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Civil Procedure, Insurance Law

DATE OF LOSS MEANS THE DATE OF THE DENIAL OF THE CLAIM, NOT THE DATE OF THE EVENT TRIGGERING THE CLAIM, CAUSE OF ACTION NOT BARRED BY TWO YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 4TH DEPT.

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, overruling Fourth Department precedent, determined causes of action stemming from a 2009 home burglary should not have been dismissed as barred by the two year statute of limitation. The term “date of loss” in the policy was interpreted to mean the date of the claim denial, not the date of the burglary:

Plaintiff commenced this action more than two years after the 2009 theft. Interpreting the phrase “date of loss” as the date on which the theft occurred, defendant contends that the action is time-barred under the terms of the policy. Plaintiff, on the other hand, interprets the phrase “date of loss” as the date on which the claim was denied and, as a result, contends that the action was timely commenced. We agree with plaintiff. Despite cases holding that “date of loss” means the date of the underlying catastrophe, including cases from this Department (see Baluk v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 114 AD3d 1151; Klawiter v CGU/OneBeacon Ins. Group, 27 AD3d 1155), the Court of Appeals has found a distinction between the generic phrase “date of loss,” and the term of art “inception of loss” (see Medical Facilities v Pryke, 95 AD2d 692, 693, affd 62 NY2d 716; Proc v Home Ins. Co., 17 NY2d 239, 243-244, rearg denied 18 NY2d 751; Steen v Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 89 NY 315, 322-325). As the Second Circuit noted in Fabozzi v Lexington Ins. Co. (601 F3d 88, 91), those cases have not been overruled or disavowed in any way.

Indeed, as the 1st Department recognized in Medical Facilities, “nothing in [Proc] suggests an intention to alter [the] general rule” … , which is “that an action for breach of contract commences running at the time the breach takes place” … . Thus, only the very specific “inception of loss” or other similarly “distinct language” permits using the catastrophe date as the limitations date … . Here, the policy did not contain the specific “inception of loss” or other similarly distinct language, and we thus disavow our decisions in Baluk and Klawiter to the extent that they hold otherwise.

Inasmuch as ” [a]mbiguities in an insurance policy are to be construed against the insurer’ ” … , we conclude that the two-year limitations period contained in the policy did not begin to run until “the loss [became] due and payable” … . Lobello v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 2017 NY Slip Op 05543, 4th Dept 7-7-17

INSURANCE LAW (DATE OF LOSS MEANS THE DATE OF THE DENIAL OF THE CLAIM, NOT THE DATE OF THE EVENT TRIGGERING THE CLAIM, CAUSE OF ACTION NOT BARRED BY TWO YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 4TH DEPT)/CIVIL PROCEDURE (INSURANCE LAW, STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, DATE OF LOSS MEANS THE DATE OF THE DENIAL OF THE CLAIM, NOT THE DATE OF THE EVENT TRIGGERING THE CLAIM, CAUSE OF ACTION NOT BARRED BY TWO YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 4TH DEPT)/STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (INSURANCE LAW, DATE OF LOSS MEANS THE DATE OF THE DENIAL OF THE CLAIM, NOT THE DATE OF THE EVENT TRIGGERING THE CLAIM, CAUSE OF ACTION NOT BARRED BY TWO YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 4TH DEPT)

July 7, 2017
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Contract Law, Insurance Law, Landlord-Tenant

INSURER’S DISCLAIMER OF COVERAGE IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE IS NOT SUFFICIENT PROOF THE TENANT FAILED TO PROCURE THE INSURANCE REQUIRED BY THE LEASE, SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE BREACH OF CONTRACT CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED.

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined summary judgment on the breach of contract cause of action should not have been granted. The property owner (the church) in this parking lot slip and fall case alleged that the lessee (Stepping Stones) failed to procure the insurance required by the lease. That allegation was based on the insurer’s disclaimer of coverage. The Fourth Department noted that the disclaimer could be erroneous and was therefore not proof of a breach of the lease:

In denying Stepping Stones’s motion in part and sua sponte granting summary judgment to the Church defendants on the breach of contract claims, the court reasoned that the Church defendants were entitled to judgment on the ground that, “[i]f the insurance carrier provided by Stepping Stones fails to cover the broad coverage demanded by the Lease, then Stepping Stones has breached the Lease agreement.”

