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GRANDMOTHER ENTITLED TO HEARING ON HER PETITION FOR CUSTODY, HEARING SHOULD BE HELD IN DISPOSITIONAL PORTION OF PROCEEDINGS TO TERMINATE MOTHER’S PARENTAL RIGHTS.

The Second Department, in a case related to the two cases summarized immediately above, determined grandmother’s petition for custody should not have been dismissed without a hearing. Mother’s parental rights were terminated based upon mental illness and permanent neglect. The Second Department held that grandmother’s petition for custody should be part of the dispositional hearing in the mother’s parental rights proceedings:

A grandparent has standing to seek custody of a child pursuant to Family Court Act article 6 when the child is in foster care, and is generally entitled to a hearing … . While the grandmother was not entitled to an immediate hearing on her custody petition prior to the determination made at the conclusion of the fact-finding hearing in the termination proceedings against the mother … , the proper procedural course would have been for the Family Court to consider her custody petition in the context of a dispositional hearing in the underlying termination proceedings, wherein the court would determine the best interests of the child … . The grandmother did not testify at the fact-finding hearing or any of the permanency hearings held in relation to the termination proceedings against the mother, and was therefore never afforded the right to be heard on the issues … . Accordingly, the Family Court erred in failing to resolve the custody petition before freeing the child for adoption … . Matter of Weiss v Weiss, 2016 NY Slip Op 05717, 2nd Dept 8-3-16

FAMILY LAW (GRANDMOTHER ENTITLED TO HEARING ON HER PETITION FOR CUSTODY, HEARING SHOULD BE HELD IN DISPOSITIONAL PORTION OF PROCEEDINGS TO TERMINATE MOTHER’S PARENTAL RIGHTS)/CUSTODY (GRANDMOTHER ENTITLED TO HEARING ON HER PETITION FOR CUSTODY, HEARING SHOULD BE HELD IN DISPOSITIONAL PORTION OF PROCEEDINGS TO TERMINATE MOTHER’S PARENTAL RIGHTS)/GRANDPARENTS (FAMILY LAW, GRANDMOTHER ENTITLED TO HEARING ON HER PETITION FOR CUSTODY, HEARING SHOULD BE HELD IN DISPOSITIONAL PORTION OF PROCEEDINGS TO TERMINATE MOTHER’S PARENTAL RIGHTS)

GRANDMOTHER ENTITLED TO HEARING ON WHETHER SHE HAS STANDING TO PETITION FOR VISITATION.

The Second Department, in a case related to the cases summarized immediately above and below, determined Family Court should not have dismissed grandmother’s petition for visitation on standing grounds without first conducting a hearing:

Where a grandparent seeks visitation pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 72(1), the court must undertake a two-part inquiry … . First, the court must determine whether the grandparent has standing to petition for visitation based on the death of a parent or equitable circumstances … . Where the court concludes that the grandparent has established standing, the court must then determine whether visitation with the grandparent is in the best interests of the child … . In determining whether equitable circumstances confer standing, the court must examine all relevant facts … . “[A]n essential part of the inquiry is the nature and extent of the grandparent-grandchild relationship,” including whether the grandparent has a meaningful relationship with the child … .

Here, the grandmother’s petition alleged the existence of a sufficient relationship with the child to confer standing upon her to seek visitation … . Further, the information before the Family Court was insufficient to enable it to undertake a comprehensive independent review of the standing issue, without a hearing … . Matter of Weiss v Orange County Dept. of Social Servs., 2016 NY Slip Op 05716, 2nd Dept 8-3-16

 

FAMILY LAW (GRANDMOTHER ENTITLED TO HEARING ON WHETHER SHE HAS STANDING TO PETITION FOR VISITATION)/VISITATION (GRANDMOTHER ENTITLED TO HEARING ON WHETHER SHE HAS STANDING TO PETITION FOR VISITATION)/GRANDPARENTS (FAMILY LAW, GRANDMOTHER ENTITLED TO HEARING ON WHETHER SHE HAS STANDING TO PETITION FOR VISITATION)

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MOTHER, WHO DEFAULTED, ENTITLED TO DISPOSITIONAL HEARING IN PROCEEDINGS TO TERMINATE HER PARENTAL RIGHTS BASED UPON MENTAL ILLNESS AND PERMANENT NEGLECT.

