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Criminal Law, Judges

AS PART OF A PLEA BARGAIN, THE JUDGE PROMISED TO ORDER DEFENDANT TO BE ENROLLED IN THE COMPREHENSIVE ALCOHOL AND SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT (CASAT) PROGRAM; BECAUSE DEFENDANT WAS NOT ELIGIBLE FOR THE PROGRAM, HIS MOTION TO VACATE HIS GUILTY PLEA SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing County Court, determined defendant’s motion to vacate his guilty plea should have been granted. The judge’s promise to order defendant to be enrolled in the CASAT (comprehensive alcohol and substance abuse treatment) program was central to defendant’s plea bargain. The program was not available to the defendant because he was not convicted of a drug-related offense:

… County Court promised to order him to be enrolled in CASAT, a promise that could not be fulfilled because CASAT is only available to individuals convicted of drug-related offenses (see Penal Law § 60.04 [6]). We agree. “A guilty plea induced by an unfulfilled promise either must be vacated or the promise honored” … . Defendant was not enrolled in CASAT as he was not statutorily eligible for participation (see Penal Law § 60.04 [6] …), so the promise cannot be honored. Moreover, the record reflects that the mandate for CASAT enrollment was “part and parcel of defendant’s plea agreement” … . Thus, defendant is entitled to vacatur of his guilty plea … . People v Robinson, 2025 NY Slip Op 05125, Third Dept 9-25-25

Practice Point: Here defendant was promised, as part of a plea bargain, enrollment in the CASAT program. It turned out he was not eligible for the program. Because the program was “part and parcel of defendant’s plea agreement,” defendant was entitled to vacatur of his guilty plea.

 

September 25, 2025
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2025-09-25 20:28:092025-09-28 20:46:52AS PART OF A PLEA BARGAIN, THE JUDGE PROMISED TO ORDER DEFENDANT TO BE ENROLLED IN THE COMPREHENSIVE ALCOHOL AND SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT (CASAT) PROGRAM; BECAUSE DEFENDANT WAS NOT ELIGIBLE FOR THE PROGRAM, HIS MOTION TO VACATE HIS GUILTY PLEA SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (THIRD DEPT).
Attorneys, Evidence, Family Law, Judges

AN ATTORNEY SHOULD BE DISQUALIFIED UNDER THE ADVOCATE-WITNESS RULE WHEN THE ATTORNEY’S TESTIMONY IS NECESSARY TO PROVE ISSUES IN DISPUTE, NOT THE CASE HERE (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the husband’s attorney, Smith, should not have been disqualified on the ground he would be called as a witness at trial. The appellate division determined Smith’s testimony was not relevant to the financial issues in the divorce action. Therefore Smith should not have been disqualified on the basis that his testimony would be necessary at trial:

The advocate-witness disqualification rules contained in the Code of Professional Responsibility provide guidance, but are not binding authority for courts in determining whether a party’s attorney should be disqualified during litigation … . “Disqualification of a law firm during litigation implicates not only the ethics of the profession but also the substantive rights of the litigants. Disqualification denies a party’s right to representation by the attorney of its choice” … . In considering whether to disqualify counsel, the court must consider a litigant’s right to select his own counsel and the fairness and effect of disqualification in the particular factual setting … . Whether to disqualify an attorney rests in the sound discretion of the trial court … . However, an attorney should be disqualified only when his or her testimony is necessary to prove the issues in dispute … . The party seeking or supporting disqualification need not show that counsel’s continued representation would prejudice his or her client where the court finds that counsel’s testimony is necessary on his or her client’s behalf … . De Luca v De Luca, 2025 NY Slip Op 05146, First Dept 9-25-25

Practice Point: Here the proposed testimony by the attorney was not necessary to prove issues in dispute. Therefore the attorney should not have been disqualified.

