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Judges, Labor Law-Construction Law

IF THE LADDER DOESN’T MOVE AND PLAINTIFF LOSES HIS BALANCE AND FALLS, THERE IS NO LIABILITY UNDER LABOR LAW 240(1); BUT IF THE LADDER MOVES FOR NO APPARENT REASON LIABILITY ATTACHES (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff in this ladder-fall case was entitled to summary judgment on the Labor Law 240(1) cause of action. The court clearly explained when Labor Law 240(1) liability is triggered by a fall from a ladder. Even if the ladder moves for no apparent reason, liability attaches:

“To establish a violation under Labor Law § 240(1), ‘[t]here must be evidence that the ladder was defective or inadequately secured and that the defect, or the failure to secure the ladder, was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff’s injuries'” … . “The collapse of a scaffold or ladder for no apparent reason while a plaintiff is engaged in an activity enumerated under the statute creates a presumption that the ladder or scaffold did not afford proper protection” … . “Where, for instance, the plaintiff falls from a ladder because the plaintiff lost his or her balance, and there is no evidence that the ladder was defective or inadequate, liability pursuant to Labor Law § 240(1) does not attach” … . “By contrast, where a ladder slides, shifts, tips over, or otherwise collapses for no apparent reason, the plaintiff has established a violation” … . Nunez v Trustees of Columbia Univ., 2026 NY Slip Op 05319, Second Dept 9-16-26

Practice Point: Consult this decision for a clear explanation of when Labor Liability 240(1) liability is triggered by a fall from a ladder.​

 

September 16, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-09-16 14:49:512026-09-20 15:08:06IF THE LADDER DOESN’T MOVE AND PLAINTIFF LOSES HIS BALANCE AND FALLS, THERE IS NO LIABILITY UNDER LABOR LAW 240(1); BUT IF THE LADDER MOVES FOR NO APPARENT REASON LIABILITY ATTACHES (SECOND DEPT).
Civil Procedure, Judges

THE CONDITIONAL ORDER OF DISMISSAL DID NOT MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF A VALID 90-DAY NOTICE PURSUANT TO CPLR 3216(A); THEREFORE THE JUDGE COULD NOT, SUA SPONTE, DISMISS THE COMPLAINT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the conditional order of dismissal did not serve as a 90-day notice because it did not state that failure to comply with the notice will serve as a basis for dismissal for failure to prosecute. Therefore the judge did not have the authority, sua sponte, to dismiss the complaint:

“CPLR 3216 permits a court, on its own initiative, to dismiss an action for want of prosecution where certain conditions precedent have been complied with” … . As relevant here, an action cannot be dismissed pursuant to CPLR 3216(a) “‘unless a written demand is served upon the party against whom such relief is sought in accordance with the statutory requirements, along with a statement that the default by the party upon whom such notice is served in complying with such demand within said ninety day period will serve as a basis for a motion by the party serving said demand for dismissal as against him [or her] for unreasonably neglecting to proceed'” … . “While a conditional order of dismissal may have the same effect as a valid 90-day notice pursuant to CPLR 3216” … , here, the conditional order of dismissal was defective in that it did not state that the plaintiff’s failure to comply with the notice will serve as a basis for a motion by the court to dismiss the complaint for failure to prosecute … . “In the absence of proper notice, the court was without power to dismiss the action for the plaintiff’s failure to comply with the conditional order of dismissal” … . Under these circumstances, the action should have been restored to the active calendar. Nationstar Mtge., LLC v Adekoje, 2026 NY Slip Op 05315. Second Dept 9-16-26

Practice Point: Although a conditional order of dismissal can serve as a valid 90-day notice pursuant to CPLR 3216, to do so the conditional order of dismissal must meet all the content requirements mandated by CPLR 3216, including informing the plaintiff that the failure to comply will result in dismissal of the complaint.

