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DEFENDANT WAS NOT UNDULY PREJUDICED BY CODEFENDANT’S ATTORNEY’S SUMMATION-ARGUMENT THAT DEFENDANT WAS A SHOOTER AND THE CODEFENDANT WAS NOT; THE TRIAL EVIDENCE DID NOT POINT TO THAT CONCLUSION AND THE JURY WAS INSTRUCTED THAT SUMMATIONS ARE NOT EVIDENCE (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Cannataro, affirming the Fourth Department, determined that the trial judge properly denied the defendant’s motion to sever the trials of the codefendants. The charges stemmed from a drive-by shooting in which two guns were fired. The trial evidence did not demonstrate defendant’s lack of involvement. In summation the codefendant’s attorney argued defendant was one of the shooters and the codefendant was not:

Where counsel for a codefendant essentially functioned as “a second prosecutor” and elicited damaging evidence against the defendant, we have held that severance was required based on the “compelling prejudice” to the defendant … . No similar degree of prejudice was created by codefendant’s closing argument here.

… [D]efendant raised the specter of a potential irreconcilable conflict between the defenses prior to trial, but apart from the comments made in summation, the defenses were remarkably consistent in their primary focus on discrediting the eyewitness. Although Bordies’ [the codefendant’s] argument that the evidence supported the conclusion that defendant was guilty was diametrically opposed to defendant’s claim of innocence, this type of discord emerging between codefendants only in summation did not rise to the level of an irreconcilable conflict for purposes of severance in these particular circumstances.

Moreover, the trial court properly instructed the jury that the attorneys’ arguments were not evidence and should not be considered as evidence when they judged the facts. That being so, and given that the jury is presumed to have followed the court’s instructions … , any conflict raised solely by counsel’s arguments could not have formed the basis of the jury’s verdict. In sum, there was no “undue” prejudice to defendant. People v Everson, 2025 NY Slip Op 05738, CtApp 10-16-25

Practice Point: Consult this opinion for insight into when the severance of codefendants’ trials is required and when it is not.

 

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