 

September 25, 2025
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2025-09-25 14:15:552025-09-29 08:25:17AN ATTORNEY SHOULD BE DISQUALIFIED UNDER THE ADVOCATE-WITNESS RULE WHEN THE ATTORNEY’S TESTIMONY IS NECESSARY TO PROVE ISSUES IN DISPUTE, NOT THE CASE HERE (FIRST DEPT).
Civil Procedure, Evidence, Judges, Negligence

THE ISSUES OF NEGLIGENCE AND PROXIMATE CAUSE WERE NOT INTERTWINED; THE VERDICT FINDING DEFENDANT NEGLIGENT BUT THAT THE NEGLIGENCE WAS NOT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE INJURY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SET ASIDE; IN RESPONSE TO A JURY NOTE, THE JUDGE PROPERLY TOLD THEM THEY COULD FIND THAT THE ACCIDENT DID NOT HAPPEN (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Dillon, reversing Supreme Court, determined the motion to set aside the verdict finding the defendant negligent but that the negligence was not the proximate cause of the accident should not have been set aside. The plaintiff alleged repair to the steering mechanism of his van was negligently done, that he suddenly lost the ability to steer the van and it crashed into a concrete barrier which was parallel to the roadway. The evidence was such that the jury could have found the accident did not happen in the way alleged by the plaintiff. The damage to the van did not appear to be consistent with the accident as described by plaintiff. When the jury sent a note asking whether they could find that the accident didn’t happen, the trial judge properly told them they could so find:

The narrow question we must address to determine this appeal is whether the Supreme Court properly, in effect, granted those branches of the plaintiff’s motion which were pursuant to CPLR 4404(a) to set aside so much of the jury verdict as, upon finding that the defendants were negligent, found that such negligence was not a substantial factor in causing injury to the plaintiff … . We answer this question in the negative, holding that the court erred by, in effect, granting those branches of the plaintiff’s motion where, as here, issues of negligence and proximate cause are not inextricably intertwined as a result of there being a rational view of the evidence that the plaintiff’s accident did not occur as claimed. Additionally, this appeal provides the opportunity to state our view that, in a personal injury action where there were questions about whether the alleged injury-producing event actually occurred as claimed by the plaintiff here, it was not error for the court to respond to a jury note by instructing that the jury could consider whether the alleged accident occurred. * * *

If, as the Supreme Court concluded in this instance, the jury’s deliberation involved an uncomplicated determination of whether the defendants had negligently installed the pitman arm of the plaintiff’s van, which, in turn, resulted in the plaintiff’s loss of steering and the accident as described, then the jury’s finding of negligence without a finding of proximate cause would be inconsistent. But the trial evidence was not so uncomplicated as to be subject to only one view of the events. Here, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendants, as we must in these instances, there was a valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences upon which the jury could parse the alleged negligent repair from the alleged proximate cause and determine that while the defendants were negligent, they were not a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s claimed accident … . Krohn v Schultz Ford Lincoln, Inc., 2025 NY Slip Op 05072, Second Dept 9-24-25

Practice Point: Here the jury concluded the defendant’s repair of plaintiff’s van was negligent, but they also concluded the negligence was not the proximate cause of the accident. That verdict should not have been set aside. The evidence was such that the jury could have found that the accident as described by the plaintiff didn’t happen. The judge properly instructed them in response to a note that they could so find.

 

September 24, 2025
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2025-09-24 15:31:182025-09-28 19:32:28THE ISSUES OF NEGLIGENCE AND PROXIMATE CAUSE WERE NOT INTERTWINED; THE VERDICT FINDING DEFENDANT NEGLIGENT BUT THAT THE NEGLIGENCE WAS NOT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE INJURY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SET ASIDE; IN RESPONSE TO A JURY NOTE, THE JUDGE PROPERLY TOLD THEM THEY COULD FIND THAT THE ACCIDENT DID NOT HAPPEN (SECOND DEPT).
Civil Procedure, Evidence, Judges, Negligence

DEFENDANT AND A WITNESS SAID THE LIGHT WAS RED, PLAINTIFF SAID THE LIGHT WAS GREEN, SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS PRECLUDED, CREDIBILTY CANNOT BE CONSIDERED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court in this intersection bicycle-vehicle accident case, reminds us that credibility plays no role in a summary judgment ruling. Plaintiff, the bicyclist, alleged he entered the intersection with a green light. Defendant and a witness alleged plaintiff entered the intersection against a red light. The conflicting evidence required denial of defendants’ motion for summary judgment:

The parties’ conflicting versions of how the accident occurred preclude summary judgment … . It is well settled that a “court’s role in deciding a motion for summary judgment is issue finding, not issue determination. . . . Moreover, [i]t is not the court’s function on a motion for summary judgment to assess credibility” … . Plaintiff’s version of events “is not incredible as a matter of law, and the different versions of the facts submitted by the parties raise[ ] credibility questions for a jury to resolve” … . Wachtel v Alan Joel Communications, Inc., 2025 NY Slip Op 05053, First Dept 9-23-25

Practice Point: Credibility plays no role at the summary judgment stage.

