You are here: / Evidence
,

THE FACT THAT DEFENDANT WAS PARKED IN A HIGH CRIME AREA NEAR AN APARTMENT COMPLEX AND THE FILED “TRESPASS AFFIDAVIT” BY AN APARTMENT PROPERTY MANAGER, REQUESTING THAT ANYONE ON THE PROPERTY WHO WAS NOT A TENANT BE ARRESTED FOR TRESPASS, DID NOT PROVIDE THE POLICE WITH A “PARTICULARIZED” REASON FOR APPROACHING THE DEFENDANT TO REQUEST INFORMATION; THE COCAINE AND HANDGUN SEIZED UPON THE DEFENDANT’S ARREST SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED; THE INDICTMENT WAS DISMISSED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department. suppressing evidence seized upon defendant’s arrest and dismissing the indictment. over a two-justice dissent, determined that the police did not have particularized information which justified approaching defendant’s car which was parked near an apartment complex. There was a “trespass affidavit” by an apartment property manager on file with the police department which requested that any person who was not a tenant be arrested for trespass. The police approached defendant, who, it turned out, was a tenant. But based on an officer’s observation of a bag containing a tan substance inside the car, the officers ordered defendant out the car, searched the defendant’s person and car, and seized cocaine and a handgun:

… [T]he officer’s testimony that the apartment complex was in a high-crime area did not justify approaching defendant. The trespass affidavit failed to afford the officers any more particularized reason for approaching defendant. Therein, although the property manager for the apartment complex stated generally that there “was reason to believe that persons are congregating on the . . . property . . . [who] do not reside at said property,” there was no allegation in the trespass affidavit that the property was, for example, “plagued by illegal drug trade” or gang violence … . Indeed, the property manager did not specify any prior or ongoing incidents of criminal activity on the premises, but instead expressed a general belief that persons might be “congregating on the property,” which is a multi-building residential apartment complex, “without [the property manager’s] permission.” The property manager nonetheless also acknowledged in the trespass affidavit that non-residents were often permissibly on the property, such as guests of tenants. Thus, defendant was not “parked at an establishment around which criminal activity was known to occur” … . Further, the officers observed defendant momentary idling in a vehicle in a publicly accessible parking lot on a summer evening outside a residential apartment complex … , not “in a private space restricted by signage and a lock” … . Thus, nothing in the officers’ observation of defendant’s conduct, even considered in light of the assertions in the trespass affidavit, “provided a particularized reason to request information” … . People v Robinson, 2026 NY Slip Op 01693, Fourth Dept 3-20-26

Practice Point: Here the police did not have a “particularized reason” for approaching defendant’s parked car near an apartment complex. The facts that (1) the defendant was parked in a high crime area and (2) an apartment-complex property manager had filed a “trespass affidavit” with the police was not enough to allow the police to approach the defendant to request information.

 

, , ,

A HOSPITAL HAS A DUTY TO RETAIN AN INTOXICATED PATIENT WHO HAS BEEN ADMITTED INVOLUNTARILY PURSUANT TO THE MENTAL HYGIENE LAW IF THE PATIENT IS INCAPACITATED TO A DEGREE THERE WAS A LIKELIHOOD OF HARM TO THE PATIENT OR OTHERS (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined there was a question of fact whether defendant hospital breached its duty to retain the decedent for emergency treatment because decedent was incapacitated by alcohol to a degree there was a likelihood of harm to decedent or others:

A hospital does not owe an intoxicated patient, who went to the hospital voluntarily, a duty to prevent that patient from leaving the hospital against medical advice even when that patient has been admitted to the hospital for medical treatment … . By contrast, however, the decedent here was admitted involuntarily (see Mental Hygiene Law former § 22.09 [e]). Defendant therefore had a duty to retain decedent for emergency treatment if decedent was incapacitated by alcohol or substances to such a degree that there was a likelihood to result in harm to decedent or others, as those terms are defined under Mental Hygiene Law former § 22.09 … .