The Second Department determined mother’s motion to vacate the dispositional portions of the orders terminating her parental rights based upon mental illness and permanent neglect should have been granted. Mother defaulted, but moved to vacate both the fact-finding a dispositional aspects of the orders:

Family Court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying that branch of the mother’s motion which was to vacate the dispositional portions of the orders of fact-finding and disposition. Although, in the context of a proceeding pursuant to Social Services Law § 384-b to terminate parental rights based on mental illness, a separate dispositional hearing is not necessarily required in every case … , the circumstances of this case were not such that a separate dispositional hearing was unwarranted … . Furthermore, in the case of permanent neglect, the Family Court may not dispense with a dispositional hearing in the absence of the consent of the parties … . Consequently, the mother was entitled to vacatur of the dispositional portions of the orders of fact-finding and disposition in the interest of justice … . Matter of Isabella R.W. (Jessica W.), 2016 NY Slip Op 05715, 2nd Dept 8-3-16

FAMILY LAW (MOTHER, WHO DEFAULTED, ENTITLED TO DISPOSITIONAL HEARING IN PROCEEDINGS TO TERMINATE HER PARENTAL RIGHTS BASED UPON MENTAL ILLNESS AND PERMANENT NEGLECT)/PARENTAL RIGHTS, TERMINATION OF (MOTHER, WHO DEFAULTED, ENTITLED TO DISPOSITIONAL HEARING IN PROCEEDINGS TO TERMINATE HER PARENTAL RIGHTS BASED UPON MENTAL ILLNESS AND PERMANENT NEGLECT)/PERMANENT NEGLECT (MOTHER, WHO DEFAULTED, ENTITLED TO DISPOSITIONAL HEARING IN PROCEEDINGS TO TERMINATE HER PARENTAL RIGHTS BASED UPON MENTAL ILLNESS AND PERMANENT NEGLECT)

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CRITERIA FOR REVEIW OF A CUSTODY DETERMINATION CONCISELY EXPLAINED.

The Second Department, upholding Family Court’s custody determination, offered a concise description of the analytical criteria:

There is “no prima facie right to the custody of the child in either parent” … . The essential consideration in making an award of custody is the best interests of the children … , which are determined by a review of the totality of the circumstances … . In making a determination as to what custody arrangement is in the children’s best interests, the court should consider the quality of the home environment and the parental guidance the custodial parent provides for the children, the ability of each parent to provide for the children’s emotional and intellectual development, the financial status and ability of each parent to provide for the children, the relative fitness of the respective parents, and the effect an award of custody to one parent might have on the children’s relationship with the other parent … . The court should also consider the children’s wishes, weighed in light of their ages and maturity … . “As a custody determination depends to a great extent upon an assessment of the character and credibility of the parties and witnesses, the findings of the Family Court will not be disturbed unless they lack a sound and substantial basis in the record” … . Matter of Schultheis v Schultheis, 2016 NY Slip Op 05648, 2nd Dept 7-27-16

FAMILY LAW (CRITERIA FOR REVIEW OF A CUSTODY DETERMINATION CONCISELY EXPLAINED)/CUSTODY (CRITERIA FOR RREVEIW OF A CUSTODY DETERMINATION CONCISELY EXPLAINED)/APPPEALS (FAMILY LAW, CRITERIA FOR REVIEW OF A CUSTODY DETERMINATION CONCISELY EXPLAINED)

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WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE REVIEW RESULTED IN REVERSAL IN THIS JUVENILE DELINQUENCY PROCEEDING, TESTIMONY OF POLICE OFFICERS REJECTED.

