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NON-RELATIVE ALLEGED EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES REQUIRING A HEARING ON HER CUSTODY PETITION.

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined petitioner, a non-relative who regularly cared for the child, had made a showing of extraordinary circumstance sufficient to require a hearing on her petitioner for custody:

Although an individual who is unrelated to a child has no statutory right to seek custody … , a nonrelative may nevertheless be afforded standing to seek custody upon a showing of extraordinary factual circumstances … . We conclude that, contrary to the determination of the Family Court, the evidence presented at the hearing compels a finding of “extraordinary circumstances” … . The petitioner sustained her burden of demonstrating extraordinary circumstances based upon, inter alia, the prolonged separation of the grandfather and the step-grandmother from the subject child, their lack of significant involvement in the child’s life for a period of time, their failure to contribute to the child’s financial support, and the strong emotional bond between the child and the petitioner … . Matter of Cade v Roberts, 2016 NY Slip Op 05495, 2nd Dept 7-13-16

FAMILY LAW (NON-RELATIVE ALLEGED EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES REQUIRING A HEARING ON HER CUSTODY PETITION)/CUSTODY (NON-RELATIVE ALLEGED EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES REQUIRING A HEARING ON HER CUSTODY PETITION)

CHILDREN DID NOT RECEIVE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN NEGLECT PROCEEDINGS.

The Fourth Department, reversing Family Court, determined the children in the neglect proceeding did not receive effective assistance of counsel from the attorney for the child (AFC). The AFC took positions contrary to the wishes of two of the children (Brian and Alyssa):

The Rules of the Chief Judge provide that an AFC “must zealously advocate the child’s position” (22 NYCRR 7.2 [d]), even if the AFC “believes that what the child wants is not in the child’s best interests” … . There are two exceptions to this rule: (1) where the AFC is convinced that the “child lacks the capacity for knowing, voluntary and considered judgment”; or (2) where the AFC is convinced that “following the child’s wishes is likely to result in a substantial risk of imminent, serious harm to the child” … . Here, there is no dispute that the trial AFC took a position contrary to the position of two of the subject children … . * * *

Inasmuch as the trial AFC failed to advocate Brian and Alyssa’s position at the fact-finding hearing, he was required to determine that one of the two exceptions to the Rules of the Chief Judge applied, as well as “[to] inform the court of the child[ren]’s articulated wishes” … . Here, the trial AFC did not fulfill either obligation … . Indeed, the record establishes that neither of the two exceptions applied. Matter of Brian S. (Scott S.), 2016 NY Slip Op 05464, 4th Dept 7-8-16

 

FAMILY LAW (CHILDREN DID NOT RECEIVE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN NEGLECT PROCEEDINGS)/ATTORNEYS (FAMILY LAW, CHILDREN DID NOT RECEIVE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN NEGLECT PROCEEDINGS)/NEGLECT (CHILDREN DID NOT RECEIVE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN NEGLECT PROCEEDINGS)/EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL (FAMMILY LAW, CHILDREN DID NOT RECEIVE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN NEGLECT PROCEEDINGS)

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MOTHER’S PRO SE PETITION FOR CUSTODY MODIFICATION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED SUA SPONTE BY FAMILY COURT WITHOUT A HEARING.

The Third Department determined Family Court should not have, sua sponte, dismissed mother’s pro se petition for custody modification without a hearing:

“‘In any modification proceeding, the threshold issue is whether there has been a change in circumstances since the prior custody order significant enough to warrant a review of the issue of custody to ensure the continued best interests of the child[]'” … . While an evidentiary hearing is not required in every case, a hearing is generally “necessary and should be conducted unless the party seeking the modification fails to make a sufficient evidentiary showing to warrant a hearing or no hearing is requested and the court has sufficient information to undertake a comprehensive independent review of the child[]’s best interests” … . In determining whether a pro se petitioner made a sufficient evidentiary showing to warrant a hearing, we construe the pleadings liberally and afford the petitioner the benefit of every favorable inference … .

