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LACK OF WRITTEN NOTICE OF AN ICY CONDITION PRECLUDED SUIT IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE.

The Second Department determined the county’s written notice required precluded suit in this “slip and fall on ice” action:

Here, the County established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by submitting the affidavit of a County employee, which indicated that she had conducted a search of the relevant records covering a five-year period prior to the date of the accident, and found no written notice of any dangerous or defective conditions at the accident site … .

… Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, the County could require prior written notice of the icy condition because the landing on the exterior steps of the building where the accident occurred provided the public with a general right of passage, and thus served the same functional purpose as a sidewalk, which is one of the locations specifically enumerated in General Municipal Law § 50-e(4) … . Walker v County of Nassau, 2017 NY Slip Op 00683, 2nd Dept 2-1-17

 

MUNICIPAL LAW (LACK OF WRITTEN NOTICE OF AN ICY CONDITION PRECLUDED SUIT IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE)/SLIP AND FALL (LACK OF WRITTEN NOTICE OF AN ICY CONDITION PRECLUDED SUIT IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE)/NEGLIGENCE (LACK OF WRITTEN NOTICE OF AN ICY CONDITION PRECLUDED SUIT IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE)

SPEED OF PLAINTIFF BICYCLIST RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT RE HIS COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE.

The First Department determined the allegation plaintiff bicyclist was going fast in the bike lane raised a question of fact about the plaintiff’s comparative negligence. Plaintiff was injured when he stopped fast after defendant taxi driver turned into the bike lane:

Plaintiff, a cyclist, made a prima facie showing of his entitlement to partial summary judgment based on his evidence, including averments of a nonparty witness, that he was lawfully traveling in a designated bicycle lane, with a yield sign in his favor, when defendant taxi driver attempted to make a left turn and, in the process, crossed over the bicycle lane just moments before plaintiff arrived at the same spot, causing plaintiff to brake sharply and be pitched over his handlebars in order to avoid a collision with the taxi (see 34 RCNY 4-12[p][2]…).

In opposition, defendant taxi driver’s observations that plaintiff was riding his bicycle very fast raised factual issues as to plaintiff’s potential comparative negligence … . An accident may have more than one proximate cause … . Bell v Angah, 2017 NY Slip Op 00613, 1st Dept 1-31-17

 

NEGLIGENCE (SPEED OF PLAINTIFF BICYCLIST RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT RE HIS COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE)/BICYCLISTS (TRAFFIC ACCIDENT, SPEED OF PLAINTIFF BICYCLIST RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT RE HIS COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE)/TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS (BICYCLISTS, SPEED OF PLAINTIFF BICYCLIST RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT RE HIS COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE)

QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER OPTICAL CONFUSION OBSCURED A STEP, DEFENDANT’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED.

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff had raised a question of fact in this slip and fall case. Plaintiff tripped on a step defendant claimed was open and obvious. Plaintiff raised a question of fact about optical confusion with photographs and an affidavit from an expert:

Plaintiff tripped and fell on a step on a walkway on defendant’s premises while crossing the campus during her lunch break. Assuming that defendant established prima facie that the step was open and obvious and not inherently dangerous … , plaintiff raised a triable issue of fact whether the condition was open and obvious by demonstrating through an expert’s affidavit and photographs that the color and position of the step created optical confusion, i.e., “the illusion of a flat surface, visually obscuring … [the] step[]” … . Buonchristiano v Fordham Univ., 2017 NY Slip Op 00586, 1st Dept 1-31-17

NEGLIGENCE (QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER OPTICAL CONFUSION OBSCURED A STEP, DEFENDANT’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED)/SLIP AND FALL (QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER OPTICAL CONFUSION OBSCURED A STEP, DEFENDANT’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED)/OPEN AND OBVIOUS (STEP, SLIP AND FALL, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER OPTICAL CONFUSION OBSCURED A STEP, DEFENDANT’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED)/OPTICAL CONFUSION (STEP, SLIP AND FALL, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER OPTICAL CONFUSION OBSCURED A STEP, DEFENDANT’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED)

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PLAINTIFF, WHICH ULTIMATELY WON THE PATENT INFRINGEMENT SUIT, ALLEGED MALPRACTICE IN THE BRINGING OF CERTAIN MOTIONS; HAD THE MOTIONS WON, IT WAS ALLEGED, $10 MILLION IN LEGAL FEES WOULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED; THE MALPRACTICE ACTION WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED.