Assuming, arguendo, that defendant met its burden of demonstrating that it did not breach its duty to ensure that decedent was no longer incapacitated to the degree that there was a likelihood to result in harm to decedent or others, we conclude that plaintiff raised an issue of fact. Plaintiff’s expert opined that, under the circumstances and “especially in such proximity to the events that occurred in the hospital in the hours prior to discharge,” it was a breach of the standard of care to allow decedent to be discharged … . Guadagno v Erie County Med. Ctr. Corp., 2026 NY Slip Op 01698, Fourth Dept 3-20-26

Practice Point: A hospital has a duty to retain an intoxicated patient who has been admitted involuntarily if the patient is incapacitated to a degree there is a likelihood of harm to the patient or others. That duty is not triggered by an intoxicated patient who went to the hospital voluntarily.

 

,

MOTHER’S MENTAL ILLNESS AND HER REQUEST FOR RESPITE CARE BECAUSE SHE WAS OVERWHELMED DID NOT SUPPORT A NEGLECT FINDING; THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF AN IMMINENT RISK TO THE CHILDREN (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Family Court, determined the evidence of mother’s mental illness did not support the finding that she neglected the children:

The court’s determination that the mother neglected the subject children was not supported by a preponderance of the evidence … . Neglect occurs when a child’s “physical, mental or emotional condition has been impaired or is in imminent danger of becoming impaired” as the result of the parent’s failure to “exercise a minimum degree of care” (Family Ct Act § 1012 [f][i]). “While parental neglect may be based on mental illness, proof of a parent’s mental illness alone will not support a finding of neglect, unless it is shown that the parent’s condition resulted in imminent danger to the child” … .

Although the mother testified that she was diagnosed with anxiety and depression, the record does not support a finding of “a link or causal connection” between the mother’s diagnoses and any impairment or imminent danger of impairment to the children … . The sole evidence of actual impairment was a burn on one of the children, and the uncontroverted testimonial and documentary evidence establish that the injury was accidental and that the mother provided care … .

Further, petitioner failed to establish how the mother’s mental health diagnoses caused the children to be in imminent danger of being impaired. The mother openly acknowledged her mental health diagnoses and treatment … . The record demonstrates that the mother was at all relevant times under the care of a psychiatrist and was compliant with the psychiatrist’s prescribed medications. ….

The mother’s request for respite care was also not a proper basis for finding imminent risk. … [S]he was feeling overwhelmed with caring for her three children and was unwilling or unable to care for and supervise them any longer. The miscellaneous information section states that the mother said she did not want her children any longer and wanted ACS to take them … because she was feeling overwhelmed. … The mother explicitly testified that she was not afraid she would “do something” to hurt her children or herself. Matter of Ja.W., 2026 NY Slip Op 01623, First Dept 3-19-26

Practice Point: Here there no evidence that mother presented an imminent risk of impairment to her children. Mother’s acknowledged mental illness, for which she was receiving treatment, and her request for respite care because she was feeling overwhelmed did not amount to neglect.

 

,

THE ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT’S PRIOR POSSESSION OF DRUGS TO PROVE CONSTRUCTIVE POSSESSION OF DRUGS FOUND IN A SHARED APARTMENT WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR; THE PRIOR POSSESSION CONVICTION STEMMED FROM DRUGS FOUND IN DEFENDANT’S VEHICLE, TWO YEARS BEFORE; THEREFORE THE PRIOR CRIME WAS NOT LOGICALLY CONNECTED TO ANY ISSUE IN THE CASE; THE EVIDENCE WAS ERRONEOUSLY ADMITTED SOLELY TO PROVE DEFENDANT’S PROPENSITY TO POSSESS DRUGS (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, reversing the Appellate Division, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Troutman, over a three-judge dissent, determined the evidence of defendant’s prior possession of drugs found in his vehicle two years before was erroneously admitted to prove defendant’s constructive possession of drugs found in a shared apartment:

Generally, evidence of a defendant’s prior possession of drugs is inadmissible at trial to show their intent to sell drugs or knowing possession of drugs on another occasion … . This follows from our longstanding Molineux rule, which provides that “evidence of a defendant’s uncharged crimes or prior misconduct is not admissible if it cannot logically be connected to some specific material issue in the case, and tends only to demonstrate the defendant’s propensity to commit the crime charged” … . When evidence of prior uncharged crimes or misconduct is logically connected to some specific material issue in the case—such as intent, motive, knowledge, common scheme or plan, or identity of the defendant—the evidence falls under an exception to the Molineux rule, and a court may admit the evidence if its probative value outweighs its potential for prejudice to the defendant … .