 

September 23, 2025
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2025-09-23 10:37:372025-09-28 10:40:40DEFENDANT AND A WITNESS SAID THE LIGHT WAS RED, PLAINTIFF SAID THE LIGHT WAS GREEN, SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS PRECLUDED, CREDIBILTY CANNOT BE CONSIDERED (FIRST DEPT).
Attorneys, Criminal Law, Evidence, Judges

DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO RENEW THE MOTION TO DISMISS THE INDICTMENT WHEN ADDITIONAL GRAND JURY TESTIMONY WAS RELEASED TO THE DEFENSE BECAUSE THE JUDGE HAD REVIEWED THE ENTIRE GRAND JURY MINUTES BEFORE DENYING THE MOTION; TWO-JUSTICE DISSENT ARGUED THE MOTION COURT WOULD HAVE BENEFITTED FROM ANOTHER ARGUMENT BASED ON THE NEWLY RELEASED EVIDENCE (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, affirming defendant’s conviction over a two-justice dissent, determined defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to renew the defense motion to dismiss the indictment after additional grand jury testimony was released. The majority concluded there was no new evidence to support a motion to renew because the judge reviewed all the grand jury testimony before denying the motion to dismiss. The dissenters argued there was insufficient evidence defendant shared the intent of the shooter and the motion court would have benefitted from another argument where defense counsel raised the newly released grand jury evidence:

“There can be no denial of effective assistance of counsel arising from counsel’s failure to make a motion or argument that has little or no chance of success” … . Defendant cannot demonstrate that a motion to renew would have had any likelihood of success because defendant had previously moved to dismiss the indictment and the court had denied the motion after conducting an in camera review of the grand jury minutes, which included the witness’s grand jury testimony that was subsequently provided to defendant’s counsel. Thus, the court had already determined that the evidence presented before the grand jury, including the witness’s testimony, established a legally sufficient prima facie case.

Moreover, a motion for renewal “must be based upon additional material facts which existed at the time the prior motion was made, but were not then known to the party seeking leave to renew, and, therefore, not made available to the court” … . Although the grand jury minutes were not available to defendant’s counsel at the time the motion to dismiss was filed, the court conducted a review of the complete grand jury minutes and then denied dismissal of the indictment. Consequently, there were no additional material facts upon which defendant’s counsel could have based a motion to renew, as the witness’s grand jury testimony was already known to the court in its entirety. Therefore, defendant’s counsel’s failure to file such a motion was insufficient to render his performance ineffective under both the state and federal standards … . People v Williams, 2025 NY Slip Op 05016, First Dept 9-18-25

Practice Point: Here the majority determined a motion to renew the motion to dismiss the indictment based on grand jury testimony released after the motion argument had little chance of success because the judge had reviewed all the grand jury evidence before denying the motion. The dissenters argued the judge would have benefitted from a second argument based on the newly released testimony, and therefore defense counsel was ineffective for failing move to renew.

 

September 18, 2025
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2025-09-18 09:51:382025-09-21 10:20:09DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO RENEW THE MOTION TO DISMISS THE INDICTMENT WHEN ADDITIONAL GRAND JURY TESTIMONY WAS RELEASED TO THE DEFENSE BECAUSE THE JUDGE HAD REVIEWED THE ENTIRE GRAND JURY MINUTES BEFORE DENYING THE MOTION; TWO-JUSTICE DISSENT ARGUED THE MOTION COURT WOULD HAVE BENEFITTED FROM ANOTHER ARGUMENT BASED ON THE NEWLY RELEASED EVIDENCE (FIRST DEPT).
Attorneys, Civil Procedure, Evidence, Judges, Negligence