The First Department determined the legal malpractice action by plaintiff (Brookwood) against defendant law firm (A & B) was properly dismissed. The law firm defended plaintiff in a patent infringement action which eventually won (with new lawyers). Plaintiff incurred legal fees of $10 million. In this malpractice action, plaintiff alleged its legal fees would have been much lower had the law firm won certain motions early on in the case:

A focal point of this appeal is Brookwood’s claim that A & B, in the patent action, negligently litigated defenses that were available to Brookwood pursuant to 28 USC § 1498. 28 USC § 1498 provides that when a patent is infringed for the benefit of the United States government, the patent holder’s remedy is against the United States in the United States Court of Federal Claims. Brookwood alleges that had A & B not been negligent, the motions that A & B eventually brought based on 28 USC § 1498 would have been granted and Brookwood would have avoided the approximately $10 million it expended on defending itself at trial and on appeal. Important in this analysis is the fact that Brookwood ultimately prevailed in the underlying patent action, achieving a judgment of noninfringement. The theory of Brookwood’s malpractice case is not that but for A & B’s negligence it would have prevailed in the patent action; rather Brookwood’s claim is that but for the manner in which A & B interposed the defenses available to Brookwood under 28 USC § 1498, Brookwood would have prevailed without incurring the additional legal fees it expended. In other words, but for A & B’s negligence, Brookwood could have achieved the same result more expeditiously and economically. The Supreme Court granted A & B’s motion and dismissed the complaint in its entirety, holding, among other things, that the allegations did not support a finding of attorney negligence or of proximate cause. We now affirm. * * *

Decisions regarding the evidentiary support for a motion or the legal theory of a case are commonly strategic decisions and a client’s disagreement with its attorney’s strategy does not support a malpractice claim, even if the strategy had its flaws. “[A]n attorney is not held to the rule of infallibility and is not liable for an honest mistake of judgment where the proper course is open to reasonable doubt” … . Moreover, an attorney’s selection of one among several reasonable courses of action does not constitute malpractice … . Brookwood has not alleged facts supporting its claim that A & B’s evidentiary decision, to rely on [the plaintiff’s] expert, rather than compromise the merits of Brookwood’s position on other arguments, was an unreasonable course of action. Brookwood Cos., Inc. v Alston & Bird LLP, 2017 NY Slip Op 00535, 1st Dept 1-26-17

 

ATTORNEYS (LEGAL MALPRACTICE, PLAINTIFF, WHICH ULTIMATELY WON THE PATENT INFRINGEMENT SUIT, ALLEGED MALPRACTICE IN THE BRINGING OF CERTAIN MOTIONS, HAD THE MOTIONS WON, IT WAS ALLEGED, $10 MILLION IN LEGAL FEES WOULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED, THE MALPRACTICE ACTION WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED)/LEGAL MALPRACTICE (PLAINTIFF, WHICH ULTIMATELY WON THE PATENT INFRINGEMENT SUIT, ALLEGED MALPRACTICE IN THE BRINGING OF CERTAIN MOTIONS, HAD THE MOTIONS WON, IT WAS ALLEGED, $10 MILLION IN LEGAL FEES WOULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED, THE MALPRACTICE ACTION WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED)/NEGLIGENCE (LEGAL MALPRACTICE, PLAINTIFF, WHICH ULTIMATELY WON THE PATENT INFRINGEMENT SUIT, ALLEGED MALPRACTICE IN THE BRINGING OF CERTAIN MOTIONS, HAD THE MOTIONS WON, IT WAS ALLEGED, $10 MILLION IN LEGAL FEES WOULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED, THE MALPRACTICE ACTION WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED)

DEFENDANT DID NOT DEMONSTRATE WHEN ALLEGEDLY DEFECTIVE STEP WAS LAST INSPECTED AND DID NOT DEMONSTRATE ANY DEFECT WAS LATENT, SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY DENIED.

