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BUT FOR TEST FOR LEGAL MALPRACTICE IS NOT THE SAME AS SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE, IT IS ENOUGH THAT AN ATTORNEY’S ACTIONS CONSTITUTE A PROXIMATE CAUSE.

The Third Department, in a lawsuit alleging breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty and fraud (among other causes of action) stemming from the underfunding of a Workers’ Compensation benefits trust fund, determined the complaint stated a cause of action for legal malpractice. The lawyer, Gosdeck, argued that the complaint failed to allege his actions were the sole proximate cause of the injury. The Third Department reasoned that the “but for” test for legal malpractice was not the same as “sole proximate cause:”

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… [W]e reject Gosdeck’s argument that plaintiff was required to allege that he was the sole proximate cause of alleged damages. Rather, “[i]n an action to recover damages for legal malpractice, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the attorney failed to exercise the ordinary reasonable skill and knowledge commonly possessed by a member of the legal profession and that the attorney’s breach of this duty proximately caused [the] plaintiff to sustain actual and ascertainable damages”… . “An attorney’s conduct or inaction is the proximate cause of a plaintiff’s damages if but for the attorney’s negligence the plaintiff . . . would not have sustained actual and ascertainable damages”… . We agree with Supreme Court that, on this motion to dismiss a claim of legal malpractice that is based on negligent legal advice given over a period of time, the “but for” standard is not synonymous with sole proximate cause and that plaintiff’s burden is to prove that Gosdeck’s negligence was a proximate cause of damages … . New York State Workers’ Compensation Bd. v Program Risk Mgt., Inc., 2017 NY Slip Op 04184, 3rd Dept 5-25-17

ATTORNEYS (LEGAL MALPRACTICE, BUT FOR TEST FOR LEGAL MALPRACTICE IS NOT THE SAME AS SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE, IT IS ENOUGH THAT AN ATTORNEY’S ACTIONS CONSTITUTE A PROXIMATE CAUSE)/LEGAL MALPRACTICE (BUT FOR TEST FOR LEGAL MALPRACTICE IS NOT THE SAME AS SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE, IT IS ENOUGH THAT AN ATTORNEY’S ACTIONS CONSTITUTE A PROXIMATE CAUSE)/WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW (LEGAL MALPRACTICE RE MANAGEMENT OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION TRUST, BUT FOR TEST FOR LEGAL MALPRACTICE IS NOT THE SAME AS SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE, IT IS ENOUGH THAT AN ATTORNEY’S ACTIONS CONSTITUTE A PROXIMATE CAUSE)/NEGLIGENCE (LEGAL MALPRACTICE, BUT FOR TEST FOR LEGAL MALPRACTICE IS NOT THE SAME AS SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE, IT IS ENOUGH THAT AN ATTORNEY’S ACTIONS CONSTITUTE A PROXIMATE CAUSE

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CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST ACCOUNTANTS STEMMING FROM A WORKERS’ COMPENSATION TRUST FOUND TO BE $8 MILLION IN DEBT SURVIVED MOTIONS TO DISMISS, SIX YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS APPLIES TO INTENTIONAL (AS OPPOSED TO NEGLIGENT) CONDUCT.

The Third Department determined Supreme Court should not have dismissed the breach of fiduciary duty cause of action against defendant accountants (Fuller) stemming from a workers’ compensation trust found to be more than $8 million in debt. The 2nd Department also found Supreme Court properly applied the six year statute of limitations to the allegedly intentional acts by the defendant accountants (designed to conceal the debt). The defendant accountants unsuccessfully argued the three-year (negligence/malpractice) statute of limitations should apply. Regarding the breach of fiduciary duty cause of action, the 2nd Department explained:

Although the duty owed by an accountant is generally not fiduciary in nature … , a fiduciary relationship exists where the accountant is “under a duty to act for or to give advice for the benefit of [the client] upon matters within the scope of the relation” … . This inquiry is “necessarily fact-specific” … , and the dispositive factor is whether there is “confidence on one side and resulting superiority and influence on the other” … . Plaintiff alleged that Fuller held itself out to have the requisite skill and expertise to maintain the trust’s financial records, provide auditing services and — importantly — provide advice to the trust regarding the trust’s financial status. According to plaintiff, Fuller breached its fiduciary duty by knowingly and consistently concealing the trust’s true financial condition and failing to properly advise the trust regarding its solvency, causing over $8 million in damages. Accepting these allegations as true and giving plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference … , we find that plaintiff’s cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty is sufficiently stated to survive Fuller’s motion to dismiss … .  New York State Workers’ Compensation Bd. v Fuller & LaFiura, CPAs, P.C., 2017 NY Slip Op 00225, 3rd Dept 1-12-17