 

September 16, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-09-16 14:49:432026-09-28 13:26:41THE CONDITIONAL ORDER OF DISMISSAL DID NOT MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF A VALID 90-DAY NOTICE PURSUANT TO CPLR 3216(A); THEREFORE THE JUDGE COULD NOT, SUA SPONTE, DISMISS THE COMPLAINT (SECOND DEPT).
Civil Procedure, Evidence, Judges

THE DEFENSE MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE JURY VERDICT AND REINSTATE COUNTERCLAIMS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, CRITERIA EXPLAINED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined Supreme Court should not have reinstated defendants’ counterclaims which were rejected by the jury after a lengthy trial. The First Department explained the criteria for setting aside a jury verdict pursuant to CPLR 4404(a):

Defendants are not entitled to reinstatement of their counterclaims, which were each unequivocally rejected by the jury after a lengthy trial. Pursuant to CPLR 4404(a), a court may set aside a jury verdict, or order a new trial, where “the verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence,” or “in the interest of justice.” In making this determination, the court must proceed with caution, because “in the absence of indications that substantial justice has not been done, a successful litigant is entitled to the benefits of a favorable jury verdict” … . Thus, a verdict should only be set aside if the evidence is so in favor of the moving party that the verdict “could not have been reached on any fair interpretation of the evidence” … , or in the interests of justice due to “errors in the trial court’s rulings on the admissibility of evidence, mistakes in the charge, misconduct, newly discovered evidence, and surprise” … . Beach v Touradji Capital Mgt., LP, 2026 NY Slip Op 05231, First Dept 9-3-26

Practice Point: Consult this decision for insight into the criteria for setting aside a jury verdict. Here the jury’s rejection of defendants’ counterclaims should not have been disturbed.​

 

September 3, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-09-03 13:35:292026-09-09 13:55:21THE DEFENSE MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE JURY VERDICT AND REINSTATE COUNTERCLAIMS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, CRITERIA EXPLAINED (FIRST DEPT).
Appeals, Criminal Law, Family Law, Judges

ALTHOUGH SUPREME COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT GRANTED THE PEOPLE’S MOTION TO PREVENT THE TRANSFER OF THE ADOLESCENT OFFENDER’S CASE TO FAMILY COURT, MITIGATING FACTS AND THE LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE UNDERLYING THE “RAISE THE AGE” LEGISLATION WARRANTED INVOCATION OF THE COURT’S “INTEREST OF JUSTICE” JURISDICTION AND DENIAL OF THE PEOPLE’S MOTION (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Chan, reversing Supreme Court, over a two-justice dissent, held that Supreme Court did not abuse its discretion when it granted the People’s motion to prevent the transfer of the adolescent offender’s case to Family Court. On the “no abuse of discretion” question, the majority and the dissenters agreed. The majority, however, went on to invoke its “interest of justice” jurisdiction, based on mitigating facts and the underlying purpose of the “Raise the Age (RTA)” legislation, to deny the People’s motion and allow the transfer to Family Court:

… [D]efendant, then 17 years old, chased a young woman across a basketball court, grabbed her from the back while placing his arm around her neck, and eventually brought her to the ground….  As a result, the young woman suffered minor injuries. At no point, including at the time of his arrest, did defendant take out, display, use, or fire [the] gun [found in his fanny pack]. Nor did he otherwise threaten to do so. * * *

Under the RTA, prosecutions of adolescent offenders — defined as 16 or 17 year olds charged with a felony — are presumptively removable from the Youth Part of Supreme Court to Family Court (see CPL 722.10[1]; CPL 722.23[1], [2] …). The People can rebut that presumption if a defendant is charged with a class A nondrug felony or a violent felony, and the People prove, “by a preponderance of the evidence,” that defendant (1) “caused significant physical injury” during the commission of the offense, (2) “displayed a firearm, shotgun, rifle or deadly weapon” in “furtherance of” the offense, or (3) committed a sex offense (see CPL 722.23[2][c] …). “Otherwise, the case is removed to Family Court unless, upon a motion by the People, the [Y]outh [P]art determines that ‘extraordinary circumstances exist that should prevent the transfer of the action to’ Family Court” … . * * *

… [D]efendant shouldered caretaker responsibilities for his family, including assisting his mother during a difficult pregnancy and being a source of mentorship and support for his younger siblings. He participated avidly in sports teams and lessons. His maturity was importantly manifested by his demonstrated amenability to Family Court’s services. For example, defendant highlighted his improved school performance during the COVID-19 pandemic, his interest in pursuing vocational studies, and his successful graduation from the Exalt Youth program with perfect attendance and outstanding participation. …

In our view, these are precisely the types of facts that the legislators contemplated would support removal to Family Court … . People v Key, 2026 NY Slip Op 05234, First Dept 9-3-26

Practice Point: Consult this opinion for an in depth discussion of the purpose and implementation of the “Raise the Age” legislation which allows the transfer of adolescent offenders’ felony prosecutions to Family Court.