The Second Department determined defendants’ motion for summary judgment in this slip and fall case was properly denied. Plaintiff was injured when a concrete step broke and gave way.  Defendants did not demonstrate when the area in question was last inspected and did not demonstrate the defect at issue was latent:

A defendant moving for summary judgment in a slip-and-fall case has the initial burden of establishing that it did not create the alleged dangerous or defective condition or have either actual or constructive notice of its existence for a sufficient length of time to discover and remedy it … . A defendant has constructive notice of a defect when it is visible and apparent, and has existed for a sufficient length of time before the accident that it could have been discovered and corrected … . “To meet its initial burden on the issue of lack of constructive notice, a defendant is required to offer some evidence as to when the accident site was last cleaned or inspected prior to the plaintiff’s fall” … . “When a defect is latent and would not be discoverable upon a reasonable inspection, constructive notice may not be imputed” … .

Here, in the absence of any evidence as to when the defendants last inspected the subject staircase before the accident, or that the condition of the step was a latent defect that could not have been discovered upon a reasonable inspection, the defendants failed to establish, prima facie, that they lacked constructive notice of the allegedly defective condition of the subject step … . Gairy v 3900 Harper Ave., LLC, 2017 NY Slip Op 00458, 2nd Dept 1-25-17

 

NEGLIGENCE (DEFENDANT DID NOT DEMONSTRATE WHEN ALLEGEDLY DEFECTIVE STEP WAS LAST INSPECTED AND DID NOT DEMONSTRATE ANY DEFECT WAS LATENT, SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY DENIED)/SLIP AND FALL (DEFENDANT DID NOT DEMONSTRATE WHEN ALLEGEDLY DEFECTIVE STEP WAS LAST INSPECTED AND DID NOT DEMONSTRATE ANY DEFECT WAS LATENT, SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY DENIED)/NOTICE (SLIP AND FALL, EFENDANT DID NOT DEMONSTRATE WHEN ALLEGEDLY DEFECTIVE STEP WAS LAST INSPECTED AND DID NOT DEMONSTRATE ANY DEFECT WAS LATENT, SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY DENIED)

PLAINTIFF ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS INTERSECTION ACCIDENT CASE, WHETHER DEFENDANT STOPPED BEFORE ENTERING PLAINTIFF’S RIGHT OF WAY WAS NOT DISPOSITIVE.

The Second Department determined plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment in this intersection accident case. The court noted that whether the defendant’s truck (driven by Lindo) stopped at a stop sign before entering plaintiff’s right of way was not dispositive. It was enough that the truck entered plaintiff’s path, whether it had previously stopped or not:

Here, the plaintiff established his prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that Lindo, who was faced with a stop sign at the intersection, negligently drove the sanitation truck into the intersection without yielding the right-of-way to the plaintiff, and that this was the sole proximate cause of the accident … .