Here, because the People’s evidence of a prior incident involving defendant’s possession of drugs was not logically connected to any specific material issue in this drug possession case, apart from defendant’s propensity for possessing drugs, the trial court erred in admitting that evidence. Inasmuch as this error was not harmless, we reverse and remit for defendant to receive a new trial. * * *

The main issue at trial was whether defendant had constructive or knowing possession of the contraband distributed throughout three rooms in the apartment. We agree with the dissenting Justices below that defendant’s possession of cocaine in his car in 2017 was not relevant to that issue. The two incidents involved different locations, different circumstances, different theories of possession, and took place around two years apart. People v Henderson, 2026 NY Slip Op 01627, CtApp 3-19-26

Practice Point: Here defendant’s conviction for possession of drugs found in his vehicle was admitted to prove he had constructive possession of drugs found in a shared apartment two years later. Because the prior crime evidence was not connected to any issue in the case on trial other than defendant’s propensity to possess drugs, it was reversible error to admit it.

 

, , ,

TWO PEOPLE WERE SHOT IN A DRIVE-BY SHOOTING; DEFENDANT, IN THE PLEA ALLOCUTIONS, DID NOT ADMIT TO FIRING SEPARATELY AT EACH VICTIM; THEREFORE THE PEOPLE DID NOT MEET THEIR BURDEN TO SHOW THE COMMISSION OF TWO DISTINCT CRIMES; CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES COULD NOT BE IMPOSED (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, affirming the Appellate Division, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Rivera, over a two-judge dissent, determined the prosecutor did not demonstrate that the two victims of this drive-by shooting were struck by different bullets fired separately at each, causing separate injuries to each. Therefore the judge could not impose consecutive sentences. The court noted that this issue need be preserved for appeal:​

… [T]he prosecutor should have been aware at the time of the plea, based on our unambiguous caselaw, that they had the burden of ensuring defendant allocuted to sufficient facts to establish that he separately shot at the two victims or that the victims were injured by separate bullets, in order for consecutive sentencing to be legally authorized. But because the prosecutor failed to satisfy their burden and place on the record the alleged “separate and distinct” acts underlying the two crimes … , the trial court had no legal authority to impose consecutive sentences in this case. People v Sabb, 2026 NY Slip Op 01590, CtApp 3-19-26

Practice Point: Here the defendant was never asked during the plea allocutions whether he fired two shots separately injuring the two victims. Therefore the People did not meet their burden to prove the commission of two separate crimes and consecutive sentences could not be imposed.

 

, ,

THE ACT OF SIMPLE POSSESSSION OF A WEAPON WAS COMPLETE BEFORE THE WEAPON WAS USED TO SHOOT THE VICTIM DURING A ROBBERY; THEREFORE, DESPITE THE OVERLAP OF THE ELEMENTS OF SIMPLE POSSESSION OF A WEAPON AND THE ELEMENTS OF FELONY MURDER AND ROBBERY, CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES WERE PROPERLY IMPOSED (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Garcia, affirming the Appellate Division, determined the sentence for simple possession of a weapon was properly imposed to run consecutively to the concurrent sentences for felony murder and robbery:

Penal Law § 70.25 (2) governs consecutive sentencing, providing that “[w]hen more than one sentence of imprisonment is imposed on a person for two or more offenses committed through a single act or omission, or through an act or omission which in itself constituted one of the offenses and also was a material element of the other, the sentences . . . must run concurrently.” Otherwise, the decision to impose consecutive sentences is a matter of discretion; the statute provides that “when multiple sentences of imprisonment are imposed on a person at the same time . . . the sentence or sentences imposed by the court shall run either concurrently or consecutively . . . in such manner as the court directs at the time of sentence” … .