Practice Point: Here the majority and the dissenters agreed Supreme Court did not abuse its discretion when it granted the People’s motion to deny the transfer of the adolescent’s case to Family Court, but the majority went on to invoke its “interest of justice” jurisdiction to reverse, something the Court of Appeals would not have the power to do.

 

September 3, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-09-03 10:20:392026-09-13 12:54:21ALTHOUGH SUPREME COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT GRANTED THE PEOPLE’S MOTION TO PREVENT THE TRANSFER OF THE ADOLESCENT OFFENDER’S CASE TO FAMILY COURT, MITIGATING FACTS AND THE LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE UNDERLYING THE “RAISE THE AGE” LEGISLATION WARRANTED INVOCATION OF THE COURT’S “INTEREST OF JUSTICE” JURISDICTION AND DENIAL OF THE PEOPLE’S MOTION (FIRST DEPT).
Civil Procedure, Foreclosure, Judges

HERE IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION, PLAINTIFF FILED A REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL INTERVENTION SEEKING A SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE WITHIN ONE YEAR OF DEFENDANT’S DEFAULT; THEREFORE PLAINTIFF NEED NOT PROVIDE A REASONABLE EXCUSE FOR THE DELAY OR DEMONSTRATE A MERITORIOUS CAUSE OF ACTION TO AVOID DISMISSAL FOR ABANDONMENT PURSUANT TO CPLR 3215(C); ANY FURTHER DELAYS AFTER THE REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL INTERVENTION ARE IRRELEVANT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court’s sua sponte dismissal of the complaint in this foreclosure action, determined plaintiff did not abandon the action because it filed a request for judicial intervention seeking a settlement conference within one year of defendant’s default:

Pursuant to CPLR 3215(c), “[i]f the plaintiff fails to take proceedings for the entry of judgment within one year after the default, the court shall not enter judgment but shall dismiss the complaint as abandoned . . . unless sufficient cause is shown why the complaint should not be dismissed.” “To avoid dismissal pursuant to CPLR 3215(c), it is not necessary for a plaintiff to actually obtain a default judgment within one year of the default. Rather, as long as ‘proceedings’ are being taken, and these proceedings manifest an intent not to abandon the case but to seek a judgment, the case should not be subject to dismissal” … . The filing of a request for judicial intervention that seeks a residential mortgage foreclosure settlement conference as mandated by CPLR 3408 constitutes the taking of proceedings under CPLR 3215(c) … . * * *

Since the plaintiff demonstrated that it initiated proceedings for the entry of a judgment of foreclosure and sale within one year after [the] default, it was not required to proffer a reasonable excuse or demonstrate a potentially meritorious cause of action … . Furthermore, “once the plaintiff established that it had initiated proceedings for the entry of a judgment within one year after the defendants’ default, it was in compliance with CPLR 3215(c) and it was not required, under the plain language of that subdivision, to account for any additional periods of delay that may have occurred subsequent to the initial one-year period contemplated by CPLR 3215(c)” … . Aurora Loan Servs., LLC v Miller, 2026 NY Slip Op 05153, Second Dept 9-2-26

Practice Point: If, in a foreclosure action, plaintiff files a request for judicial intervention and a settlement conference within one year of defendant’s default, plaintiff need not provide an excuse for the delay or demonstrate a meritorious cause of action to avoid dismissal of the complaint as abandoned pursuant to CPLR 3215(c). Once proceedings have been taken within one year of default, any further delays after the taking of proceedings are irrelevant to any claim of abandonment.