DEFENSE COUNSEL’S REMARKS ALLEGING PLAINTIFF AND HER ATTORNEY FABRICATED EVIDENCE IN THIS SIDEWALK SLIP AND FALL CASE DENIED PLAINTIFF A FAIR TRIAL (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing defendant’s verdict in this sidewalk slip and fall case, determined defense counsel’s remarks in the opening and summation, alleging that the plaintiff and her lawyer, fabricated the account of where she fell, deprived plaintiff of a fair trial:

… [D]uring his opening statement, the defendant’s attorney made improper remarks accusing the plaintiff’s attorney of assisting the plaintiff with fabricating her account of where she fell, stating, among other things, that after the plaintiff told her attorney what street she fell on, “they went out to look for the worst spot on the street and they found it.” The defendant’s attorney further stated that the location of the fall claimed by the plaintiff was “lawyer-created fantasy” … . Similarly, on summation, the defendant’s attorney improperly stated that the plaintiff “changed her testimony based upon something her lawyer said to her,” and “although ‘perjury’ might be a little of a harsh word . . . she certainly testified willfully falsely” … . In addition, the defendant’s attorney improperly injected his own beliefs on summation, stating, “I truly don’t believe [the accident] happened here” and, after accusing the plaintiff of testifying falsely, stating, “I felt bad for [the defendant]. I felt bad for the whole system” … . Moreover, the defendant’s attorney inappropriately encouraged the jurors to speculate that the plaintiff declined to call an investigator as a witness at trial because the investigator would have testified unfavorably to the plaintiff … . Further, the defendant’s attorney improperly appealed to the passions of the jurors by stating that “[e]verything [the defendant has] worked for for his entire life is at risk on this trial” and that “[the plaintiff] wants to take my client’s property or money” … . Under the circumstances of this case, “‘the comments of the [defendant’s] counsel . . . were not isolated, were inflammatory, and were unduly prejudicial'” and “‘so tainted the proceedings as to have deprived [the plaintiff] . . . of a fair trial'” … . Windham v Campoverde, 2025 NY Slip Op 04939, Second Dept 9-10-25

Practice Point: Here counsel’s remarks in the opening and summation irreparably tainted the proceedings requiring a new trial.

 

September 10, 2025
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2025-09-10 13:29:472025-09-14 13:46:20DEFENSE COUNSEL’S REMARKS ALLEGING PLAINTIFF AND HER ATTORNEY FABRICATED EVIDENCE IN THIS SIDEWALK SLIP AND FALL CASE DENIED PLAINTIFF A FAIR TRIAL (SECOND DEPT).
Civil Procedure, Evidence, Judges, Landlord-Tenant, Negligence

THE JUDGE IN THIS SIDEWALK SLIP AND FALL CASE FAILED TO ADEQUATELY EXPLAIN TO THE JURY THE DIFFERENT DUTIES OWED BY THE TENANT AND THE OWNER OF THE BUILDING ABUTTING THE SIDEWALK; THE MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE PLAINTIFF’S VERDICT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED; IN ADDITION, THE SECOND DEPARTMENT HELD DAMAGE AWARDS FOR PLAINTIFF’S INJURED ANKLE WERE EXCESSIVE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendants’ motion to set aside the verdict in this slip and fall case should have been granted. The defendants are the owner and tenant in the building abutting the allegedly defective sidewalk where plaintiff fell. The judge’s charge to the jury did not adequately explain how defendants’ duties differed as tenant and landowner. The Second Department also held the damage awards were excessive:

… Supreme Court should have granted that branch of the defendants’ motion which was pursuant to CPLR 4404(a) to set aside the verdict on the issue of liability in the interest of justice and for a new trial on the issue of liability. In charging the jury, the court failed to differentiate between White Castle [tenant] and Asaro [landowner], and failed to identify how their duties differed as tenant and as landowner, respectively. Thus, the court did not “adequately convey[ ] the sum and substance of the applicable law to be charged” … . Due to the possibility that this conflation may have prejudiced either defendant or both defendants, each defendant is entitled to a new trial on the issue of liability against it … . Rendon v White Castle Sys., Inc., 2025 NY Slip Op 04925, Second Dept 9-10-25

Practice Point: Here the jury instructions did not clearly explain the different duties owed by a tenant versus a landowner with respect to a defective sidewalk abutting the building. The inadequate instructions required that the plaintiff’s verdict in this slip and fall case be set aside.