In her pro se petition, the mother alleged that she had moved into an apartment with the child’s maternal grandmother, had enrolled as a full-time student and was attending “[a]lcohol counseling.” Inasmuch as the mother’s alcohol abuse was a primary factor in Family Court’s January 2015 custody determination, the mother’s factual allegations of improvement, construed liberally and if established after a hearing, could afford a basis for awarding the mother increased parenting time, unsupervised parenting time and/or access to the child’s medical and educational records. Accordingly, we find that Family Court erred in dismissing the mother’s petition without a hearing … . Matter of Miller v Bush, 2016 NY Slip Op 05413, 3rd Dept 7-7-16

 

FAMILY LAW (MOTHER’S PRO SE PETITION FOR CUSTODY MODIFICATION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED SUA SPONTE BY FAMILY COURT WITHOUT A HEARING)/CUSTODY (MOTHER’S PRO SE PETITION FOR CUSTODY MODIFICATION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED SUA SPONTE BY FAMILY COURT WITHOUT A HEARING)/MODIFICATION OF CUSTODY (MOTHER’S PRO SE PETITION FOR CUSTODY MODIFICATION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED SUA SPONTE BY FAMILY COURT WITHOUT A HEARING)

SEVERE ABUSE PETITION AGAINST MOTHER SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED.

The Third Department determined the severe abuse petition against mother (respondent) should not have been dismissed by Family Court. The abuse was apparently inflicted by mother’s boyfriend in her absence and resulted in the child’s death:

Respondent demonstrated reckless judgment and disregard for the safety and well-being of the older child by allowing the boyfriend — who she had dated for only a very brief period of time and knew went out at night to procure illegal drugs — to care for her children and, significantly, by permitting him to continue to care for her children and inflict further abuse after the older child had sustained serious and an abnormal degree of bruising, which she unreasonably attributed to accidental causes and the explanations provided by the boyfriend … . To that end, respondent was aware, or should have been aware, of the older child’s numerous injuries indicative of extensive, repeated and accumulating abuse.

Equally troubling is respondent’s failure to seek professional medical treatment for the older child notwithstanding her knowledge of numerous visible injuries. Matter of Mason F. (Katlin G.–Louis F.), 2016 NY Slip Op 05408, 3rd Dept 7-7-16

 

FAMILY LAW (SEVERE ABUSE PETITION AGAINST MOTHER SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED)/CHILD ABUSE (SEVERE ABUSE PETITION AGAINST MOTHER SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED)/SEVERE ABUSE (SEVERE ABUSE PETITION AGAINST MOTHER SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED)

FATHER’S MOTION TO DISMISS MOTHER’S PETITION FOR CUSTODY MODIFICATION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, FURTHER INQUIRY REQUIRED.

The Third Department determined mother presented sufficient evidence of a change in circumstances to survive father’s motion to dismiss her petition for a custody modification:

Viewed as a whole and accepted as true for this purpose, despite the existence of some apparent contrary evidence, the mother’s proof regarding physical discipline in the father’s household, together with the alleged improvement and stabilization of the mother’s living situation, constituted a change in circumstances sufficient to overcome a motion to dismiss … . The mother thus satisfied her initial burden, and a further and more complete inquiry as to whether a modification of custody is in the best interests of the children is warranted … . Accordingly, we find that Family Court erred in granting the father’s motion to dismiss on this ground.  Matter of Mary BB. v George CC., 2016 NY Slip Op 05406, 3rd Dept 7-7-16

FAMILY LAW (FATHER’S MOTION TO DISMISS MOTHER’S PETITION FOR CUSTODY MODIFICATION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, FURTHER INQUIRY REQUIRED)/CUSTODY (FATHER’S MOTION TO DISMISS MOTHER’S PETITION FOR CUSTODY MODIFICATION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, FURTHER INQUIRY REQUIRED)/MODIFICATION OF CUSTODY (FATHER’S MOTION TO DISMISS MOTHER’S PETITION FOR CUSTODY MODIFICATION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, FURTHER INQUIRY REQUIRED)

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FAMILY COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED A PETITION SEEKING AN ORDER FOR FINDINGS REQUIRED FOR SPECIAL IMMIGRANT RESIDENT STATUS.

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined the petition for an order making specific findings which would lead to special immigrant resident status (SIJS) should have been granted:

Pursuant to 8 USC § 1101(a)(27)(J) … and 8 CFR 204.11, a special immigrant is a resident alien who, inter alia, is under 21 years of age, unmarried, and dependent upon a juvenile court or legally committed to an individual appointed by a state or juvenile court. Additionally, for a juvenile to qualify for SIJS, a court must find that reunification of the juvenile with one or both of the juvenile’s parents is not possible due to parental abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis found under state law … , and that it would not be in the juvenile’s best interest to be returned to his or her previous country of nationality or country of last habitual residence … .

