You are here: / / DAMAGE TO SOIL FROM LEAD EMISSIONS AND LEAD PAINT COULD NOT BE SEPARATED,...
, ,

DAMAGE TO SOIL FROM LEAD EMISSIONS AND LEAD PAINT COULD NOT BE SEPARATED, ALTHOUGH LEAD PAINT DAMAGE WAS NOT SUBJECT TO THE POLICY EXCLUSION, THE EXCLUSION FOR LEAD EMISSIONS CONTROLLED.

The First Department, in an action seeking reimbursement for environmental cleanup costs, determined the policy exclusion from coverage of lead emissions controlled, even though the soil was also contaminated with lead paint, which was not excluded from coverage:

​

In this case, not only did the damage result from different sources, i.e., lead emissions and lead paint, but, also, one source is excluded from coverage and the other is not. However, the damage resulting from either source is not readily divisible from the damage resulting from the other. The combined effect of the lead emissions and the lead paint was soil contamination – of the same soil. To the extent a particular area was contaminated solely by lead paint, it was not (and could not have been) included in the EPA’s remediation efforts (see 42 USC § 9604). Moreover, claimant would not have had to pay for any damage – including lead paint damage – if not for the accompanying pollution (see 42 USC § 9607). Thus, the entire claim is barred by the pollution exclusions. Matter of Midland Ins. Co., 2017 NY Slip Op 05171, 1st Dept 6-22-17

INSURANCE LAW (ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP, DAMAGE TO SOIL FROM LEAD EMISSIONS AND LEAD PAINT COULD NOT BE SEPARATED, ALTHOUGH LEAD PAINT DAMAGE WAS NOT SUBJECT TO THE POLICY EXCLUSION, THE EXCLUSION FOR LEAD EMISSIONS CONTROLLED)/ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (INSURANCE, DAMAGE TO SOIL FROM LEAD EMISSIONS AND LEAD PAINT COULD NOT BE SEPARATED, ALTHOUGH LEAD PAINT DAMAGE WAS NOT SUBJECT TO THE POLICY EXCLUSION, THE EXCLUSION FOR LEAD EMISSIONS CONTROLLED)POLLUTION EXCLUSIONS (INSURANCE, DAMAGE TO SOIL FROM LEAD EMISSIONS AND LEAD PAINT COULD NOT BE SEPARATED, ALTHOUGH LEAD PAINT DAMAGE WAS NOT SUBJECT TO THE POLICY EXCLUSION, THE EXCLUSION FOR LEAD EMISSIONS CONTROLLED)

You might also like
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S PETITION ALLEGING RESPONDENT DISINFECTANT-DISTRIBUTOR ENGAGED IN PRICE GOUGING AT THE OUTSET OF THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED; THE CONTROLLING STATUTE, GENERAL BUSINESS LAW 396-R, IS NOT VOID FOR VAGUENESS (FIRST DEPT).
LAW OFFICE FAILURE DEEMED A REASONABLE EXCUSE, DEFAULT JUDGMENT VACATED.
Release Applied to Claims Unknown at the Time the Release Was Signed and to Claims Among Parties on the Same Side of the Underlying Lawsuit
TOW TRUCK DEFENDANTS FURNISHED THE CONDITION FOR THE REAR-END COLLISION BUT TOW TRUCK WAS NOT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE, TOW TRUCK DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT).
FAILURE TO INFORM THE DEFENSE ABOUT A SECOND EYEWITNESS TO THE SHOOTING WAS A REVERSIBLE BRADY VIOLATION, THE MOTION TO VACATE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED; NEW TRIAL ORDERED (FIRST DEPT).
FORBEARANCE CAN BE ADEQUATE CONSIDERATION CREATING A VALID CONTRACT (FIRST DEPT)
COURTROOM SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN CLOSED TO FAMILY MEMBERS DURING THE UNDERCOVER OFFICER’S TESTIMONY, NEW TRIAL ORDERED (FIRST DEPT).
QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER ZIP LINE WAS DEFECTIVE AND WHETHER PLAINTIFF KNEW OR SHOULD HAVE KNOWN OF THE RISKS OF USING THE ZIP LINE.

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

JUROR WHO ASKED TO BE EXCUSED AFTER FOUR DAYS OF DELIBERATIONS BECAUSE SHE COULD... CAP ON STATE MEDICAID FUNDS USED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS AND EXECUTIVE PAY...