 

September 10, 2025
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2025-09-10 12:44:592025-09-14 13:12:48THE JUDGE IN THIS SIDEWALK SLIP AND FALL CASE FAILED TO ADEQUATELY EXPLAIN TO THE JURY THE DIFFERENT DUTIES OWED BY THE TENANT AND THE OWNER OF THE BUILDING ABUTTING THE SIDEWALK; THE MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE PLAINTIFF’S VERDICT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED; IN ADDITION, THE SECOND DEPARTMENT HELD DAMAGE AWARDS FOR PLAINTIFF’S INJURED ANKLE WERE EXCESSIVE (SECOND DEPT).
Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Defamation, Evidence, Judges

ALTHOUGH PLAINTIFF IN THIS DEFAMATION ACTION WAS ALLOWED TO SUE UNDER A PSEUDONYM, THE TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER PROHIBITING DEFENDANTS FROM REVEALING PLAINTIFF’S IDENTITY TO THIRD PARTIES, INCLUDING WITNESSES AND INVESTIGATORS, WAS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL PRIOR RESTRAINT OF SPEECH (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the temporary restraining order prohibiting defendants from revealing plaintiff’s identity to third parties in this defamation action was an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech. Plaintiff had been allowed to sue under a pseudonym:

… Supreme Court erred in granting that branch of the plaintiffs’ motion which was for a temporary restraining order prohibiting the defendants from disclosing the plaintiffs’ identities to third parties, sharing any statements or documents regarding the instant action, or discussing the instant action. “A prior restraint on speech is a law, regulation or judicial order that suppresses speech on the basis of the speech’s content and in advance of its actual expression” … . “Any imposition of prior restraint, whatever the form, bears a ‘heavy presumption against its constitutional validity, and a party seeking to obtain such a restraint bears a correspondingly heavy burden of demonstrating justification for its imposition'” … . An injunction issued in the area of First Amendment rights under the United States Constitution “must be tailored as precisely as possible to the exact needs of the case” … . Here, the Supreme Court’s temporary restraining order was overbroad, such that it prevented the defendants from discussing the instant action with third-party witnesses or disclosing the plaintiffs’ names for investigative purposes … . Doe v Eliyas, 2025 NY Slip Op 04876, Second Dept 9-10-25

Practice Point: Consult this decision for insight into when a restraining order prohibiting revealing the identity of a plaintiff suing under a pseudonym is an unconstitutional prior restraint of speech.

 

September 10, 2025
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2025-09-10 11:37:582025-09-14 11:56:54ALTHOUGH PLAINTIFF IN THIS DEFAMATION ACTION WAS ALLOWED TO SUE UNDER A PSEUDONYM, THE TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER PROHIBITING DEFENDANTS FROM REVEALING PLAINTIFF’S IDENTITY TO THIRD PARTIES, INCLUDING WITNESSES AND INVESTIGATORS, WAS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL PRIOR RESTRAINT OF SPEECH (SECOND DEPT). ​
Criminal Law, Judges

THE CONSENT-SEARCH PROBATION CONDITION WAS NOT WARRANTED IN THIS DWI CASE; THERE WAS A COMPREHENSIVE TWO-JUSTICE DISSENT (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, over a comprehensive two-justice dissent, determined the probation condition requiring defendant to consent to a search of his person or home was not warranted in this DWI case. Defendant was found asleep in his car, engine running, with a bottle of alcohol on the seat. He had twice before been convicted of DWI:

… [W]e hold that the consent-search condition imposed by the sentencing court is not reasonably related to defendant’s rehabilitation or necessary to ensure that he will lead a law-abiding life. Initially, it is undisputed that defendant was not armed with a weapon when he committed the crime of which he was convicted. Defendant also has no history of violence or use of weapons and has never been convicted of an offense involving weapons … . * * *