 

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW (CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST ACCOUNTANTS STEMMING FROM A WORKERS’ COMPENSATION TRUST FOUND TO BE $8 MILLION IN DEBT SURVIVED MOTIONS TO DISMISS)/FRAUD (CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST ACCOUNTANTS STEMMING FROM A WORKERS’ COMPENSATION TRUST FOUND TO BE $8 MILLION IN DEBT SURVIVED MOTIONS TO DISMISS)/CIVIL PROCEDURE (SIX YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS APPLIED TO INTENTIONAL ACTS BY ACCOUNTANTS, CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST ACCOUNTANTS STEMMING FROM A WORKERS’ COMPENSATION TRUST FOUND TO BE $8 MILLION IN DEBT SURVIVED MOTIONS TO DISMISS)/FIDUCIARY DUTY (BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST ACCOUNTANTS STEMMING FROM A WORKERS’ COMPENSATION TRUST FOUND TO BE $8 MILLION IN DEBT SHOULD HAVE SURVIVED MOTION TO DISMISS)/ACCOUNTANTS (CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST ACCOUNTANTS STEMMING FROM A WORKERS’ COMPENSATION TRUST FOUND TO BE $8 MILLION IN DEBT SURVIVED MOTIONS TO DISMISS, SIX YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS APPLIED TO INTENTIONAL ACTS BY ACCOUNTANTS)/STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST ACCOUNTANTS STEMMING FROM A WORKERS’ COMPENSATION TRUST FOUND TO BE $8 MILLION IN DEBT SURVIVED MOTIONS TO DISMISS, SIX YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS APPLIED TO INTENTIONAL ACTS BY ACCOUNTANTS)

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MANY (BUT NOT ALL) CAUSES OF ACTION ALLOWED TO GO FORWARD IN AN ACTION AGAINST ADMINISTRATORS AND TRUSTEES OF A WORKERS’ COMPENSATION TRUST FOUND TO BE $188 MILLION IN DEBT.

The Third Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Egan, determined that certain causes of action can go forward in a lawsuit by the Workers’ Compensation Board against administrators and trustees of the Health Care Providers Self-Insurance Trust. The trust, which was to provide workers’ compensation coverage for the trust’s members, was found to be $188 million in debt. The opinion is fact-specific and much too detailed to be summarized here. Breach of fiduciary duty, aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, breach of contract, breach of good faith and fair dealing, gross negligence, alter ego liability, among other theories, were alleged. Many causes of action were deemed time-barred. Some causes of action dismissed by Supreme Court were reinstated. State of N.Y. Workers’ Compensation Bd. v Wang, 2017 NY Slip Op 00057, 3rd Dept 1-5-17

 

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW (MANY CAUSES OF ACTION ALLOWED TO GO FORWARD IN AN ACTION AGAINST ADMINISTRATORS AND TRUSTEES OF A WORKERS’ COMPENSATION TRUST FOUND TO BE $188 MILLION IN DEBT)/TRUSTS AND ESTATES (WORKERS’ COMPENSATION, MANY CAUSES OF ACTION ALLOWED TO GO FORWARD IN AN ACTION AGAINST ADMINISTRATORS AND TRUSTEES OF A WORKERS’ COMPENSATION TRUST FOUND TO BE $188 MILLION IN DEBT)/FIDUCIARY DUTY (TRUSTS AND ESTATES, MANY CAUSES OF ACTION ALLOWED TO GO FORWARD IN AN ACTION AGAINST ADMINISTRATORS AND TRUSTEES OF A WORKERS’ COMPENSATION TRUST FOUND TO BE $188 MILLION IN DEBT)

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PLEADING REQUIREMENTS FOR A LAUNDRY LIST OF FRAUD-RELATED CAUSES OF ACTION SUCCINCTLY ILLUSTRATED.

The Second Department, in the context of motions to dismiss, motions for injunctions, and motions for sanctions, described the pleading requirements for the following causes of action: preliminary injunction, permanent injunction, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, aiding and abetting fraud, constructive trust, conspiracy to commit a tort, fraudulent conveyance, unjust enrichment and conversion. Swartz v Swartz, 2016 NY Slip Op 08390, 2nd Dept 12-14-16

 

CIVIL PROCEDURE (PLEADING REQUIREMENTS FOR A LAUNDRY LIST OF FRAUD-RELATED CAUSES OF ACTION SUCCINCTLY ILLUSTRATED)/FRAUD PLEADING REQUIREMENTS FOR A LAUNDRY LIST OF FRAUD-RELATED CAUSES OF ACTION SUCCINCTLY ILLUSTRATED)

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ELEMENTS OF AIDING AND ABETTING FRAUD EXPLAINED, WHEN FRAUD IN THE INDUCEMENT CAN INVALIDATE AN ARBITRATION CLAUSE EXPLAINED (NOT THE CASE HERE).