On appeal, Stepping Stones addresses only the court’s determination with respect to the breach of contract claims. We agree with Stepping Stones that the court erred in granting summary judgment to the Church defendants on those claims, and we therefore modify the order accordingly. The mere fact that the insurance carrier disclaimed coverage for the accident does not establish as a matter of law that Stepping Stones failed to obtain the necessary coverage. It is possible that the insurance carrier’s disclaimer was improper, and that possibility may be explored by way of a declaratory judgment action … . Strong v St. Thomas Church of Irondequoit, 2017 NY Slip Op 05333, 4th Dept 6-30-17

 

June 30, 2017
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Insurance Law

ALTHOUGH NO SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP EXISTED BETWEEN BROKER AND PLAINTIFF, CAUSE OF ACTION BASED UPON PLAINTIFF’S SPECIFIC REQUEST FOR FLOOD INSURANCE (WHICH WAS NOT INCLUDED IN THE POLICY) SURVIVED SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

The Fourth Department determined summary judgment was properly awarded to the insurance broker (First Niagara) because no special relationship existed with plaintiff. Plaintiff specifically asked defendant whether plaintiff had flood insurance and further stated plaintiff wanted flood insurance. Defendant never responded. After flood damage occurred plaintiff learned the policy did not include flood insurance. Although no special relationship existed, plaintiff’s cause of action based upon the specific request for flood insurance survived summary judgment:

“As a general principle, insurance brokers have a common-law duty to obtain requested coverage for their clients within a reasonable time or inform the client of the inability to do so” … . “Absent a specific request for coverage not already in a client’s policy or the existence of a special relationship with the client, an insurance agent or broker has no continuing duty to advise, guide[ ] or direct a client to obtain additional coverage” … . “[A] special relationship may arise where (1) the agent receives compensation for consultation apart from payment of the premiums . . . (2) there was some interaction regarding a question of coverage, with the insured relying on the expertise of the agent . . . ; or (3) there is a course of dealing over an extended period of time which would have put objectively reasonable insurance agents on notice that their advice was being sought and specially relied on’ “… .

Here, First Niagara met its initial burden of establishing that no special relationship existed, and plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact  … . Specifically, First Niagara submitted evidence that it received no compensation from plaintiff over and above the commissions it received for the insurance policies it had procured, that plaintiff did not use First Niagara as its exclusive agent, and that plaintiff retained final decision-making authority over what coverage to obtain … . Thus, even accepting plaintiff’s allegations as true, we conclude that “the record in the instant case presents only the standard consumer-agent insurance placement relationship” … .

We further conclude, however, that First Niagara failed to tender “sufficient evidence to eliminate any material issues of fact from the case” relating to plaintiff’s specific request for flood insurance coverage … . … [T]here are triable issues of fact concerning whether plaintiff made a specific request for flood insurance coverage prior to the flood event … . Petri Baking Prods., Inc. v Hatch Leonard Naples, Inc., 2017 NY Slip Op 05338, 4th Dept 6-30-17

 

June 30, 2017
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Insurance Law

THE $2,000,000 REPLACEMENT INSURANCE POLICY WAS CANCELLED FOR NON-PAYMENT JUST HOURS BEFORE PLAINTIFF WAS STRUCK BY THE INSURED’S CAR, THE FACT THAT A PREMIUM SUFFICIENT FOR THE PRIOR $1,000,000 POLICY HAD BEEN PAID WAS OF NO CONSEQUENCE.

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, over a two-justice dissent, determined the umbrella policy had been cancelled for non-payment just hours before plaintiff (Garcia) was struck by the car owned by the insured, Rakowski. The Second Department rejected the argument that the insurance contract was divisible. The GEICO policy in effect was a $2,000,000 umbrella policy which represented an increase from a prior $1,000,000 policy. The additional premium ($199) for the $2,000,000 policy had not been paid, but the premium in an amount equal to the premium for the prior $1,000,000 policy ($306) had been paid. The Second Department held that the $1,000,000 coverage was no longer available. Only the $2,000,000 policy was in effect, and that was cancelled for failure to pay the additional $199 premium:

