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THE DEFENDANT DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO MOVE TO SUPPRESS THE GUN FOUND UNDER HIS SEAT IN THE CAR; THE PEOPLE DID NOT RELY ON THE STATUTORY PRESUMPTION THAT THE OCCUPANTS OF A CAR POSSESS CONTRABAND IN THE CAR; RATHER THE PEOPLE RELIED ON THE TESTIMONY OF A POLICE OFFICER WHO SAW DEFENDANT PLACE AN OBJECT UNDER HIS SEAT; AFTER DEFENDANT GOT OUT OF THE CAR, THE BARREL OF THE GUN WAS IN PLAIN VIEW (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant’s motion to suppress a weapon seized from a car in which defendant was a passenger should not have been granted. Defendant, who had no possessory interest in the car, did not have standing to contest the search of the car. The People did not rely on the statutory presumption that the occupants of a car possess contraband in the car. Rather, the People relied on the testimony of an officer who saw the defendant put an object under his seat. The barrel of the seized gun was in plain view:

A vehicle passenger with no ownership or possessory interest in the vehicle does not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in its interior … . As a result, a passenger in a car who is not charged with possession of a weapon or drugs under a statutory presumption (see Penal Law § 265.15[3] …) has no standing to challenge the search of the vehicle once it has been lawfully stopped … . Here, the People did not rely on the statutory presumption of possession but instead relied on the direct observations of a police detective. Specifically, the police detective testified at the suppression hearing that, during the initial stop of the vehicle in which the defendant was a passenger, the detective observed the defendant reach between his legs and place something under his seat. After the defendant had been removed from the vehicle, the detective looked through the windshield and saw, underneath the front passenger seat in the area where he had seen the defendant place something, the front of the barrel of a gun in plain view. Because the People relied on that testimony rather than any statutory presumption to establish possession of the gun, the defendant did not have standing to challenge the search of the vehicle in which he was a passenger and had no ownership interest … . Moreover, the defendant does not challenge the legality of the vehicular stop, which, in any event, was found by the court to have been lawful—a determination that may not be reviewed on this appeal (see CPL 470.15[1] …). Accordingly, the defendant failed to establish his standing to challenge the search of the vehicle and the seizure of the gun … . People v Knight, 2025 NY Slip Op 04736, Second Deppt 8-20-25

Practice Point: A passenger in a car who has no ownership or possessory interest in the car does not have standing to contest the search of the car unless the People rely on the statutory presumption, i.e., the occupants of a car possess contraband in the car. Here the People relied on testimony from an officer who saw the defendant put an object on the floor of the car under his seat and the barrel of the gun was in plain view. The defendant had no ownership or possessory interest in the car. The People did not rely on the statutory presumption. So defendant did not have standing move to contest the search of the car.

 

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