Based upon our independent factual review, the record establishes that the child’s father is deceased, and therefore, reunification of the child with the father is not possible … .

Further, the Family Court erred with respect to its recital of the best interest element. The law does not require a finding that “it is in [the child’s] best interest to remain in the United States,” but that “it would not be in the [child’s] best interest to be returned to [his or her] previous country of nationality or country of last habitual residence” (8 USC § 1101[a][27][J][ii]). Here, the record reflects that it would not be in the child’s best interest to be returned to El Salvador, her previous country of nationality and last habitual residence. Matter of Carlos A.M. v Maria T.M., 2016 NY Slip Op 05374, 2nd Dept 7-6-16

 

FAMILY LAW (FAMILY COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED A PETITION SEEKING AN ORDER FOR FINDINGS REQUIRED FOR SPECIAL IMMIGRANT RESIDENT STATUS)/IMMIGRATION LAW (FAMILY COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED A PETITION SEEKING AN ORDER FOR FINDINGS REQUIRED FOR SPECIAL IMMIGRANT RESIDENT STATUS)/SPECIAL IMMIGRANT RESIDENT STATUS (FAMILY COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED A PETITION SEEKING AN ORDER FOR FINDINGS REQUIRED FOR SPECIAL IMMIGRANT RESIDENT STATUS)

HUSBAND ENTITLED TO ONLY FIVE PERCENT OF WIFE’S ENHANCED EARNING CAPACITY FROM WIFE’S MASTER’S DEGREE OBTAINED DURING MARRIAGE.

The Second Department determined husband’s contribution to wife’s master’s degree was minimal. Therefore the award to the husband of 5% of the wife’s increased earning capacity was proper. The court explained the relevant law:

While the enhanced earnings of the defendant resulting from the Master’s degree and advanced certification she obtained during the marriage are marital property subject to equitable distribution … , ” it is . . . incumbent upon the nontitled party seeking a distributive share of such assets to demonstrate that [he or she] made a substantial contribution to the titled party’s acquisition of that marital asset [and], [w]here only modest contributions are made by the nontitled spouse toward the other spouse’s attainment of a degree or professional license, and the attainment is more directly the result of the titled spouse’s own ability, tenacity, perseverance and hard work, it is appropriate for courts to limit the distributed amount of that enhanced earning capacity'” … . Here, since the plaintiff’s contributions to the defendant’s acquisition of her degree and advanced certification were minimal, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in awarding him only five percent of the value of the defendant’s enhanced earning capacity … . Taylor v Taylor, 2016 NY Slip Op 04705, 2nd Dept 6-15-16

 

FAMILY LAW (HUSBAND ENTITLED TO ONLY FIVE PERCENT OF WIFE’S ENHANCED EARNING CAPACITY FROM WIFE’S MASTER’S DEGREE OBTAINED DURING MARRIAGE)/EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION (HUSBAND ENTITLED TO ONLY FIVE PERCENT OF WIFE’S ENHANCED EARNING CAPACITY FROM WIFE’S MASTER’S DEGREE OBTAINED DURING MARRIAGE)/ENHANCED EARNING CAPACITY (HUSBAND ENTITLED TO ONLY FIVE PERCENT OF WIFE’S ENHANCED EARNING CAPACITY FROM WIFE’S MASTER’S DEGREE OBTAINED DURING MARRIAGE)

MOTHER’S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS VIOLATED, MOTHER INSTRUCTED NOT TO CONSULT WITH ATTORNEY DURING RECESSES, WHICH WERE EXTENSIVE.