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined the finding that appellant, had he been an adult, would have committed criminal possession of a weapon (and related offenses) was against the weight of the evidence. The Second Department clearly explained its role in a weight of the evidence review and essentially rejected the testimony of the arresting officers:

 

In conducting our weight of the evidence review, we have a responsibility to affirmatively review the record; independently assess all of the proof; substitute our own credibility determinations for those made by the Family Court in an appropriate case; determine whether the Family Court’s determination was factually correct; and acquit the appellant if we are not convinced that the Family Court’s adjudication of the appellant as a juvenile delinquent was proven beyond a reasonable doubt … . * * *

The reasonable inferences to be made from the officers’ collective testimony were that at least two other individuals were with the appellant at the time of his arrest and, contrary to the initial testimony that the appellant was the only person observed in the area of the firearm, multiple individuals were in the vicinity of the firearm at the relevant time.

In addition, when the appellant was brought to the precinct, he denied possessing the firearm and asked Officer Thomas to check to see if there were cameras in the area of the incident. Officer Thomas testified that at the end of his shift on the date in question, he returned to the scene and viewed surveillance video from a store in the area. However, he did not take notes or ask for a copy of the video, and he “completely forgot to notify anybody” of his investigation or record it in his memo book. At the time of the fact-finding hearing, he could not recall whether the video he viewed depicted the street at the relevant time. Matter of Trevor S., 2016 NY Slip Op 05574, 2nd Dept 7-20-16

 

FAMILY LAW (JUVENILE DELINQUENCY, WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE REVIEW RESULTED IN REVERSAL IN THIS JUVENILE DELINQUENCY PROCEEDING, TESTIMONY OF POLICE OFFICERS REJECTED)/EVIDENCE (JUVENILE DELINQUENCY, WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE REVIEW RESULTED IN REVERSAL IN THIS JUVENILE DELINQUENCY PROCEEDING, TESTIMONY OF POLICE OFFICERS REJECTED)/CRIMINAL LAW (JUVENILE DELINQUENCY, WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE REVIEW RESULTED IN REVERSAL IN THIS JUVENILE DELINQUENCY PROCEEDING, TESTIMONY OF POLICE OFFICERS REJECTED)/APPEALS (JUVENILE DELINQUENCY, WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE REVIEW RESULTED IN REVERSAL IN THIS JUVENILE DELINQUENCY PROCEEDING, TESTIMONY OF POLICE OFFICERS REJECTED)/JUVENILE DELINQUENCY (WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE REVIEW RESULTED IN REVERSAL IN THIS JUVENILE DELINQUENCY PROCEEDING, TESTIMONY OF POLICE OFFICERS REJECTED)

FAMILY COURT DID NOT HAVE THE POWER TO ORDER THE FINGERPRINTING OF PETITIONER IN A GUARDIANSHIP PROCEEDING.

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined the guardianship petition should not have been denied solely because the petitioner did not comply with the order requiring the fingerprinting of petitioner as part of a criminal background check. Family Court did not have the authority to require fingerprinting:

Contrary to the Family Court’s determination, there is no express statutory fingerprinting requirement in a proceeding such as this pursuant to Family Court Act § 661(a) for “[g]uardianship of the person of a minor or infant” … . Consequently, it was improper for the Family Court to dismiss the petition based solely on the petitioner’s failure to comply with a directive to obtain fingerprinting… . Matter of Silvia N. P. L. v Jorge M. N. P., 2016 NY Slip Op 05567, 2nd Dept 7-20-16

 

FAMILY LAW (FAMILY COURT DID NOT HAVE THE POWER TO ORDER THE FINGERPRINTING OF PETITIONER IN A GUARDIANSHIP PROCEEDING)/GUARDIANSHIP (FAMILY LAW, FAMILY COURT DID NOT HAVE THE POWER TO ORDER THE FINGERPRINTING OF PETITIONER IN A GUARDIANSHIP PROCEEDING)/FINGERPRINTING (FAMILY LAW, FAMILY COURT DID NOT HAVE THE POWER TO ORDER THE FINGERPRINTING OF PETITIONER IN A GUARDIANSHIP PROCEEDING)

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HEARSAY EVIDENCE OF CHILD’S STATEMENT NOT CORROBORATED, CUSTODY MODIFICATION PETITION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED.

