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WHERE THE STATUTORY PRECONDITIONS FOR DISMISSAL OF A COMPLAINT FOR NEGLECT TO PROSECUTE (CPLR 3216) ARE NOT MET, THE COURT HAS NO AUTHORITY TO, SUA SPONTE, DISMISS THE ACTION; RATHER, THE ACTION MUST BE RESTORED TO THE ACTIVE CALENDAR (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the judge did not have the authority to, sua sponte, dismiss the complaint for neglect to prosecute. At the time the purported 90-day notice was issued by the judge, issue had not yet been joined. In addition, the purported 90-day notice did not include all the information required by CPLR 3216(b):

“CPLR 3216 permits a court, on its own initiative, to dismiss an action for want of prosecution where certain conditions precedent have been complied with” … . “[A] court may not dismiss an action based on neglect to prosecute unless the CPLR 3216 statutory preconditions to dismissal are met” … . Here, the Supreme Court was without authority to issue a 90-day notice since issue was not joined in the action … .

In addition, “[p]ursuant to CPLR 3216(b), an action cannot be dismissed pursuant to CPLR 3216(a) unless a written demand is served upon the party against whom such relief is sought in accordance with the statutory requirements, along with a statement that the default by the party upon whom such notice is served in complying with such demand within said ninety day period will serve as a basis for a motion by the party serving said demand for dismissal as against him [or her] for unreasonably neglecting to proceed” … . Here, there is no evidence in the record that the plaintiff was served with a written demand as required by CPLR 3216. Moreover, the conditional order of dismissal, which, in effect, served as a 90-day notice pursuant to CPLR 3216, was defective in that it did not state that the plaintiff’s failure to comply with the demand would serve as a basis for the Supreme Court, on its own motion, to dismiss the action for failure to prosecute … . Further, the record demonstrates that no such motion was ever made, nor was there entry of an order of dismissal. Therefore, the action should have been restored to the active calendar without considering whether the plaintiff had a reasonable excuse for its delay in moving to vacate the conditional order of dismissal … . Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Poyer, 2026 NY Slip Op 03145, Second Dept 5-20-26

Practice Point: An action cannot be dismissed by a judge, sua sponte, for failure to prosecute if (1) issue had not yet been joined, or (2) if all the statutory preconditions for dismissal pursuant to CPLR 3216 have not been met. Rather, the action must be restored to the active calendar.

 

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