTIPLE DWELLING LAW (ELEVATORS, REVERSIBLE ERROR TO REFUSE TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON RES IPSA LOQUITUR AND MULTIPLE DWELLING LAW LIABILITY IN THIS ELEVATOR ACCIDENT CASE)

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LEAD POISONING, STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS RUNS FROM WHEN THE SYMPTOMS ARE FIRST DISCOVERED, NOT WHEN THE CAUSE OF THE SYMPTOMS IS LEARNED.

The Third Department determined an action by a 28-year-old woman alleging lead paint poisoning was time-barred. Plaintiff was first diagnosed with high levels of lead in 1990. The statute of limitations runs from when the symptoms are first discovered, not when the cause of the symptoms is learned:

… [D]efendants’ submissions were sufficient to demonstrate that plaintiff was cognizant of her claimed injuries, or, at a minimum, reasonably should have been, such that the action is barred by the statute of limitations. Although CPLR 214-c (2) permits an action to proceed within three years from the “discovery of the injury,” this means the “discover[y of] the primary condition on which the claim is based” … , or, put differently, “the discovery of the manifestations or symptoms of the latent disease that the harmful substance produced” … . Here, accepting that lead was the causative harmful substance, plaintiff was aware of her injuries, which first manifested when she started public education in 1990 and, according to plaintiff, continued throughout her school years. Although plaintiff argues that her action is timely because she first discovered that she suffered lead poisoning when her attorney sent a solicitation letter to her mother in 2012, we disagree. Where, as here, a plaintiff is seeking the benefit of the discovery rule applicable to toxic torts, the statute runs from the date the condition or symptom is discovered or reasonably should have been discovered, not the discovery of the specific cause of the condition or symptom … . Vasilatos v Dzamba, 2017 NY Slip Op 01615, 3rd Dept 3-2-17

NEGLIGENCE (LEAD POISONING, STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS RUNS FROM WHEN THE SYMPTOMS ARE FIRST DISCOVERED, NOT WHEN THE CAUSE OF THE SYMPTOMS IS LEARNED)/TOXIC TORTS (LEAD POISONING, STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS RUNS FROM WHEN THE SYMPTOMS ARE FIRST DISCOVERED, NOT WHEN THE CAUSE OF THE SYMPTOMS IS LEARNED/LEAD POISONING (STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS RUNS FROM WHEN THE SYMPTOMS ARE FIRST DISCOVERED, NOT WHEN THE CAUSE OF THE SYMPTOMS IS LEARNED)

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CERTIFICATE OF MERIT INADEQUATE, COMPLAINT DISMISSED.

The Third Department determined the certificate of merit filed in this medical malpractice action was inadequate. The complaint alleged malpractice by a surgeon. The certificate was based on the affidavit of plaintiff’s (Calcagno’s) physical therapist:

A certificate of merit “merely ensures that counsel has satisfied himself or herself that there is a reasonable basis for the commencement of an action” … . The statute requires counsel to submit a certificate of merit declaring that he or she has consulted with at least one licensed physician who is knowledgeable regarding the relevant issues in the action, has reviewed the facts of the case, and has thus concluded that such a reasonable basis exists … .

We agree with Supreme Court that the certificate proffered by plaintiffs is inadequate. The allegations of malpractice arise from defendants’ diagnosis and surgical treatment, and the certificate of merit is based upon an affidavit of Calcagno’s physical therapist, who opined, “as a physical therapist,” that defendants’ actions were “departures from good and accepted medical practice.” However, by definition, a physical therapist cannot diagnose and is incompetent to attest to the standard of care applicable to physicians and surgeons … . Moreover, we find no merit in plaintiffs’ contention that the certificate of merit should be deemed adequate, as it was also based on certain medical reports, Calcagno’s testimony, and the pleadings. Review of these documents, standing alone, cannot suffice. Expert analysis is required to establish whether there was any departure from established standards of care, and whether any such departure was the proximate cause of injury to Calcagno … . Calcagno v Orthopedic Assoc. of Dutchess County, PC, 2017 NY Slip Op 01616, 3rd Dept 3-2-17