The Third Department reversed Family Court, finding that the hearsay evidence of the child’s statement father had touched her were not corroborated and therefore could not form the basis of a modification of custody:

Evidence of the abuse came in the form of the child’s out-of-court statements and, inasmuch as “the evidentiary standards established in Family Ct Act article 10” were applicable under these circumstances, the question became whether her statements were “sufficiently corroborated” so as to be admissible … . The mother testified that the child stated that the father had touched her, then acted out an incident of sexual abuse. The child also told her therapist that the father had touched her, but the therapist testified that the child declined to give details about the incident and did not opine that the child’s behavior was indicative of sexual assault or that there was reason to believe that her statements were truthful. The therapist expressly declined to offer such an opinion in her testimony, in fact, making clear that she would not say whether the child’s claims were “true or untrue.” The child herself did not testify, and Family Court rejected the belated requests of counsel for the father and the child for a Lincoln hearing.

The corroboration requirement is not demanding and may be “satisfied by any other evidence tending to support the reliability of the [child’s] previous statements” … , but mere “repetition of an accusation” will not suffice … . The proof here did not rise above repetition to include additional evidence such as expert testimony that the child’s behavior or her statements were consistent with abuse, physical evidence of abuse, or the sworn testimony or in camera statements of the child herself … . Matter of Leighann W. v Thomas X., 2016 NY Slip Op 05522, 3rd Dept 7-14-16

 

FAMILY LAW (HEARSAY EVIDENCE OF CHILD’S STATEMENT NOT CORROBORATED, CUSTODY MODIFICATION PETITION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED)/EVIDENCE (FAMILY LAW, HEARSAY EVIDENCE OF CHILD’S STATEMENT NOT CORROBORATED, CUSTODY MODIFICATION PETITION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED)/HEARSAY (FAMILY LAW, HEARSAY EVIDENCE OF CHILD’S STATEMENT NOT CORROBORATED, CUSTODY MODIFICATION PETITION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED)/CUSTODY (HEARSAY EVIDENCE OF CHILD’S STATEMENT NOT CORROBORATED, CUSTODY MODIFICATION PETITION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED)/CORROBORATION (FAMILY LAW, (HEARSAY EVIDENCE OF CHILD’S STATEMENT NOT CORROBORATED, CUSTODY MODIFICATION PETITION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED)

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WHEN CHILD TURNED 21 WHILE GUARDIANSHIP AND SPECIAL IMMIGRANT JUVENILE STATUS PROCEEDINGS WERE PENDING, FAMILY COURT LOST JURISDICTION.

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Sgroi, determined Family Court no longer had jurisdiction over a petition seeking guardianship and special findings to seek special immigrant juvenile status (SIJS) because the child turned 21 during the pendency of the proceedings:

… [O]nce the subject child turned 21 years old, the Family Court no longer possessed authority to determine the guardianship petition. Furthermore, since dependency upon a juvenile court is a prerequisite for the issuance of an order making the declaration and specific findings to enable a child to petition for SIJS, the Family Court also properly denied the petitioner’s SIJS motion. Matter of Maria C.R. v Rafael G., 2016 NY Slip Op 05503, 7-13-16

FAMILY LAW (WHEN CHILD TURNED 21 WHILE GUARDIANSHIP AND SPECIAL IMMIGRANT JUVENILE STATUS PROCEEDINGS WERE PENDING, FAMILY COURT LOST JURISDICTION)/IMMIGRATION LAW (FAMILIY LAW, WHEN CHILD TURNED 21 WHILE GUARDIANSHIP AND SPECIAL IMMIGRANT JUVENILE STATUS PROCEEDINGS WERE PENDING, FAMILY COURT LOST JURISDICTION)/SPECIAL IMMIGRANT JUVENILE STATUS (WHEN CHILD TURNED 21 WHILE GUARDIANSHIP AND SPECIAL IMMIGRANT JUVENILE STATUS PROCEEDINGS WERE PENDING, FAMILY COURT LOST JURISDICTION)

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SUPPORT MAGISTRATE SHOULD NOT HAVE CONSIDERED MOTHER’S POST-HEARING SUBMISSION OF AFFIDAVITS AND EXHIBITS, FATHER DEPRIVED OF ABILITY TO CROSS-EXAMINE AND OBJECT TO EXHIBITS.