Garcia argues, and our dissenting colleagues would conclude, that, because of how the premiums were set out in the Amended Declarations, there is an ambiguity as to whether Rakowski received a policy for $2,000,000 or $1,000,000, or as to whether the policy was divisible or severable as to the amount of coverage. We disagree. The fact that the premium was separately stated for the increase in the coverage limit is irrelevant here. The $1,000,000 renewal proposal of the policy from the previous year had already been sent out before Rakowski asked for an increase in the amount of coverage to $2,000,000. The “Amended Declarations,” which, by their terms, “SUPERSEDE[D] ANY PREVIOUS DECLARATION” for the policy period beginning October 10, 2005, were sent to Rakowski after she asked for the changes to her policy. Thus, the additional billing, which separated the original premium from the amount attributable to the increase, was unremarkable and did not give rise to an ambiguity in the policy that Rakowski had asked for and GEICO agreed to provide: a liability limit of $2,000,000 as of the beginning of the new policy period. Garcia is not seeking to divide Rakowski’s policy, but, in effect, to rewrite it to provide what Rakowski never asked for: a policy with coverage of only $1,000,000.

As Garcia points out, forfeiture is not favored in the law… , and, where cancellation of an entire policy would result in forfeiture, courts may be reluctant to hold that an insurance contract is not divisible … . There is, however, no forfeiture here. Rakowski asked for, and received, a $2,000,000 policy, and she had $2,000,000 in coverage from the outset of the policy period, October 10, 2005. Because she only paid part of the premium, her coverage was cancelled, upon notice, when the prorated premium for the coverage she contracted for was exhausted. In other words, Rakowski got everything she paid for, and she forfeited nothing. That Rakowski “just missed” being insured for the injuries caused to Garcia is unfortunate, but nonetheless irrelevant to this analysis. GEICO sent its cancellation notice more than six months before Rakowski’s vehicle struck Garcia. We are not free to alter the meaning of the policy to avoid the result caused by Rakowski’s nonpayment of the premium for her $2,000,000 policy … . Garcia v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 2017 NY Slip Op 05202, 2nd Dept 6-28-17

 

June 28, 2017
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Insurance Law

INSURERS’ RESPONSES TO INSUREDS’ CLAIMS UNDER THE INSURANCE CONTRACTS AMOUNTED TO A DENIAL OF LIABILITY, INSUREDS NOT OBLIGATED TO COOPERATE OR OBTAIN CONSENT TO SETTLE. ​

The First Department determined the insurer’s responses to the insureds’ claims amounted to a denial of coverage. Therefore the insureds were not obligated to cooperate with the insurers or obtain the insurers’ consent to settle:

Defendants’ [insurers’] unreasonable delay in dealing with plaintiffs’ claims under the insurance contracts, consistently stated position that the various regulatory investigations and civil actions concerning plaintiffs’ alleged late trading and marketing-timing transactions did not constitute claims under the contracts, and insistence that in any event disgorgement payments such as those demanded by the regulators were not insurable as a matter of law constitute a denial of liability under the contracts that justifies plaintiffs’ settlement of those claims without defendants’ consent… . The record does not support defendants’ contention that plaintiffs breached their obligation to cooperate, but in any event defendants’ repudiation of liability for plaintiffs’ claims also excuses plaintiffs from performance of that obligation … . The “reservation of rights” language in defendants’ letters to plaintiffs does not change this result … .  J.P. Morgan Sec. Inc. v Vigilant Ins. Co., 2017 NY Slip Op 05181, 1st Dept 6-27-17

 

June 27, 2017
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Criminal Law, Insurance Law

BAIL BONDSMAN IS NOT ENTITLED TO KEEP THE PREMIUM POSTED TO UNDERWRITE A BAIL BOND IF BAIL IS SUBSEQUENTLY DISAPPROVED AND THE ARRESTEE IS NOT RELEASED.

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge DiFiore, determined the defendant bail bondsman, Judelson, who agreed to underwrite a $2 million bail bond in return for a premium of $120,560, could not keep the premium when bail was disapproved and the arrestee, Bogoraz, was not released. The bond was posted, but bail was disapproved at the subsequent hearing:

The question before us ultimately turns on when a “premium” is earned. The use of the word “premium” in [Insurance Law] section 6804 (a) is significant because that term connotes a consideration paid to an insurer for assuming a risk … . Risk, when used “with reference to insurance, describes the liability assumed as specified on the face of the policy” … . Notably, in 1997, when the legislature amended section 6804 to increase premium rates to sureties, the sponsor justified the change as providing “an incentive to assume more risk by bonding agents” … .