 

NEGLIGENCE (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, CERTIFICATE OF MERIT INADEQUATE, COMPLAINT DISMISSED)/MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (CERTIFICATE OF MERIT INADEQUATE, COMPLAINT DISMISSED)/CERTIFICATE OF MERIT (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, CERTIFICATE OF MERIT INADEQUATE, COMPLAINT DISMISSED)

PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATION SHE SAW A DENT IN A WAXY SUBSTANCE MADE BY HER SHOE AS SHE FELL WAS SUFFICIENT TO DEFEAT DEFENDANT’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION, SUPREME COURT REVERSED.

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, over a two-justice dissent, determined defendant should not have been granted summary judgment in this slip and fall case. Plaintiff alleged she slipped on a waxy substance on a marble floor and alleged she saw a “dent” in the substance made by her shoe when she fell. Defendant submitted evidence that the floor was never waxed:

Here, there is a triable issue of fact as to whether there was a slippery substance on the bathroom floor that caused plaintiff to fall notwithstanding defendant’s assertion that it never used wax in that particular bathroom. Contrary to the motion court’s findings, plaintiff’s proof was not speculative and was sufficient to defeat the motion, because she set forth a specific reason for the slippery condition on the floor, namely a build-up of wax … . Indeed, as noted above, she “saw a big line, the dent of my shoe in the wax all the way that I fell,” suggesting that her shoe gouged out some of the waxy substance where she fell. This was more than just leaving a streak … , which would happen regardless of the condition of the floor. Villa v Property Resources Corp. (137 AD3d 454 [1st Dept 2016]), recently decided by this Court, is also not dispositive. There, plaintiff merely felt a wetness on her pants and hands that smelled like wax or ammonia, while here, plaintiff saw the dent of her shoe in the waxy substance … . De Paris v Women’s Natl. Republican Club, Inc., 2017 NY Slip Op 01625, 1st Dept 3-2-17

NEGLIGENCE (PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATION SHE SAW A DENT IN A WAXY SUBSTANCE MADE BY HER SHOE AS SHE FELL WAS SUFFICIENT TO DEFEAT DEFENDANT’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION, SUPREME COURT REVERSED)/SLIP AND FALL (PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATION SHE SAW A DENT IN A WAXY SUBSTANCE MADE BY HER SHOE AS SHE FELL WAS SUFFICIENT TO DEFEAT DEFENDANT’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION, SUPREME COURT REVERSED)

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COMMON CARRIERS DO NOT HAVE A DUTY TO KEEP BUS STEPS FREE OF SNOW TRACKED IN DUE TO A RECENT STORM.

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant transit authority’s motion for summary judgment should have been granted. Plaintiff slipped on snow on a step as she got off a bus:

Plaintiff testified that she slipped and fell as she was exiting a bus owned and operated by defendants because the step was covered with a slushy condition. She and the bus driver both stated that there was snow all over the ground from a storm that had ended earlier that day, and certified meteorological records submitted by defendants demonstrated that a snow storm that started the previous night and ended earlier in the day of the accident had left about six inches of snow on the ground. The bus driver also testified that passengers tracked snow onto the bus on their shoes and boots as they boarded.

Common carriers are not obligated to provide a “constant remedy” for the tracking of water onto a bus during an ongoing storm or for a reasonable time thereafter … . Similarly, when the ground is covered with snow left by a recent storm, “it would be unreasonable to expect the [defendants] to constantly clean the front steps of the subject bus” … . Plaintiff’s argument that defendants failed to show lack of notice of the slushy condition is irrelevant, since they did not breach any duty of care under the existing weather conditions. Harbison v New York City Tr. Auth., 2017 NY Slip Op 01503, 1st Dept 2-28-17

 