In opposition, the defendants failed to raise a triable issue of fact. The question of whether Lindo stopped at the stop sign is not dispositive, since the evidence established that he failed to yield even if he did stop … . Moreover, the defendants failed to contest the plaintiff’s deposition testimony that he was already in the intersection when he saw the sanitation truck one second prior to the impact, and therefore could not have avoided the accident … . Fuertes v City of New York, 2017 NY Slip Op 00457, 2nd Dept 1-25-17

NEGLIGENCE (PLAINTIFF ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS INTERSECTION ACCIDENT CASE, WHETHER DEFENDANT STOPPED BEFORE ENTERING PLAINTIFF’S RIGHT OF WAY WAS NOT DISPOSITIVE)/TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS (PLAINTIFF ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS INTERSECTION ACCIDENT CASE, WHETHER DEFENDANT STOPPED BEFORE ENTERING PLAINTIFF’S RIGHT OF WAY WAS NOT DISPOSITIVE)

DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR PRECLUDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS ELEVATOR ACCIDENT CASE.

The First Department determined defendant’s motion for summary judgment in this elevator accident case was properly denied. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applied:

The motion court properly concluded that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur precludes the award of summary judgment in defendant’s favor in this action where plaintiff was injured when the elevator in which he was riding came to a sudden and abrupt stop. Elevator malfunctions ordinarily do not occur in the absence of negligence … , and defendant has failed to demonstrate as a matter of law that it lacked exclusive control over the subject elevator at the time of the accident. Defendant’s argument that vandalism was the cause of the elevator’s malfunction, lacks support in the record, and there is no evidence that plaintiff’s actions played a role in the cause of the accident. Galante v New York City Hous. Auth., 2017 NY Slip Op 00430, 1st Dept 1-24-17

NEGLIGENCE (ELEVATOR ACCIDENT, DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR PRECLUDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS ELEVATOR ACCIDENT CASE)/ELAVATORS (DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR PRECLUDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS ELEVATOR ACCIDENT CASE)/RES ISPA LOQUITUR (ELEVATOR ACCIDENT, DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR PRECLUDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS ELEVATOR ACCIDENT CASE)

NO NOTICE OF ALLEGED SKIDDING AND SHAKING OF ESCALATOR, RES IPSA LOQUITUR NOT APPLICABLE.

The First Department determined the escalator-fall case against defendant Macy’s and (apparently) defendant ThyssenKrupp (responsible for escalator maintenance) was properly dismissed. The defendants demonstrated they had no notice of a problem with the escalator (either before or after the accident). The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur did not apply because plaintiff did not show the alleged skidding and shaking of the escalator could only have resulted from defendants’ negligence:

Macy’s operations manager and ThyssenKrupp’s elevator mechanic both testified that they did not receive any reports of the escalators shaking or stopping and starting before the date of plaintiff’s accident; nor did anyone, including plaintiff, before her July 2009 accident, observe the escalators stop and start several times in succession … . … The fact that Macy’s made service calls to ThyssenKrupp on January 15, 2009 and February 15, 2009, because the escalator from the basement to the main level was not running, does not raise an issue of fact as to notice, since there is no evidence that those calls were occasioned by the type of malfunctioning plaintiff describes … . * * *

Plaintiff claims that the escalator skidded and shook causing her to fall forward. The evidence in this record establishes that the elevator never operated in this manner either before or after the alleged accident. Plaintiff was able, after her fall, to ride the escalator up to the next level without any further escalator malfunction. Without more, this proof is insufficient to establish that the event is of a kind that ordinarily does not happen in the absence of negligence … . Torres-Martinez v Macy’s, Inc., 2017 NY Slip Op 00429, 1st Dept 1-24-17

 

NEGLIGENCE (ESCALATOR FALL, NO NOTICE OF ALLEGED SKIDDING AND SHAKING OF ESCALATOR, RES IPSA LOQUITUR NOT APPLICABLE)/SLIP AND FALL (ESCALATOR FALL, NO NOTICE OF ALLEGED SKIDDING AND SHAKING OF ESCALATOR, RES IPSA LOQUITUR NOT APPLICABLE)/ESCALATORS (ESCALATOR FALL, NO NOTICE OF ALLEGED SKIDDING AND SHAKING OF ESCALATOR, RES IPSA LOQUITUR NOT APPLICABLE)/RES IPSA LOQUITUR (ESCALATOR FALL, NO NOTICE OF ALLEGED SKIDDING AND SHAKING OF ESCALATOR, RES IPSA LOQUITUR NOT APPLICABLE)

EVEN THOUGH THE PEDESTRIAN DID NOT HAVE THE RIGHT OF WAY WHEN HE CROSSED THE STREET, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER DRIVER COULD HAVE AVOIDED STRIKING HIM.