The Second Department, finding that a cause of action for aiding and abetting breach of contract does not exist, explained the elements of aiding and abetting fraud. The court further found that the arbitration clause was not invalidated by the allegations of fraud in the inducement:

There is no cause of action for aiding and abetting a breach of contract … . To recover for aiding and abetting fraud, the plaintiff must plead “the existence of an underlying fraud, knowledge of the fraud by the aider and abettor, and substantial assistance by the aider and abettor in the achievement of the fraud” … . “Substantial assistance” requires an affirmative act on the defendant’s part … . “[T]he mere inaction of an alleged aider or abettor constitutes substantial assistance only if the defendant owes a fiduciary duty directly to the plaintiff” … . * * *

The plaintiffs contend that the arbitration agreement is invalid because it was fraudulently induced. However, a broad arbitration provision is separable from the substantive provisions of a contract such that the agreement to arbitrate is valid even if the substantive provisions of the contract were induced by fraud … . “The issue of fraud in the inducement affects the validity of the arbitration clause only when the fraud relates to the arbitration provision itself, or was part of a grand scheme that permeated the entire contract'” … . “To demonstrate that fraud permeated the entire contract, it must be established that the agreement was not the result of an arm’s length negotiation, or the arbitration clause was inserted into the contract to accomplish a fraudulent scheme” … . Markowits v Friedman, 2016 NY Slip Op 07932, 2nd Dept 11-23-16

 

FRAUD (ELEMENTS OF AIDING AND ABETTING FRAUD EXPLAINED, WHEN FRAUD IN THE INDUCEMENT CAN INVALIDATE AN ARBITRATION CLAUSE EXPLAINED)/CONTRACT LAW (ELEMENTS OF AIDING AND ABETTING FRAUD EXPLAINED, WHEN FRAUD IN THE INDUCEMENT CAN INVALIDATE AN ARBITRATION CLAUSE EXPLAINED)/ARBITRATION (WHEN FRAUD IN THE INDUCEMENT CAN INVALIDATE AN ARBITRATION CLAUSE EXPLAINED)

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COMPLAINT STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST BROKER INDIVIDUALLY FOR NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION AND FOR BREACH OF A FIDUCIARY DUTY AGAINST THE BROKER’S CORPORATION.

The Second Department, reversing (modifying), Supreme Court determined the complaint stated a cause of against for negligent misrepresentation against an insurance broker (Weiss) individually and for breach of fiduciary duty against the broker’s corporation (JDW). It was alleged that the defendants failed to add plaintiff’s landlord as an additional insured and the broker signed a certificate which falsely indicated the landlord had been added to the policy:

Here, the Supreme Court erred in determining, upon reargument, that the complaint failed to state a cause of action sounding in negligent misrepresentation against Weiss individually. … [W]e note that the complaint, as amplified by the evidentiary materials submitted by the plaintiffs, alleged that Weiss personally signed a certificate of insurance falsely stating that the plaintiffs’ landlord had been added as an additional insured on a certain commercial general liability insurance policy, and forwarded this certificate to the plaintiffs, knowing that it was required by the plaintiffs’ landlord. This is sufficient, for purposes of CPLR 3211(a)(7), to state a cause of action against Weiss, based on his personal participation in the commission of a tort … . * * *

The common-law rule is that “an insurance broker acting as an agent of its customer has a duty of reasonable care to the customer to obtain [specifically] requested coverage within a reasonable time after the request, or to inform the customer of the agent’s inability to do so, [but] the agent owes no continuing duty to advise, guide or direct the customer insured to obtain additional coverage” … . However “[w]here a special relationship develops between the broker and client, . . . [the] broker may be liable, even in the absence of a specific request, for failing to advise or direct the client to obtain additional coverage” … . The Court of Appeals has identified three “exceptional situations” which may give rise to such a special relationship: ” (1) the agent receives compensation for consultation apart from payment of the premiums; (2) there was some interaction regarding a question of coverage, with the insured relying on the expertise of the agent; or (3) there is a course of dealing over an extended period of time which would have put objectively reasonable insurance agents on notice that their advice was being sought and specially relied on'” … .