NEGLIGENCE (COMMON CARRIERS DO NOT HAVE A DUTY TO KEEP BUS STEPS FREE OF SNOW TRACKED IN DUE TO A RECENT STORM)/BUSES (SLIP AND FALL, COMMON CARRIERS DO NOT HAVE A DUTY TO KEEP BUS STEPS FREE OF SNOW TRACKED IN DUE TO A RECENT STORM)/SLIP AND FALL (BUSES, COMMON CARRIERS DO NOT HAVE A DUTY TO KEEP BUS STEPS FREE OF SNOW TRACKED IN DUE TO A RECENT STORM)

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PLAINTIFFS’ DECEDENT COMMITTED SUICIDE SHORTLY AFTER DEFENDANT PSYCHIATRISTS SAW HER, PLAINTIFFS’ EXPERT RAISED QUESTIONS OF FACT ABOUT WHETHER DEFENDANTS DEVIATED FROM THE MINIMUM STANDARD OF CARE.

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendants’ motions for summary judgment in this psychiatric malpractice case should not have been granted. Plaintiffs’ expert found fault in, inter alia, defendants’ failure to document suicide assessments. Plaintiffs’ decedent committed suicide shortly after the defendant psychiatrists, Roberts and Decker, saw her:

Plaintiffs submitted the factually specific affidavit of a psychiatrist who, relying upon the foregoing, opined that Roberts deviated from the minimum standard of care in failing to document a proper suicide risk assessment and then discharging decedent without ensuring that she obtain psychotherapy and medication management within two days … . * * *

Plaintiffs’ expert psychiatrist opined that Decker fell short of the minimum standard of care by failing to properly conduct and document a suicide risk assessment of decedent, who was experiencing triggering anxiety and untreated depression. The psychiatrist further opined that Decker departed from the minimum standard of care in placing medication adjustment and psychotherapy on hold in the expectation that a “severely compromised” person would provide more information on an inpatient treatment facility that she was curious about. Tkacheff v Roberts, 2017 NY Slip Op 01429, 3rd Dept 2-23-17

 

NEGLIGENCE (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, PLAINTIFFS’ DECEDENT COMMITTED SUICIDE SHORTLY AFTER DEFENDANT PSYCHIATRISTS SAW HER, PLAINTIFFS’ EXPERT RAISED QUESTIONS OF FACT ABOUT WHETHER DEFENDANTS DEVIATED FROM THE MINIMUM STANDARD OF CARE)/MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (PLAINTIFFS’ DECEDENT COMMITTED SUICIDE SHORTLY AFTER DEFENDANT PSYCHIATRISTS SAW HER, PLAINTIFFS’ EXPERT RAISED QUESTIONS OF FACT ABOUT WHETHER DEFENDANTS DEVIATED FROM THE MINIMUM STANDARD OF CARE)/EVIDENCE (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, PLAINTIFFS’ DECEDENT COMMITTED SUICIDE SHORTLY AFTER DEFENDANT PSYCHIATRISTS SAW HER, PLAINTIFFS’ EXPERT RAISED QUESTIONS OF FACT ABOUT WHETHER DEFENDANTS DEVIATED FROM THE MINIMUM STANDARD OF CARE)/EXPERT OPINION (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, PLAINTIFFS’ DECEDENT COMMITTED SUICIDE SHORTLY AFTER DEFENDANT PSYCHIATRISTS SAW HER, PLAINTIFFS’ EXPERT RAISED QUESTIONS OF FACT ABOUT WHETHER DEFENDANTS DEVIATED FROM THE MINIMUM STANDARD OF CARE)/PSYCHIATRISTS (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, PLAINTIFFS’ DECEDENT COMMITTED SUICIDE SHORTLY AFTER DEFENDANT PSYCHIATRISTS SAW HER, PLAINTIFFS’ EXPERT RAISED QUESTIONS OF FACT ABOUT WHETHER DEFENDANTS DEVIATED FROM THE MINIMUM STANDARD OF CARE)/SUICIDE (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, PLAINTIFFS’ DECEDENT COMMITTED SUICIDE SHORTLY AFTER DEFENDANT PSYCHIATRISTS SAW HER, PLAINTIFFS’ EXPERT RAISED QUESTIONS OF FACT ABOUT WHETHER DEFENDANTS DEVIATED FROM THE MINIMUM STANDARD OF CARE)

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