 

September 2, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-09-02 13:07:482026-09-08 14:42:35HERE IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION, PLAINTIFF FILED A REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL INTERVENTION SEEKING A SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE WITHIN ONE YEAR OF DEFENDANT’S DEFAULT; THEREFORE PLAINTIFF NEED NOT PROVIDE A REASONABLE EXCUSE FOR THE DELAY OR DEMONSTRATE A MERITORIOUS CAUSE OF ACTION TO AVOID DISMISSAL FOR ABANDONMENT PURSUANT TO CPLR 3215(C); ANY FURTHER DELAYS AFTER THE REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL INTERVENTION ARE IRRELEVANT (SECOND DEPT).
Civil Procedure, Judges

DEFENDANTS DID NOT SUBMIT AN AFFIRMATION DEMONSTRATING A GOOD FAITH EFFORT TO RESOLVE THE DISCOVERY ISSUES; DEFENDANTS, IN THEIR MOTION TO PRECLUDE THE PLAINTIFF FROM PRESENTING EVIDENCE AS A DISCOVERY SANCTION, DID NOT DEMONSTRATE PLAINTIFF’S FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH COURT-ORDERED DISCOVERY WAS “WILLFUL AND CONTUMACIOUS;” DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO PRECLUDE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendants’ motion to preclude plaintiff from offering evidence or responding to a dispositive motion as a discovery sanction should not have been granted for two reasons: (1) the defendants did not submit an affirmation demonstrating a good faith effort to resolve the discovery issues (22 MYCRR 202.t(a)); and (2), the defendants failed to demonstrate plaintiff’s failure to comply with court-ordered discovery was willful and contumacious:

‘Pursuant to CPLR 3126, a court may impose discovery sanctions, including the . . . preclusion of evidence, where a party “refuses to obey an order for disclosure or willfully fails to disclose information which the court finds ought to have been disclosed”‘” … . “Before a court invokes the drastic remedy of precluding a party from offering evidence at trial, there must be a clear showing that the failure to comply with court-ordered discovery was willful and contumacious” … . Here, the defendants failed to make a clear showing of a willful and contumacious failure by the plaintiff to comply with discovery demands. The defendants’ motion papers failed to identify precisely what discovery was demanded and never provided. In addition, the August 2022 order only referred vaguely to, among other things, “authorizations,” and the March 2024 order directed the plaintiff to submit “complete responses” to the defendants’ combined discovery demands without any indication of the nature of the alleged outstanding discovery. Under the circumstances, the defendants failed to make the requisite showing justifying the Supreme Court’s imposition of the subject discovery sanctions … . Noh Soon Park v Food Bazaar Supermarket, 2026 NY Slip Op 05108, Second Dept 8-26-26

Practice Point: Consult this decision for insight into what a defendant must demonstrate to win a motion to preclude the plaintiff from presenting evidence as a sanction for failure to comply with court-ordered discovery.

 

August 26, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-08-26 16:04:232026-08-30 16:25:42DEFENDANTS DID NOT SUBMIT AN AFFIRMATION DEMONSTRATING A GOOD FAITH EFFORT TO RESOLVE THE DISCOVERY ISSUES; DEFENDANTS, IN THEIR MOTION TO PRECLUDE THE PLAINTIFF FROM PRESENTING EVIDENCE AS A DISCOVERY SANCTION, DID NOT DEMONSTRATE PLAINTIFF’S FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH COURT-ORDERED DISCOVERY WAS “WILLFUL AND CONTUMACIOUS;” DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO PRECLUDE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT). ​
Civil Procedure, Judges

HERE SUPREME COURT PROPERLY FOUND THERE WAS “GOOD CAUSE SHOWN” FOR AN EXTENSION OF TIME FOR SERVICE OF THE SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT AND THE EXTENSION WAS PROPERLY GRANTED BEFORE THE TRAVERSE HEARING ON THE INITIAL ATTEMPT AT SERVICE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Lasalle, determined the judge properly granted plaintiff an extension of time to serve the summons and complaint for “good cause shown. ” pursuant to CPLR 306-b. In addition, the judge properly granted the extension before holding the traverse hearing to determine the validity of the initial service of process:

… Supreme Court properly determined that the plaintiff established good cause. The plaintiff established reasonable diligence in ascertaining Brown’s [defendant’s] address. The plaintiff’s counsel reasonably relied upon the representation made by Brown in response to the information subpoena, and counsel confirmed those representations by conducting database inquiries. Moreover, the process server established that he acted with reasonable diligence in effecting service. In response, …

… Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in granting relief pursuant to CPLR 306-b before holding the traverse hearing [re: the initial attempt at service].. CPLR 306-b does not contain any language stating that a court must decide whether an initial attempt at service of process was valid before granting an extension of time to re-attempt service … . A court may, in the interests of judicial economy, grant an extension before holding a traverse hearing … . M&T Bank v Global Sign Cleaning & Maintenance, Inc., 2026 NY Slip Op 05092, Second Dept 8-25-26

Practice Point: This opinion fleshes out the criteria for an extension of time to serve the summons and complaint “for good cause shown” pursuant to CPLR 306-b.

