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You are here: Home1 / Negligence2 / PLAINTIFF ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS INTERSECTION ACCIDENT CASE,...
Negligence

PLAINTIFF ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS INTERSECTION ACCIDENT CASE, WHETHER DEFENDANT STOPPED BEFORE ENTERING PLAINTIFF’S RIGHT OF WAY WAS NOT DISPOSITIVE.

The Second Department determined plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment in this intersection accident case. The court noted that whether the defendant’s truck (driven by Lindo) stopped at a stop sign before entering plaintiff’s right of way was not dispositive. It was enough that the truck entered plaintiff’s path, whether it had previously stopped or not:

Here, the plaintiff established his prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that Lindo, who was faced with a stop sign at the intersection, negligently drove the sanitation truck into the intersection without yielding the right-of-way to the plaintiff, and that this was the sole proximate cause of the accident … .

In opposition, the defendants failed to raise a triable issue of fact. The question of whether Lindo stopped at the stop sign is not dispositive, since the evidence established that he failed to yield even if he did stop … . Moreover, the defendants failed to contest the plaintiff’s deposition testimony that he was already in the intersection when he saw the sanitation truck one second prior to the impact, and therefore could not have avoided the accident … . Fuertes v City of New York, 2017 NY Slip Op 00457, 2nd Dept 1-25-17

NEGLIGENCE (PLAINTIFF ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS INTERSECTION ACCIDENT CASE, WHETHER DEFENDANT STOPPED BEFORE ENTERING PLAINTIFF’S RIGHT OF WAY WAS NOT DISPOSITIVE)/TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS (PLAINTIFF ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS INTERSECTION ACCIDENT CASE, WHETHER DEFENDANT STOPPED BEFORE ENTERING PLAINTIFF’S RIGHT OF WAY WAS NOT DISPOSITIVE)

January 25, 2017
Tags: Second Department
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