… [T]he circumstances of defendant’s past use of illegal substances do not support a finding that the imposition of the consent-search condition was reasonably necessary to ensure that defendant will lead a law-abiding life or to assist him to do so, particularly where the frequency and magnitude of his use of illegal substances are unknown … . * * *

There are certain limited circumstances where alcohol becomes contraband for the purposes of the consent-search condition, such as when it is open and located in a running vehicle … . However, the consent-search condition is not limited to conform to these specific circumstances. Rather, the condition broadly authorizes warrantless searches of defendant’s person, vehicle and place of abode. This extensive reach into areas of defendant’s life where he may legally possess and consume alcohol is not reasonably related to defendant’s rehabilitation or individually tailored in relation to the offense committed, especially considering that defendant will still be “checked up on” pursuant to the condition permitting unannounced visits from a probation officer at his residence or elsewhere, which he does not challenge … . People v Andrus, 2025 NY Slip Op 04817, First Dept 8-28-25

Practice Point: Consult this decision and dissent for insight into when a consent-search probation condition is warranted and when, as here, it is inappropriate.

 

August 28, 2025
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2025-08-28 09:30:122025-08-31 10:04:06THE CONSENT-SEARCH PROBATION CONDITION WAS NOT WARRANTED IN THIS DWI CASE; THERE WAS A COMPREHENSIVE TWO-JUSTICE DISSENT (FIRST DEPT).
Civil Procedure, Judges, Municipal Law

HERE THE ARGUMENT THAT NECESSARY PARTIES HAD NOT BEEN JOINED SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN REJECTED; THE PROPER REMEDY IS TO SUMMON THE NECESSARY PARTIES, NOT DISMISSAL (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, noted that the proper remedy for the failure to include a necessary party is to summon the missing party, not dismiss the action:​

The nonjoinder of necessary parties may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, by any party or by the court on its own motion, including for the first time on appeal” … . “Necessary parties are defined as ‘[p]ersons who ought to be parties if complete relief is to be accorded between the persons who are parties to the action or who might be inequitably affected by a judgment in the action'” … . “The rule serves judicial economy by preventing a multiplicity of suits. It also insures fairness to third parties who ought not to be prejudiced or embarrassed by judgments purporting to bind their rights or interest where they have had no opportunity to be heard” …. “Dismissal of an action or proceeding for nonjoinder of a necessary party is only a last resort” …. Therefore, “[w]hen a necessary party has not been made a party and is ‘subject to the jurisdiction’ of the court, the proper remedy is not dismissal of the complaint or the petition, but rather for the court to direct that the necessary party be summoned” … .

Supreme Court improperly rejected the respondents’ contention that the petitioners failed to join necessary parties. The petitioners sought to annul so much of the Village Board’s resolution …  as appointed Tucci to his position [with the Village Fire Department], and the court granted that request. Since Tucci was a person “who might be”—and in fact was—”inequitably affected by a judgment” in this proceeding (CPLR 1001[a]), he was a necessary party … . Similarly, as the petitioners sought relief that could result in a change to the leadership of the Fire Department, the Board of Fire Wardens was also a necessary party … .

… [D]ismissal of this proceeding is not the appropriate remedy for nonjoinder of Tucci and the Board of Fire Wardens … . Instead, “[u]nder these circumstances, the appropriate procedure is for the Supreme Court to determine whether [those parties] can be summoned and, if joinder cannot be effectuated, to determine whether the proceeding[ ] may nevertheless proceed in [their] absence, upon consideration of the factors set forth in CPLR 1001(b)” … . Matter of Riverside Hose Co., Inc. v Village of Tarrytown Vil. Bd., 2025 NY Slip Op 04793, Second Dept 8-27-25

Practice Point: Consult this decision for a definition of “necessary parties” within the meaning of CPLR 1001(b) and an explanation of the proper procedure for dealing with the failure to join a necessary party.

 

August 27, 2025
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2025-08-27 11:08:222025-08-31 11:38:10HERE THE ARGUMENT THAT NECESSARY PARTIES HAD NOT BEEN JOINED SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN REJECTED; THE PROPER REMEDY IS TO SUMMON THE NECESSARY PARTIES, NOT DISMISSAL (SECOND DEPT).
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