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HOSPITAL SECURITY PERSONNEL WENT TO PLAINTIFF’S APARTMENT AND ESCORTED HER TO DEFENDANT HOSPITAL (THE UNDERLYING CIRCUMSTANCES WERE NOT DESCRIBED); PLAINTIFF WON A “FALSE IMPRISONMENT” SUIT AND WAS AWARDED $3.5 MILLION; THE MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE VERDICT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED; PLAINTIFF’S SUBJECTIVE BELIEF SHE COULD NOT LEAVE THE APARTMENT OR THE VEHICLE TRANSPORTING HER TO THE HOSPITAL WAS INSUFFICIENT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, setting aside the $3.5 million verdict, determined the evidence did not support the “false imprisonment” theory of liability. Plaintiff was escorted from her apartment to defendant hospital by hospital security personnel (the underlying circumstances are not explained in the decision). Plaintiff alleged she was confined in her apartment and in the vehicle in which she was taken to the hospital:

“‘A motion pursuant to CPLR 4404(a) to set aside a jury verdict and for judgment as a matter of law will be granted where there is simply no valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences which could possibly lead rational [persons] to the conclusion reached by the jury on the basis of the evidence presented at trial'” … . “[T]he question of whether a verdict was utterly irrational, entitling a movant to a directed verdict, involves a pure question of law” … . “‘In considering such a motion, the facts must be considered in a light most favorable to the nonmovant'” … .

“To prevail on a cause of action to recover damages for false arrest or false imprisonment, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant intended to confine the plaintiff, that the plaintiff was conscious of the confinement, that the plaintiff did not consent to the confinement, and that the confinement was not privileged” … . * * *

The decedent’s subjective belief that she was confined in her apartment and that the security officers would not leave if asked is insufficient, without more, to establish an intent to confine … . Moreover, a threat to call the police does not constitute “detaining force necessary to establish the tort of false imprisonment” … . In addition, the fact that the decedent testified that the security officers parked their vehicle so as to block the decedent’s driveway is insufficient to establish confinement, absent other evidence that the decedent was incapable of departing by foot … .

… The decedent’s testimony as to her own subjective belief that, once she was in the vehicle, she felt that she “no longer had any rights and that [she] was in custody and . . . imagined what would happen if [she] tried to get out of the car,” is insufficient, without more, to establish an intent to confine … . Dender v North Shore Manhasset Hosp., 2025 NY Slip Op 07378, Second Dept 12-31-25

Practice Point: Consult this decision for an explanation of the criteria for setting aside a verdict awarding damages.

Practice Point: Consult this decision for insight into the proof required to support an allegation of “false imprisonment.”

 

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