When does a bail bond surety incur risk? In our view, the risk associated with the bail bond is that the principal admitted on bail will fail to appear and the bail bond will be forfeited … . If the posted collateral does not cover the bail bond, the surety may suffer a financial loss. The surety does not incur this risk when the principal is not released and so has no opportunity to jump bail … . While the surety assumes a binding obligation to pay the bail upon posting the bail bond, no risk attaches from this obligation alone. Risk is triggered only when the court takes additional steps following the posting — approving the bail bond and issuing a certificate authorizing the principal’s release … . When a hearing is ordered under CPL 520.30, the court approves or disapproves the bail bond after the hearing … . If the court disapproves the bail bond, the surety never runs the risk it contracted to insure. Gevorkyan v Judelson, 2017 NY Slip Op 05176, CtApp 6-27-17

 

June 27, 2017
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Environmental Law, Insurance Law, Toxic Torts

DAMAGE TO SOIL FROM LEAD EMISSIONS AND LEAD PAINT COULD NOT BE SEPARATED, ALTHOUGH LEAD PAINT DAMAGE WAS NOT SUBJECT TO THE POLICY EXCLUSION, THE EXCLUSION FOR LEAD EMISSIONS CONTROLLED.

The First Department, in an action seeking reimbursement for environmental cleanup costs, determined the policy exclusion from coverage of lead emissions controlled, even though the soil was also contaminated with lead paint, which was not excluded from coverage:

​

In this case, not only did the damage result from different sources, i.e., lead emissions and lead paint, but, also, one source is excluded from coverage and the other is not. However, the damage resulting from either source is not readily divisible from the damage resulting from the other. The combined effect of the lead emissions and the lead paint was soil contamination – of the same soil. To the extent a particular area was contaminated solely by lead paint, it was not (and could not have been) included in the EPA’s remediation efforts (see 42 USC § 9604). Moreover, claimant would not have had to pay for any damage – including lead paint damage – if not for the accompanying pollution (see 42 USC § 9607). Thus, the entire claim is barred by the pollution exclusions. Matter of Midland Ins. Co., 2017 NY Slip Op 05171, 1st Dept 6-22-17

INSURANCE LAW (ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP, DAMAGE TO SOIL FROM LEAD EMISSIONS AND LEAD PAINT COULD NOT BE SEPARATED, ALTHOUGH LEAD PAINT DAMAGE WAS NOT SUBJECT TO THE POLICY EXCLUSION, THE EXCLUSION FOR LEAD EMISSIONS CONTROLLED)/ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (INSURANCE, DAMAGE TO SOIL FROM LEAD EMISSIONS AND LEAD PAINT COULD NOT BE SEPARATED, ALTHOUGH LEAD PAINT DAMAGE WAS NOT SUBJECT TO THE POLICY EXCLUSION, THE EXCLUSION FOR LEAD EMISSIONS CONTROLLED)POLLUTION EXCLUSIONS (INSURANCE, DAMAGE TO SOIL FROM LEAD EMISSIONS AND LEAD PAINT COULD NOT BE SEPARATED, ALTHOUGH LEAD PAINT DAMAGE WAS NOT SUBJECT TO THE POLICY EXCLUSION, THE EXCLUSION FOR LEAD EMISSIONS CONTROLLED)

June 22, 2017
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Insurance Law

POST-DEATH INTEREST ON AN ANNUITY SHOULD NOT BE CALCULATED BY APPLYING THE INTEREST RATE AT THE TIME OF PAYMENT TO THE ENTIRE PERIOD BETWEEN THE DEATH OF THE ANNUITANT (1998) AND THE DATE OF PAYMENT (2012).

The Second Department interpreted an ambiguous term in an Insurance Law statute to determine the appropriate post-death interest to be paid on an annuity. The interest rate at the time of payment should not be applied to entire period between the death of the annuitant (1998) and the date of payment (2012). Rather, the historical interest rates during that time should be applied:

​

On or about November 8, 2012, TFLIC [defendant insurer] sent the plaintiff a check for $142,163.54, representing the value of Annuity #8231 on the date of … death ($132,071.06), plus $10,092.48 in interest, calculated at an annual rate of 0.5%. The estate accepted the payment “without waiving any rights that [the plaintiff] may have to interest since the date of death, costs and expenses resulting from your failure to provide this annuity upon the decedent’s death.” The estate later commenced this action against the defendants alleging, inter alia, breach of contract for the delay in paying the proceeds of Annuity #8231, and demanding, inter alia, prejudgment interest at the legal rate of 9% (see CPLR 5004). …

​

… [T]he calculation of interest on the proceeds due under Annuity #8231 must be determined in accordance with the principles set forth in Insurance Law § 3214, which applies specifically to interest paid on the proceeds of an annuity following the death of the annuitant. …

​

The Supreme Court erred … in determining that the rate of interest due on the proceeds of Annuity #8231 pursuant to Insurance Law § 3214(c) should be determined solely by reference to the rate in effect at the time of payment—in this case, 0.5%.