 

August 26, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-08-26 15:37:242026-08-30 16:04:15HERE SUPREME COURT PROPERLY FOUND THERE WAS “GOOD CAUSE SHOWN” FOR AN EXTENSION OF TIME FOR SERVICE OF THE SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT AND THE EXTENSION WAS PROPERLY GRANTED BEFORE THE TRAVERSE HEARING ON THE INITIAL ATTEMPT AT SERVICE (SECOND DEPT).
Family Law, Judges

IN A MODIFICATION-OF-CHILD-SUPPORT PROCEEDING, EVEN WHERE THE MOVING PARTY MAKES OUT A PRIMA FACIE CASE SUPPORTING A REDUCTION, IF THE SUBMISSIONS RAISE QUESTIONS OF FACT A HEARING MUST BE HELD BEFORE A RULING IS MADE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined that, even though defendant presented evidence supporting a downward modification of child support, the submissions by the parties raised questions of fact. Therefore the judge should not have ruled without holding a hearing. A recurring reason for Family Court reversals is the failure to hold a hearing:

The court may modify an order of child support where “there has been a change in either party’s gross income by fifteen percent or more since the order was entered, last modified, or adjusted” (Domestic Relations Law § 236[B][9][b][2][ii][B] …). “However, such reduction in income shall not be considered as a ground for modification unless it was involuntary and the party has made diligent attempts to secure employment commensurate with his or her education, ability, and experience” … . “‘On an application for modification of child support, a hearing is necessary where the parties’ evidentiary submissions disclose the existence of genuine issues of fact'” … .

Here, although the defendant demonstrated, prima facie, that his income had decreased by more than 15%, the reduction of income occurred through no fault of his own, and he made diligent efforts to secure comparable employment, a hearing is necessary because the parties’ evidentiary submissions disclosed the existence of genuine issues of fact … . Feldsherova v Lee, 2026 NY Slip Op 05080, Second Dept 8-26-26

Practice Point: Family Court reversals are often the result of the failure to hold a hearing.

 

August 26, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-08-26 13:36:572026-08-30 15:37:07IN A MODIFICATION-OF-CHILD-SUPPORT PROCEEDING, EVEN WHERE THE MOVING PARTY MAKES OUT A PRIMA FACIE CASE SUPPORTING A REDUCTION, IF THE SUBMISSIONS RAISE QUESTIONS OF FACT A HEARING MUST BE HELD BEFORE A RULING IS MADE (SECOND DEPT).
Civil Procedure, Judges

A JUDGE DOES NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO DISMISS AN ACTION FOR “NEGLECT TO PROSECUTE” UNLESS THE STATUTORY PREREQUISITES FOR DISMISSAL SPELLED OUT IN CPLR 3216 ARE MET (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the judge should not have, sua sponte, dismissed the action for “neglect to prosecute.” CPLR 3216 spells out the conditions which must be met before dismissal of an action is appropriate:

The October 2024 order directed the plaintiff to file a note of issue 10 days prior to the inquest and noted that “[t]he failure to file a Note of Issue as directed or appear as directed may be deemed an abandonment of the claims giving rise to the Inquest.”

The plaintiff did not file the note of issue by the date of the inquest. In an order entered February 4, 2025, the Supreme Court, pursuant to the October 2024 order, sua sponte, directed dismissal of the action with prejudice. The plaintiff appeals.

“A court may not dismiss an action based on neglect to prosecute unless the CPLR 3216 statutory preconditions to dismissal are met” … . Pursuant to CPLR 3216(b), an action cannot be dismissed pursuant to CPLR 3216(a) “unless a written demand is served upon ‘the party against whom such relief is sought’ in accordance with the statutory requirements, along with a statement that the ‘default by the party upon whom such notice is served in complying with such demand within said ninety day period will serve as a basis for a motion by the party serving said demand for dismissal as against him [or her] for unreasonably neglecting to proceed'” … . The statute also requires “where, as here, a written demand to resume prosecution of the action is made by the court, ‘the demand shall set forth the specific conduct constituting the neglect, which conduct shall demonstrate a general pattern of delay in proceeding with the litigation'” … .