The Second Department determined father was entitled to a hearing on mother’s petition to enforce college expense provisions of a stipulation of settlement. The support magistrate considered affidavits and exhibits submitted after the hearing by mother, depriving father of his right to cross-examine and object:

Family Court Act § 433(a) requires that a respondent “shall be given opportunity to be heard and to present witnesses.” A hearing must consist of an adducement of proof coupled with an opportunity to rebut it … . Here, the Support Magistrate erred in considering the mother’s affidavits and unverified financial information, rather than testimony supported by appropriate documentary evidence, in determining the mother’s petition … . As the father was deprived of the opportunity to rebut the mother’s affidavits and exhibits, the matter must be remitted to the Family Court … for a new hearing and determination on the mother’s petition … . Matter of Hezi v Hezi, 2016 NY Slip Op 05498, 2nd Dept 7-13-16

 

FAMILY LAW (SUPPORT MAGISTRATE SHOULD NOT HAVE CONSIDERED MOTHER’S POST-HEARING SUBMISSION OF AFFIDAVITS AND EXHIBITS, FATHER DEPRIVED OF ABILITY TO CROSS-EXAMINE AND OBJECT TO EXHIBITS)/EVIDENCE (FAMILY COURT, SUPPORT MAGISTRATE SHOULD NOT HAVE CONSIDERED MOTHER’S POST-HEARING SUBMISSION OF AFFIDAVITS AND EXHIBITS, FATHER DEPRIVED OF ABILITY TO CROSS-EXAMINE AND OBJECT TO EXHIBITS)

HEARING SHOULD HAVE BEEN HELD TO DETERMINE WHETHER INTIMATE RELATIONSHIP PROVIDED FAMILY COURT WITH JURISDICTION OVER PETITION SEEKING ORDER OF PROTECTION.

The Second Department determined Family Court should have held a hearing to determine whether the court had jurisdiction over a petition for an order of protection based upon an “intimate relationship” between the subject of the proposed order of protection and the petitioner:

Although the statute expressly excludes a “casual acquaintance” and “ordinary fraternization between two individuals in business or social contexts” from the definition of “intimate relationship” (Family Ct Act § 812[1][e]), “the legislature left it to the courts to determine on a case-by-case basis what qualifies as an intimate relationship within the meaning of Family Court Act § 812(1)(e), based upon consideration of factors such as the nature or type of relationship, regardless of whether the relationship is sexual in nature; the frequency of interaction between the persons; and the duration of the relationship'” … . “[T]he determination as to whether persons are or have been in an intimate relationship’ within the meaning of Family Court Act § 812(1)(e) is a fact-specific determination which may require a hearing” … .

Here, in light of the parties’ conflicting allegations as to whether they had an “intimate relationship” within the meaning of Family Court Act § 812(1)(e), the Family Court, prior to determining the respondent’s motion, in effect, to dismiss, should have conducted a hearing on that issue … . Matter of Singh v DiFrancisco, 2016 NY Slip Op 05504, 2nd Dept 7-13-16

FAMILY LAW (HEARING SHOULD HAVE BEEN HELD TO DETERMINE WHETHER INTIMATE RELATIONSHIP PROVIDED FAMILY COURT WITH JURISDICTION OVER PETITION SEEKING ORDER OF PROTECTION)/INTIMATE RELATIONSHIP (FAMILY LAW, HEARING SHOULD HAVE BEEN HELD TO DETERMINE WHETHER INTIMATE RELATIONSHIP PROVIDED FAMILY COURT WITH JURISDICTION OVER PETITION SEEKING ORDER OF PROTECTION)

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