Insurance Law § 3214(c), entitled “Interest upon proceeds of life insurance policies and annuity contracts,” provides, in relevant part, that, “interest upon the principal sum paid to the beneficiary . . . shall be computed daily at the rate of interest currently paid by the insurer on proceeds left under the interest settlement option, from the date of the death of an . . . annuitant in connection with a death claim on such a . . . contract of annuity . . . to the date of payment and shall be added to and be a part of the total sum paid.” … [T]he word “currently” is ambiguous, as it could refer to the rate in effect on each date on which a daily computation must be made. Conversely, it could refer to the rate in effect on the date of payment.

” Where the language of a statute is susceptible of two constructions, the courts will adopt that which avoids injustice, hardship, constitutional doubts or other objectionable results'”… . Applying this principle here, the calculation of interest under section 3214(c) should reflect the rates applied by the insurer in the normal course of managing its funds held on deposit, rather than arbitrarily determining the entire interest payment based on the happenstance of the interest rate in effect on the date of payment … . …

​

Accordingly, summary judgment should have been denied to both parties in this case, as the record presents unresolved issues of fact regarding the historical interest rates used by TFLIC and its predecessor, TLICNY, between 1998 (the year of …. death) and 2012 (the year on which the proceeds of Annuity #8231 were paid). Fleischman v Transamerica Corp., 2017 NY Slip Op 05068, 2nd Dept 6-21-17

 

INSURANCE LAW (ANNUITIES, INTEREST ON AN ANNUITY SHOULD NOT BE CALCULATED BY APPLYING THE INTEREST RATE AT THE TIME OF PAYMENT TO THE ENTIRE PERIOD BETWEEN THE DEATH OF THE ANNUITANT (1998) AND THE DATE OF PAYMENT (2012))/ANNUITIES (INSURANCE LAW, INTEREST, INTEREST ON AN ANNUITY SHOULD NOT BE CALCULATED BY APPLYING THE INTEREST RATE AT THE TIME OF PAYMENT TO THE LIFE OF THE ANNUITY)/INTEREST (ANNUITIES, INSURANCE LAW, INTEREST ON AN ANNUITY SHOULD NOT BE CALCULATED BY APPLYING THE INTEREST RATE AT THE TIME OF PAYMENT TO THE ENTIRE PERIOD BETWEEN THE DEATH OF THE ANNUITANT (1998) AND THE DATE OF PAYMENT (2012)))

June 21, 2017
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Attorneys, Insurance Law, Labor Law-Construction Law, Workers' Compensation

INSURER WHICH OPTED NOT TO DEFEND THIS CONSTRUCTION ACCIDENT CASE WAS REQUIRED TO INDEMNIFY THE INSURERS WHICH SETTLED THE CLAIM FOR BOTH DAMAGES AND EXCESS ATTORNEYS’ FEES, PLAINTIFF HIRED A MORE EXPENSIVE LAW FIRM ($795/HR) RATHER THAN USE THE FIRM HIRED BY THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION CARRIER ($150/HR).

The First Department, over a dissent, determined the plaintiff’s insurer (RLI), which opted not to defend this construction accident case, was required to indemnify the insurers who paid the $2.5 million settlement, both for the damages and the excess attorney’s fees. The plaintiff opted to hire a law firm other that the firm used by the workers’ compensation carrier (SLI). The workers’ compensation carrier paid $150/hour toward the other attorneys’ fees. The firm hired by plaintiff (Greenberg Traurig) charged $795/hr. The dissent argued the fees should have been capped at $150/hr. The other issue addressed by the court was the late notification of plaintiff’s insurer. The late notice was excused because of a good faith belief recovery was limited to workers’ compensation (and therefore subject to a policy exclusion):

​

RLI’s argument that the voluntary payment doctrine bars recovery of amounts paid to Greenberg Traurig in defense of the underlying claim is without merit. Having chosen to deny coverage and not participate in the defense, RLI “excluded itself from any aspect of the [p]laintiff’s defense in the Vasquez estate’s action,” including the negotiation of attorneys’ fees and the selection of attorneys, as so found by the motion court, and cannot now be heard to complain. Plaintiff is entitled to recover attorneys’ fees incurred in defense of the underlying action as “damages which are the natural and probable consequence of the breach” by RLI of the contract of insurance … .