Here, the Supreme Court was without power to, sua sponte, direct dismissal of the action pursuant to CPLR 3216, as the statutory prerequisites for dismissal under that statute were not met … . Avanza Group, LLC v Bugz Innovations, LLC, 2026 NY Slip Op 05068, SEcond Dept 8-26-26

Practice Point: Absent fulfilling the prerequisites for dismissal of an action for “neglect to prosecute” spelled out in CPLR 3216 a judge does not have the authority to dismiss on that ground.

 

August 26, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-08-26 12:55:092026-08-30 13:14:06A JUDGE DOES NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO DISMISS AN ACTION FOR “NEGLECT TO PROSECUTE” UNLESS THE STATUTORY PREREQUISITES FOR DISMISSAL SPELLED OUT IN CPLR 3216 ARE MET (SECOND DEPT).
Civil Procedure, Evidence, Family Law, Judges

THE JUDGE DISMISSED FATHER’S NEW YORK CUSTODY PETITION BECAUSE MOTHER HAD PREVIOUSLY COMMENCED A CUSTODY PROCEEDING IN FLORIDA; BECAUSE THE JUDGE DID NOT FOLLOW THE PROCEDURE MANDATED BY THE UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION AND ENFORCEMENT ACT, THE MATTER WAS REMITTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversed Family Court and remitted the matter. The Family Court judge dismissed the father’s New York custody petition on the ground mother had previously commenced a custody proceeding in Florida where she and the child resided. The judge, however, did not follow the procedures mandated by the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act which must precede a ruling that one of the two courts is the most appropriate forum:

Pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (see Domestic Relations Law article 5-A), a New York court “may not exercise its jurisdiction” in a child custody proceeding “if, at the time of the commencement of the proceeding, a proceeding concerning the custody of the child has been commenced in a court of another state having jurisdiction substantially in conformity with [Domestic Relations Law article 5-A], unless the proceeding has been terminated or is stayed by the court of the other state because a court of this state is a more convenient forum” (Domestic Relations Law § 76-e[1] …). “If the court determines that a child custody proceeding has been commenced in a court in another state having jurisdiction substantially in accordance with [Domestic Relations Law article 5-A], the court of this state shall stay its proceeding and communicate with the court of the other state” (Domestic Relations Law § 76-e[2]; see Domestic Relations Law § 77-f …). “If the court of the state having jurisdiction substantially in accordance with [Domestic Relations Law article 5-A] does not determine that the court of this state is a more appropriate forum, the court of this state shall dismiss the proceeding” (Domestic Relations Law § 76-e[2] …).

A court, acting pursuant to these provisions, must make a record of its communications with a court of another state on substantive matters, must promptly inform the parties of the communication, and grant the parties access to the record (see Domestic Relations Law § 75-i[4] …). The court may, in its discretion, allow the parties to participate in the communication, but “[i]f the parties are not able to participate in the communication, they must be given the opportunity to present facts and legal arguments before a decision on jurisdiction is made” (Domestic Relations Law § 75-i[2] …). Matter of Adames v Digangi, 2026 NY Slip Op 05022, Second Dept 8-19-26

Practice Point: Consult this decision for an explanation of the statutory procedure mandated when a judge must decide which of two forums is appropriate for a custody proceeding. Here mother commenced a custody proceeding in Florida and father subsequently commenced a custody proceeding in New York.

 

August 19, 2026
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-08-19 12:51:292026-08-28 12:05:04THE JUDGE DISMISSED FATHER’S NEW YORK CUSTODY PETITION BECAUSE MOTHER HAD PREVIOUSLY COMMENCED A CUSTODY PROCEEDING IN FLORIDA; BECAUSE THE JUDGE DID NOT FOLLOW THE PROCEDURE MANDATED BY THE UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION AND ENFORCEMENT ACT, THE MATTER WAS REMITTED (SECOND DEPT).
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