The Second Department, exercising its interest of justice jurisdiction, determined a new custody hearing was necessary because Family Court instructed mother not to speak to her attorney during recesses:

… [T]he mother’s hearing testimony spanned several court dates and took place over a period of months. At the end of four hearing dates, while the mother’s testimony was continuing, the Family Court instructed the mother not to discuss her testimony with her attorney during the recess. One of these recesses was overnight, two recesses were for approximately one week, and one recess was, because of adjournments, for more than three months. …

The Family Court violated the mother’s fundamental due process rights when it instructed her not to consult with her attorney during recesses, which resulted in her being unable to speak to her attorney over extended periods of time … . Matter of Turner v Valdespino, 2016 NY Slip Op 04724, 2nd Dept 6-15-16

 

FAMILY LAW (MOTHER’S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS VIOLATED, MOTHER INSTRUCTED NOT TO CONSULT WITH ATTORNEY DURING RECESSES, WHICH WERE EXTENSIVE)/ATTORNEYS (MOTHER’S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS VIOLATED, MOTHER INSTRUCTED BY FAMILY COURT NOT TO CONSULT WITH ATTORNEY DURING RECESSES, WHICH WERE EXTENSIVE)/DUE PROCESS  (MOTHER’S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS VIOLATED, MOTHER INSTRUCTED BY FAMILY COURT NOT TO CONSULT WITH ATTORNEY DURING RECESSES, WHICH WERE EXTENSIVE)

UNCLE SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO INTERVENE IN NEGLECT PROCEEDINGS.

The Third Department, reversing Family Court, determined uncle should have been allowed to intervene in neglect proceedings to seek custody of the children who had been removed from the home:

There is no question that the uncle is authorized to seek intervention under the statute; he is one of the enumerated relatives permitted to pursue such relief, and both respondent and the child's father (among others) consented to his appearance in the proceeding. Nor does Family Ct Act § 1035 (f) limit the right of intervention to only the fact-finding and dispositional hearings held on a pending Family Ct Act article 10 neglect petition. Quite the contrary, it broadly permits a qualified relative seeking temporary or permanent custody of the child to participate “in all phases of dispositional proceedings” (Family Ct Act § 1035 [f] [emphasis added]). Furthermore, a permanency hearing is plainly dispositional in nature. A dispositional hearing is defined as “a hearing to determine what order of disposition should be made” (Family Ct Act § 1045), and Family Ct Act § 1089 (d) provides that, “[a]t the conclusion of each permanency hearing, the court shall . . . determine and issue its findings, and enter an order of disposition in writing.” Family Court seemed to acknowledge all of this, but reasoned that intervention was not permitted because the dispositional phase of the proceeding terminated upon completion of the dispositional hearing concerning the article 10 petition and the issuance of an order pursuant to Family Ct Act § 1052 (a). This was error. Matter of Demetria FF. (Tracy GG.), 2016 NY Slip Op 04499, 3rd Dept 6-9-16

FAMILY LAW (UNCLE SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO INTERVENE IN NEGLECT PROCEEDINGS)/NEGLECT (UNCLE SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO INTERVENE IN NEGLECT PROCEEDINGS)/CUSTODY UNCLE SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO INTERVENE IN NEGLECT PROCEEDINGS)

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STANDARD FOR THE NEED FOR A HEARING TO DETERMINE CUSTODY CLARIFIED; HERE SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE RULED ON CUSTODY WITHOUT A HEARING.

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Garcia, reversing the Appellate Division, determined Supreme Court should not have awarded sole custody to father without a hearing. The “adequate relevant information” standard used by the Appellate Division was not the correct one:

… [W]e hold only that, on this record, the Appellate Division erred in holding that a hearing was not required based on an application of the “adequate relevant information” standard. In doing so, we reaffirm the long-established principle that, as a general matter, custody determinations should be rendered only after a full and plenary hearing. We decline, however, to fashion a “one size fits all” rule mandating a hearing in every custody case statewide. However, where, as here, facts material to the best interest analysis, and the circumstances surrounding such facts, remain in dispute, a custody hearing is required. Accordingly, a court opting to forego a plenary hearing must take care to clearly articulate which factors were — or were not — material to its determination, and the evidence supporting its decision. Under the circumstances of this case, a plenary hearing was necessary. S.L. v J.R., 2016 NY Slip Op 04442, CtApp 6-9-16

FAMILY LAW (STANDARD FOR THE NEED FOR A HEARING TO DETERMINE CUSTODY CLARIFIED; HERE SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE RULED ON CUSTODY WITHOUT A HEARING)/CUSTODY (STANDARD FOR THE NEED FOR A HEARING TO DETERMINE CUSTODY CLARIFIED; HERE SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE RULED ON CUSTODY WITHOUT A HEARING)/EVIDENCE (FAMILY LAW, STANDARD FOR THE NEED FOR A HEARING TO DETERMINE CUSTODY CLARIFIED; HERE SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE RULED ON CUSTODY WITHOUT A HEARING)

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