New York Appellate Digest
  • Home
  • About
  • Just Released
  • Update Service
  • Streamlined Research
  • CLE Courses
  • Contact
  • Menu Menu
You are here: Home1 / Judges
Family Law, Judges

THE JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE DELEGATED HER AUTHORITY TO DETERMINE PARENTAL ACCESS TO ONE OF THE CHILDREN IN THIS ABUSE/NEGLECT PROCEEDING (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Family Court in this abuse and neglect proceeding, held Family Court should not have delegated its authority to determine father’s parental access to one of the children:

… Family Court … found that the father sexually abused and neglected Alexander and derivatively abused and neglected Maximillian, and conditioned the father’s parental access with Alexander and Maximillian upon the consent of Alexander. * * *

… [A] court may not delegate its authority to determine parental access to either a parent or a child … . … [W]e remit the matter … for a new determination as to the father’s parental access with Alexander and Maximillian in accordance with the best interests of those children … . Matter of Alexander M.R. (Manuel D. J. R.), 2026 NY Slip Op 05790, Second Dept 10-7-26

Practice Point: A judge cannot delegate the authority to determine parental access.​

 

October 7, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-10-07 18:11:312026-10-15 20:00:59THE JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE DELEGATED HER AUTHORITY TO DETERMINE PARENTAL ACCESS TO ONE OF THE CHILDREN IN THIS ABUSE/NEGLECT PROCEEDING (SECOND DEPT).
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Judges

THE LIMITED INQUIRY CONDUCTED BY THE JUDGE BEFORE HOLDING THE TRIAL IN DEFENDANT’S ABSENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO DEMONSTRATE DEFENDANT FORFEITED HIS RIGHT TO BE PRESENT AT THE TRIAL (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing the judgment of conviction, determined the inquiry conducted by the judge when the defendant did not show up for trial was insufficient. The record did not establish defendant had deliberately forfeited his right to be present:

… [T]he court held a colloquy on the record, during which the court and defense counsel stated that the defendant had previously assured them of his intention to be present at trial. Defense counsel further informed the court that he did not know where the defendant was, and had looked for him in the courthouse. Defense counsel stated that he had been unable to reach the defendant that morning, but had received a message from the defendant’s mother indicating that the defendant was “on the way.” …  Following limited inquiry, the court commenced the trial in the defendant’s absence shortly after 12:00 p.m.

“‘A defendant’s right to be present at a criminal trial is encompassed within the confrontation clauses of the State and Federal Constitutions'” … . A defendant may “forfeit that right by deliberately absenting himself [or herself] from the proceedings” … . However, “‘before proceeding in the defendant’s absence, the court has an obligation to inquire into the surrounding circumstances to determine if the defendant’s absence is deliberate and to recite on the record the reasons for its finding,'” and “‘[t]he failure to conduct such an inquiry constitutes reversible error'” … . Furthermore, “[w]hile the right to be present may, under some circumstances, be waived by a defendant’s conduct, trial in absentia is not thereby automatically authorized” … . “Rather, the trial court must exercise its sound discretion upon consideration of all appropriate factors, including the possibility that [the] defendant could be located within a reasonable period of time, the difficulty of rescheduling trial and the chance that evidence will be lost or witnesses will disappear” … .

Here, the Supreme Court erred in conducting the trial in the defendant’s absence without sufficient inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the defendant’s absence, and the record is therefore insufficient to establish that the defendant deliberately absented himself from the proceedings and thereby forfeited his right to be present … . Furthermore, the record does not reflect that the court considered all of the appropriate factors before proceeding in the defendant’s absence … . People v Jorge, 2026 NY Slip Op 05811, Second Dept 10-7-26

Practice Point: Consult this decision for insight into the inquiry a judge must make before proceeding with a trial in the defendant’s absence.