Here, contrary to the defendants’ contention, the complaint sufficiently alleged that there was a course of dealing between JDW and the plaintiffs over an extended period of time, which may have given rise to a special relationship between them … . JT Queens Carwash, Inc. v JDW & Assoc., Inc., 2016 NY Slip Op 07295, 2nd Dept 11-9-16

 

INSURANCE LAW (COMPLAINT STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST BROKER INDIVIDUALLY FOR NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION AND FOR BREACH OF A FIDUCIARY DUTY AGAINST THE BROKER’S CORPORATION)/CORPORATION LAW (INSURANCE LAW, COMPLAINT STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST BROKER INDIVIDUALLY FOR NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION AND FOR BREACH OF A FIDUCIARY DUTY AGAINST THE BROKER’S CORPORATION)/NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION (INSURANCE LAW, COMPLAINT STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST BROKER INDIVIDUALLY FOR NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION AND FOR BREACH OF A FIDUCIARY DUTY AGAINST THE BROKER’S CORPORATION)/FIDUCIARY DUTY (INSURANCE LAW, COMPLAINT STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST BROKER INDIVIDUALLY FOR NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION AND FOR BREACH OF A FIDUCIARY DUTY AGAINST THE BROKER’S CORPORATION)

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COOPERATIVE BOARD’S PARKING RESTRICTION WAS A PROPER EXERCISE OF THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE.

The Second Department determined the cooperative board’s parking restriction was a proper exercise of the business judgment rule (and did not constitute a breach of fiduciary duty):

“In the context of cooperative dwellings, the business judgment rule provides that a court should defer to a cooperative board’s determination [s]o long as the board acts for the purposes of the cooperative, within the scope of its authority and in good faith'”… . “[D]ecision making tainted by discriminatory considerations is not protected by the business judgment rule'” … .

Here, the defendants demonstrated their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the complaint by establishing that the decision to enforce parking rules and prohibit parking in the grass area behind one of the cooperative buildings was protected by the business judgment rule … . In particular, the defendants demonstrated that they were acting in the best interests of the cooperative after making a number of capital improvements that added to the aesthetics and value of the property. Beach Point Partners v Beachcomber, Ltd., 2016 NY Slip Op 07284, 2nd Dept 11-9-16

COOPERATIVES (COOPERATIVE BOARD’S PARKING RESTRICTION WAS A PROPER EXERCISE OF THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE)/BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE (COOPERATIVES, COOPERATIVE BOARD’S PARKING RESTRICTION WAS A PROPER EXERCISE OF THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE)

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JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT, ALTHOUGH UNSIGNED, WAS VALID BECAUSE IT WAS CAPABLE OF BEING PERFORMED IN ONE YEAR; CAUSE OF ACTION FOR BREACH ACCRUED IN 2013 WHEN PAYMENT REQUIRED BY THE 2001 AGREEMENT WAS NOT MADE.

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Saxe, determined defendants’ motion to dismiss breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty causes of action as untimely was properly denied. The facts, which concern the sale of interests in a Russian oil company, are too complex to summarize here. The court held that the complaint alleged a breach of a 2001 joint venture investment agreement based upon an alleged failure to pay plaintiff a portion of sale proceeds in 2013, making the 2014 lawsuit timely:

 

… [T]he motion court denied defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s causes of action for breach of their joint venture agreement and the 2001 Agreement, and for breach of defendants’ fiduciary duty. It held that although there was no written investment agreement signed by both defendants … plaintiff sufficiently pleaded the existence of a valid oral agreement by alleging that the parties agreed to the central terms of the unsigned investment agreement. It further held that the oral agreement was not void under the statute of frauds because it was capable of being performed within one year, and because the statute of frauds is generally inapplicable to joint ventures. It also rejected defendants’ argument that plaintiff’s breach of contract and breach of joint venture claims were time barred, reasoning that the claimed breach of the 2001 Agreement was defendants’ failure to pay plaintiff his percentage share of the 2013 … sale proceeds. * * *

This action was commenced within both limitations periods, because defendants “had a recurring obligation to pay plaintiff his . . . share of the profits generated by” the joint venture. … . A new claim accrued when the obligation to do so was allegedly breached in 2013. Lebedev v Blavatnik, 2016 NY Slip Op 06463, 1st Dept 10-4-16

 

