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BUT FOR TEST FOR LEGAL MALPRACTICE IS NOT THE SAME AS SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE, IT IS ENOUGH THAT AN ATTORNEY’S ACTIONS CONSTITUTE A PROXIMATE CAUSE.

The Third Department, in a lawsuit alleging breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty and fraud (among other causes of action) stemming from the underfunding of a Workers’ Compensation benefits trust fund, determined the complaint stated a cause of action for legal malpractice. The lawyer, Gosdeck, argued that the complaint failed to allege his actions were the sole proximate cause of the injury. The Third Department reasoned that the “but for” test for legal malpractice was not the same as “sole proximate cause:”

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… [W]e reject Gosdeck’s argument that plaintiff was required to allege that he was the sole proximate cause of alleged damages. Rather, “[i]n an action to recover damages for legal malpractice, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the attorney failed to exercise the ordinary reasonable skill and knowledge commonly possessed by a member of the legal profession and that the attorney’s breach of this duty proximately caused [the] plaintiff to sustain actual and ascertainable damages”… . “An attorney’s conduct or inaction is the proximate cause of a plaintiff’s damages if but for the attorney’s negligence the plaintiff . . . would not have sustained actual and ascertainable damages”… . We agree with Supreme Court that, on this motion to dismiss a claim of legal malpractice that is based on negligent legal advice given over a period of time, the “but for” standard is not synonymous with sole proximate cause and that plaintiff’s burden is to prove that Gosdeck’s negligence was a proximate cause of damages … . New York State Workers’ Compensation Bd. v Program Risk Mgt., Inc., 2017 NY Slip Op 04184, 3rd Dept 5-25-17

ATTORNEYS (LEGAL MALPRACTICE, BUT FOR TEST FOR LEGAL MALPRACTICE IS NOT THE SAME AS SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE, IT IS ENOUGH THAT AN ATTORNEY’S ACTIONS CONSTITUTE A PROXIMATE CAUSE)/LEGAL MALPRACTICE (BUT FOR TEST FOR LEGAL MALPRACTICE IS NOT THE SAME AS SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE, IT IS ENOUGH THAT AN ATTORNEY’S ACTIONS CONSTITUTE A PROXIMATE CAUSE)/WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW (LEGAL MALPRACTICE RE MANAGEMENT OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION TRUST, BUT FOR TEST FOR LEGAL MALPRACTICE IS NOT THE SAME AS SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE, IT IS ENOUGH THAT AN ATTORNEY’S ACTIONS CONSTITUTE A PROXIMATE CAUSE)/NEGLIGENCE (LEGAL MALPRACTICE, BUT FOR TEST FOR LEGAL MALPRACTICE IS NOT THE SAME AS SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE, IT IS ENOUGH THAT AN ATTORNEY’S ACTIONS CONSTITUTE A PROXIMATE CAUSE

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