 

October 7, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-10-07 13:00:392026-10-17 23:37:23THE LIMITED INQUIRY CONDUCTED BY THE JUDGE BEFORE HOLDING THE TRIAL IN DEFENDANT’S ABSENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO DEMONSTRATE DEFENDANT FORFEITED HIS RIGHT TO BE PRESENT AT THE TRIAL (SECOND DEPT).
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Judges

THE SUPREME COURT’S RULING IN ERLINGER V US DOES NOT ALTER THE LANDSCAPE OF NEW YORK’S PREDICATE OFFENDER STATUTES; A JUDGE, AS OPPOSED TO A JURY, CAN MAKE THE CALCULATIONS NECESSARY TO DETERMINE THE BOUNDS OF THE 10-YEAR LOOKBACK PERIOD, INCLUDING THE TOLLING OF THE LOOKBACK BY INCARCERATION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing the resentence, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Landicino, determined the US Supreme Court decision in Erlinger v US “does not alter the landscape of New York’s predicate offender statutes, the constitutionality of which is well-settled.” Therefore a judge, as opposed to a jury, can make the ministerial calculations required for any tolling of the 10-year lookback period for predicate offenses:

… [T]he tolling calculation under the subject predicate felony offender statutes does not involve an inquiry into the underlying facts that led to the predicate convictions. Rather, the court is required to determine the dates that a defendant entered and was discharged from a correctional facility upon serving a prior sentence … . These ministerial calculations do not implicate any factual determination as to the defendant’s actions during a prior crime of conviction and are akin to the “fact of prior conviction” … . To the extent that a sentencing court must divine the date of the commission of the present offense in order to determine the bounds of the 10-year lookback period, it is constitutionally permitted to use Shepard documents [judicial records, plea agreements, and colloquies between a judge and the defendant] to ascertain “the jurisdiction in which the defendant’s crime occurred and its date” … . Such an inquiry certainly does not impermissibly invite the sentencing court to “try to discern what a trial showed, or a plea proceeding revealed, about the defendant’s underlying conduct” … . A jury is not required to resolve an inquiry that “does not relate to the commission of the offense itself” … . To protect the rights of a defendant during sentencing as a predicate felony offender, New York’s procedural rules provide for a hearing before the judge when the defendant “controverts an allegation” in the predicate felony statement (CPL 400.21). That is all that is required—the Constitution does not entitle a defendant to a jury determination on the issue of whether a predicate offense was committed within 10 years of the commission of the instant offense, including any calculation regarding the periods during which the defendant was incarcerated. People v Gardner, 2026 NY Slip Op 05809, Second Dept 10-7-26

Practice Point: In New York, a judge, as opposed to a jury, may make the lookback calculations associated with the application of the predicate offender sentencing statutes.

 

October 7, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-10-07 11:46:052026-10-17 12:58:27THE SUPREME COURT’S RULING IN ERLINGER V US DOES NOT ALTER THE LANDSCAPE OF NEW YORK’S PREDICATE OFFENDER STATUTES; A JUDGE, AS OPPOSED TO A JURY, CAN MAKE THE CALCULATIONS NECESSARY TO DETERMINE THE BOUNDS OF THE 10-YEAR LOOKBACK PERIOD, INCLUDING THE TOLLING OF THE LOOKBACK BY INCARCERATION (SECOND DEPT).
Criminal Law, Evidence, Judges

DEFENDANT PRESENTED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE THAT HE WAS THE VICTIM OF ABUSE BY HIS GIRLFRIEND AT THE TIME OF THE OFFENSE TO WARRANT A HEARING ON HIS MOTION TO VACATE HIS SENTENCE AND FOR RESENTENCING PURSUANT TO THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE SURVIVORS JUSTICE ACT (DVSJA) (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant’s motion to vacate his sentence and for resentencing pursuant to the Domestic Violence Survivors Justice Act (DVSJA) should not have been denied without a hearing. The court explained what a defendant must demonstrate to warrant a hearing:

The Domestic Violence Survivors Justice Act (DVSJA) “permits courts to sentence defendants to an alternative, less severe sentence if the defendant was a victim of domestic violence and convicted of certain eligible offenses” (… see Penal Law § 60.12). The DVSJA sets forth a three-prong test for entitlement to resentencing: “(a) at the time of the instant offense, the defendant was a victim of domestic violence subjected to substantial physical, sexual or psychological abuse inflicted by a member of the same family or household as the defendant . . . ; (b) such abuse was a significant contributing factor to the defendant’s criminal behavior; [and] (c) having regard for the nature and circumstances of the crime and the history, character[,] and condition of the defendant, . . . a sentence of imprisonment pursuant to [Penal Law §§ 70.00, 70.02, 70.06, 70.71(2), or (3)] would be unduly harsh” … .

A defendant’s motion for resentencing under the DVSJA “must include at least two pieces of evidence corroborating the . . . claim,” and “[a]t least one piece of evidence must be either a court record, pre-sentence report, social services record, hospital record, sworn statement from a witness to the domestic violence, law enforcement record, domestic incident report, or order of protection” (CPL 440.47[2][c] …).

Here, the defendant’s evidence in support of his motion included affidavits of his cousin and friend, as well as hospital records. Collectively, this evidence corroborated the defendant’s allegations that he was a victim of domestic violence subjected to substantial abuse inflicted by his girlfriend R.W. at the time that he committed the subject offense … . People v M.W., 2026 NY Slip Op 05815, Second Dept 10-7-26

Practice Point: Consult this decision for an explanation of the evidence a defendant must present to warrant a hearing on a motion vacate a sentence and for resentencing pursuant to the DVSJA.​

 

October 7, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-10-07 10:57:302026-10-18 11:29:02DEFENDANT PRESENTED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE THAT HE WAS THE VICTIM OF ABUSE BY HIS GIRLFRIEND AT THE TIME OF THE OFFENSE TO WARRANT A HEARING ON HIS MOTION TO VACATE HIS SENTENCE AND FOR RESENTENCING PURSUANT TO THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE SURVIVORS JUSTICE ACT (DVSJA) (SECOND DEPT).
Criminal Law, Evidence, Judges

THE JURY SHOULD HAVE BEEN CHARGED WITH THE “DEFENSE OF A GOOD CLAIM OF RIGHT” IN THIS PETIT LARCENY CASE; DEFENDANT HAD REMOVED A MEMORIAL TO A MURDER VICTIM WHICH HAD BEEN SET UP ON THE SIDEWALK IN FRONT OF DEFENDANT’S MOTHER’S HOUSE (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, vacating defendant’s petit larceny conviction and ordering a new trial, over a dissent, determined the jury should have been charged with the “defense of good claim of right.” The defendant was tried for criminally negligent homicide and petit larceny. A mistrial was declared on the criminally negligent homicide charge and she was convicted of petit larceny. Defendant subsequently pled guilty to criminally negligent homicide and then appealed the petit larceny conviction. The petit larceny charge alleged defendant dismantled and took away parts of a memorial for a murder victim which had been set up on the sidewalk in front of defendant’s mother’s house by the murder victim’s mother. It was the murder victim’s mother who was killed when she was struck by a vehicle driven by the defendant (the subject of the criminally negligent homicide conviction):

… Supreme Court improperly denied the defendant’s request to charge the jury with the defense of a good faith claim of right. “In determining whether to instruct a jury on a claimed defense, the court must view the evidence adduced at trial in the light most favorable to the defendant” … . “The charge must be given if there is evidence reasonably supportive of the defense, even if there is other evidence which, if credited, would negate it” … . “Where evidence exists upon which the jury could reasonably find that a particular defense applies, questions as to the credibility of the defendant’s testimony or inconsistences in the evidence presented do not disentitle the defendant to an instruction on the defense; those questions of fact are to be resolved by the jury” … . “If the evidence sufficiently supports a defense, a failure by the court to charge the jury constitutes reversible error” … .