CIVIL PROCEDURE (JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT, ALTHOUGH UNSIGNED, WAS VALID BECAUSE IT WAS CAPABLE OF BEING PERFORMED IN ONE YEAR; CAUSE OF ACTION FOR BREACH ACCRUED IN 2013 WHEN PAYMENT REQUIRED BY THE 2001 AGREEMENT WAS NOT MADE)/CONTRACT LAW (JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT, ALTHOUGH UNSIGNED, WAS VALID BECAUSE IT WAS CAPABLE OF BEING PERFORMED IN ONE YEAR; CAUSE OF ACTION FOR BREACH ACCRUED IN 2013 WHEN PAYMENT REQUIRED BY THE 2001 AGREEMENT WAS NOT MADE)/CORPORATION LAW (JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT, ALTHOUGH UNSIGNED, WAS VALID BECAUSE IT WAS CAPABLE OF BEING PERFORMED IN ONE YEAR; CAUSE OF ACTION FOR BREACH ACCRUED IN 2013 WHEN PAYMENT REQUIRED BY THE 2001 AGREEMENT WAS NOT MADE)/JOINT VENTURES (JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT, ALTHOUGH UNSIGNED, WAS VALID BECAUSE IT WAS CAPABLE OF BEING PERFORMED IN ONE YEAR; CAUSE OF ACTION FOR BREACH ACCRUED IN 2013 WHEN PAYMENT REQUIRED BY THE 2001 AGREEMENT WAS NOT MADE)/STATUTE OF FRAUDS (JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT, ALTHOUGH UNSIGNED, WAS VALID BECAUSE IT WAS CAPABLE OF BEING PERFORMED IN ONE YEAR; CAUSE OF ACTION FOR BREACH ACCRUED IN 2013 WHEN PAYMENT REQUIRED BY THE 2001 AGREEMENT WAS NOT MADE)

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SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY GRANTED IN ACTIONS AGAINST EXECUTOR FOR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY AND NEGLIGENCE.

The Second Department determined summary judgment was properly granted in the objectants’ actions against the executor (Mahler) for breach of fiduciary duty and negligence.  The executor sold the estate asset (real property) to an acquaintance for half of its value. The acquaintance sold the property for nearly double the purchase price:

A fiduciary acting on behalf of an estate is required to employ such diligence and prudence to the care and management of the estate assets and affairs as would prudent persons of discretion and intelligence in their own like affairs … . “[A] fiduciary owes a duty of undivided and undiluted loyalty to those whose interests the fiduciary is to protect” … . In performing his fiduciary duty as the executor of the decedent’s estate, Mahler was required to use good business judgment … . To the extent that the sale of the property does not meet this standard, the beneficiaries of the estate may seek to surcharge him … . “To obtain such a surcharge, it is not enough for the contestants to show that the representatives of the estate did not get the highest price obtainable; it must be shown that they acted negligently, and with an absence of diligence and prudence which an ordinary [person] would exercise in his [or her] own affairs” … . Matter of Billmyer, 2016 NY Slip Op 05994, 2nd Dept 9-14-16

TRUSTS AND ESTATES (SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY GRANTED IN ACTIONS AGAINST EXECUTOR FOR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY AND NEGLIGENCE)/FIDUCIARY DUTY, BREACH OF (SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY GRANTED IN ACTIONS AGAINST EXECUTOR FOR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY AND NEGLIGENCE)/EXECUTORS (SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY GRANTED IN ACTIONS AGAINST EXECUTOR FOR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY AND NEGLIGENCE)

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COMPLAINT STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR AIDING AND ABETTING BREACH OF A FIDUCIARY DUTY.

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff stated a cause of action for aiding and abetting the breach of a fiduciary duty. Plaintiff’s former partner left the partnership and joined defendant accounting firm, taking a client with him. Partners owe one another a fiduciary duty. The complaint alleged the defendant firm aided and abetted the former partner in breaching that duty. The court outlined the relevant law:

To recover damages for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty, a plaintiff must plead and prove that a fiduciary duty owed to the plaintiff was breached, that the defendant knowingly induced or participated in the breach, and that the plaintiff was damaged as a result of the breach … . Knowing participation in a breach of fiduciary duty occurs when the defendant provides substantial assistance to the primary violator … . ” Substantial assistance occurs when a defendant affirmatively assists, helps conceal or fails to act when required to do so, thereby enabling the breach to occur . . . . However, the mere inaction of an alleged aider or abettor constitutes substantial assistance only if the defendant owes a fiduciary duty directly to the plaintiff'” … . Smallberg v Raich Ende Malter & Co., LLP, 2016 NY Slip Op 04704, 2nd Dept 6-15-16

 

PARTNERSHIP LAW (COMPLAINT STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR AIDING AND ABETTING BREACH OF A FIDUCIARY DUTY)/FIDUCIARY DUTY (PARTNERSHIP LAW, COMPLAINT STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR AIDING AND ABETTING BREACH OF A FIDUCIARY DUTY)

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