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant’s motion for summary judgment should not have been granted in this pedestrian traffic accident. Plaintiff pedestrian conceded he did not have the right of way when he crossed in a crosswalk. There was a question of fact whether the driver could have seen the pedestrian and avoided the accident:

Plaintiff pedestrian testified that he was struck by defendant’s vehicle while crossing the street within the crosswalk, but conceded that he did not have the right of way when he entered the street (… Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1112;…). Nevertheless, when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, triable issues of fact exist as to the relative positions of plaintiff and defendant at the time of the accident, and whether defendant could have seen plaintiff before the accident and failed to exercise due care to avoid the accident … . Sylvester v Velez, 2017 NY Slip Op 00390, 1st Dept 1-19-17

NEGLIGENCE (EVEN THOUGH THE PEDESTRIAN DID NOT HAVE THE RIGHT OF WAY WHEN HE CROSSED THE STREET, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER DRIVER COULD HAVE AVOIDED STRIKING HIM)/PEDESTRIANS (EVEN THOUGH THE PEDESTRIAN DID NOT HAVE THE RIGHT OF WAY WHEN HE CROSSED THE STREET, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER DRIVER COULD HAVE AVOIDED STRIKING HIM)/TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS (EVEN THOUGH THE PEDESTRIAN DID NOT HAVE THE RIGHT OF WAY WHEN HE CROSSED THE STREET, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER DRIVER COULD HAVE AVOIDED STRIKING HIM)

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ACCIDENT REPORT WHICH DID NOT INDICATE PETITIONER WAS INJURED DID NOT NOTIFY THE CITY OF THE ESSENTIAL FACTS, THEREFORE LEAVE TO FILE LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM PROPERLY DENIED.

The Second Department determined the petition for leave to file a late notice of claim against the city, based upon a traffic accident involving a city police car, was properly denied. Although there was a police report of the accident, there was no indication in the report that petitioner was injured:

“A report which describes the circumstances of the accident without making a connection between the petitioner’s injuries and negligent conduct on the part of the public corporation will not be sufficient to constitute actual notice of the essential facts constituting the claim” … . Here, since the police accident report does not connect any injuries sustained by the petitioners to any negligent conduct on the part of the operator of the respondents’ vehicle, it was not sufficient to provide the respondents with actual notice of the essential facts constituting the claim. Moreover, the direct involvement of the respondents’ employee in the accident itself, without more, is also not sufficient to establish that the respondents acquired actual notice of the essential facts constituting the claim … . Matter of D’Agostino v City of New York, 2017 NY Slip Op 00302, 2nd Dept 1-18-17

MUNICIPAL LAW (ACCIDENT REPORT WHICH DID NOT INDICATE PETITIONER WAS INJURED DID NOT NOTIFY THE CITY OF THE ESSENTIAL FACTS, THEREFORE LEAVE TO FILE LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM PROPERLY DENIED)/NEGLIGENCE (MUNICIPAL LAW, ACCIDENT REPORT WHICH DID NOT INDICATE PETITIONER WAS INJURED DID NOT NOTIFY THE CITY OF THE ESSENTIAL FACTS, THEREFORE LEAVE TO FILE LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM PROPERLY DENIED)/NOTICE OF CLAIM (MUNICIPAL LAW, ACCIDENT REPORT WHICH DID NOT INDICATE PETITIONER WAS INJURED DID NOT NOTIFY THE CITY OF THE ESSENTIAL FACTS, THEREFORE LEAVE TO FILE LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM PROPERLY DENIED)

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