… [W]e find that there was sufficient evidence to support the defendant’s good faith claim of right defense. * * * … [A]t trial, the People read the defendant’s grand jury testimony demonstrating that she had previously removed memorial items, including, inter alia, balloons and flowers without incident. Furthermore, at trial, a witness testified that he and the defendant, among others, had previously removed memorial items and no one ever asked where said items were and no one was ever arrested for removing same. This evidence reasonably supports the defendant’s claim of right defense. While there may have been evidence that contradicts the defendant’s claim of right defense, those are questions of fact the jury should have resolved … . People v Drago, 2026 NY Slip Op 05807, Second Dept 10-7-26

Practice Point: Consult this decision for a rare discussion of the “defense of a good claim of right” in the context of a petit larceny charge.

 

October 7, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-10-07 10:51:492026-10-17 11:45:40THE JURY SHOULD HAVE BEEN CHARGED WITH THE “DEFENSE OF A GOOD CLAIM OF RIGHT” IN THIS PETIT LARCENY CASE; DEFENDANT HAD REMOVED A MEMORIAL TO A MURDER VICTIM WHICH HAD BEEN SET UP ON THE SIDEWALK IN FRONT OF DEFENDANT’S MOTHER’S HOUSE (SECOND DEPT). ​
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Judges

WHERE A COURT’S DETERMINATION TO ENHANCE A DEFENDANT’S SENTENCE IS BASED SOLELY ON CALCULATIONS DRAWN FROM CERTIFIED PUBLIC RECORDS OF DEFENDANT’S PRIOR INCARCERATION, SENTENCE ENHANCEMENT CAN BE IMPOSED BY A JUDGE (AS OPPOSED TO A JURY) (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the question whether periods of incarceration which tolled the look-back period for enhancement of defendant’s sentence can be determined by a judge, as opposed to a jury:

The court granted defendant’s CPL 440.20 motion and concluded that the initial predicate statement was facially insufficient and that, pursuant to Erlinger [602 US 821], tolling determinations must be made by a jury. The court held that it could “neither determine, nor convene a jury to determine[,] that defendant was previously incarcerated at a particular time and place in an effort to enhance his sentencing.” * * *

​Defendant moved under CPL 440.20 to set aside the persistent violent felony offender sentence, arguing that the predicate felony statement was facially insufficient because it omitted periods of incarceration necessary to toll the statutory ten-year lookback period. Defendant contended that, under Erlinger, a jury was required to make the factual determination of whether any tolling finding would bring his prior conviction within the lookback window. * * *

As this Court found in People v Young (…2026 NY Slip Op 02883 […2026]), Erlinger does not apply to the tolling protocol contained in New York’s predicate felony sentencing statutes. These involve a “rote arithmetic calculation to be made based on certified public records” … . Such objective determinations fall within the narrow Almendarez-Torres exception permitting judicial determination of “the fact of a prior conviction” and associated ministerial facts such as dates.

… [T]he sentencing court erred in holding that tolling findings must be made by a jury and that it therefore could not sentence defendant as a persistent violent felony offender. As in Young, the tolling determination at issue required the court to review official admission and release records as well as calculate the periods during which defendant was confined. This administrative determination does not implicate the Sixth Amendment under Erlinger but rather falls within the Almendarez-Torres exception. People v Sabater, 2026 NY Slip Op 05459, First Dept 9-24-26

Practice Point: Where sentence enhancement is based solely on certified public records of prior incarceration, there is no requirement that a jury, as opposed to the judge, make the enhancement determination.

