You are here: / / PLAINTIFF WAS ELIGIBLE FOR RELEASE FROM JAIL PURSUANT TO CPL 180.80 BUT...
, , ,

PLAINTIFF WAS ELIGIBLE FOR RELEASE FROM JAIL PURSUANT TO CPL 180.80 BUT WAS KEPT INCARCERATED FOR AN ADDITIONAL 2 1/2 MONTHS; PLAINTIFF’S FALSE IMPRISONMENT AND NEGLIGENCE CAUSES OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Ford, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s causes of action for false imprisonment and negligence should not have been dismissed. Plaintiff sued the town because he was not released from custody pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law 180.80:

CPL 180.80 “requires the release of individuals being held in pretrial detention pending action of a Grand Jury after 120 or 144 hours of custody unless, among other neutralizing circumstances, an indictment has been voted” … . * * *

The allegation that the defendant detained the plaintiff for an additional 2½ months after it was required to release him pursuant to CPL 180.80 is a very serious one. This Court notes that the defendant does not deny this allegation outright, but instead attempts to shift blame to the plaintiff for what would, if true, be its own grievous error. McKay v Town of Southampton, 2023 NY Slip Op 04664, Second Dept 9-20-23

Practice Point: Here the plaintiff was not released from jail when he was eligible for release pursuant to CPL 180.80. His lawsuit against the town for false imprisonment and negligence should not have been dismissed.

 

You might also like
MOTHER, WHO OPPOSES VACCINATING THE CHILD, SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN AWARDED MEDICAL DECISION-MAKING AUTHORITY (SECOND DEPT).
USURY IS AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE WHICH IS WAIVED IF NOT RAISED, SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE SEVERED USURIOUS PROVISIONS OF LOAN AGREEMENTS WHERE DEFENDANT DEFAULTED (SECOND DEPT).
A VIDEO OF AN ALLEGED ASSAULT BY DEFENDANT’S EMPLOYEES WAS EITHER NEGLIGENTLY OR WILLFULLY LOST; SUPREME COURT PROPERLY RULED DEFENDANTS COULD NOT INTRODUCE ANY EVIDENCE WHICH CONTRADICTED AN AFFIDAVIT DESCRIBING WHAT THE VIDEO DEPICTED (SECOND DEPT).
ALTHOUGH THE CHILD-SUPPORT CONTEMPT PROCEEDING WAS IN SUPREME COURT, NOT FAMILY COURT, PLAINTIFF HAD A RIGHT TO COUNSEL UNDER THE JUDICIARY LAW; PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE BECAUSE NO MEDICAL EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED TO SUPPORT PLAINTIFF’S TESTIMONY HE WAS UNABLE TO WORK (SECOND DEPT).
MOTION TO VACATE A DEFAULT JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO CPLR 317 AND 5015 PROPERLY DENIED, CRITERIA EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT).
PRODUCTION OF THE ORIGINAL NOTE AND ENDORSEMENTS WAS “MATERIAL AND NECESSARY” TO THE DETERMINATION WHETHER THE BANK HAS STANDING TO BRING THE FORECLOSURE ACTION, DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 240 (1) AND 241 (6) CAUSES OF ACTION; DEFENDANTS WERE ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 200 CAUSE OF ACTION (SECOND DEPT).
BY ENTERING A PLEA AGREEMENT WITH A TESTIFYING CODEFENDANT THE TRIAL JUDGE ABANDONED THE ROLE OF A NEUTRAL ARBITER AND DEPRIVED DEFENDANT OF A FAIR TRIAL (SECOND DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

IN THIS STAIRWAY SLIP AND FALL CASE, PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO DISCOVERY OF... THE MAJORITY DETERMINED THE DEFENDANT DEVELOPED THE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE COMPLAINANT...