To determine whether consecutive sentences are permitted, a sentencing court must first examine the statutory elements of the crimes and determine whether those elements overlap “under either prong” of Penal Law § 70.25 (2) and, if they do, “the People may yet establish the legality of consecutive sentencing by showing that the ‘acts or omissions’ committed by defendant were separate and distinct acts” … . That is, where sufficient evidence of separate and distinct acts is presented by the People, “consecutive sentences are possible regardless of whether the statutory elements of the offenses overlap” … .

… [T]he convictions at issue here have overlapping material elements. * * * Whatever the overlap, however, we conclude that the People met their burden of establishing that the defendant’s acts here were separate and distinct and therefore the consecutive sentences imposed were legal.

The People demonstrated that defendant’s possession of the gun in violation of Penal Law § 265.03 (3) was an act distinct from the commission of the robbery. Defendant obtained the gun, at minimum, more than one hour before the robbery, carried it across approximately 15 city blocks, and placed it under a bed in a co-conspirator’s home for “a little while” before eventually retrieving the gun and walking over to the intended victim’s building. Evidence that defendant obtained the gun and then used it to commit the substantive crime provided a sufficient basis for the sentencing judge to impose consecutive sentences. … ” ‘[t]he evidence clearly established that defendant was carrying the weapon at the time he encountered and shot the victim,’ ” and therefore ” ‘the act of possession was complete before the shooting, and consecutive sentences were authorized by’ ” the statute … . People v Billups, 2026 NY Slip Op 01589, CtApp 3-19-26

Practice Point: Consult this opinion for insight into when a judge may impose consecutive sentences despite an overlap of the elements of the crimes.

 

, ,

THE JURY’S CONCLUSION THAT THE BURGLARY VICTIM SUFFERED “PHYSICAL INJURY” WAS AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE; THE ONLY EVIDENCE WAS THE VICTIM’S TESTIMONY HE SUFFERED PAIN AT 6 ON A SCALE OF 1 TO 10 (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, vacating defendant’s burglary convictions, applying a weight-of-the-evidence analysis, determined the proof the victim suffered “physical injury,” an element of the offenses, was insufficient:

The evidence, properly weighed, does not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim sustained a physical injury … . Although the victim testified that he suffered pain as high as 6 on a scale of 1 to 10, he also testified that he was “in a little pain. Wasn’t much pain, but [he] was in pain.” There were no photographs of the victim’s injury and the victim testified that he never requested medical attention. Therefore, under the circumstances of this case, the verdict finding the defendant guilty of burglary in the first degree under Penal Law § 140.30 and burglary in the second degree under Penal Law § 140.25(1)(b), based solely upon the victim’s subjective testimony, was against the weight of the credible evidence … . People v Carroll, 2026 NY Slip Op 01528, Second Dept 3-18-26

Practice Point: A burglary victim’s testimony that he suffered pain at 6 on a scale of 1 to 10 did not support the jury’s finding that the victim suffered “physical injury” under a weight-of-the-evidence analysis by the appellate court.​

 

, , ,

THE MEDICAL RECORDS PROVIDED DEFENDANT HOSPITAL WITH TIMELY NOTICE OF THE FACTS UNDERLYING THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CAUSE OF ACTION; THEREFORE PLAINTIFF’S APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s application for leave to file a late notice of claim in this medical malpractice action should have been granted. The medical records provided the defendant hospital with sufficient timely notice of the cause of action:

“Merely having or creating hospital records, without more, does not establish actual knowledge of a potential injury where the records do not evince that the medical staff, by its acts or omissions, inflicted any injury” … . “Where the alleged malpractice is apparent from an independent review of the medical records, those records constitute ‘actual knowledge of the facts constituting the claim'” … .

