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ALTHOUGH PLAINTIFF INJURED BY CO-WORKER, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANT’S ACTIONS WERE GROSSLY NEGLIGENT AND THEREFORE NOT WITHIN THE SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT, ALSO A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER EMPLOYER CONDONED DEFENDANT’S ACTIONS, PLAINTIFF’S SUIT NOT PRECLUDED BY WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW.

The Third Department determined plaintiff could sue in negligence, despite the fact that defendant was a co-worker. Defendant struck plaintiff with a golf club inflicting an injury that required the removal of a testicle. There was a question of fact whether defendant’s actions were grossly negligent or reckless and there not within the scope of defendant’s employment. There was also a question of fact whether the employer condoned defendant’s actions:

There is no dispute that plaintiff and defendant were coemployees, that plaintiff was injured in the course of his employment and that he collected workers’ compensation benefits for his injuries. Pursuant to Workers’ Compensation Law § 29 (6), these benefits are the exclusive remedy for an employee injured “by the negligence or wrong of another in the same employ.” Having the same employer is not synonymous with being “in the same employ” and, to be shielded from liability, a defendant “must himself [or herself] have been acting within the scope of his [or her] employment and not have been engaged in a willful or intentional tort” … . Here, there is no indication that plaintiff was involved in any horseplay … . The differing versions of the event presented by the parties, as well as the two club employees who supported plaintiff’s version, raise genuine questions of fact as to whether defendant intended to strike plaintiff and did so in an excessive manner given the sensitive area of impact. Although defendant was not directly disciplined by the club and resigned to take a new position a few months after the incident, a question of fact also remains as to whether the club condoned defendant’s actions. As such, we conclude that Supreme Court properly determined that questions of fact existed as to whether defendant acted in a “grossly negligent and/or reckless” manner when he swung the golf club shaft and struck plaintiff, as alleged in the complaint … . Montgomery v Hackenburg, 2017 NY Slip Op 01744, 3rd Dept 3-9-17

NEGIGENCE (WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW, ALTHOUGH PLAINTIFF INJURED BY CO-WORKER, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANT’S ACTIONS WERE GROSSLY NEGLIGENT AND THEREFORE NOT WITHIN THE SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT, ALSO A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER EMPLOYER CONDONED DEFENDANT’S ACTIONS, PLAINTIFF’S SUIT NOT PRECLUDED BY WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW)/WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW (NEGLIGENCE, (ALTHOUGH PLAINTIFF INJURED BY CO-WORKER, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANT’S ACTIONS WERE GROSSLY NEGLIGENT AND THEREFORE NOT WITHIN THE SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT, ALSO A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER EMPLOYER CONDONED DEFENDANT’S ACTIONS, PLAINTIFF’S SUIT NOT PRECLUDED BY WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW)/EMPLOYMENT LAW (WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW, ALTHOUGH PLAINTIFF INJURED BY CO-WORKER, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANT’S ACTIONS WERE GROSSLY NEGLIGENT AND THEREFORE NOT WITHIN THE SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT, ALSO A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER EMPLOYER CONDONED DEFENDANT’S ACTIONS, PLAINTIFF’S SUIT NOT PRECLUDED BY WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW)

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