We reject defendant’s argument that the $150 per hour contributed by SIF acts as a ceiling on fees … . Any agreement between SIF and plaintiff as to fees has no bearing on RLI’s responsibility to provide a defense, save as it pertains to any eventual allocation of defense costs as between the two carriers … . The record does not contain a copy of the SIF policy, so we are unable to make any determination as to whether the carriers share the costs of defense in equal parts as primary carriers, or whether defendant RLI is solely responsible. It may be noted that under RLI’s policy, competing primary insurers are to contribute on an equal basis. Cohen Bros. Realty Corp. v RLI Ins. Co., 20 17 NY Slip Op 04776, 1st Dept 6-13-17

 

INSURANCE LAW (ATTORNEY’S FEES, INSURER WHICH OPTED NOT TO DEFEND THIS CONSTRUCTION ACCIDENT CASE WAS REQUIRED TO INDEMNIFY THE INSURERS WHICH SETTLED THE CLAIM FOR BOTH DAMAGES AND EXCESS ATTORNEYS’ FEES, PLAINTIFF HIRED A MORE EXPENSIVE LAW FIRM ($795/HR) RATHER THAN USE THE FIRM HIRED BY THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION CARRIER ($150/HR))/ATTORNEYS (INSURANCE LAW, FEES, INSURER WHICH OPTED NOT TO DEFEND THIS CONSTRUCTION ACCIDENT CASE WAS REQUIRED TO INDEMNIFY THE INSURERS WHICH SETTLED THE CLAIM FOR BOTH DAMAGES AND EXCESS ATTORNEYS’ FEES, PLAINTIFF HIRED A MORE EXPENSIVE LAW FIRM ($795/HR) RATHER THAN USE THE FIRM HIRED BY THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION CARRIER ($150/HR))/EMPLOYMENT LAW (INSURANCE LAW, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW, INSURER WHICH OPTED NOT TO DEFEND THIS CONSTRUCTION ACCIDENT CASE WAS REQUIRED TO INDEMNIFY THE INSURERS WHICH SETTLED THE CLAIM FOR BOTH DAMAGES AND EXCESS ATTORNEYS’ FEES, PLAINTIFF HIRED A MORE EXPENSIVE LAW FIRM ($795/HR) RATHER THAN USE THE FIRM HIRED BY THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION CARRIER ($150/HR))

June 13, 2017
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Civil Procedure, Insurance Law, Labor Law-Construction Law

ACTION BY PLAINTIFF’S SUBROGEE (INSURER) AGAINST DEFENDANT’S SUBROGEE (INSURER) IN THIS CONSTRUCTION ACCIDENT CASE BARRED BY COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL AND RES JUDICATA, CONCEPTS OF SUBROGATION AND PRIVITY EXPLAINED.

The First Department, over a detailed dissent which lays out the complicated facts, affirming Supreme Court (Reed, J.), determined the action by insurer’s subrogee (Nationwide) against the insured’s subrogee (US Underwriters) in this Labor Law (construction accident) action was barred by collateral estoppel and res judicata. The underlying action had settled for about $1.55 million.

FROM THE DISSENT (THE FACTS):

On or about July 9, 2001, Kerwin Park, an employee of Armadillo Construction Corp., a demolition contractor, sustained personal injuries while working on a construction site. Park commenced the underlying Labor Law action against the general contractor (Artimus) and others. Nationwide, Artimus’s insurer, tendered the defense of the action to Armadillo and Armadillo’s insurer, U.S. Underwriters; Artimus was an additional insured on the U.S. Underwriters policy. By letter dated August 31, 2001, U.S. Underwriters denied coverage to Artimus, copying the broker and Armadillo on the letter, based on late notice of occurrence and various exclusions in the policy. …[T]he underlying action settled for approximately $1.55 million. Nationwide contributed to the settlement on Artimus’s behalf. Artimus also obtained a default judgment on its third-party indemnification claim against Armadillo. … Artimus moved to restore its claims against Armadillo to the active calendar in the declaratory judgment action. In granting the motion, the court (Ramos, J.) cited to Justice Cahn’s earlier decision in the action and observed that no decision had been made concerning Armadillo’s entitlement to coverage. * * * Justice Reed granted U.S. Underwriters’ motion to dismiss the complaint, concluding that Artimus, as Armadillo’s subrogee, was collaterally estopped from bringing the instant action, because it was in privity with Armadillo, and whatever rules of collateral estoppel applied to Armadillo would also apply to Artimus (and its subrogee, Nationwide). The court found that as a consequence, Artimus was bound by Justice Cahn’s order. The court also found that the action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata.