Here, in support of his motion, the plaintiff submitted, inter alia, medical records and an affidavit of a physician who reviewed the records and concluded that there had been a departure from accepted medical practice … . Inasmuch as the medical records, upon independent review, suggested injury attributable to medical malpractice, the medical records provided the defendant with actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim … . Kazeem v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp. (Queens Hosp. Center), 2026 NY Slip Op 01497, Second Dept 3-18-26

Practice Point: The medical records themselves can be deemed to have provided a defendant hospital with timely notice of the facts underlying a medical malpractice action such that an application for leave to file a late notice of claim should be granted.

 

, , ,

DEFENDANT FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE PLAINTIFF RECEIVED AND REVIEWED THE “TERMS AND CONDITIONS” ADDENDUM TO THE CONTRACT WHICH INCLUDED THE ARBITRATION CLAUSE; DEFENDANT’S EFFORT TO COMPEL ARBITRATION DENIED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Higgitt, determined the defendant energy company did not demonstrate plaintiff agreed to an arbitration clause which defendant claimed was included in a four-page “Terms and Conditions” addendum to the contract. Essentially plaintiffs argued they were never provided with the four-page “Terms and Conditions.” Defendant relied on weak and contradictory evidence to the contrary, some of which was provided for the first time in a reply document (generally not considered by a motion court):

As a procedural matter, defendant could not employ its reply to remedy a basic deficiency in its prima facie showing … . After all, defendant’s theory of actual notice rested on its sales representative’s adherence to a business practice and defendant was unable to establish, in its underlying submission, the actual relevant practice (if any) that [the sales representative] used.

As a substantive matter, the inconsistent factual presentation between defendant’s underlying submission and its reply submission leaves a void on the critical question of what documents were reviewed with [plaintiff], undermining defendant’s contention that a particular business practice was employed and followed such that [plaintiff] received actual notice of the arbitration provision. Knight v Family Energy Inc., 2026 NY Slip Op 01599, First Dept 3-17-26

 

,

THE STREET STOP OF DEFENDANT WAS INVALID UNDER BOTH THE US SUPREME COURT’S “HILL VS CALIFORNIA” “MISTAKEN ARREST” CRITERIA AND THE NYS “DEBOUR” STREET STOP CRITERIA; THE WEAPON DISCARDED BY DEFENDANT AS HE FLED SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, reversing the Appellate Division, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Halligan, over a three-judge dissent, determined the parole investigators did not have “reasonable suspicion” that the defendant was in fact the parole absconder for whom they had a warrant when they pulled along side the defendant on the street in an unmarked car. The parole investigators wore civilian clothes. The defendant, who was not the parole absconder, ran and threw away a firearm. He ultimately pled guilty to attempted criminal possession of a firearm. The defendant was wearing a ski mask so the investigators could not see his face when they pulled along side of him:

Supreme Court denied suppression, applying a rule for mistaken arrests derived from the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Hill v California (401 US 797 [1971]). The court credited the testimony of the investigator and his partner and held that the defendant’s physical similarities with the absconder, coupled with his “immediate” flight upon being approached, supported the officers’ reasonable belief that the defendant was the target of their warrant. * * *

The defendant and the People disagree about whether we should evaluate the investigators’ pursuit and arrest under De Bour or Hill. * * *

We need not decide which of the tests should control, because in this scenario we do not perceive a meaningful difference between Hill’s requirement of a reasonable mistaken belief and De Bour’s level three standard of reasonable suspicion. … Under Hill, the arresting officer must provide “reasonable, articulable grounds to believe that the suspect is the intended arrestee” … . By the same token, our De Bour caselaw specifies that reasonable suspicion requires an officer to point to “specific and articulable facts which, along with any logical deductions, reasonably prompted th[e] intrusion” … . Thus, when it comes to evaluating this particular scenario, the tests essentially ask the same question: whether the totality of the circumstances, including the defendant’s appearance and any additional observations about their behavior, justifies the resulting police-citizen encounter.  * * *

Nothing in the record here demonstrates that the defendant could have known that he was fleeing from law enforcement. People v Jones, 2026 NY Slip Op 01447, CtApp 3-17-26

Practice Point: Here the US Supreme Court’s “mistaken arrest” criteria for a valid street stop and the NYS “Debour” criteria for a valid street stop required the same level of “reasonable suspicion.”

 

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy