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ACTION BY PLAINTIFF’S SUBROGEE (INSURER) AGAINST DEFENDANT’S SUBROGEE (INSURER) IN THIS CONSTRUCTION ACCIDENT CASE BARRED BY COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL AND RES JUDICATA, CONCEPTS OF SUBROGATION AND PRIVITY EXPLAINED.

The First Department, over a detailed dissent which lays out the complicated facts, affirming Supreme Court (Reed, J.), determined the action by insurer’s subrogee (Nationwide) against the insured’s subrogee (US Underwriters) in this Labor Law (construction accident) action was barred by collateral estoppel and res judicata. The underlying action had settled for about $1.55 million.

FROM THE DISSENT (THE FACTS):

On or about July 9, 2001, Kerwin Park, an employee of Armadillo Construction Corp., a demolition contractor, sustained personal injuries while working on a construction site. Park commenced the underlying Labor Law action against the general contractor (Artimus) and others. Nationwide, Artimus’s insurer, tendered the defense of the action to Armadillo and Armadillo’s insurer, U.S. Underwriters; Artimus was an additional insured on the U.S. Underwriters policy. By letter dated August 31, 2001, U.S. Underwriters denied coverage to Artimus, copying the broker and Armadillo on the letter, based on late notice of occurrence and various exclusions in the policy. …[T]he underlying action settled for approximately $1.55 million. Nationwide contributed to the settlement on Artimus’s behalf. Artimus also obtained a default judgment on its third-party indemnification claim against Armadillo. … Artimus moved to restore its claims against Armadillo to the active calendar in the declaratory judgment action. In granting the motion, the court (Ramos, J.) cited to Justice Cahn’s earlier decision in the action and observed that no decision had been made concerning Armadillo’s entitlement to coverage. * * * Justice Reed granted U.S. Underwriters’ motion to dismiss the complaint, concluding that Artimus, as Armadillo’s subrogee, was collaterally estopped from bringing the instant action, because it was in privity with Armadillo, and whatever rules of collateral estoppel applied to Armadillo would also apply to Artimus (and its subrogee, Nationwide). The court found that as a consequence, Artimus was bound by Justice Cahn’s order. The court also found that the action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata.

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FROM THE MAJORITY:

… [T]he parties were afforded a full and fair opportunity to litigate the insurance coverage issues in the prior action. Nationwide is therefore collaterally estopped from litigating the same issues already decided against its subrogor, Artimus, who in turn is estopped from litigating the same issues decided against its subrogor, Armadillo, as a subrogee of the insured.

Moreover, the principles of res judicata favor defendants herein. Nationwide and Artimus seek to enforce the judgment that they were awarded against Armadillo in the third-party personal injury action. However … in the prior action the court found that the coverage exclusion with respect to the personal injury action in U.S. Underwriters policy was applicable. By bringing this action as subrogees of Artimus and Armadillo under Insurance Law § 3420, Nationwide and Artimus are essentially seeking to relitigate Artimus’s claims for coverage. “Res judicata is designed to provide finality in the resolution of disputes, recognizing that [c]onsiderations of judicial economy as well as fairness to the parties mandate, at some point, an end to litigation” … . Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v U.S. Underwriters Ins. Co., 2017 NY Slip Op 04774, 1st Dept 6-13-17

 

 

INSURANCE LAW (ACTION BY PLAINTIFF’S SUBROGEE (INSURER) AGAINST DEFENDANT’S SUBROGEE (INSURER) IN THIS CONSTRUCTION ACCIDENT CASE BARRED BY COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL AND RES JUDICATA, CONCEPTS OF SUBROGATION AND PRIVITY EXPLAINED)/CIVIL PROCEDURE (INSURANCE LAW, LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, ACTION BY PLAINTIFF’S SUBROGEE (INSURER) AGAINST DEFENDANT’S SUBROGEE (INSURER) IN THIS CONSTRUCTION ACCIDENT CASE BARRED BY COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL AND RES JUDICATA, CONCEPTS OF SUBROGATION AND PRIVITY EXPLAINED)/LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (INSURANCE LAW, CIVIL PROCEDURE, ACTION BY PLAINTIFF’S SUBROGEE (INSURER) AGAINST DEFENDANT’S SUBROGEE (INSURER) IN THIS CONSTRUCTION ACCIDENT CASE BARRED BY COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL AND RES JUDICATA, CONCEPTS OF SUBROGATION AND PRIVITY EXPLAINED)/COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL (INSURANCE LAW, LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, ACTION BY PLAINTIFF’S SUBROGEE (INSURER) AGAINST DEFENDANT’S SUBROGEE (INSURER) IN THIS CONSTRUCTION ACCIDENT CASE BARRED BY COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL AND RES JUDICATA, CONCEPTS OF SUBROGATION AND PRIVITY EXPLAINED)/RES JUDICATA (INSURANCE LAW, LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, ACTION BY PLAINTIFF’S SUBROGEE (INSURER) AGAINST DEFENDANT’S SUBROGEE (INSURER) IN THIS CONSTRUCTION ACCIDENT CASE BARRED BY COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL AND RES JUDICATA, CONCEPTS OF SUBROGATION AND PRIVITY EXPLAINED)/PRIVITY (INSURANCE LAW, LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, ACTION BY PLAINTIFF’S SUBROGEE (INSURER) AGAINST DEFENDANT’S SUBROGEE (INSURER) IN THIS CONSTRUCTION ACCIDENT CASE BARRED BY COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL AND RES JUDICATA, CONCEPTS OF SUBROGATION AND PRIVITY EXPLAINED)

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