​

FROM THE MAJORITY:

… [T]he parties were afforded a full and fair opportunity to litigate the insurance coverage issues in the prior action. Nationwide is therefore collaterally estopped from litigating the same issues already decided against its subrogor, Artimus, who in turn is estopped from litigating the same issues decided against its subrogor, Armadillo, as a subrogee of the insured.

Moreover, the principles of res judicata favor defendants herein. Nationwide and Artimus seek to enforce the judgment that they were awarded against Armadillo in the third-party personal injury action. However … in the prior action the court found that the coverage exclusion with respect to the personal injury action in U.S. Underwriters policy was applicable. By bringing this action as subrogees of Artimus and Armadillo under Insurance Law § 3420, Nationwide and Artimus are essentially seeking to relitigate Artimus’s claims for coverage. “Res judicata is designed to provide finality in the resolution of disputes, recognizing that [c]onsiderations of judicial economy as well as fairness to the parties mandate, at some point, an end to litigation” … . Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v U.S. Underwriters Ins. Co., 2017 NY Slip Op 04774, 1st Dept 6-13-17

 

 

INSURANCE LAW (ACTION BY PLAINTIFF’S SUBROGEE (INSURER) AGAINST DEFENDANT’S SUBROGEE (INSURER) IN THIS CONSTRUCTION ACCIDENT CASE BARRED BY COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL AND RES JUDICATA, CONCEPTS OF SUBROGATION AND PRIVITY EXPLAINED)/CIVIL PROCEDURE (INSURANCE LAW, LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, ACTION BY PLAINTIFF’S SUBROGEE (INSURER) AGAINST DEFENDANT’S SUBROGEE (INSURER) IN THIS CONSTRUCTION ACCIDENT CASE BARRED BY COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL AND RES JUDICATA, CONCEPTS OF SUBROGATION AND PRIVITY EXPLAINED)/LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (INSURANCE LAW, CIVIL PROCEDURE, ACTION BY PLAINTIFF’S SUBROGEE (INSURER) AGAINST DEFENDANT’S SUBROGEE (INSURER) IN THIS CONSTRUCTION ACCIDENT CASE BARRED BY COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL AND RES JUDICATA, CONCEPTS OF SUBROGATION AND PRIVITY EXPLAINED)/COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL (INSURANCE LAW, LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, ACTION BY PLAINTIFF’S SUBROGEE (INSURER) AGAINST DEFENDANT’S SUBROGEE (INSURER) IN THIS CONSTRUCTION ACCIDENT CASE BARRED BY COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL AND RES JUDICATA, CONCEPTS OF SUBROGATION AND PRIVITY EXPLAINED)/RES JUDICATA (INSURANCE LAW, LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, ACTION BY PLAINTIFF’S SUBROGEE (INSURER) AGAINST DEFENDANT’S SUBROGEE (INSURER) IN THIS CONSTRUCTION ACCIDENT CASE BARRED BY COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL AND RES JUDICATA, CONCEPTS OF SUBROGATION AND PRIVITY EXPLAINED)/PRIVITY (INSURANCE LAW, LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, ACTION BY PLAINTIFF’S SUBROGEE (INSURER) AGAINST DEFENDANT’S SUBROGEE (INSURER) IN THIS CONSTRUCTION ACCIDENT CASE BARRED BY COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL AND RES JUDICATA, CONCEPTS OF SUBROGATION AND PRIVITY EXPLAINED)

June 13, 2017
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 CurlyHost https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png CurlyHost2017-06-13 16:44:542020-02-06 16:06:28ACTION BY PLAINTIFF’S SUBROGEE (INSURER) AGAINST DEFENDANT’S SUBROGEE (INSURER) IN THIS CONSTRUCTION ACCIDENT CASE BARRED BY COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL AND RES JUDICATA, CONCEPTS OF SUBROGATION AND PRIVITY EXPLAINED.
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