 

September 24, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-09-24 11:56:462026-10-04 11:35:44WHERE A COURT’S DETERMINATION TO ENHANCE A DEFENDANT’S SENTENCE IS BASED SOLELY ON CALCULATIONS DRAWN FROM CERTIFIED PUBLIC RECORDS OF DEFENDANT’S PRIOR INCARCERATION, SENTENCE ENHANCEMENT CAN BE IMPOSED BY A JUDGE (AS OPPOSED TO A JURY) (FIRST DEPT).
Criminal Law, Judges

THE CHARGES STEMMED FROM AN ARMED CONFRONTATION WITH POLICE OFFICERS; A PROSPECTIVE JUROR INDICATED SHE “WOULD PROBABLY RELATE TO THE POLICE OFFICERS;” THE DENIAL OF THE DEFENSE CHALLENGE TO THE JUROR REQUIRED REVERSAL AND A NEW TRIAL (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Third Department, reversing the judgment of conviction and ordering a new trial, determined the defense challenge to a prospective juror should have been granted:

The trial evidence established that officers with the Hudson Police Department responded to a residence regarding a possible domestic incident. Upon their arrival, the officers announced themselves and knocked on the door for approximately five minutes before the door was eventually opened and they were permitted entry. Two officers entered the single-bedroom apartment while two others remained outside. One of the officers inside the apartment then came upon the bedroom where defendant was wielding a knife, which he had raised above his head in the direction of that officer. The officer, who was in uniform and visible to defendant, drew his service weapon and directed defendant to drop the knife multiple times before defendant ultimately did so. Defendant was then placed into custody with extreme difficulty. This chain of events was echoed by the three other officers present during the underlying events. * * *

After acknowledging close relationships with several individuals in law enforcement, the prospective juror expressed that, although she “would like to think [she] can be fair,” she “would probably relate to the [law enforcement] victims.” While “words like ‘think’ or ‘try’ are not talismanic words that automatically make a statement equivocal” … , the prospective juror continued that she “hope[d] that [she] could still be fair.” Altogether, these equivocal statements raised a clear question as to her ability to remain impartial and, therefore, could only be remedied by an unequivocal statement of impartiality … . However, when pressed by defense counsel as to whether she could be fair, the prospective juror failed to directly address the issue and, in fact, seemed to further express her own bias. County Court did not then attempt to rehabilitate the prospective juror … and, as a result, her prior statements of partiality were not remedied … . Under these circumstances we find disqualification to have been required. Thus, because defendant exhausted his peremptory challenges before jury selection was complete, a new trial is necessary … . People v Edmunds, 2026 NY Slip Op 05442, Third Dept 9-23-26

Practice Point: Consult this decision for insight into the inquiry required when a prospective juror indicates a bias in favor of law enforcement.

 

September 23, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-09-23 11:52:352026-09-28 12:08:34THE CHARGES STEMMED FROM AN ARMED CONFRONTATION WITH POLICE OFFICERS; A PROSPECTIVE JUROR INDICATED SHE “WOULD PROBABLY RELATE TO THE POLICE OFFICERS;” THE DENIAL OF THE DEFENSE CHALLENGE TO THE JUROR REQUIRED REVERSAL AND A NEW TRIAL (SECOND DEPT). ​
Civil Procedure, Foreclosure, Judges

PLAINTIFF BANK’S FAILURE TO MOVE FOR A JUDGMENT OF FORECLOSURE AND SALE AS DIRECTED IN A 2017 ORDER WAS NOT SUFFICIENT GROUNDS FOR THE COURT, SUA SPONTE, TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court in this foreclosure action, determined plaintiff bank’s failure to move for a judgment of foreclosure and sale as directed by a 2017 order was not sufficient grounds for the court, sua sponte, to dismiss the complaint:

“‘A court’s power to dismiss a complaint, sua sponte, is to be used sparingly and only when extraordinary circumstances exist to warrant dismissal'” … . Here, the plaintiff’s failure to move for a judgment of foreclosure and sale as directed by the March 2017 order was not a sufficient ground upon which to, sua sponte, direct dismissal of the complaint … . Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted those branches of the plaintiff’s motion which were to vacate the August 2017 order and to restore the action to the active calendar. U.S. Bank, N.A. v Morrison, 2026 NY Slip Op 05346, Second Dept 9-16-26

Practice Point: Appellate courts don’t like sua sponte dismissals of complaints.

Similar issue and result in Wilmington Sav. Fund Socy., FSB v Hilario, 2026 NY Slip Op 05351, Second Dept 9-16-26

 

September 16, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-09-16 17:25:022026-09-20 18:32:57PLAINTIFF BANK’S FAILURE TO MOVE FOR A JUDGMENT OF FORECLOSURE AND SALE AS DIRECTED IN A 2017 ORDER WAS NOT SUFFICIENT GROUNDS FOR THE COURT, SUA SPONTE, TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT (SECOND DEPT).
Civil Procedure, Judges

FALURE TO COMPLY WITH THE MODE OF SERVICE SPECIFIED IN AN ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE DEPRIVES THE COURT OF JURISDICTION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff did not comply with the mode of service specified in the order to show cause and did not give proper notice of the motion. Therefore, Supreme Court was without jurisdiction to hear it:

The Supreme Court erred in granting the plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction and to restore the action to the active calendar. The mode of service provided for in an order to show cause is jurisdictional in nature and must be literally followed … . The failure to give proper notice of a motion deprives the court of jurisdiction to hear the motion … . Here, since the plaintiff failed to comply with the directives in the order to show cause, the court was without jurisdiction to entertain the motion … . Sosa v Gonzaga, 2026 NY Slip Op 05337, Second Dept 9-16-26

Practice Point: A party’s failure to comply with the mode of service specified in an order to show cause deprives the court of jurisdiction to hear the motion.

 

September 16, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-09-16 15:31:362026-09-20 16:58:03FALURE TO COMPLY WITH THE MODE OF SERVICE SPECIFIED IN AN ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE DEPRIVES THE COURT OF JURISDICTION (SECOND DEPT).
Evidence, Judges, Negligence

THE DESTRUCTION OF VIDEO EVIDENCE OF THE SLIP AND FALL WARRANTED A SANCTION; HOWEVER, IT WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION TO PRECLUDE THE DEFENSE FROM PRESENTING ANY EVIDENCE RE: LIABILITY; AN ADVERSE INFERENCE CHARGE WITH RESPECT TO THE VIDEO EVIDENCE IS AN APPROPRIATE SANCTION (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the appropriate sanction for the destruction of the video which depicted the slip and fall was an adverse inference charge with respect to the video evidence, not the preclusion of all defense evidence re: liability:

During discovery, the defendants produced a video that was one minute and seven seconds in length and which depicted the moments shortly after the plaintiff’s fall. The premises’s superintendent testified that he recorded the video on his cell phone from the building’s surveillance footage on the day of the incident. The portion of the surveillance video that the superintendent recorded does not capture the moment of the fall itself or any time prior to the fall. * * *

Supreme Court properly determined that an imposition of spoliation sanctions against the defendants was warranted, as the defendants had an obligation to preserve the subject surveillance videos and were at least negligent in failing to preserve them, and the destroyed evidence was relevant to the plaintiff’s claim … . However, the court improvidently exercised its discretion in precluding the defendants from presenting any testimony, evidence, or defense as to their liability at trial. Instead, under the circumstances, the court should have directed that an adverse inference charge be given against the defendants at trial with respect to the video surveillance footage of the incident … . Alvarez v 100-10 67th Rd. Condominium, 2026 NY Slip Op 05261, Second Dept 9-16-26

Practice Point: Here video evidence of the slip and fall was destroyed warranting a sanction. Preclusion of all defense evidence re: liability was an abuse of discretion. An adverse inference jury instruction was appropriate.

Similar issues and results in Houghton v Piperaro, 2026 NY Slip Op 05290, Second Dept 9-16-26.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

September 16, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-09-16 15:08:082026-09-20 12:15:40THE DESTRUCTION OF VIDEO EVIDENCE OF THE SLIP AND FALL WARRANTED A SANCTION; HOWEVER, IT WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION TO PRECLUDE THE DEFENSE FROM PRESENTING ANY EVIDENCE RE: LIABILITY; AN ADVERSE INFERENCE CHARGE WITH RESPECT TO THE VIDEO EVIDENCE IS AN APPROPRIATE SANCTION (SECOND DEPT). ​
Page 2 of 126‹1234›»

Categories

  • Abuse of Process
  • Account Stated
  • Accountant Malpractice
  • Administrative Law
  • Agency
  • Animal Law
  • Appeals
  • Arbitration
  • Architectural Malpractice
  • Arts and Cultural Affairs Law
  • Associations
  • Attorneys
  • Banking Law
  • Bankruptcy
  • Battery
  • Chiropractor Malpractice
  • Civil Commitment
  • Civil Conspiracy
  • Civil Forfeiture
  • Civil Procedure
  • Civil Rights Law
  • Civil Service Law
  • Condominium Corporations
  • Condominiums
  • Constitutional Law
  • Consumer Law
  • Contempt
  • Contract Law
  • Conversion
  • Cooperatives
  • Copyright
  • Corporation Law
  • Correction Law
  • County Law
  • Court of Claims
  • Criminal Law
  • Debtor-Creditor
  • Defamation
  • Dental Malpractice
  • Disciplinary Hearings (Inmates)
  • Education-School Law
  • Election Law
  • Eminent Domain
  • Employment Law
  • Engineering Malpractice
  • Environmental Law
  • Equitable Recoupment
  • Evidence
  • Fair Credit Reporting Act
  • Fair Housing Act
  • Fair Housing Amendments Act
  • False Arrest
  • False Claims Act
  • False Imprisonment
  • Family Law
  • Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA)
  • Fiduciary Duty
  • Forcible Touching
  • Foreclosure
  • Fraud
  • Freedom of Information Law (FOIL)
  • Human Rights Law
  • Immigration Law
  • Immunity
  • Indian Law
  • Insurance Law
  • Intellectual Property
  • Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
  • Involuntary Medical Treatment and Feeding (Inmates)
  • Judges
  • Judiciary Law
  • Labor Law
  • Labor Law-Construction Law
  • Land Use
  • Landlord-Tenant
  • Legal Malpractice
  • Lien Law
  • Limited Liability Company Law
  • Longshoreman's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act
  • Malicious Prosecution
  • Maritime Law
  • Medicaid
  • Medical Malpractice
  • Mental Hygiene Law
  • Military Law
  • Money Had and Received
  • Municipal Law
  • Navigation Law
  • Negligence
  • Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
  • Negligent Misrepresentation
  • Notarial Misconduct
  • Nuisance
  • Partnership Law
  • Personal Property
  • Pharmacist Malpractice
  • Physician Patient Confidentiality
  • Pistol Permits
  • Prima Facie Tort
  • Private Nuisance
  • Privilege
  • Products Liability
  • Professional Malpractice
  • Public Authorities Law
  • Public Corporations
  • Public Health Law
  • Public Nuisance
  • Real Estate
  • Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL)
  • Real Property Law
  • Real Property Tax Law
  • Religion
  • Replevin
  • Retirement and Social Security Law
  • Securities
  • Sepulcher
  • Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA)
  • Social Services Law
  • Statutes
  • Tax Law
  • Tenant Harassment
  • Tortious Interference with Contract
  • Tortious Interference with Employment
  • Tortious Interference with Prospective Business Relations
  • Tortious Interference With Prospective Economic Advantage
  • Town Law
  • Toxic Torts
  • Trade Secrets
  • Trademarks
  • Trespass
  • Trespass to Chattels
  • Trusts and Estates
  • Uncategorized
  • Unemployment Insurance
  • Unfair Competition
  • Uniform Commercial Code
  • Usury
  • Utilities
  • Vehicle and Traffic Law
  • Victims of Gender-Motivated Violence Protection Law (VGM)
  • Village Law
  • Water Law
  • Workers' Compensation
  • Zoning

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

Scroll to top